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 ABSTRACT 
Political Economy of Late Industrialization in High Tech: 
Politics, Policy, and Innovation in the Korean Aircraft Manufacturing Sector 
The study intends to review the prospects of bolstering sectoral capacities in East Asian developmental 
states over the course of building institutional infrastructure in highly complex technological products 
with a focus on aircraft manufacturing. In the case of the late industrialization process of East Asian 
catch-up economies, theory revealed the astonishing economic performances that arouse from 
established institutional arrangements, which were engendered unique towards the country’s 
idiosyncratic political attributions. Leaving behind the glorious economic achievements of late 
industrialization, however, East Asian developmental states have been struggling in its attempts of 
enhancing sectoral competitive capacities into intensely science based areas of highly advanced 
technological fields. 
Industrial upgrading has been the talk of the town the past few decades in Korea, as the fast 
following sectors in technology catch-up started to foresee the stalling growth patterns emerging across 
its economic sphere. In order to grasp the growing economic potentials of high tech advanced products 
such as in aircraft-manufacturing, the national innovation systems of Korea attempted to accommodate 
emerging developmental challenges through established institutional arrangements in R&D, production, 
and industrial competition structures, which once proven its effectiveness during the earlier days of 
rapid industrialization. Over the process of industrially upgrading into these knowledge-based capital 
intensive sectors, the domestic institutional arrangements, in association with external international 
conditions, which facilitated achievements in fast economic catch-up, have turned cumbersome in terms 
of transitioning the country’s innovation system adaptive enough to accommodate the more complex 
technological challenges. Vertical stovepipes streamlined towards state driven economic development 
policies have somewhat become obsolete as the institutional construct, shaped attune to the processes 
of late industrialization, has exhibited incompetence over regulating spontaneously grown sectoral firm 
based capacities and competitiveness in advanced technological manufacturing fields. Thus, the 
inherent developmental complexities unfolding in a highly technological Schumpeterian Mark II sector 
increasingly present convoluted challenges against established institutions of the national innovation 
systems. The situation materialized ostensibly evident in the Chaebol dominated industrial composition 
of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector where government competition policies did not perform 
well enough to fulfill the developmental aspirations of aircraft manufacturing. The proposed framework 
of analysis for this study attempts to accommodate relevant contemporary theories made known from a 
bundle of innovation studies, which include the theories of national innovation systems, varieties of 
capitalism, developmental state, and complex product systems. The theory illuminates the sectoral 
innovation systems demonstrated from the technological regimes of the Schumpeterian Mark II sectors, 
of which translates into the situation of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector. In this regard, the 
  
proposed analytical framework developed from these point of views highlights the role of coordinative 
mechanisms that interconnects national-regional-sectoral levels of innovation over a chosen high 
technology sector. The absorptive capacities of key actors and diffusion mechanisms of established 
institutions constitute the major analytical point of this coordinative mechanism.  
The main argument of the study asserts the need to effectively build cross sectoral coordinative 
mechanisms throughout the national, regional, and sectoral level of analysis, while exerting concerted 
efforts to overcome the multiple layers of hurdles against late entrants into technologically complex 
business areas. Consequently, regarding an attainable solution for Korea successful accession into 
highly technological sectors, the paper necessitates the transitional efforts of transforming a rigid state-
led innovation system into a spontaneously integrated coordinative institutional structure, which 
accommodates a broad spectrum of absorptive capacities and diffusion mechanisms tailored for 
developing complex product systems.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Jae was once a promising athlete in his college soccer team. Although he started the sport late in his 
high school year after being handpicked into the team by the school head coach, he rapidly improved 
his skills and performances based on the substantial support provided by the school and his team mates. 
Superior in physical conditions, standing nearly six feet tall with an exceptionally flexible and agile 
footwork, Jae dominated the high school division leagues, which earned him a soccer scholarship into 
college.  
After leaving behind the accolades of his varsity team glories, Jae was drafted with a second 
overall pick into a renowned professional soccer team. His performances in the league, however, came 
in a little shy from the high expectations as a first class player. The game plan turned more complex 
than the college division leagues. After five years into professional soccer, he was compelled to 
understand the nature of the games the hard way in a sense that the professional leagues applied different 
rule sets and customary practices from amateur high school leagues. Jae noticed he did not obtain the 
requisite skills to dribble the ball against a sturdy defense line. He did not have the wide viewpoint of 
observing the field as to where to effectively pass the ball. Jae was used to playing comfortable games 
where he simply positioned himself nearby the goal while his team mates from college and high school 
laboriously passed him the ball to score goals. Jae could no longer rely on the old way of playing games 
he used to play, at which he now had to set the conditions of the game for his team mates and himself. 
Competition was intense, not only against adversary teams, but also within the team itself, contesting 
against multiple players over certain team positions. Hence, Jae was placed in a predicament in terms 
of adapting into the new set of governing norms and regulations of professional soccer. His late entrance 
into the sports and biased team tactics once given him the fame and glory in the lower leagues of the 
sport, but became no longer valid in the professional leagues. The earlier set of rules in high school and 
college shaped Jae’s performing skills mediocre in rating compared to other players in the professional 
league, which mean he came to play the sport without possessing the basic preconditions of becoming 
a competent soccer player. And these skills are not what someone can build-up overnight. How can Jae 
overcome the quagmire of this transition and successfully establish his reputation in the league? 
This is a situation commonly experienced by East Asian late industrializing countries at the 
moment of attempting to transition into higher value added technological sectors. The relative economic 
backwardness supported by a powerful state-influenced market economy has enabled Asian 
developmental states to rapidly catch-up technologically with its contemporary industrial competitors. 
The institutional composition of these countries, arranged in a way that uniquely reflected the respective 
national idiosyncrasies of its innovation system, have engendered the developmental engine to outpace 
its Western European and American forerunners in economic growth rates and technological 
achievements, primarily concentrated in consumer products and relatively low-profiled industrial 
commodities. The dazzling accomplishments in electronics, automobiles, shipbuilding, and so forth, 
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exemplify the way how specific institutional compositions in government driven economic planning, 
associated with selective state-business relationships, assisted by the streams of international trade 
conditions, resulted in what the contemporaries label as the ‘East Asian Miracle’. However, as the 
competitive circumstances change, triggered by the emergence of rapidly modernizing developmental 
states from other parts of the world, mainly China and the periphery Southeast Asian economies, have 
swiftly taken over the comparative advantages in the traditional sectors where East Asian 
developmental states performed strong influence in the global market. In this regard, countries like 
Korea and Taiwan have been striving to move up into the domain of high tech sectors such as 
biotechnology, aerospace, robotics and artificial intelligence, etc., where the platforms are connected 
into a cascade of interconnected systems that constitute a complex manufacturing structure of 
networked products. The gaming rules substantially differ from the playing grounds where East Asian 
developmental states excelled. This new domain demands a high degree of mastery over the distinctive 
characteristics of nonlinearity, intuitive regulations, adaptive behaviors, and feedback loops, at which 
the role of the state becomes marginalized and market mechanism strongly relies on the spontaneous 
order of the interconnected structure of the national innovation system. Respectfully, the once successful 
East Asian developmental states have shown difficulties in penetrating into this domain. The existing 
institutions that once celebrated success and prosperity have now turned obsolete. Thus the idea of 
innovating these customary industrial arrangements into a socio-economic structure effectively adaptive 
to the new technological challenges has presented a puzzling problem to these countries. 
Innovation is a pervasive term that encompasses the ideas of progressiveness and change. The 
lifecycle of a firm, organization, or country is highly dependent on how these entities adequately 
respond to exogenous, if not endogenous, changes, hence institutional flexibility to adopt innovation. 
However, there are instances shown through history that represent certain characteristics of an 
institution showing favorable terms for innovative ideas. On the contrary there also exist elements that 
function as stumbling blocks in accepting the incoming waves of innovative changes. No one hardly 
imagined a half century ago that a war torn society like Korea with the world’s highest illiteracy rates 
and lowest per capita income would become a rising global economic powerhouse that produces high-
tech commercial products in addition to illustrious cultural fascinations. Nonetheless, history frequently 
shows the ebb and flow of these occasions which still continues even now. A number of evidence show 
that institutional factors contribute in large part to innovative changes.  
Innovation is often used in mixed terms with inventions, whereby inventions are generally used 
as expressing “newness” of technology or other conceptual figures, whereas innovation is termed as 
expressing the “process” or “adaptive implementations” of inventions.1 For instance, the idea of a 
helicopter that was first conceived by Leonardo Da Vinci in the medieval period was nothing less but 
an “idea” at that time; the lack of materials, engineering job skills, accumulated knowledge in 
                                                          
1 Jan Fagerberg, “Innovation, a guide to the literature,” in Fagerbrg, Mowey, and Nelson, Oxford Handbook of Innovation, 
p. 5 
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aerodynamics, power engines, etc., lingers the illusiveness of these images in the domain of imaginative 
fantasies. It was not until the modern era after the industrial revolution and the conceptual illustration 
of flying transformed into reality science in mainstream aeronautics and dynamics that enabled the 
engineering of the helicopter. In this regard, the appropriations of innovation are contingent upon the 
maturity of systems that supports the full implementation of these new innovative ideas into physically 
real figures. Here, we see the need to define the scope and role of the governing systems that materializes 
these new inventions into commercial commodities. The arrangement of these systems, or in other 
words institutions, normally come analogous with norms and values that are materialized in legal 
systems, informal rules, or common knowledge acquired by actors through history and culture of a 
group, society, and nation. The widely acclaimed institutions of the developed world are those that 
revolve around the market economy, hence different forms of capitalism showing different institutional 
tendencies toward innovation. In this aspect, different governance systems of market capitalism 
determine the various customs of innovation.  
The case of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector is evidence to this line of thinking. The 
aircraft-manufacturing sector is commonly labeled as a high tech profession that incorporates a system 
of complexity, or complex product systems (CoPS), such as aeronautical dynamics, avionics and 
armaments, intricate networks of radio-navigation, and so forth. In this matter, the Korean aircraft-
manufacturing sector is considered a wonderful subject to study the advantages and disadvantages of 
technological innovation regimes both in the public and private spectrum. The industry has been 
supported by various policy incentives and given preferential treatment under numerous government 
contracts, but the qualitative scale in technological development trends has remained slow, if not 
stagnant, after reviewing the achievements shown from the progression of major development programs. 
Instead of striving for a highly competitive stature through relentless efforts of innovation, the industry 
has become lopsided in a domestic cutthroat competition against each other. Nonetheless, the 
government continues to announce ambitious military projects with overly optimistic forecasts with 
hopefuls for accompanying substantial trickle down effects, aka spinoffs, into other business sectors, 
whereas the flagrant reality signifies unimpressive innovative accomplishments.  
In a comparative point of view, the Korean aircraft industry has been placed far lower in 
competitiveness against its overseas contenders, coming 17th in place internationally behind Taiwan 
and Brazil. Already in the late 1980s and 1990s, both Taiwan and Brazil successfully accomplished 
indigenous production of its own fighters or commercial airliners, whereas the Korean aircraft industry 
to date has not been able to come in pair with the aircraft-manufacturing sectors of these two countries. 
Even compared to other domestic business sectors such as automobiles, shipbuilding, and consumer 
electronics, the accomplishments of the aircraft-manufacturing sector have not shown much impressive 
performances. Was the government policy wrong in the first place or was it the industry’s reluctance to 
adaptively transform into necessary competitive dispositions? Even now, though the sector is positioned 
in a critical juncture to replace its primary fighter jet, which appeared evident in the bidding process of 
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the Air Force’s Future Fighter Experiment (F-X) program and the Korea Fighter Experiment (KFX) 
program, spectators constantly witnessed the absence of a strategic vision and systematic efforts that 
synchronizes a construct for technological innovation. I had the opportunity to routinely deal with these 
challenges in the aircraft industry throughout my professional career and found it a pity to see honest 
and sincere developmental efforts and valuable resources, both national and corporate, became buried 
under the debris of domestic politics and sectoral inertial resistance. Thus, the landscape of the Korean 
aircraft manufacturing sector replicates the analogy of the gazelles from the ‘Red Queen’. 
The national innovation systems for late industrialized countries currently confront inherent 
challenges in sustained development and industrial upgrading. Especially for industrially fast following 
countries like Korea that went through a process of rapid economic catch-up and technological 
development, now finds its place on top of the S-shaped learning curve while faces sluggish growth 
rates in the midst of institutional hurdles when entering into the high tech domain of complex product 
systems. The country’s institutional arrangements and organizational setting that were considered 
suitable for technology imitation during the fast-paced economic development phase have now turned 
obsolete and are in dire need of substantial repair and overhaul in order to keep up with rapidly 
transformative competitive circumstances in the course of sustaining innovation momentums 
experienced throughout all technological dimensions. Hence, the old Schumpeterian business cycles of 
‘creative destruction’ for achieving ‘technology innovation’ for ‘economic growth’ come into being. 
However, the reform efforts, under the vernaculars of ‘creative destruction’, are hindered by stove-piped 
bureaucratic inefficiencies that obstruct the mechanisms of interagency coordination and technology 
innovation. State-business relations represented by crony capitalism that once generated the economic 
growth engine for some East Asian developmental states have grown out of proportion and 
demonstrated intrinsic limitations in integrating and exploiting innovative opportunities. Hence, the 
developmental state theory that once swept the literature of development economics and East Asian 
political economy requires some reconstruction work. 
The challenges of national innovation systems in the aspects of state-business relations and 
national science and technology authorities appear obvious within the distributed architecture of defense 
acquisition systems. The defense industry and weapon system procurement apparatus are deeply 
influenced by government policies and bureaucratic dynamics. The South Korean aerospace and 
defense sector perfectly fits into this framework. The government nurtured the defense industry through 
large amounts of subsidies and technological assistance, which enabled the defense sector to grow in 
size and scope. As the defense sector reached its pinnacle in industrial catch-up, the issue of 
technologically upgrading the industrial capabilities to more complex weapon systems has become 
complicated. The state can no longer lead the way in industrial development and upgrading where at 
some point it became the obstacle in itself against innovation. Organizational inertia and restrictive 
bureaucracies have made it difficult to share critical knowledge and diffuse technology between major 
stakeholders throughout the total life cycle management system of defense products and systems. In 
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this regard, the Korean integrated defense acquisition management architecture has come to a point 
where it is rated as a technical sector that marginally contributes to the domestic economy. 
This study seeks to tackle some of the implicit restraints of state capitalism against late 
industrialized catch-up economies attempting to enter the high tech domain by using the Korean 
aircraft-manufacturing sector as a case study. The theme of this study derived from the following two 
elements. 
 
1) Where does the theory of developmental states stand in the innovation discourse? 
• National Innovation Systems perspective 
• Varieties of Capitalism perspective 
• Firm based theories (CoPS) vs. Statist theories (Catch-up Economies) 
2) What challenges confront developmental states in technology and industrial upgrading? 
• Domestic institutional factors 
• International systemic factors 
• Inherent technological factors 
 
The study intends to critique and answer the research questions further developed from these 
two motivations in regards to the institutional aspects reflected in the given analytical framework. In 
this respect, this study intends to focus on the institutional elements of innovation, especially on the 
aspects of adopting new technological developments, and strives to answer the following questions; 
how technological innovation permeates institutions; what are the optimal conditions for institutions to 
become adaptive to technological innovation; How do these innovative elements in the micro-level 
become viral and evolve into the macro-level, henceforth the formulation of national systems of 
innovation. The main scope of innovation covered in this paper is limited to technology and the 
institutional aspects how these innovations occur within the national systems of innovation. 
 
1) Evolution of the developmental state theory. 
• Shortcomings in technology upgrade 
• Changing role of the state in evolutionary aspects 
2) Contributing dynamics of institutions to the diffusion of innovations. 
• Role of national innovation systems 
• Interactions with market mechanisms 
3) Characteristics of Schumpeterian Mark II sectors in aerospace and defense. 
• Changing patterns of global aerospace and defense value chain 
• Adaptive transition for developmental states 
4) Evolution of state-business relations and consequences to the innovative performances of the 
Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector. 
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• National R&D policy and technology commercialization 
• Corporate strategies under the context of national strategic interests 
5) Disruptive causes that impacted on the innovation trajectory of the Korean aircraft-
manufacturing sector. 
• Domestic structure vs. international systemic 
 
In chapter two, the study reviews the literature of state driven economic policies that include 
the typologies of national innovation systems, complex product systems, comparative studies of 
capitalist regimes, and the developmental state theory. It reviews two layers of analysis as part of 
supplementing the comparative debate between National Innovation Systems, Varieties of Capitalism, 
and Developmental State theory. One layer that adds to this debate is the general theory of innovation 
networks that reviews the connectivity between S&T capacities, market mechanism, institutions, and 
public policy. The second layer presents additional thoughts on the ever evolving high-tech sector and 
the correlative aspects towards existing institutions, which is represented by the analytics adopted from 
Complex Product Systems (CoPS). 
The third chapter provides an overall review of the global aerospace and defense sector. The 
chapter mainly follows the analytic framework laid out in Chapter two, which covers the innovation 
mechanisms over industry implementation within a global settlement. It then compares the 
technologically advanced industrial countries and the technologically emerging countries represented 
in Tier One and Tier Two industries by introducing the trends of the international aerospace industry 
and technological idiosyncrasies between first-tiered and second-tiered countries in this field. 
Chapter four surveys the national innovation systems of Korea, reviews the competitive 
elements in science and technology policies, and scrutinizes the critical linkages with the local industrial 
chain. It then extends this framework specifically into the defense sector and assesses the connectivity 
between the national S&T and defense S&T apparatus. 
Chapter five further investigates the framework in terms of how state sponsored institutions 
formed what is now the current shape of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector. The chapter 
constitutes one of the four main entry points of the dissertation regarding the institutional components 
for catching-up in the Korean aircraft industry. It outlines the historical aspects of the industry followed 
by reviewing the national innovation systems in science and engineering that constructs the essentials 
of the technological catch-up process. The chapter attempts to identify the reason behind the sluggish 
development trajectory of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector by surveying national level 
institutions and anchor tenets that connects the national systems with subnational actors. 
Chapter six reviews the regional level and sectoral level institutions within the national 
innovation construct of the aircraft-manufacturing sector. It attempts to survey connection points 
between regional capacity building efforts and national policy directives. It then proceeds into sectoral 
level innovation dynamics by illustrating the consolidation process of local aircraft-manufacturers in 
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the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and further efforts to sustain sectoral development and 
growth. 
The following two chapters are case studies of specific developmental trends in Korea’s effort 
in aircraft manufacturing. Chapter seven examines the thirty-year history of the fixed-wing sector by 
reviewing the chronologies of capacity building through domestic and international efforts. It then dives 
into the development case of the T-50 Golden Eagle Advanced Supersonic Jet Trainer and scrutinizes 
the success and limiting factors of the program based on the given analytical framework. 
Chapter eight extends the analysis from the previous fixed-wing case study, and further 
researches the rotor-wing sector as a separate branch of aircraft manufacturing, by reviewing the efforts 
to build-up capacity in rotorcraft manufacturing from the past thirty years of industry experience. It then 
reviews the Korea Utility Helicopter-Surion as a case study under the purview of the given analytical 
framework of national innovation systems and the role of state capitalism. 
The concluding chapter reviews the analytical framework and developmental history of the 
Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector and strives to pull out the theoretical limitations and the lessons 
learned in applying the framework into practical case studies. 
Before entering into the details of this study, I personally find it important to illuminate the 
general terminologies used in the text. When addressing the Korean aircraft industry, I use the term 
‘aircraft-manufacturing sector’ to avoid potential jargons of misinterpretation with other business 
sectors relevant to this line of business. The term ‘aircraft industry’ is often confused between the 
manufacturing business and the airborne transportation business. Some people use it interchangeably 
as a single comprehensive business area whereas others distinguish it with a clear definitive boundary. 
In the defense industrial area of expertise, the field is often termed as the aerospace and defense industry, 
that covers a wide range of industrial products involving the full spectrum of weapon systems 
development and manufacturing. Also within the advanced industrial countries, the field is referred to 
as the aerospace industry that covers both aircraft manufacturing and the space exploration enterprise. 
Whatsoever, neither of these terms fit well into second tiered catch-up economies, at which the main 
effort relies on engineering and manufacturing of aircraft products. In the case of Korea, domestic 
aircraft manufacturing efforts mostly fall under this category, where the field gives very limited 
accounts over the space exploration field. Also, the production of aircrafts considers a very narrowly 
focused domain that becomes troublesome terming it as an ‘industrial’ field. In this respect, this study 
entitles the domestic efforts in producing aircrafts as the ‘aircraft-manufacturing sector’, but will often 
refer to the area as the ‘aerospace industry’ when juxtaposing it with a global anecdote. 
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Chapter 2. Theory and Analytical Framework 
The world was astounded by the robust developmental achievements of the East Asian economies 
during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Japan and the four East Asian Tigers have demonstrated unprecedented 
state led performances in technological catch-up and industrial upgrading, captured in double digit 
economic growth rates in both scale and scope. However, starting from the mid-1990s, the long heralded 
achievements of East Asian economic development have stumbled into a stalemate, experiencing 
sluggish growth rates while struggling against apparent institutional challenges towards technological 
innovation. Thus, after reaching its peak on the S-curve, the institutional setting of developmental states 
that nurtured the rapid technological catch-up and industrial upgrading has somewhat turned obsolete, 
and to a certain extent, started to obstruct the competitive basis of the country’s national innovation 
systems. 
The study of national innovation systems and its supporting institutions traces a long tradition 
of interdisciplinary and comparative research between socio-economic components and politico-
economic activities. Most studies of different capitalist practices primarily focused on political 
compositions, therefore the way how institutions are arranged and the ensuing interaction with different 
entities of the society have constituted the focal point of the analysis. The socio-economic approach 
contributed by the rich literature of national innovation systems (NIS) accounts for the impact of varying 
national institutional constellations in the micro/macro level analysis onto divergent innovative 
effectiveness. 2  The politico-economic approach, highlighted by the advocates of the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) discourse, supplements the shortcomings of NIS theorists regarding institutional 
establishments whereby it further facilitates the incorporation of traditional institutional theory in the 
macro level of innovation studies.3 The intent of this chapter is to form an analytical framework in 
innovation studies through identifying a convergent point between the three main line of thinking, and 
attempts to apply this framework in a regionally focused undertaking on late industrialization and 
economic catch-up in East Asia. 
2.1. East Asian Capitalism, the Developmental State, and its Place in the Innovation 
Debate 
Innovation in late industrializing countries is considered more of a learning process, thus it is often 
termed industrial technology upgrading that follows the phased implementing sequences of learning-
imitation-adoption-adaptation, further leading into innovation in relative mastery and maturity of the 
                                                          
2 Edquist, Charles, Systems of Innovation: Perspectives and Challenges, in Fagerberg et. Al., The Oxford Handbook of 
Innovation, 2005, p. 188. 
3 Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, Doing Institutional Analysis: Implications for the Study of Innovations, Review of International 
Political Economy No. 7, 2000, p. 43. 
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subject area industrial field.4 Under this context, East Asian developmental states, pioneered by the 
early industrialization of Japan followed by the East Asian Tigers such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, have demonstrated an effective statist role in terms of strategic intervention into 
the market that enabled these economies to rapidly catch-up with the global standards of economic 
excellence. 
In this respect, developmental state theory refers to a pattern of state-led macroeconomic 
planning, which is often cited as state development capitalism most notably salient in the four East 
Asian countries stated above. The theory illuminates the rapid economic achievements in industrial 
sectors strategically chosen by the government – such as in relative low-tech sectors in regards to 
consumer electronics, shipbuilding, automobiles, ICT, etc., where the countries successfully earned the 
title of fast followers in par with advanced industrialized countries. The vibrant and dynamic 
intraregional industrial networks allowed a fluid transfusion of foreign investment and technology 
transfer opportunities. Industrial tools such as tariff barriers, export driven policies, centralized financial 
system, R&D subsidies and infrastructure development, etc., were factors that contributed towards 
maximizing national productivity. 5  In a technological sense, the East Asian relative economic 
backwardness, driven by strong nationalistic sentiments with perceived public aspirations of rapid 
industrialization to catch-up with Western industrialized countries, has motivated and facilitated the 
adoption of new technology and promoted further diffusion and exploitation of the subject technological 
field into industrial upgrading. Nowadays, the East Asian developmental states are more than ever 
technologically accomplished countries with proven competitiveness in the global economy and R&D 
networks. Representative characteristics of developmental states are strong state-level intervention in 
the market through the implementation of extensive regulatory market policies and the execution of 
state-led economic planning.6 These strong nationalistic motivations combined with aspirations to 
catch-up technologically are often coined as ‘technonationalism’, and was used as a slogan to solicit 
the backing of the public to support the country’s development excursions. It is a national ideology that 
weds the ideals of ‘rich nation strong army’ into the technological innovation process of indigenization-
diffusion-nurturance in order to become more self-reliant in its industrial setting as well as its national 
security establishments. Technonationalism initially promoted the diffusion of dual-use technology in 
terms of spin-off (conversion from military to commercial) or spin-on (from commercial to the 
military).7 
The combination of state capitalism, or big leadership roles, and the external advantages of 
late development, or second-mover advantages, spared East Asian developmental states from the 
                                                          
4 Eduardo B. Viotti, “National Learning Systems: A new approach on technical change in late industrializing economies and 
evidence from Brazil and South Korea,” Science, Technology and Innovation Discussion Paper No. 12, Center for 
International Development, Harvard University, 2001 
5 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, World Bank Policy Research Report, 1993, p. 46. 
6 Adrian Leftwich, “Developmental states, effective states, and poverty reduction: The primacy of politics,” UNRISD 
Project on Poverty Reduction and Policy Regimes, 2008, p. 10. 
7 Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation Strong Army 
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uncertainties and risks of first-order technological innovation, while facilitated the industrial technology 
upgrading process through effectively acquiring the requisite knowledge and skill base from its 
advanced industrial competitors. State-business relations were governed and controlled by elite 
technocrats in the government that were less subject to electoral politics under the guise of authoritarian 
leadership, thus the political system obtained relative liberty to plan and execute long-term economic 
policies with minimal disruption from other economic players such as corporations or labor unions.8 
The authoritarian regimes of East Asia have offered relative stability in domestic politics that 
empowered state technocrats with the political maneuvering capability necessary to execute state 
initiatives under a highly structured and competently staffed enforcement agency.9 Consequently, the 
hierarchy of technocratic bureaucracy facilitated consensus building within the vertical and horizontal 
structures of the government and promoted efficiency in policy making.10 Therefore, although most 
governments of East Asia had no ownership over private corporations, bureaucrats leveraged the market 
by strictly imposing control measures through ways of choosing and protecting national champions in 
selected industrial sectors with a focused export oriented policy supported by strong corporatist 
alliances between the state and corporate actors.11 As such, East Asian countries were able to rapidly 
mobilize national resources with a vested interest in economic growth and development rather than on 
redistribution of public wealth, which resulted in the making of the East Asian economic miracle, but 
also placed developmental states into laggards of social welfare that eventually hindered the progress 
into an egalitarian society in furtherance of promoting technological innovation. 
The financial institutions were mostly under strict regulatory control of the government, where 
state capital ultimately forced repressive policies in the finance sector to establish publically-imposed 
interest rates below market standards that supplied loans to industrial sectors specifically sponsored by 
state policy, i.e. getting the prices wrong. 12  In the case of Japan and South Korea, a collusive 
relationship between state and private businesses was formulated that engendered crony capitalism 
among widely diversified special business groups and state actors. 13  These strategically chosen 
industrial sectors gained momentum in catching up with other advanced contenders, which later formed 
large and diversified business conglomerates. On the other hand, state-business relations at Taiwan was 
more restrained and fragmented among the transplanted bureaucratic and military authorities that 
migrated from mainland China in conjunction with the indigenous businesses locally pre-established in 
the region. This created extra space for coexistence and evolution between state owned enterprises and 
smaller firms elsewhere, which formed the characteristics of Taiwanese economy relatively non-
                                                          
8 Adrian Leftwitch, , "Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental state," Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 3, 1995, p. 402  
9 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1982, Stanford University Press. 
10 Joseph Wong, “The Adaptive Developmental State in East Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2004, p. 
351. 
11 Ibid., p. 408. 
12 World Bank, p. 9. 
13 David Kang, “Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea,” International 
Organization, Vol. 56, Issue 1, 2002, p. 191. 
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interventionist, leaning towards a more neoliberal stature. In the case of Singapore, the city-state has 
adequately leveraged its strategic location as a critical trading port, and has efficaciously accommodated 
foreign investments into its economy. Thus, the once small port city cornered in between the Malacca 
Strait has become the regional headquarter of a number of multinational corporations.14  
In a technological sense, the developmental state demonstrated its effectiveness in 
coordinating national actors over an industrial path that has already been established by western 
advanced economies. The well-defined technological risks in the industrial sectors of steel, electronics, 
automotive, shipbuilding, and so forth, have reduced uncertainties in the business prospectus with 
maximized short-term returns, which allowed East Asian developmental states to fully exploit the given 
path and proven technology, with a comparative advantage in production costs realized through the 
availability of cheap labor.15 In addition to the comparative advantage in costs and low risks factors in 
technology development, the unique geopolitical imperatives of the Cold-War situation in a historical 
context also provided opportunities for East Asian developmental states in the aspects of receiving 
substantial amounts of technological assistance from advanced western economies, notably the United 
States, in order to prevent the continued expansion of communist and socialist ideals in the region. 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan were recipients of tremendous technology assistance in the commercial and 
military domains during this period, which allowed these countries to build-up its economy and military 
to a level in par against its impending security threats.16 
However, after the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the East Asian development model has 
confronted serious doubts with its adaptive capabilities and sustained effectiveness. The market 
mechanisms that supported the Developmental State Theorem, regarding the elements of manipulative 
exchange rates, repressive authoritarian regulatory powers against corporate decisions and labor 
policies, comparative advantage in low-skilled mass produced commodities accomplished through 
relatively cheap labor, unconditional technology transfers and assistance from advanced industrial 
countries, in addition to a myriad of other factors, were no longer available in the entering decades of 
the new millennium. This research will not go into detail regarding the cause and consequences of the 
East Asian Financial Crisis, but will elaborate on the transitional aspects of the East Asian 
developmental state model regarding the changes in its competitive advantages and the ensuing 
transition into a more diversified high tech industrial portfolio. 
2.1.1. Challenges of the Developmental State: Domestic and International Systemic 
Factors 
Despite the growing complexity of economic circumstances and industrial competition, the 
                                                          
14 Joseph Wong, “The Adaptive Developmental State in East Asia,” pp. 355-358. 
15 Peter Evans, “State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation,” in Sylvia Maxfield and 
Ben R. Schneider ed., Business and the State in Developing Countries, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 67 
16 Henry Wai-chung Yeung, “Rethinking the East Asian Developmental State in its Historical Context” Finance, 
Geopolitics, and Bureaucracy,” Area Development and Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 7-11. 
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developmental state theory has been criticized for its excessive reliance on the idea of defining the state 
as being internally cohesive and serving as a unitary actor, while neglecting the complex and dynamic 
working processes underlying the state structure.17 The earlier focus of developmental states was in 
catching-up with the industrialization process by closing the gap in the technology divide and promoting 
capital accumulation between the developed and less developed countries. This is not to construe the 
prestige that glamorizes the theory and practice of the developmental state. There were apparent 
misjudgments by elite bureaucrats and subsequent system failures caused from strategic intervention 
and bad selection decisions in the market, represented by previous cases of MITI’s role in establishing 
VCR standards or the long-term catastrophes of overseas construction and shipping in Korea.18 In this 
aspect, this study intends to focus on the transitional points of these developmental patterns, where the 
epitomized strengths of state systems for economic catch-up later turned obsolete and started to hinder 
developmental progression of these rapidly growing economies. After technological catch-up and 
industrial upgrading were successfully achieved, benefits of economic backwardness were no longer 
effective for further progression. There were no established models to imitate, and state bureaucracies 
were unable to build a highly advanced S&T based industrial base in the magnitude competitive enough 
towards global standards. Currently, after accomplishing a notable mark in the catching-up process, the 
focus has now shifted to diversifying the industrial structure into a higher value added sector in 
conjunction with accelerating the upgrading process of technology. Developmental states can no longer 
take credit on the previous competitive advantages granted by low labor and manufacturing costs. 
Instead, the countries must now seek its vantage point in accumulating mental capital and reorganize 
its institutional settings suitable to compete in the higher technological sectors, also known as the 
Schumpeterian Mark II sectors. Nonetheless, apparent stumbling blocks exist that hampers the smooth 
transition of East Asian economies into the global standards of high-tech. 
 Firstly, East Asian authoritarianism in state practices has significantly dissipated in the 1980s 
with the proliferation of democratic ideals assimilated into the hearts and minds of the public. The 
spread of democratic norms instigated the general public to bring down authoritarian rule and introduce 
a more diverse and pluralistic political landscape in domestic policy making. Therefore, the 
implementation of state led economic planning has become intractable, at which point made 
troublesome the conventional practices of picking winners and supporting national champions in a 
selective industrial field. The electoral politics of presidential campaigns and parliamentary elections 
provided limited assurances for sustaining national research projects and industrial development 
initiatives that resulted in certain disconnects of sustained policy support on a number of critical science 
                                                          
17 C.I. Moon and Rashemi Prasad, “Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics, and Institutions,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1994, p. 364. 
18 Gregory Noble, “The Japanese Industrial Policy Debate,” In S. Haggard and C.I. Moon eds, Pacific Dynamics, Westview 
Press, 1988. 
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based national and industrial programs.19 
 Secondly, the cooperative state-business relationship that once generated strong momentum in 
productivity growth and economic development has degenerated to a level of collusive rent-seeking 
that deteriorated entrepreneurship and innovation.20 In the case of Japan, socio-economic institutions 
formed around social norms that promoted development and national autonomy started to cripple 
national competitiveness of once a global economic super power. Social norms that served for broader 
objectives of social stability, predictability, and order – represented by lifelong employment assurances, 
state regulated market mechanisms, seniority based wages, collusive industry groups, centralized credit 
based financial systems, etc. – hindered the injection of new entrants and practices into the economy 
and ruptured state capacities of innovation, which resulted in over twenty years of sluggish economic 
growth and deteriorated national competitiveness in higher technological sectors. 
 Thirdly, the pressures of economic globalization defy the protective privileges previously 
enjoyed by state industrial protectionism, while urges the domestic economy to become more integrated 
into international norms and regulations. The deepening of the global trade and financial regimes such 
as the World Trade Organization no longer provides preferential treatment to East Asian developmental 
states in the playing ground of the world economy. Exchange rates are now subject to close monitoring 
and scrutiny, therefore all players are required to get the prices right, which leaves very little leeway for 
governments to intervene in international monetary policies. In addition to international norms, in a 
sectoral perspective, the high-tech sectors represented in the Schumpeter Mark II category presented 
significant challenges over a multitude of impediments in terms of technology acquisition, program 
management, market entrance, and so forth. The global oligopolistic structure of these industrial sectors 
poses high entry barriers against firms intending to penetrate the market. In terms of norms and 
regulations alone, the high level of appropriability such as in intellectual proprietary rights, safety 
accreditations or other functionalities, and the overarching legal mechanisms to sustain these 
components arranged within the international setting present challenges to late industrialized countries 
for market entry. Especially in the value added high tech field of biotechnology, organic chemistry, 
precision machineries, and aerospace, where international technology standards are firmly set and 
legally binding regulations such as in safety, ethics, and proprietary rights are established, a more 
intensive degree of experience or accumulation in knowledge is required for new entrants to find a place 
in this sector and outperform its competitors. 
 In the institutional aspects of developmental states, the institutions from the past 
developmental trajectory turned obsolete and not fine-tuned to coordinate the growing complexities of 
industrial upgrading in a highly advanced technological sector. This idea asserts the complications of 
replicating an innovation system of complex products from an overseas source into a national construct, 
                                                          
19 Benjamin Reilly, “Parties, Electoral Systems, and Governance,” in Diamond L., Plattner M., Chu Y., eds, Democracy in 
East Asia: A New Century, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 20. 
20 Marie Anchordoguy, Reprogramming Japan, p. 15. 
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which demands substantial reshaping of pre-existing institutions and practices into a form adaptive to 
change.21 Adopting a case study on biotech as an example, the technologically high exploratory risks 
and business uncertainties of the sector, compounded with established regulatory restrictions and safety 
protocols, have constrained decision makers from Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore to choose an industrial 
policy and institutional composition that once well functioned in the old developmental years. In 
comparison to the biotech sector, the IT sector, where the developmental state theorem performed 
adequately well, addresses the imposed risk factor through the coordinated actions between the state 
and industry in terms of trade protection, public subsidies, and reverse engineering efforts. In the highly 
innovative and complex field of biotech, under the auspices of state-led industrial policies, the three 
countries devoted substantial financial resources, adjusted domestic laws and regulations, and hand-
picked selective companies in the industry to carry out the developmental aspirations in biotech. 
Countries like the United States or China, which have a vast domestic market, can afford to mitigate 
the developmental risks as the vastly spread market neutralizes the inherent liabilities by providing 
economies of scale and scope. On the other hand, small countries with limited resources, like the East 
Asian economies, have no choice but to strategically select companies and support the requisite efforts 
of building firm competencies. However, the old strategy of selective concentration, or ‘picking-
winners’, over the course of attempting to devour an undefined technological sector, in a field of highly 
advanced complex products such as biotech, has resulted in producing an unimpressively disappointing 
economic outcome.22 The difficulties of state bureaucracies were unable to make acute assessments of 
a strenuously evolving S&T based industrial sector. Thus, the incapacity of existing institutions to 
coordinate the demanding intricacies of a globally established high-tech field has left the developmental 
state theorem of state intervention mostly applicable to fast followers in the technologically lower 
profiled business sectors of the market. Whatsoever, the attempt to extend the traditional notion of the 
theory beyond the realm of East Asian industrial upgrading is restricted.23 In this aspect, the vertically 
integrated state-business relations, illuminated as once the prominent pivot of the developmental state 
theory, have gradually transitioned to a more horizontally decentralized collaborative structure, where 
state capitalism mostly receded to a role of sowing seed money into the sector whereby letting the 
corporate players in the market to figure out the solution.24 
 In order to dive into a more in-depth analysis of state-led innovation in the systemic 
perspective, there is a need to review what the developmental theories lack. Thus, comparative 
perspectives given from other fields of studies should provide insights to these weaknesses. The 
following sections will highlight innovation studies under the perspectives of national innovation 
systems (NIS) and capitalist system (VoC: Varieties of Capitalism). 
                                                          
21 Joseph Wong, Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limitation of Asia’s Developmental State, Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p. 167. 
22 Ibid., p. 14. 
23 Ibid., p. 180. 
24 Ibid., p. 172. 
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2.2. National Innovation Systems (NIS) 
2.2.1. Overview of the NIS Literature 
 The literature of National Innovation Systems (NIS) originates from a vast literature of 
technology innovation that advocates the characteristics of country-specificity, embedded skills, 
capabilities, and accumulation of knowledge.25 The debate on the national innovation systems was first 
initiated in the late 19th Century by Friedrich List, a German economist that had contrasting views of 
the market against Adam Smith’s, in which List illustrated his doctrine in the form of a nation 
perspective opposed to Smith’s individual economics and cosmopolitan economics. The view was 
mostly in support of the economic rise of Germany as a late comer in the geopolitical landscape of 
Imperial Europe during the 19th Century, and the idea of nationalism (Pan-Germanism) to catch-up with 
its European forerunners such as the British and French. This concept was directly transferred to the 
mid-1970s after the world quietly monitored the two war-torn countries of the Second World War, 
Germany and Japan, ascending to the stature of a major economic power. The attention was highlighted 
in the role of national level institutions, which later became dubbed as “National Innovation Systems”.26 
The vast discussions on NIS were highlighted on the national institutions, its incentive 
structures, and competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological learning or the 
volume and composition of activities generating change in a country27 or the network of institutions in 
the public- and private-sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies.28 The thesis generated from these scholarly debates, in association with the emergence 
of the world’s new economic structure, crusaded over the initiative to launch an international study of 
National Innovation Systems at the OECD. The seminal work published on 1999 culminated in focused 
groups that encouraged the existence of innovative firm networks (France, Canada, Denmark), clusters 
(Netherlands), mobility of human resources (Norway, Sweden), organizational mapping (Belgium), and 
the economies of catching up (Korea). In the part of firms, the report concluded that innovation exists 
where there are frequent collaboration between firms and research institutes (universities, public/private 
laboratories) while also finding correlations in terms of firm size (larger the firm more frequent the 
collaboration).29 
 The next aspect of NIS accentuated on clusters and the policies that supports this concept. 
Clusters are engineering and manufacturing networks of highly interdependent firms linked to each 
other in a value-adding production chain, both connected in vertical and horizontal linkages. The key 
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28 Christopher Freeman, p. 5. 
29 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing National Innovation Systems, 1999, pp. 15-18. 
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to this concept is diversity and scaled economy; diversity in a sense that assures access to new and 
complementary technology between dissimilar network positions; and scaled economies in terms of 
sustaining the economic drive of innovative findings. Such conditions incorporate the array of 
interrelated industries sharing common technology, skills, information, inputs, and customers. Under 
this context, most participants are not direct competitors but share common needs and constraints.30 
The notion is driven by the aspects of human resource mobility concentrated on the efficiency of 
knowledge transfers aggregated in certain physical locations that bolsters a vibrant business ecosystem 
for firms. Countries that showed higher rates of mobility in human resources, especially within the 
highly educated sector, demonstrated higher levels of innovation. This indicated the higher mobility 
rates preconditioned the fluent transfers of information and knowledge. On the contrary, the pattern 
differed in sectors in low-tech industries where the strong demand in skilled labor consequently induced 
low degrees of mobility, hence lower levels of innovation. Conclusively, government employment 
policies and incentives to different sectors exhibited positive impacts on the level of innovative 
performances.31 Organizational mapping focused on countries like Belgium which had few domestic 
multinational firms are relatively active in basic research but less so in near market collaboration and 
private technology alliances. This indicates insufficient valuation of national R&D potential. In small 
countries of these kinds, firms are significantly more inclined to become partners of foreign actors than 
firms in large countries, and to rely on cross networking within the value chain in order to compensate 
for insufficient resources and the lack of appropriate partners available at home.32 
 The degree of innovation depends on the strong integration of science, technology, and 
business operations where institutions serve as the linchpin that lead to different patterns of innovative 
outcomes. 33 Innovation in a national framework is an aggregation of knowledge and institutional 
learning weaved in cultural ideologies inherent within the boundaries of a distinct political system.34 It 
is this distinct political system that regulates the structural setting of industries, finance, R&D, and other 
elements more conducive to innovation. For instance, the communitarian heritage of the Japanese 
national ideology 35  and effective consensus building examined by MITI and other supporting 
institutions36 highlight interactive and collective learning trends in a Japan-specific way that granted 
competitive advantage for the early success of the Japanese economy. Although similar in cultural 
heritage, different applications of institutional tools result in differed technological outcomes, as shown 
in the case of Dutch and Danish waste water treatment practices, at which the Dutch system relied more 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 85. 
31 Ibid., p. 90. 
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34 Lodge and Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness, Harvard Business School Press, 1987, p.87. 
35 Ibid. p. 89. 
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on regulatory control whereas the Danish system focused on tax incentives.37 Both practices were 
evidence of divergent innovative policy products. 
Differing governance systems define the characteristics of institutions. In other aspects, 
however, innovation theory mainly extracts its ground of argument from the way of learning, or in other 
words, institutional education and research. The set of institutional learning is represented in the socio-
economic impact of research and development, which characterizes innovation models into increasing 
complexity, bound with socioeconomic factors such as market linkage, matched up with available social 
infrastructure. In the 1950s, the growing demand in physical science, which was triggered by the 
competition among warring states during the Second World War in the development of the atom bomb, 
and the increasing democratization in education, coupled with the close linkages of university research 
on highly innovative government programs, generated the idea of ‘technology push’ of innovation. 
Simply saying, investment into universities for innovative research was the smart solution to create 
thought provoking radical products.38 The technology-push model concentrated on subsidizing big 
firms or research institutes in order to create national champions. The efforts were extended into public 
institutions by building universities and government led research laboratories. 
 However, further developments and maturation of the free market, and the following growth 
of firms and the way how it immediately responded to market demands, led to the formulation of the 
market-push models of innovation, mainly advocating that market components (firms), while reacting 
to market (customer) requirements, attributes to the innovation drive. This line of thought continues to 
dominate mainstream theories in economics and business studies.39 This model started observing the 
rise of market forces in the form of small and medium sized enterprises and the associated independent 
research and development activities that ensued. Here, the governments subsidized mostly in large scale 
national programs such as weapons development, but most of the subsidies to industry were phased out 
and was replaced as tax incentives instead in return of sustaining the commercial momentum in 
technological developments. In this period, research engines were created mostly from the commercial 
market, and a number of government led research labs became privatized, thus the portion of innovation 
has shifted to the private sector.40 As the roles of institutions unraveled in the debate of innovation 
theories, the role of government policies in the macro level took part as another source of policy debate, 
which has given high attention to the national innovation systems. 
 The heuristic nature of NIS respects the idiosyncratic differences of nation specific innovation 
systems arranged in a systemic way that relates to international trade. Because of the ‘nationalistic’ 
connotations of the term, NIS might be treated as an obsolete phrase in an era of accelerating 
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globalization. However, refuting the arguments not necessarily defying the essentials of globalization, 
but augmenting the supporting elements existing in national borders, the NIS literature recognizes the 
importance of networking regional production systems and technology districts under a globalized 
settlement.41 Previous studies based on intellectual property rights or patent statistics also supports the 
argument that national origins matters for multinational firms in terms of locating innovative 
performances.42 However, encapsulating the NIS concept within the national borders of a country 
confines the scope of potential cross-border achievements in innovation. A narrower definition mostly 
focuses on established processes supporting scientific research and development. But a broader 
perspective embraces the dynamically moving components of a vibrant transnational economic 
structure including production and marketing systems, financial institutions, and training and education 
as subsystems. 
The NIS literature distinguishes knowledge in two separate categories; tacit and codified 
knowledge. Codified knowledge literally defines officially recorded and visible features of codified 
information and knowhow that can be interpreted and diffused through formal education and training, 
whereas tacit knowledge represents the societal and un-codified features of knowledge more culturally 
embedded, which is absorbed through experience and social interaction. The focus on ‘innovation’ 
studies is mainly oriented towards the absorption and diffusion mechanism of these two knowledge 
categories in the process of ‘learning’ (Lundvall edit, 2010). The interactive nature of learning, which 
is basically a socially embedded process, has to be understood under the context of its established 
institutional settings. It is the system of these social components that brings together various elements 
for instigating the interaction of knowledge through socially established learning processes, which 
sustains the developmental dynamics within the borders of a nation state. 
Innovation systems must be understood under the context of the firm, national borders, and 
global levels of a society. Through the interaction of these different activity levels, innovation promotes 
and further generates economic growth. In the national context, the increasing importance of 
interconnecting regional production systems, industrial districts, and technologically specialized zones 
have gained importance more than ever.43 Innovation is a ubiquitous phenomenon that is reached 
through a gradual cumulative process. It occurs based on the combination of different accumulative 
achievements, hence in a Schumpeterian terminology, ‘new combination’ or a synergistic interaction of 
past experiences, resulting in a thesis-antithesis-synthesis paradigm. Such cumulative process is coined 
as routine activities “rooted in the prevailing economic structure” of the respective society where 
innovation emanates.44 In terms of the intensity or degree of innovation, incremental innovation results 
from existing product bases, therefore the coordination between established design and technological 
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features augmented by existing firms forms the basis of such changes. Radical innovation is achieved 
through a different game plan where a different set of technological principles creates new market 
opportunities for new entrants into the market.45 
In the aspects of production systems and market specialization, the innovation literature 
generally agrees on four processes that constitute the system core of innovation; production systems, 
specialized home-markets, interactive learning processes, and the institutional arrangement that 
integrates all dimensions of the economic power house.46 The life cycle approach on national systems 
stresses the relationship between production linkages and the learning process under the context of 
interaction between user sectors and production sectors.47 It highlights stimulated learning processes 
generated through the information flow shared by user-producer relationship in backward linkages. An 
extended portrayal of the life cycle approach was depicted in the hierarchical classification of national 
innovation systems through the sectoral approach of asserting different economic sectors resulting in 
different outcomes of economic growth. In this regard, the vertically upstream hierarchy, such as in the 
machinery sector, constitutes the epitome of dynamic growth. In this respect, Freeman argues the 
importance of interaction between the stakeholders within a system and sub-system existing in an 
organizational setting. He asserts the way how R&D and production sections organized in a firm, inter-
firm interactions, and state-business relationships, constitute the critical framework that nurtures 
innovation.48 This relationship was described through the Japanese system of producing knowledge. 
Nelson advocates a more in-depth review of the institutional attributions of innovation, which 
combines public and private sector technology, and emphasizes the role of universities and governments 
in the promotion of the respective technology.49 This approach was focused on the U.S. innovation in 
a narrower sense. In terms of production relationships and its NIS linkages, vertical integration of firm 
structure facilitates learning within the integrated structure of the firm where technological know-how 
is shared. However, vertically integrated structures also introduce rigidities in the production system 
that in many instances disturbs responsiveness to change. Meanwhile, production units existing outside 
of the integrated structure become reluctant to share sensitive information imperative for continued 
advancement of the production process. Thus, interactive learning becomes specialized in a limited 
scope, in which a balanced number of propellant industries (autonomous innovators) and impelled 
industries (induced innovators) come to determine the development power of a nation.50 
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2.2.2. Sectoral Systems of Innovation, Technological Regimes, and Patterns of 
Technological Catch-up 
Innovation differs based on sectoral characteristics that appear evident in the comparison of 
the specific knowledge base, economic actors and interactive networks, and the institutional 
arrangement. Under the context of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation, technology related factors, in 
par with the significance of country specific innovation patterns, have substantial influence over 
innovative activities in sectoral organizations. 51  The Schumpeterian distinction of sectoral 
characteristics that focuses on the market structure and industrial dynamics is outlined by Schumpeter 
Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II patterns of the industry.52 A Schumpeter Mark I pattern represents 
“widening” or “creative destruction” that introduces new entrepreneurial firms and practices with easy 
market access, mostly in the form of small and medium sized start-up companies, which is highly 
turbulent and technologically disruptive in terms of market competition. Widening indicates the nature 
of continued entries of innovative firms into the sector that continuously threaten to erode the 
competitive advantage of incumbent firms. The Schumpeterian Mark II pattern represents “deepening” 
or “creative accumulation” described by established large firms positioned in the core of the sector, 
built in with sector specific accumulated knowledge with the presence of high entry barriers into the 
market. Deepening relates to the prevalence of a few dominant firms in the sector that constantly 
innovates by iterative accumulation of technological knowledge. Such difference in sectoral patterns of 
innovation is explained in the learning domain, or in other words technological regimes, which 
synthesizes technological innovations in opportunities, appropriabilities, cumulativeness, and 
properties of knowledge. 53  The relationship between technological regimes and Schumpeterian 
patterns of innovation are as follows. 
  Patterns of Innovation 
Type Schumpeter Mark I Schumpeter Mark II 
Characteristics widening (creative destruction) deepening (creative accumulation) 
Entry Barriers (market structure) Low (Competitive) Small specialized firms 
High (Oligopolistic) 
Multidivisional firms 
Technological 
Regimes 
Opportunity High technological opportunities (Technologically less predictable) 
Low technological opportunities 
(Technologically predictable) 
Appropriability Low appropriabilities High appropriabilities 
Cumulativeness Low cumulativeness High cumulativeness 
Properties of 
Knowledge Generic Knowledge Specific Knowledge 
Industry Areas Information Technology, Consumer Goods Bio-tech, Aerospace,  
Table 1. Relations between Technological Regimes and Patterns of Innovation 
Source: Franco Malerba and Luigi Orsenigo, “The dynamics of evolution of industries,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 
Vol. 5, Issue 1, 1996. 
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In regards to the innovative achievements being highly concentrated to incumbent contenders 
in the market in addition to the relatively low occurrence of technological breakthroughs, catching-up 
in the technological domain generally poses more challenges in Mark II sectors than in Mark I sectors.54 
This is because the competitive order of the Mark II sector carries established norms and institutional 
rules, which presents barriers for new entrants attempting to access the sector. Hence, significant 
challenges exist for new entrants into the competition. Technological catch-up, in a general sense of 
convergence studies, is achieved through the concerted efforts of investments in physical assets and the 
accumulation of technological capabilities. Depending on social capabilities, technologically backward 
countries with socially advanced institutions have the potential of generating rapid growth opportunities 
than that of more advanced countries through successfully exploiting acquired technologies that are 
already in use by technological leaders.55 Historically, technological catch-up was associated with the 
adoption of existing techniques followed by the innovation of those techniques to improve productivity 
or induce new inventions. In pre-modern times, technological diffusion depended mostly on the 
migration of individual skilled workers because technology was embodied in persons, or was codified 
as ‘tacit’ information. However, the Industrial Revolution, signified by an era of codified engineering 
standards, created innovation in a more systemic way, which made the diffusion and absorption of 
technology comparatively transmittable than pre-modern times.56 Thus, in a structural viewpoint, the 
technological catch-up process of Western Economies in the early 20th century, although shown in 
varying degrees, mostly relied on systems of innovation generated by market mechanisms, whereby 
resources provided through financial institutions constituted the essentials of industrial development. 
Contrastingly, the East Asian catching-up process showed a different pattern, in which rapid 
industrialization after the Second World War was feasible by government led market interventionist 
policies.  
Accomplished catch-up economies have taken full advantage of inward technology transfers 
enabled through a national innovation system nurtured by firm-based absorptive capacities. This 
capacity is promoted by continued investments in science and technology education as well as in a 
competition driven domestic industrial policy, at which the effectiveness of state intervention in the 
strategic industries resulted in lesser importance compared to the earlier stages of the catch-up process 
for late industrializing countries.57 The aspect of innovative catch-up regards to the manufacturing and 
branding strategies of the respective product. First countries choose to enter the market by acquiring 
low level production skills in the form of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) entitlements, or in 
other terms called ‘subcontracting’ or ‘licensing’. The industry matures by acquiring essential design 
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skill as an Original Design Manufacturer (ODM). And lastly, the industry establishes its reputation by 
creating extensive networks for marketing, distribution, and so forth by launching its own brand and 
technical reputation, hence becoming an Original Brand Manufacturer (OBM).58 Nevertheless, this 
evolutionary process is not always the rule of thumb. Countries or firms, in some general technology or 
industrial sectors, do not necessarily follow the same evolutionary pathway (path-following) of what its 
foregone predecessors use to take, but instead skip certain stages of the evolutionary process (path-
skipping), or create their own path (path-creating) that differs from the conventional norm in some other 
cases, henceforth achieving an innovative standing of “leapfrogging” in the catching-up process.59 
Although the institutional arrangements established during the early catch-up phases were proven 
effective, the educational and organizational setting of these countries being attuned to certain 
technological types in some cases started to constrain further potentials to advance into a higher 
competitive status. Catching up is mostly referred to a process of improving productivity in 
manufacturing and related services. Once the catching up process is finalized, the rationale for 
productivity improvement loses its basis, which makes the overall economic system supporting the 
incumbent production regime relatively obsolete and subject for replacement in the course of keeping 
up with the advances in technological competition. In this respect, the portion of market share in tandem 
with technological achievements becomes critical in sustaining the fruits of technological catch-up. 
The cultural influence indeed weighs on heavily in determining the direction and performances 
of national innovation systems. A study performed on government polices of France and Germany in 
three industrial sectors – telecommunication, machine tools, and semiconductors – provides an 
assessment of the cultural impact on the outcomes of these state led policies. The knowledge group 
culture of each country is the starting point for the analysis, in which France adheres to a more 
centralized but closed elite based system whereas Germany relies on a more decentralized but open 
system with affluent human resource mobility. Therefore, the French model adheres more towards a 
state centric arrangement in a sense that the industrial policies are targeted to a small number of elites 
in the political as well as in the realm of science and technology, whereby following a top-down 
hierarchical structure. On the other hand, the German model conforms to a more opened arrangement 
in its sources of knowledge and technology, such that government policies are more attuned to allocating 
public subsidies in support of nurturing certain industrial sectors. 60  Furthermore, the differing 
educational policies of the two countries were essential in forming a unique knowledge bearing systems. 
The French policies created a highly selective group of knowledge bearing elites in the national level 
with creating highly controlled access to knowledge. In this aspect, the national technical expertise was 
largely a state function in which the elites tended to exist in a closed, self-replicating systems. To a large 
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degree, these elites were not only predominant in research and development but also in public policy as 
these trained elites became eligible to move directly from universities to public administration. 
Germany in contrast possessed an educational system focused on occupational skill training. Whereas 
French engineers stood at the top of the technical food chain while having little interaction with other 
non-knowledge bearing groups, the German knowledge bearing groups were cultivated in a more open 
fashion and possessed a culture more inclined to encourage collaboration among different groups.61 
These conditions resulted in different outputs in the three industrial sectors. If the selective French elite 
based structure was feasible in telecommunications, the German structure proved more efficient and 
innovative in machine tools. However, the national innovation systems of both countries was proven 
insufficient in coping with the new emergence of semiconductors, in which the French experienced 
huge losses whereas the Germans went through marginal gains but not much significant expansion into 
the new business field. 
A similar but different account towards national innovation system was displayed in the 
Japanese case. In the studies of the recent demise of the Japanese economy, the pressure to liberalize 
the Japanese economy after its near collapse in the 1990s has been limited by the historical legacies of 
the main bank system, supplier-manufacturer loyalty, and the organization of industry through keiretsu 
networks. The economic turmoil that disrupted the Japanese economy in the 1990s deteriorated the 
traditional three pillared institutions that were believed to have driven the Japanese economic success 
– such as lifetime job security, banking system, close ties between government and industry, and the 
Keiretsu – came into serious scrutiny. These institutions were represented by the state-led economic 
policies in which the Japanese government played a central role in the overall governing aspects of the 
economy. 62  The first pillar, system of labor relations, was characterized by relative labor peace 
attributed by enterprise unionism and lifetime employment. The financial system, which formed the 
second pillar, was highlighted by banks serving as the principal source of corporate finance in often 
turns also monitoring firm performances. The third pillar, the corporate governance system, represented 
by circular corporate ownership through Keiretsu conglomerates, cultivated an extensive network with 
small suppliers who were highly dependent on these firms for technology, managerial expertise, and 
finance, which ensured strict pricing and quality standards. 
However, the existing institutions were ruled inefficient to cope with the economic downturn, 
and government policies leaned towards de-regulation of these inefficient institutions by emulating the 
US modeled liberal market economies. In these aspects, Japan has taken a frenzied restructuring path; 
Japanese enterprises expanded merit based compensation, sold subsidiaries, and moved production 
abroad; Government modified the pension system, revised corporate law, removed substantial amounts 
of bad loans. However, these efforts were not translated into successful outcomes because the selected 
reform agendas by government officials and industry leaders failed to modify the existing institutions, 
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sometimes even reinforcing the system, opposed to abandoning these malpractices. In terms of 
employments, Japanese firms were engaged in downsizing, but without severe layoffs because these 
firms believed that downsizing in the US did not have much positive effect on corporate financial 
performance as defined by profits, productivity, or stock price. The firms believed that companies with 
the longest job tenure had the highest profits, which highly advocated political leaders to choose a more 
incremental reform policy while preserving the core institutions of the Japanese economic model.63 
Transformation of the Japanese capitalist system to a structure more accommodating to the US system 
may become a difficult task than expected because Japan’s culture discourages reforms that might 
undermine long-term relations with workers, financial institutions, and the government. As a result, the 
Japanese model has transformed into what is more selective in its alliances, more differentiated in its 
forms, and more open to foreigners and outsiders, while not undermining their networks of cooperative 
relationships with long-term partners, workers, banks, and suppliers.64 
2.2.3. Diffusion of Innovation: From Adoption to Exploitation 
Before indulging into systemic arrangements for innovation, it is imperative to understand the 
overall qualifications as prerequisites. In this regard, absorptive capacity is an element considered 
critical as a prerequisite mechanism to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and practices in an 
organized fashion. It highlights the importance of prior knowledge and diversity of background in the 
relevant fields of interest that sets conditions for further expectations of innovation. In the seminal work 
of Cohen and Levinthal, absorptive capacity is a process of properly communicating the assimilation, 
accumulation, and exploitation of shared knowledge and expertise for fostering innovation 
opportunities.65 The focal point of their reasoning was on the investment decisions of firms in R&D, 
which traces the cumulative nature of absorptive capacity and subsequent path dependence in a quickly 
moving technological field, forms a condition where the cessation in R&D investments places a firm 
hard to sustain competitiveness in the field.66 Firm level and public investment in R&D as critical 
impact factors for absorptive capacity is demonstrated in comparative studies between East Asia and 
Latin American economies, whereby the stark difference in public investment on research and tertiary 
education attributed to different performing results of economic competitiveness.67 The debate on 
absorptive capacity also takes place in the diffusion process of learning as well. Diffusion of innovation 
is realized through strong linkages between R&D, production, technological import, and customer 
reception. The stark difference between Japan and USSR in these linkages present different outcomes 
of innovation and sustained economic development. Structural integration of firm level R&D, 
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production, technology imports, and user level interfaces remained strong in the Japanese innovation 
system, whereas these linkages remained weak in the Soviet structure.68 Thus, the positive correlation 
between absorptive capacity and firm’s R&D investment has proven critical for an organization’s 
competitiveness and innovative applications. 
Zahra and George proposed a model that expanded Cohen and Levinthal’s R&D focused 
concept and definition of absorptive capacity into a more specified category classified as ‘potential 
absorptive capacity’ and ‘realized absorptive capacity’.69 Potential absorptive capacity, or receptivity, 
is an identification process of a firm to acquire externally generated knowledge and assimilate the 
subject knowledge into the firm’s operations through analysis and interpretation.70 It is a concept that 
incorporates accumulation and assimilation. Realized absorptive capacity, or innovative routines, is an 
exploitation practice that refines the acquired knowledge with existing firm knowledge into a 
transformative form, hence it is an expanded concept of exploitation suggested by Cohen and 
Levinthal. 71  Currently, the debate on absorptive capacity is mostly concentrated on ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ of an organization in a rapidly changing market environment. It covers two distinct 
elements of firm behavior in building up core competencies for competitive advantage72; paradigmatic 
shifts adaptive to radical and discontinuous change, while ensuring competitive survival by maintaining 
threshold capability standards.73 A dynamic capability is a process of adapting the organizational 
routines of a firm’s resource base to the increasingly unpredictable fluctuations derived from the 
external environment. This is often extremely challenging due to organizational inertia and path 
dependencies of organizations in the subject field of consideration. Most evident case was shown in the 
recent turbulence of Nokia, which used to be a globally leading firm in the vibrantly changing 
telecommunication industry, however only to fall back in the competition from other rising competitors 
due to difficulties in overcoming existing practices.74  
In a similar but different perspective, absorptive capacity sets the ground for the diffusion of 
technology and its innovative outcomes within organizations. Diffusion is a practice that realizes the 
value of knowledge ventures. The degree and intensity of diffusion determines the social and economic 
impact of innovation in general. Hence, under the context of absorptive capacity, the diffusion of 
innovation is primarily a process of adaptive learning, through unit level cost-benefit assessments of 
replacing incumbent systems with newly emerging innovative findings, at which point the feedback of 
this process generates improvements in products or procedural practices. The organizational behaviorist 
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and sociologist perspective of diffusion studies, highlighted in the landmark researches of Rogers 
(2003), give its core focus on the relative easiness of adopting innovation at the receiving end.75 Sitting 
at the core of this assertion is five analytic categories that attributes to the art of diffusing innovation – 
relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trial-ability, and observability of innovation.76 The idea 
of diffusion additionally elaborates that the process itself is interactive, which provides feedback for 
further improvement and change, thus becomes an occasion of spinning-off new innovations.77 On the 
other hand, although defined in a similar account, economists consider diffusion as a process of 
calculating the costs and benefits of adopting innovation to an already established custom, from which 
costs and benefits are calculated under the premises of uncertainty and limited information.78 The 
diffusion patterns are explained by describing concepts of network effects (or externalities) in order to 
complement the shortcomings of not accounting for the social feedback effects of individual adoption 
and social connectedness. Basically, the diffusion process typically follows an S-curve shape, as the 
rate of adoption initially starts at a snail’s pace but further accelerates as the innovation spreads 
throughout the adopting population, and eventually slows down as the adoption matures and saturates 
in the final phases. The two mechanisms that attribute to this process are known to be the heterogeneity 
of adopting agents, and the medium of learning on the subject matter. Heterogeneous agents, or the 
multitude of different consumer tastes, at first have different expectations in calculating the benefits 
from new innovative discoveries, while conclusively converges into the S-form through the progression 
of time as the agents continue to learn that the expectation on the benefits of adoption exceeds the cost 
of replacement. 
2.2.4. The Role of Institutions in Innovation Systems 
The NIS literature highly values the role of institutions in innovation studies. The largest 
distinction between innovation studies and neoclassical studies of economics is perhaps the way how 
each school pictures the economy; whether as a process of interaction and cumulative causation or 
simply a system of equilibrium. In the context of the Schumpeterian School, innovation is understood 
as a learning process rather than a uniquely transformative event. The learning process is transmitted 
through established institutional settings. However, institutions have both stimulating and retarding 
effects to innovation. Established institutions in learning serve as conduits of channeling and diffusing 
knowledge. But in another sense, institutions display characteristics of inertia and rigidity that hampers 
the dynamics of technical development. In many cases, institutions often resist change and in many 
instances lag behind technological developments. Rigidities in institutions are built by layered 
complexities in government structure and growing influences of interest groups in the society, which 
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reduces the responsiveness of the economic system against market signals such as price changes and 
technological advancements.79 
Institutions establish norms in actions, routines in processes, and coordinate the use of 
knowledge and information, which consequently enable a more predictable outcome by reducing 
uncertainty for people and organizations. Institutions are the social stabilizers when change occurs, 
including changes in technology. However, if the institutional setting incentivizes an established 
trajectory not condoning necessary changes for innovation, then the consequences may lead to lagging 
stagnation or even degradation in competitiveness.80 In order to avoid this, the act of forgetting, coined 
in a Schumpeterian term called ‘creative destruction’, functions to eliminate these hurdles and often 
paves the way for new innovations. In this respect, institutions shape the remembering and forgetting 
mechanism of learning through a cultural process that arranges selection and perception of 
information. 81  The institutional configurations filter and accumulate essential knowledge that is 
considered critical for technical and organizational advancement. The forgetting mechanism shuts down 
obsolete practices in technological and economic development. Consequently, institutions establish the 
routines for a systematic and organized searching for new knowledge, while concurrently running the 
forgetting mechanisms of obsolete economic practices.82 The institutional setting determines the way 
how conflicting interests from resisting forces occurring in the change process, such as labor unions, 
production systems, etc., are mitigated. The intensity of this mitigation process, demonstrated by the 
institutional capacities, either expedites or retards the innovation cycle. 
In terms of the characteristics of interactive learning, frequent interaction between different 
but relevant components of learning defines the intensity of innovation. Institutions coordinate these 
interactive processes. Learning by searching, or learning by producing, practices displayed in organized 
search closely connected with production activities of a firm. 83  In a techno-economic paradigm, 
learning by exploring practices is demonstrated mainly from pure scientific research from science labs 
or universities. Technology management in Japanese firms proved effective for incremental innovation 
as it practiced the routines of closely coordinated interactions in user-producer relationships. 84 
Culturally dependent norms tend to appear in a more tacit knowledge form. Henceforth, such culturally 
dependent norms are constructed by informal institutional notions such as time horizon of agents, role 
of trust, and the actual mix of rationality.85 Complex technology requires a longer term commitment 
that reaches a point of penetration for innovation. Trust relates to expectations for behavioral 
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consistency that reveals reliable information with the notion of no potentials to exploit weaknesses of 
incumbents. Mixed rationality finds its foundations in institutional understanding while tolerating 
communicative differences. Regarding the process of learning by searching (or exploring) in a 
knowledge based society, the role of formal institutions, such as in-house R&D departments or 
extramural R&D organizations such as universities and technical engineering laboratories, interfaces as 
bridging mechanisms between science and technology stimulates increased productivity and 
creativity.86 Through this interaction process, the higher anticipations of capacity building realize the 
utilization of unexpected novelty, which is a fundamental course for innovation.87 
Institutional diversity coexisting in the economic system, supported from the idea of 
‘flexibility ‘and ‘impurity principle’, creates options for various stock of knowledge to interact and 
generate novelty through enhanced learning capacities, while makes the system more resilient to 
disturbances and fluctuations.88 
 
Scientific and Technical Institutions in National Innovation Systems 
Institutions in the development of science and technology has proven even more critical in its 
role as history traces back into the 19th century, reminiscent of the demising British technological 
prowess overwhelmed by the ascending technological stardom of Germany and America. Despite its 
leading technological accomplishments, British institutions were unable to effectively diffuse these 
accomplishments into the wider spectrum of its economy, which was later labeled by Schumpeter 
‘entrepreneurial failure’, while the institutional settings of German and American industries, as a 
latecomer in the field, sufficiently diffused and exploited these innovative achievements through in-
house R&D and professional education of engineers.89 
Schumpeter observed oligopolistic advantages of firms after acknowledging the historical 
accounts of German electrical companies such as AEG and Siemens in the early 20th century as its 
technical departments developed new products and processes through professional internalization of 
R&D.90 In this domain, German networks of technology diffusion incorporated not only corporate 
R&D, but also bolstered interactive learning with universities supported by strong government research 
institutes by coordinating different technological standards as well as training legions of high skill labor 
forces, which became characteristic of industrial countries in later days. Putting into account the sectoral 
varieties and differences, the Second World War has legitimately expanded the scale and widened the 
horizons of government led R&D and the importance of specialized R&D departments.91 In this wider 
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process of production and R&D, without much reference to R&D outputs, incremental innovations were 
continuously generated by production engineers and shop-floor workers, which became a major source 
of productivity improvement. 92  Such characteristics were built through the capacity to fluently 
communicate and interact with various components existing outside the conventional boundaries of a 
production unit. Thus, the lost in opportunity costs for lacking such networking capacities in a national 
system becomes a huge burden for firms.93 The case of agglomerated economies such as Silicon Valley 
demonstrates the crucial importance of communication and trust between entrepreneurs, R&D units, 
suppliers, and end users of a technology dependent on both geographical and cultural proximity.94 
Rigorous R&D work serves as the contributing factor of radical discontinuities in innovation, but when 
it comes to incremental trajectories of innovation, interaction with end users of the technology become 
the dominant factor.95 
 
2.3. Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
Capitalism has placed itself in various forms within the national economic setting that resulted in 
differing economic outcomes and performances executed through diverse policy mechanisms. Such 
difference in expectations has raised the classic question of the apparent role and functionality of market 
systems and the holistic view of how the system interconnects itself with distinctive social components 
that constitute the entirety of an economic structure. Typical capitalist economies such as the U.S. and 
Germany by and large represent contrasting elements that differ widely in the institutional configuration 
of the economy organized around the market. Thus, the emerging literature in institutional economics, 
veering away from the traditional neoclassical school, has concentrated its attention towards strategic 
complementarities on organizational elements considering the disparate idiosyncrasies socially 
embedded within existing national borders of countries that generate different outcomes in 
technological innovation and economic growth. 96 Here, among various preliminary researches on 
comparative capitalism, the literature commonly labeled “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) compares 
organized production regimes through financial systems, corporate governance structure, industrial 
relations, and education and training systems, thus explains different political institutions serving as 
principal agents as the source for different innovative behavior. 
2.3.1. Overview of the VoC Literature 
While mainstream studies on comparative capitalism focuses on the state and its interaction 
with the market, the basis of the VoC approach is drawn from the resource-based idea of firms 
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developing core competencies through building or managing relationships with other firms and agents 
that generate transaction costs and principal-agent problems, at which conflicting coordination 
problems are resolved in the context of institutional establishments. Here, differences among countries 
are results entitled ‘comparative institutional advantage’. The main contribution of the VoC approach 
to the scholarly literature of comparative capitalism is the relationship between institutional 
complementarities and country performance, hence the interdependent institutional establishments 
enhancing performance expectations of the national system. This was partially proven through 
empirically measuring institutional outcomes as endogenous variables and its relations to national 
income levels, which concluded the quality of institutions, among other measured variables such as 
geography and integration, play the biggest role in national income performances; thus a proven 
functional hypothesis on the variety of institutional contributions leading to a country’s national 
competitiveness.97 Here, a point of departure worth noting is that the primacy of institutions does not 
necessarily relate to the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, but instead, the focus shifts on how 
countries strive to implement policy innovations that fundamentally reshape the institutional setting of 
their respective economies.98 
The idea further elaborates on the two distinctive types of capitalist regimes known as liberal 
market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME), based on how the regimes interact 
with market mechanisms. LMEs represent systems that appear more evident in Anglo-Saxon market 
economies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where the coordinating mechanism is 
centered on the market with limited state intervention. Because of the arm’s length nature of the state 
in coordinating economic behavior, LMEs show characteristics of strong inter-company competition 
supported by short-term oriented company finance with deregulated employment relationships, 
followed by a labor force trained under a general education system. CMEs shows contrasting 
propensities mostly evident in Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, where economic behavior is 
coordinated through nonmarket intermediations in a form of interest groups, government entities, as 
well as public and private institutions.99 Here the political economic mechanism is formed through 
competitive market arrangements, at which the legal system forms its basis respective to complete and 
formal contracting. Firms obtain higher bargaining power over other economic entities, therefore 
employment relations are mostly determined by firm decisions and the institutions that supports these 
firm-centric system encourages competition and freer movements of inputs. Conclusively, innovation 
occurred in a Liberal Market Economy is considered highly radical, therefore technological 
breakthroughs often choose their birth places in these systems. LMEs show comparative advantages 
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mostly in the high-tech and service sectors.100 
 Opposed to LMEs, CMEs are highlighted by longer term company finance and cooperative 
industry relations, associated by high levels of vocational training and standardized technological 
standings. Scandinavian countries, Germany, and Japan present distinct types of Coordinated Market 
Economies. The market mechanism mostly relies on non-market relations such as government initiated 
formal institutions to regulate the market and coordinate the interaction of firms and firm relations with 
suppliers, customers, employees, and financiers, represented in a form of state led capitalism. CMEs 
tend to be characterized by relatively long-term relations between economic actors that are also 
relatively cooperative. In the field of human resource management, CMEs tend to have high levels of 
job security, a good record on training and development, institutionalized forms of worker participation, 
based on works councils, and relatively cooperative relations between trade unions and employers' 
associations. These long-term, cooperative relations provide CMEs with their source of comparative 
advantage in the world economy: they tend to be good at process innovation and the production of high 
quality, high value-added goods in mature manufacturing industries.101 The most representative case 
of CMEs is shown in the German economic model entitled Rhineland Capitalism, or organized 
capitalism. The Institutional characteristics of the German system is featured in centralized decision 
making primarily made by the private sector, at which public and private associations exert greater 
influence in economic and social policies that enables dedicated capital to observe long-term interests 
of the firm instead of submitting to short-term returns.102 In order to salvage the backward conditions 
of a catch-up economy compared to the fledging British and American enterprises of the early 20th 
century, the German Hausbank model imposed a dynamic corporatist economic order in German 
industrial development by providing stable financial support to its emerging heavy industry sector, 
which established close coordinating connections between large businesses and financial institutions. 
The business-financial arrangements continued into post-war economic planning, which set the basis 
for the German tradition of highly cooperative unions and strong employer associations, industry-firm 
specific technical training and education system, and a long-term collaborative network between 
industry, research institutions, and universities.103 Institutional structures, placed at the core of the 
innovation system concept, are considered as the rules of the game in a society, in which a distinction 
can be made between formal institutions and informal institutions. Formal institutions are mainly rules 
that are codified and enforced by the authorities, whereas informal rules are more normative and values 
generally accepted within the society. 104  An extended discussion over the role of institutions is 
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technological structures that consist of artifacts and infrastructures in which they are integrated. These 
features are crucial for understanding the feedback mechanisms between technological change and 
institutional change. An analysis of structures typically yields insight into systemic features - 
complementarities and conflicts - that constitute drivers and barriers for technology diffusion at a certain 
moment or within a given period in time. 
In the Post-Cold War era and the spread of globalization signaled the transformation of the 
German model. The demise of Rhineland Capitalism demonstrated in the sclerotic economic growth of 
Germany in the post-unification era, that disintegrated notable features of Germany’s organized 
capitalist system such as the Hausbank model, and the bargaining power of employer associations and 
labor unions, has introduced substantial elements of market mechanisms, or a LME type institutional 
setting. Although it is considered premature to state a total collapse of the Model Deutschland, it is fair 
enough to consider the emergence of a hybrid pattern in the form of a ‘convergent’ model in a globalized 
economic system.105 Hence, there is a need to highlight the changes of VoC regimes pressured by 
globalization. The international flow of capital associated with the growing nature of the internationally 
integrated production system has seriously eroded the genuine structure of CME type countries into a 
more liberalized economy. Although discussions remain whether this is a form of convergence to the 
liberal market or divergence resulting from the comparative advantage of different capitalist systems, 
there is no gainsaying to the fact that VoC systems, in an era of globalization, have shifted into a more 
hybrid form on both ends of the debate.106 Continued internationalization has exposed CME systems 
into the global competition market, at which competitiveness cannot be sustained by quality control but 
also by price. Additionally in the financial area, the growing alteration towards stock market 
capitalization, in conjunction with the traditional ‘big banks’ remodeling its strategies towards a more 
investment oriented practice, has transformed government policies favorable to shareholder values, 
which placed firms in a position eligible to hostile takeovers. 107  The composition of corporate 
leadership was equally effected by this wave of change when senior managerial positions, mainly 
promoted from the hierarchy of technical echelons, were being replaced by lawyers and financiers 
seeking short-term returns in order to respond to shareholder demands. 108  Therefore, although 
appearing in divergent forms respective to the capitalist characteristics of the economy, the wave of 
globalization has introduced a degree of deregulation and decentralization into the socio-economic 
engine of CME countries, belittling the traditional role of corporatist bargaining of unions and 
associations to a certain extent, while enlarging the scope of market power. In a similar case, LMEs also 
experienced some overhaul in its laissez-faire system. After a series of financial scandals in the U.K., 
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which culminated in the collapse of the historically distinguished Barings Bank, the need for public 
oversight into the financial industry has encouraged the British Government to establish a regulatory 
system that consolidated the authorities of separate public institutions into a single entity called the 
‘Financial Service Authority’, which was considered a surprising move for a country like the U.K. that 
exercises predominantly self-regulating policies in the banking sector.109 
Although not included in the original classification of the VoC literature, countries like France, 
Japan, or the East Asian developmental states that demonstrate strong influence from the government 
in state capitalism, have a rather more state-influenced economic structure that show a mixed form of 
market economies from both ends of the VoC approach. The original authors of the VoC debate briefly 
cited these variations as “mixed-market economies” (MME), primarily highlighting Southern European 
states along the coastlines of the Mediterranean such as France, Spain, and Italy. 110  But a more 
sophisticated study of these economies, with a focus of countries showing histories of significant state 
intervention in finance and labor politics, were elaborated as “state-influenced market economies” 
(SME).111 In a SME system, the state intervenes in significant sectors where perceived suitable, but not 
in all domains of the society. In France, dirigiste government initiatives permeated the state into business 
activities and labor control, which generated economic growth through nationalized industries and 
placed the market under wage coordinating mechanisms.112 Under this assertion, the Mediterranean 
countries such as Spain and Italy labeled as MMEs do not necessarily coincide with the strong state led 
characteristics of France, but align more prone to the British system in areas such as income distribution 
and labor policies. Countries that show higher resemblance to the SME system are Japan, or the East 
Asian developmental states such as the Republic of Korea or Taiwan. 113  It is under these two 
comparative capitalist regimes that show different patterns of innovative outcomes based on its 
respective institutional configurations. The characteristics of SME systems will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section on East Asian capitalism later in this chapter. 
2.3.2. Variety of Capitalism Literature on Technological Innovation 
Contrary to conventional economics, Schumpeterian growth theory highly values the role of 
technology and its contribution to innovative behaviors. Within this context, learning is the conduit for 
technological advancement, and the learning process is supported under the auspices of institutions. 
The cross national difference in technology adoption, diffusion, and exploitation is determined by the 
institutional configuration of a society that leads to different innovative outcomes. Here, innovation 
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generally comes in two categories; radical and incremental alignments. The VoC theory predicts a 
society showing strong LME propensities tend to concentrate its creative talent into radical 
technological change whereas societies showing strong CME propensities focus more on incremental 
technological change. Therefore, a society highly reliant on market mechanism is geared towards more 
radical innovations while a society with more nonmarket forces is shaped more around incremental 
innovations. Radical innovation is a phenomenon that “entails substantial shifts in product lines, the 
development of entirely new goods, or major changes to the production processes.” 114  Radical 
innovation is critical for production in the high-tech sectors of complex systems such as biotechnology, 
semiconductors, aerospace, etc., where rapid and significant changes constantly occur. Incremental 
innovation is defined as “continuous but small scale improvements to existing product lines and 
production processes.”115 The priority of incremental innovation is to sustain high quality in already 
established artifacts, which pertains to improvements made in production processes primarily for cost 
reduction, hence to promote competitiveness in material goods such as machine tools, consumer items, 
engines, etc. The institutional difference, however, does not confine a society solely to either end of 
innovation types, but explains the difference in institutional configurations lead to diverse forms of 
comparative institutional advantages for innovators. 
 
  Coordinated Market Economies Liberal Market Economies 
Innovation Type Incremental, process innovation Radical, product innovation 
Control Mechanism Nonmarket Market 
Corporate 
Governance 
Decision Making 
(corporate leadership) 
work council and consensus style 
decision making top-down unilateral control 
Inter-corporate linkages interlocking corporate directors, cross shareholding equity markets with dispersed shareholders 
Business Priorities Growth and employment emphasizes current profitability 
Corporate Strategies product differentiation intense product competition 
M&A possibilities against hostile takeovers few restrictions to hostile takeovers 
Finance 
Regulation Long-term commitment,  Expects short-term equity returns 
Corporate finance large state owned banks Recapitalized on stock markets, high reliance on venture capital 
Inter-firm Collaboration highly coordinated industrial relations 
low inter-firm collaboration by restrictive 
anti-trust and contract laws 
Labor 
Market 
Job Security long term (inflexible) short term (flexible) 
Work Collaboration autonomous independent 
Education/Training Industry/Corporate specific vocational skills mobile general skills 
Unions and Associations Strong Mediocre or nonexistent 
Representative Countries 
Continental Europe: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, 
Nordic States 
Anglo-Saxon Economies: U.S.A., Canada, 
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland 
Table 2. Comparison of LME and CME 
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The institutional configurations in CMEs relates to highly coordinated industrial-relation 
systems supported by corporate governance structures portrayed as work councils and consensus style 
decision making. Corporate governance is also outlined by interlocking corporate directors and cross 
shareholding that secludes hostile takeovers while easing the burdens of turnarounds on profits. The 
combination of typical CME institutions secures longevity in employment, corporate strategies essential 
to product differentiation than product competition, and institutional workforce education nurturing 
higher skills in industry or company specific technology. All these elements assume a definite attitude 
that fosters incremental innovation. Despite the encouraging characteristics of incremental innovation, 
however, the institutional configurations are accepted as stumbling blocks for radical innovation. In the 
manner that consensus style decision making, as well as the interlocking nature of corporate directorship 
in the corporate structure, facilitating incremental innovation, resultantly obstructs radical change 
deemed necessary for reorganization of the established structure and hinders the diffusion of 
innovations. The consequences of cross shareholdings making mergers and acquisition more difficult 
inadvertently results in continued challenges for acquiring new technological knowledge.116 
The ambivalence of LMEs also contains both sides of a same coin in a reverse fashion. Flexible 
employment patterns in LMEs enable intense changes in production lines of firms while maintaining 
the proper labor mix. The relatively easy conditions for corporate M&A open new opportunities of firm 
level asset exchanges, including technological knowhow and scientific expertise. In terms of corporate 
decision making, the top-down control system permits corporate leadership to enforce rapid 
organizational changes responding to external developments. The flip side of the coin for LME 
supported institutions puts into account that corporate strategies concentrating on shareholder interest, 
seeking short term returns for profits, curtailing job security, eventually impedes worker commitment 
in developing industry/firm specific skills, which is considered a crucial factor for incremental 
innovation. 
2.3.3. Theoretical Limits of the VoC Debate 
A strong dispute against the dichotomy regarding the VoC way of aligning LME and CME 
countries based on innovation performances, however, claims that the empirical evidence in 
technological outcomes, mainly derived through the form of patent data, does not necessarily support 
the discourse of LME countries specializing in more radical sectors than CMEs. Opposing propositions 
mainly argue that the VoC categorization on prevalent innovation types confines its scope in only two 
representative countries, the United States and Germany. Such hasty generalization subsequently 
resulted in committing a biased analysis of the VoC way of thinking. A recent study describes the 
evidence provoked by the VoC literature is not supportable when the theory excludes the United States 
from the survey, stating that the United States remains as a major outlier in innovative performances 
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among the surveyed countries, of which seriously lopsided the results on the study of capitalism.117 
Also, the survey indicated mixed outcomes of CME and LME scientific achievements, claiming that 
CMEs, in some cases, appeared higher than LMEs in certain industrial sectors considered radical in 
technological innovation. 118  Another study that validated the VoC statements through reviewing 
USPTO analysis, which also showed similar results, asserting that LMEs roughly showed patterns of 
radical innovation while CMEs in incremental innovation.119 The study further argued that both types 
of capitalist market economies, although showing some distinctive features of each prevalent type, 
generally exhibited diverse patterns of specialization, which resulted in quite heterogeneous outcomes 
across industries.120 
The VoC literature accentuates the major success factor in macroeconomic performance 
depends on the implementation of institutional coherence.121 That is, coherence defined by institutional 
consistency pertinent to either side of the binary dichotomy of market or nonmarket forces – centralized 
wage policies and powerful unions coupled with a corporatist government, or a decentralized wage 
setting and weak unions coupled with a liberal government – generate conditions for stronger economic 
growth. Thus, the more the institutions coherently arrange to either side of the capitalist market 
economies, whether LME or CME types, the chances of economic growth becomes more likely. The 
literature further advocates a market structure that obviously aligns under one of the main capitalist 
categories performs socioeconomically better than countries that show hybrid patterns.122 It argues that 
an obvious alignment under one of the two categories congruently arranges better conditions for 
institutional complementarities that generate favorable synergy towards innovation in each of its 
respective sector of industrial specialty.123 However, the continued process of social mobility caused 
by globalization has eroded much of the conventional boundaries of these two distinctive alignments. 
In some cases shown in Nordic economies, which are primarily considered CMEs, countries such as 
Denmark or Sweden, after adopting critical institutional aspects of LME practices, whereby introducing 
a more hybrid structure through some dynamic interaction between market and nonmarket institutions, 
have consequently become more competitive in its national performances, thus defying the principles 
of mainstream VoC assertions on institutional complementarities.124 Especially in the Danish case, 
political decentralization in industrial policy was shown as the most critical factor that led to the 
diminishing bargaining power of corporatist unions and associations. This resulted in more 
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institutionalized collaboration between private and public sector entities, or market and nonmarket 
figures, which enabled to transform the Danish economic landscape from a low-end primary industry 
to a vibrant high-tech economy.125 The corporatist debate of the Nordic model will be further reviewed 
in the following section. 
Distinctive development patterns regarding the categorization of LMEs and CMEs tend to 
intermingle more towards convergence when considering sectoral differences, especially in areas of 
complex high-tech systems. The case of bio-tech, or bio-economy, shows more evident trends in 
convergence considering this matter. The bio-economy is a sector that consists of dynamic public-
private interdependencies in R&D, sponsored by multiple arrays of venture capital financing, 
orchestrated under sophisticated state regulation that fosters a better condition for learning and the 
diffusion of innovation. After comparing some leading countries in bio-tech, grouped in accordance 
with the VoC way of classification, it was concluded that sectoral policies matter more than national 
policy inclinations.126 Thus, an obvious CME state like Sweden compared to a LME state like the US 
did not show much difference in the institutional layout that sustains each bio-economic sector, which 
shows an apparent pattern of hybrid institutional layouts in the economy. 
2.3.4. Alternative Capitalist Models: Nordic Model of Neo-Corporatism 
The Nordic model implies to the economic and social success model of Nordic countries 
represented by welfare politics and free market economies. The common trait of this model is 
demonstrated through the continued support for a universalist welfare state, at which the promotion of 
individual autonomy and social mobility is granted alongside a commitment to free trade. The elements 
of a universalist welfare state become more evident when scrutinizing the remarkable growth patterns 
alongside with low income inequality and maximum labor force participation. Generally, these 
characteristics constitute CME type industrial structures where major industrial expectations are shaped 
around incremental innovative performances. On the contrary, the industrial efforts of Nordic countries 
also incorporate significant sectors in the radical innovative realm as well. For instance, Finnish 
telecommunication firms take a competitive market share of the international mobile phone markets, 
Denmark competes in the radically innovative sectors of therapeutic drugs, and Sweden established a 
strategic footage in the highly vibrant global aerospace industry. 127  Therefore, it would be too 
overreaching to narrow the scope of innovation in Nordic welfare states simply to incremental 
innovation sectors. In this respect, the Nordic model has been studied under the framework of a neo-
corporatist perspective, which transitioned from conservatively protective institutions to a more liberal 
market driven competitive stature, and now transformed to become an effective knowledge-intensive 
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economic structure. 
Traditional corporatist debates illustrate neo-corporatism as a theory of interest representation, 
demonstrated in a coordinated form of interaction between interest groups and governments within a 
highly bureaucratized economic system of an interventionist state, with an exclusive focus on western 
industrial democracies.128 It once served as a dominant form of governance implemented by established 
protective institutions in existing industries that moderated the conflicting interests between trade 
unions and employer associations, which politically exchanged for industrial peace, generous social 
benefits, and expansionary fiscal policies. 129  However, these legacy institutions inadvertently 
complicated the transition of Western European corporatist systems into a high-tech economic structure. 
Especially when considering the economic opportunity of information technologies presented to East 
Asian developmental states, the same technology situation was eroding the industrial niches of western 
corporatist states.130 Nonetheless, the Nordic corporatist model, represented by Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden, proved its accommodating capacities to the fledgling information revolution, as 
well as its perseverance to the shockwave of the global financial crisis. 
 
Corporatist 
Institutions Financial Markets Labor Markets 
Industrial Policy 
(knowledge) Countries 
Conservative Patient capital and banking blocs 
Employment protections, 
unemployment benefits 
Defensive policies to 
mobilize resources around 
existing sectors 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Germany 
Competitive Tax reductions and liberalized markets 
Social consensus on 
Reduced social benefits and 
employment protection 
Fiscal austerity to promote 
market competition 
Ireland, 
Netherlands 
Creative 
Risk capital and 
venture capital 
promotion 
Human capital investment 
in disruptive sectors 
Concentration in basic and 
applied R&D in emerging 
industries 
Finland, 
Denmark, 
Sweden 
Table 3. Corporatist Institutions 
Policies of centralized collective wage bargaining and fiscal policies supportive of full 
employment forms the basis of the primary characteristics expected for conservative corporatist 
institutions, at which was considered as a highly effective governance tool in Western European welfare 
states during the 1970s and 80s.131 Firm and industry specific skills were nurtured through protective 
industrial policies against outside investments. In this instance, financial markets are committed to long 
term patient capital channeled through universal banks, and employs investment strategies to grant 
employment as part of providing services to protect and incrementally upgrade the established industrial 
structure.132 Thus, social transactions remain conservative whereby protective measures are imposed 
for existing industries whereas efforts to promote movement into newer sectors are insufficient. 
Consequently, social resources are concentrated on reliable, low-medium tech industries posing lesser 
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risks towards competence destroying innovations.133 Conservative corporatist institutions therefore has 
proven competencies in low-tech niches and established industries, but is not a recommended route for 
competence destroying innovations nor capable in responding against external economic shock.  
Competitive corporatism, on the other hand, is more prone towards market led adjustments. 
Compared to the conservative corporatist approach that focuses on the degree of coordination in the 
production level, competitive corporatism places more efforts on social concertation in policy 
formulation.134 It resembles neoliberal market measures as it promotes market enhancing measures 
such as reduced government spending, less generous social benefits, and the expansion of part time or 
irregular contracts.135 As part of redistributing efforts of financial resources from underperforming 
noncompetitive industries to new growth oriented enterprises, competitive corporatist practices 
assertively function towards cutting income taxes in the personal or corporate level. Therefore, it is 
accepted as a convention for competence-enhancing innovations by facilitating the transition of low-
tech industries into high-tech markets.136 However, the industrial sector that exhibits more elements 
favorable to competitive corporatist institutions are in basic manufacturing or assembly operations 
rather than knowledge intensive sectors. 
Creative corporatism takes further action into the stance of competitive corporatist institutions 
in terms of consensus building and coordination in the production level. The collaborative nexus of 
sharing resources and information between firms, labor, and policy makers enables countries to 
adequately respond against disruptive economic changes by effectively decoupling traditional 
investments in declining sectors while targeting new knowledge intensive activities.137 The flexible 
employment of public funds into new enterprises that are devoted in novel research and development 
works. However, the introduction of creative corporatist norms also exposed countries to disruptive 
technological innovations, which constantly threatens incumbent firms in the high-tech sector from 
external challenges. 138  The traits of conservative corporatist institutions were palpable to Nordic 
countries until the late 1980s. In the case of universal banks, the Danish Privatbanken and Finnish 
banking blocs served as capital providers in established sectors such as pulp and forestry in Finland or 
food processing in Denmark that arranged protective constellations for economic growth in low-tech 
niches. But these protective barriers later hindered the economic adjustment into newer enterprise 
markets as the pre-established sectors evolved into price-fixing cartels that prevented the flow of capital 
into rising high-tech demands. It was only after the elimination of such protective financial collusion 
and the subsequent employment of selective bargaining strategies that enabled the Nordic economies to 
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revamp its competitiveness in the regional and global trade establishments.139 In this regard, sources 
of Nordic competitiveness originated from the fact of significantly overhauling traditional neo-
corporatist institutions by implementing neo-liberalist reform without sacrificing much of the essential 
corporatist ordeals.  
The pinnacle of Finland’s innovation policy is its successful transition into a knowledge 
intensive value added economy by effectively redistributing national resources into high-tech research 
and development, not just simply eradicating existing normative foundations. The transition was 
implemented by creating supporting institutions that linked firms, research institutes, and public 
universities, forming a vibrant consortium of high-tech corporate research. In a sectoral perspective, 
R&D efforts avoided simple assembly operations, which are generally sensitive to cost changes, and 
non-tradable services such as residential construction, while concentrated most of its efforts in high-
end ICT and biotechnology.140 The initiatives were structurally implemented by funneling sizable 
investments into high-tech R&D with public funds made available through a public institution called 
the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes), as well as launching new venture 
capital funds, based on the directives of the tripartite Science Policy Council.141 The Finnish industrial 
tradition of constructive state-business engagement and inter-firm collaboration between banking blocs 
and price-fixing cartels facilitated firms to share sensitive information and selectively allocate scare 
resources, which attributed to the successful implementation of these initiatives.142  
In the mobile telecommunication industry, the establishment of the Nordic Mobile Telephone 
(NMT) technology standard in 1981 created economies of scale with a noticeable joint market size, 
which operated as an open standard inducing competition. The NMT placed Nordic players well to 
compete in a digital standard called Groupe Special Mobile (GSM), which became adopted by three 
quarters of the world.143 Denmark’s model of innovation is highlighted in policies supportive to start-
ups and spin-off firms rather than providing for incumbents that already have established footprints in 
the market.144 The policy finds its basis from a long tradition of bipartite cooperation between trade 
unions and industry in skill formation that vertically covers peak-level forums down to the shop floor. 
It is coined by the term ‘flexicurity’, which represents proactively flexible labor market policies that 
allow managerial practices the liberty to hire and dismiss employment with minimum government 
intervention in the labor market while still providing post-employment security for workers.145 In terms 
of unemployment benefits, flexicurity balances between social rights and public obligations in welfare 
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schemes by imposing motivational effects in tailored vocational training programs that accommodates 
social needs.146 R&D schemes came in a form of building a strong network of small and medium sized 
enterprises at the local level where producers and suppliers were familiar with each other through 
previous educational and technological experiences provided by approved technological service 
institutes or universities.147 The networks allowed participating firms to diversify into a higher value 
added sectors of interest that facilitated spin-off firms divested from larger incumbents as well as 
establishing favorable grounds for start-up firms.148 
2.4. Complex Product and Systems (CoPS) 
2.4.1. Overview of CoPS Literature 
High technology sectors are known as areas holding significant percentages of human capital 
jobs, such as scientists, engineers, indicated through high R&D expenditures, information intensity, 
stock of capital, and various elements accommodating definitions as such.149 Other characteristics of 
high-tech also delineate effective knowledge sharing channels, highly geographically concentrated 
innovation clusters, and separation of design and manufacturing functions.150 High technology sectors 
referred in this study are those labeled as industrial products characterized with a large hierarchically-
organized supply chain interconnected with a network of prime contractors and suppliers. This sector 
normally has significant economic and political values to the customers and producers, which is 
characterized by highly capital intensive, low volume production, tailored design products, and the vast 
scope of interconnected networks for R&D, production, and operations. The sector is relatively 
considered either a novel product area, associated with rapid growth in a self-sustaining manner, or a 
significantly extensive system area that spans into a long life cycle lasting over decades. In this respect, 
innovation emerges in an evolutionary fashion in terms of the insertion of new technological features 
conducted through a phased system upgrade and modification procedure.151 As such, these features 
make the sector discernable from conventional mass produced industrial products. Intuitively 
distinguishing this form of evolving product areas from the conventional commodity products of mass 
production, complex products and systems are often cited in a general term as CoPS. The subject 
industrial fields of CoPS embody significant uncertainty and risks, involving a myriad of components, 
interconnected network architecture, and control mechanisms after completion of production, which 
conceptually brings in typically intricate attributes represented by coordination and innovation 
throughout the production process.  
                                                          
146 Ibid., p. 29. 
147 Malgorzata Runiewicz-Wardyn, Knowledge Flows, Technological Change, and Regional Growth in the European 
Union, Springer, 2013, p. 82. 
148 Ibid., p. 89. 
149 Ann Markusen, Peter Hall and Amy Glasmeier, High Tech America: The What, How, Where and Why of Sunrise 
Industries, Unwin Hyman, 1987, p. 5. 
150 Ashok Bardhan, Dwight Jaffee, Cynthia Kroll, Globalization and a High-Tech Economy: California, the United States 
and Beyond, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 21. 
151 Mike Hobday, “Product complexity, innovation and industrial organization,” Research Policy No. 26, 1998, p. 672. 
 42 
Firstly, unlike mass production commodity items where the firm is identified as the main unit 
of analysis, the CoPS project itself, which spans into cross sectoral collaboration between various 
entities such as the prime contractor (often designated as the system integrator), bidding party (in many 
cases governments or large businesses or consortiums of such), subcontractors and associated supply 
chain, constitutes the main unit of analysis. The absolute reality here is the fact that CoPS development 
mostly exceeds the engineering capacities of a single firm, which strongly requires the accommodation 
of other professional entities performing in its established area of expertise within the project boundaries. 
Here, the public appeal of CoPS is through promoting the idea of the project itself opposed to mass 
product items where products become the primary subject for soliciting marketing promotion. In this 
aspect, due to the small batches of production, CoPS is more influenced by customer needs than regular 
market dynamics. Therefore, the traditional product-life cycle debate resonates marginally into the 
discourse of CoPS. In this regard, CoPS projects are hierarchically structured, meaning that each phase 
of technical development and production are closely connected, at which unit costs and technical 
complexity become extensively attached from the previous phase to the next phase of designing and 
manufacturing. Therefore, the integration of disparate components and modules thus needs to be closely 
coordinated and engineered.152 
Secondly, cross-sectoral coordination constitutes a major feature of CoPS. Traditional 
organizations show predominantly vertical structures, which eventually result in inflexibility, 
coordination difficulties, and low integration. The complexity of system design and production of major 
end items from this sector requires a high aggregation of knowledge and an intricate manufacturing 
base Here, it becomes imperative for the central agent called the system integrator to coordinate the 
participation of external supplier units that provide a wide range of expertise and components essential 
to the product development process.153 The array of different system components plays distinctive and 
interrelated roles, hence each serving in independently functional areas but comprehensively 
synchronized to achieve a common goal. Also, the larger and more complex structure of the system 
makes the knowledge transfer process more relational base and tacit in nature throughout the project 
design and execution phase, where small numbers of expert technicians in relevant fields eventually 
turn out to be the only feasible sources of major manufacturing functions. In this aspect, the relationship 
between the system integrating firms and subcontracting supplier units become critical in the course of 
developing and manufacturing complex products. Adding to the already immoderate complexity 
challenges of coordination, military systems also require substantial feedback loops from downstream 
to upstream production phases, which substantially alters system architectures and design specifics in 
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the system integration process.154 
Thirdly, CoPS are inherently subject to public norms and regulations, which often serve as 
either catalysts or impediments for innovation. Mostly in the realms of public safety compliances and 
standardized interfaces, the regulatory preconditions over CoPS development and manufacturing 
processes customarily facilitate the engineering and manufacturing phases. For instance, 
standardization of system components not only assists compatibility with other systems within the 
network structure, but also promotes knowledge transfer to other learning units as well. However, such 
standardization mechanism in some occasion confines CoPS units from further exploring novel 
opportunities or adopt evolutionary technologies into the overall system. The current conundrum with 
military GPS encryption supports this notion.155 Another aspect of regulatory control over CoPS is 
represented in export control regimes of certain products, mostly associated with military applications. 
The fundamental objective of US high-tech export control policies was to preclude the transfer of state-
of-the-art defense technologies to adversaries such as the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw 
Pact, which adversely had harmful impacts onto the US economy in terms of sustaining technological 
competitiveness.156 It was demonstrated that the discouragement of diffusing technological knowhow 
by these control regimes have obstructed subsequent learning opportunities through knowledge 
diffusion to improve the skill sets and technological readiness of the industrial sectors. 
A fourth aspect of CoPS is the growing importance of informal relationships. As mentioned in 
the second chapter, the diffusion of tacit knowledge, which mostly embodies deep experience and high-
tech artisanship, is associated with inter-relational attributes that often requires the circumvention of 
formally established procedures and communication protocols of an organization. However, it is 
through these means of communication where rapid exchanges of ideas and information proliferates 
and creates successful convergent processes for better innovative outcomes. 157  These exchanges 
through informal channels are deemed critical for the development of novel products. A brief 
description of informal relationships refers to social interactions or the amassing of social capitals of 
the firm. In this relational perspective, the buildup of ‘trust’ is considered the most important element 
for stronger and sustained exchanges.158 
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2.4.2. Integrated Analytical Framework of CoPS 
The conditions described above presents continued challenges in various ways. An integrated 
analytical framework over these CoPS challenges mainly highlights four areas of concern; Business, 
Systems Integration Process, Organization, and External Circumstances.159 Business aspects of CoPS 
engage in the analysis of strategic business objectives such as market share and cooperative alliances 
with other firms. In a sense of firm level relationships, intercorporate technology alliances are viewed 
as pipelines for the focal firm to obtain access into a larger variety of knowledge and resources.160 Thus, 
the better the resources in business portfolio the partner firm obtains the more benefits to the focal firm 
by establishing access relationships to those resources through alliances. Such traits are shown evident 
in high-technology sectors where a network of shared knowledge and interaction becomes a norm for 
innovative processes and outcomes. For instance, the typical business practices of Japanese companies 
in the form of firm level learning and the effectiveness of production networks are demonstrated in the 
Toyota case where knowledge transfers across organizational boundaries are facilitated by inter-
organizational routines constructed under strong network identities generated through knowledge 
sharing mechanisms; rules for knowledge protection against free riders; creation of cost reducing 
knowledge sharing processes in sub-networks.161 Human asset specificity, or human specialization, 
which efficiently allows the transfer of know-how and technology, is a well-known substance formed 
from long term inter-firm relationships and continuous information exchanging instruments that are 
deemed integral for innovation.162 
Systems integration and project management constitute the core capabilities of the CoPS 
supply chain. The effective organizational form adaptive for CoPS is described as a Project Based 
Organization (PBO), which is normally a temporary project formed with the objective to develop, 
manufacture, and operate customary products considered in the realm of CoPS. The PBO is intrinsically 
flexible and reconfigurable to changing client needs opposed to the general notion of large hierarchical 
organizations being rigid and obtrusive to customer changes and innovations. 163  Opposed to the 
conventional form of matrix organizations, where functional divisions such as finance, marketing, 
engineering, human resources, R&D, manufacturing, etc. represent the division of operating functions 
and capabilities, in a PBO the functional resources are shared by each project. Here, the governing 
mechanism between project divisions and functional divisions primarily lie upon the delegated 
authorities from senior corporate management boards to project managers and functional managers. A 
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typical project manager in a PBO demonstrate stronger authorities over decision making than functional 
managers when coping with emerging properties or responding to changing client requirements, 
whereas functional managers exercise stronger authorities vice versa over routine production and 
engineering tasks.164 
Risk factors associated with large CoPS projects are likely to involve institutional 
commitments that may entrap industries or the society in general from the respective business. The legal, 
organizational, and political institutions originally arranged to support CoPS projects create inertia that 
causes inferior technology paths to survive the business cycle long after it should’ve been abandoned.165 
The technological lock-in reinforced by the close relationship between states and businesses, which 
prevent the democratic functioning of market forces, eventually result in catastrophic outcomes where 
the society has to pay for the remedies of extricating from the business. The British Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP) Project is a case that exemplifies this situation where the decision to 
sustain the project ended up in paying huge losses by the society in terms of remedy payments as well 
as losses in opportunities to invest in other more promising fields. 
 
 
  Figure 1. CoPS Integrated Analytic Framework  
  (Adopted and reproduced from Ren and Yeo, “Research Challenges on CoPS Innovation”, Journal 
of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers, Vol. 23, Issue 6, 2006.) 
 
2.4.3. Progressive Dynamics of System Integration: CoPS and Innovation Networks 
The sequential aspects of economic catch-up models suggest the feasibility of firms short-
cutting certain developmental phases in the industrialization process. As stated in previous sections of 
this chapter, after acquiring the requisite knowledge and skill base in the respective manufacturing 
subjects, firms were able to skip, or create, certain developmental processes in the course of catching 
up. Under the context of CoPS domain, however, certain circumventing efforts do not necessarily lead 
into successful catch-up outcomes. The repetitive and iterative natures of CoPS manufacturing calls for 
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deepen accumulation of knowledge (R&D) and skillsets (manufacturing), which require governments 
to coordinate coherent development strategies and firms to build capacities for engineering and 
manufacturing. In this aspect, the path following credentials through the practice of OEM-ODM-OBM 
process is the most assured pathway for technological catch-up. Especially, in a Schumpeterian Mark 
II technological regime where economies of scale and scope relies on an integrated R&D structure and 
a horizontally collaborative production system between public and private entities, catch-up strategies 
adheres to the phased development sequences pre-established by the forerunners in the sector. 166 
Catching-up in the CoPS domain require extensive networking with major actors with a broad and deep 
integrated knowledge base and skillset. The pivotal role of institutions managing to coordinate and 
leverage these capabilities determines the success factors of a CoPS project.167 
Sources of knowledge in highly concentrated technological fields are widely distributed, at 
which brings the point where no firm or entity singlehandedly obtains the required skill set that can 
bring innovation to the market. Thus, extensive collaboration from all dimensions formed through 
routed membership becomes a prerequisite that can effectively manage these diversified patterns of 
technological progression and innovation. Organizations that established a multitude of collaborative 
ties most likely construct improved protocols to exchange and filter critical information. These 
collaborative relationships mapped as networks become the locus of innovation that directly impacts on 
competitive positions.168 
In the sense of technological innovation, networks are formed around contractual relationships 
demonstrated in cross industrial disciplinary research consortia, strategic alliances between firms, 
professional memberships in various technological associations, and so forth. Intensiveness of 
relationships is divided into strong and weak ties. Strong ties become obvious in risk sharing instances 
such as in R&D partnerships, joint ventures, and equitable alliances, whereas weak ties appear evident 
in risk averse relationships such as in licensing or patenting agreements.169 However, tacit knowledge 
is more transferrable through strong ties while novel opportunities are mostly formed around weak ties. 
The more sophisticated the knowledge and technological applications are in place, the importance of 
network mechanisms in R&D, product development and distribution become ostensible. Other related 
studies show positive correlation between technological sophistication and intensity of strategic 
alliances.170 Innovation in complex systems such as the aerospace sector shows apparent features of 
this trait. Informal ties make significant contributions to innovation because it facilitates the sharing of 
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complex information. Innovation Networks can positively serve as conduits or channels of information 
flows and exchanges. But on the flip side, innovation networks also present challenges in effectively 
exploiting innovation opportunities. Established networks that form strong ties and mutually dependent 
collaborations often enmesh the relationship into path dependent inflexibilities that often obstruct 
further advancement of technological opportunities. Network connectivity thus also has its declining 
limitations shown by diminishing returns in effectiveness and efficiency of patenting performances. 
Cohesiveness in networks facilitates the flow of information but often does not recognize promising 
sources of new ideas. An optimal blend of strong and weak ties is therefore necessary, but it is also a 
difficult task to surmount.171  
Market failures and network failures are together known causes why certain countries cannot 
excel in S&T. Markets fail when informed rational individuals are absent, or when exchange of goods, 
services, and capital are nonexistent, or when innovation and economic efficiency fail to appear. 
Governments intervene in order to prevent market failures. General notion understood as basic primers 
used by governments to build strong market forces are highlighted in the five pillar construct; 1) 
Property Rights; 2) R&D Subsidies; 3) STEM Education; 4) Research Universities; 5) Trade Policy. 
There is no silver bullet that defines the pathway to innovation, whereas the five pillars proportionately 
interacting with each other determines the national innovation rates of countries in S&T capacities.172 
Another noteworthy element that constitutes absorptive capacities in S&T considers the 
institutionalization of technical standards. Often coined measurement standards, a narrow definition of 
the term relates with well documented technical specifics, codified criterion, or accepted practices in 
products, processes, and performances. Technical standards carry significant weight that enable 
efficient communication between different systems or network participants, and becomes more critical 
in highly complex product systems.173 
 
2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
Institutions have always served as a conduit of innovation. Different accounts of innovation were 
generated by differing establishments and cultural heritages, but the concept of transferring information 
and ideas among people, enterprises, via institutions, remains almost identical. Innovation and the 
following developments in technology results from a complex set of relationships among actors in the 
system, which include enterprises, universities, and government research centers. In this context, policy 
makers need to understand these mechanisms to leverage better performances and improving overall 
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competitiveness by nurturing the systems of innovation beyond national level boundaries. In this regard, 
policies which seek to improve networking among the actors and institutions in the system and which 
aim at enhancing the innovative capacity of firms, particularly their ability to identify and absorb 
technologies, are most valuable in the practice of innovation. 
 Putting this into consideration, the study intended to apply different sets of innovation theories 
with a vested interest on institutional arrangements as an analytical framework in the overall attempt to 
review the industrial upgrading process of a fast following economy. The constrained discourse of the 
developmental state theorem in the post Asian Financial Crisis era, regarding the country’s strong 
willingness to enter the realm of Schumpeterian Mark II technological regimes, have posed several 
challenges in regards to the structural adaptations of the subject innovation system. State driven 
economic planning initiatives receded where corporate Korea has taken over more shares in the 
innovation responsibility. Vertical stovepipes embedded within the state decision making process, 
which was proven effective during the days of fast economic catch-up, have turned out to be laggards 
and inadequate in the course of responding against undefined setbacks originated from market forces. 
In this regard, state bureaucracy driven by technocrats has transitioned to market professionalism. The 
economy, especially in high tech complex product systems, diversified into a myriad of business sectors 
where state technocrats could no longer regulate the entire planning and development process. The 
technological/industrial upgrading process has phased out the public expectation of short business 
returns and necessitated the requirements to institute long gestation periods over R&D investments and 
a process to effectively accumulate knowledge and experience.174 In respect to legacy developmental 
state assertions, fast following countries successfully stretched the defined pathways of economic 
development, which embodied low risk and assured investment outcomes. The circumstances 
transitioned to entering undefined high risk developmental processes blended in uncertain business 
prospectus. The innovation system accustomed to codified processes in engineering and manufacturing 
is compelled to transform into a system attuned to learning and exploiting tacit knowledge and 
engineering practices in the respective sectoral area of expertise. Development schemes now have to 
learn how to conceptually design products and competently integrate various engineering functions into 
a system platform. The daunting engineering and manufacturing tasks of complex product systems has 
dissolved the vertically integrated production system into a more horizontally collaborative network 
structure. The incorporation of every actor that counts in the development process, from 
university/government laboratories, statesmen, workshop level technicians, and so forth, has become 
indispensable. Thus, the mechanism to institutionally coordinate the various aspects of launching the 
innovation engine has become identifiable as the key area of focus for the analysis of this study. 
 This study endeavored to capture these elements in the below diagram that strived to 
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accommodate the four primary theoretical discussions of innovation studies – developmental state, 
national innovation system, varieties of capitalism, complex product systems. 
 
 
Figure 2. Analytical Framework of Catch-up Strategies in Schumpeterian Mark II Technological Regimes 
The analysis focuses on the coordinative institutions that function as a linchpin among the 
major actors in a Schumpeterian Mark II technological regime for late entrants in the sector. Hence, the 
interactive coordination processes that accommodate absorptive capacities represented by the concerted 
efforts of knowledge accumulation, and the diffusion mechanisms represented by the production 
networks have been placed in the center of the analysis. Coordinative institutions, in this regard, not 
only considers government roles in terms of regulating the innovation process, but also covers the 
regional and sectoral innovation system spontaneously established and instituted throughout the process 
of building foundational capacities. 
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Chapter 3: The Global Aerospace and Defense Industry 
3.1. Overview 
The global aerospace industry is generally regarded a white man’s playground, considering the fact of 
the industry being predominantly dissected by American and Western European firms. Aerospace is a 
field that has been generally labeled together with the armament industry, thus frequently cited as 
aerospace and defense, although the commercial aircraft manufacturing sector constitute a comfortable 
majority in the global business. Along with motor vehicles and other transport equipment, aircraft 
manufacturing is categorized as complex product systems and is therefore arranged under the 
technological regime of Schumpeterian Mark II sectors.175 
The aerospace industry is a high-tech knowledge intensive industrial sector that induces high 
performance outcomes in production and employment. According to the US Aerospace Industries 
Association in 2007, the average salaries in aerospace (USD 93K) performed 44% higher than that of 
other manufacturing sectors (USD 65K).176 European firms also show similar patterns in value added 
where the per capita productivity of value added marked EUR 82K, which performed higher than 
automobiles (EUR 62K), and locomotives (EUR 44K). In terms of business sales indicators 
comparative to employment rates as of 2015, the net sales of Boeing produced USD 96 billion with an 
employment of 161,400, whereas Samsung produced USD 171 billion with an employment of 
308,745.177 
Aerospace represents a characteristic of a lengthy product development period with a life cycle 
that spans into decades, in addition to high entry barriers in terms of technology refinement and capital 
investments. Based on the comparatively long life cycle of an aircraft product, when a firm once 
successfully penetrates and settles into the industry, the position guarantees a secure and stable condition 
in terms of business earnings. For instance, the Boeing 747 has extended its operations for nearly 40 
years throughout multiple phases of repairs and overhauls after its maiden flight in 1970.178 The F-4 
Phantom is still in use after being constantly upgraded since its first deployment in 1961. Considering 
the long product life cycle of an aircraft, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) is a source of 
sustained growth opportunities, where it generates substantial business returns measured twice as much 
as manufacturing aircrafts.179 The broad scope in coverage between commercial aviation and military 
aircrafts, this paper intends to primarily focus on the defense sector.  
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Figure 3. Global Aerospace and Defense Market Breakdown: Goodrich Corporation 2007 Investor Conference, New 
York City, 31 October 2007 
  
 Major technological breakthroughs in modern aviation history achieved by entrepreneurial 
pioneers such as the Loughead Brothers, Jack Northrop, Claudius Dornier, and so forth, constructed an 
industry centralized across the Atlantic, which continues to thrive even now. The highly sophisticated 
and delicate nature of aeronautical engineering constantly requires highly skilled artisanship organized 
in a standardized arrangement suitable for developing and manufacturing aircrafts with assured quality 
and safety that strictly complies with international norms and regulations. The rules and institutional 
setting for aerospace firms were primarily formed around the interaction between technological 
progress and business interests of Western European and American firms. Thus, the evolutionary 
trajectory of the industry was in favor of the companies operating within the physical boundaries of 
these two continents. However, the globalization trends of the high tech sector and the ensuing pursuit 
of catch-up firms in this playground has introduced new contenders into the field of aerospace, but has 
yet produced any noteworthy outcomes for the new entrants in terms of business performance and an 
established corporate reputation. Thus, penetrating the thick barriers of the industry has been a challenge 
for new entrants in various ways. This chapter attempts to review the general characteristics of the 
aerospace industry in technological complexity, institutional arrangements, and industry structure, 
under the context of seeking to identify the challenges of enhancing sectoral competitiveness in this 
realm. 
3.2. Technological Complexity and High Cost Factors 
A quote from a local Seattle engineer at a Boeing plant once claimed that an aircraft is a million pieces 
flying together in one single formation. The increasing number of components interconnected to higher 
operational systems makes aircraft products more complex with the continued technological 
progression of aeronautical engineering.  
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3.2.1. Aerospace Industry as Schumpeterian Mark II Technological Regimes 
In the early days of aircraft-manufacturing, the comparatively easy entry into competition and 
the frequent erosion of an incumbent’s market position precipitated by new firm entries have labeled 
the sector as a technological regime under Schumpeter Mark I. However, as aircraft-manufacturing 
transformed into a science based industry, with the growing complexity of technology and ensuing 
establishment of sector specific technological regimes, highlighted under internationally compatible 
technology standards, regulatory safety protocols, and the sustained dominance of several global 
champion firms, the sector became labeled under Schumpeter Mark II technological regimes. 180 
Essentially, aerospace involves complex engineering processes through the integration of electronics, 
aerodynamics, propulsion science, composite materials, etc., in which activities for deepen knowledge 
accumulation and technology diffusion processes becomes paramount when striving to sustain business 
operations in this cutthroat competitive environment. In reference to the Boeing 747-8 Intercontinental, 
having made its first delivery in 2012, the airplane consists of over 6 million individual components, 
and was optimally designed to incorporate new composite materials to improve rising demands of 
global fuel economy standards. Manufacturing points of critical aircraft components were distributed 
to nearly 30 countries, supplied by 550 supplier firms.181 
Combat aircraft development is considered an expensive venture as it accompanies exorbitant 
price tags for development, production, and life cycle sustainment. Therefore, only a handful of firms 
in the world are capable of manufacturing modern combat aircrafts.182 According to a recent RAND 
survey on combat aircraft cost increasing factors through comparing the development and production 
unit price of the F-15A (1975) and F-22A (2005), system complexity represented in material, equipment, 
and labor components contributed almost 40% towards price escalation. Accounting for other 
contributing factors, including the learning process of these complex systems (15%), the total price 
escalation factors caused by technical complexity grew to a portion of approximately 55%.183 Such 
trend is more evident when reviewing major aerospace and development programs. Many of these 
programs have suffered large substantial cost increases and schedule delays, while exhibited lower than 
expected performances. The risk factor identified so far largely contributes to the ambitious 
development objectives that exceeds technological capabilities within the given budget and timeline.184 
This is attributed by the increasing technological complexity of these systems compounded by a risk 
averse culture that has nearly no tolerance of failure under a budget-constrained and economically 
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pessimistic environment. Although new systems engineering technologies and processes pioneered 
aeronautical engineering programs in the heydays of the aerospace and defense industry, the complexity 
of aerospace and defense programs has outpaced the advancement of these systems engineering tools 
in functional fields of advanced simulation, spiral development, complex adaptive systems, and so 
forth.185 
 For security reasons, countries prefer to localize the supply base of critical armaments. 
However, the risk factor associated with a country’s decision to introduce combat aircrafts relates to the 
ever increasing cost pressure alongside with the degree of compromising national security through 
foreign procurement. Country’s tend to retain domestic capabilities of supplying critical defense 
products such as ammunition or command control and reconnaissance platforms for security reasons, 
whereas costly complex product systems entailed with significant development risks such as combat 
aircrafts and underwater naval systems attract comparatively less attention in terms of indigenous 
supply capabilities. Thus, to the surprise of many, combat aircrafts have become an internationally 
marketable commodity that can be substituted by foreign products. Figure 2 describes the relational 
aspects between domestic supply aspirations (security pressure) and cost realities (cost pressure). The 
higher the development risk associated with increasing cost projections, a country shows lesser interest 
in attaining indigenous supply capabilities, which increases the possibility of foreign product 
substitution.186 
 
 
Figure 4. Cost vs. Security Pressures in Procuring Major Defense Equipment    
Source: PriceWaterhouseCooper, The Defense Industry in the 21st Century, 2005. 
 
On the other hand, the cost-benefits of technology upgrades over system performance are 
marginal. Technological complexity and associated cost increases account negatively to product 
                                                          
185 Report by Charles River Associates, “Innovation in Aerospace and Defense,” CRA Project No. M13385-05, p. 21. 
186 PriceWaterhouseCooper, The Defense Industry in the 21st Century, 2005, pp. 7-10. 
 54 
competitiveness in the international market. The marginal utility of introducing slightly advanced 
system performance in modern aircrafts consequently incurs sharp increases in development costs. 
Therefore, no matter how feasible the performance improvement applied to the aircraft, the outcome 
results in slightly superior technological performances compared to the previous levels. Consequently, 
the substantial increase in price tags significantly degrades product competitiveness in the international 
market.187 Considering commercial risk factors, a sizeable scale of upfront capital investments is the 
industry norm in a sense of enduring long term recuperation periods projected on investment returns 
over development costs. For instance, in order to deliver a large commercial aircraft in the 1970s, an 
upfront development cost of approximately USD 2 billion was the norm, at which the business revenues 
started flowing in after four years of initial delivery. In this regard, the industry has to undergo an 
average breakeven point around 10 to 12 years. The economy of scale at least allows the commercial 
sector to predict market trends and performances, but the military sector entirely depends on 
government procurement, which makes it tremendously challenging for sustainable business operations 
after the conclusion of the program.188 In an already overcrowded commercial aircraft market, for 
instance, the cancellation of the MD-11 medium-long range transport has signified the era of smaller 
and more efficient transport aircraft types in the civil aircraft industry, which permanently ousted 
McDonnell Douglas from the civil aircraft business.189 
In a program management perspective, the traditional development strategies of aircraft 
manufacturing follow a concurrent engineering practice rather than sequential prototyping. Concurrent 
engineering is a method that allows program authorities to combine the developmental stages of 
engineering together with the manufacturing phase within a condense timeline. In comparison, 
sequential development results in long development periods over a thorough verification process before 
final product delivery, thus has not been a preferred procurement method in defense products. In 
concurrent engineering, program milestones often proceed to the next stage without adequately 
conducting test and evaluation over major prototypes in each developmental phase. In this aspect, 
concurrent engineering carries substantial engineering risks, which requires retrofitting efforts before 
entering into low rate initial production phases of the subject defense product. The retrofitting sequences 
result in chronic program delays and cost increases. The U.S. defense apparatus initially adopted this 
procurement practice during the Second World War and subsequently into the Cold War, with strategic 
reasons over maintaining military advantage in the arms race against the Soviet Bloc, supported by a 
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sizeable defense budget to attain ambitious performance requirements. Notably, the U.S. Air Force’s 
strategic bomber fleet after WWII, ranging from the Boeing B-47 Stratojet all the way to the Northrop 
Grumman B-2 Spirit, has all selected concurrent engineering methods as the primary practice for 
development in order to comply with critical program milestones. Such engineering methodologies 
have become a norm in military aircraft-manufacturing worldwide.190 
In a systems integration point of view, the developmental standpoint of complex systems such 
as aerospace products have become extremely costly and involves diverse technological capabilities. 
Relationships with subcontractors are critical for prime contractors to successfully design and construct 
various subsystems and modules into the main platform, at which system integration work becomes the 
paramount phase of all development and production efforts. The requirement to assemble the complex 
aerodynamics of propulsion systems, avionics, operations software, and armaments, to name a few, in 
a single platform effectively enough to surmount the developmental objectives, has made it crucially 
important for the prime contractor to understand the engineering specifics of its suppliers. Thus, the 
aerospace industry comprises a network of interconnected firms providing modularized subcomponents, 
where the prime contractor – in many cases the overall system designer and integrator – plays the core 
of the developmental work, while the remaining design and manufacturing efforts are outsourced to 
other subcontractors.191  
The development and manufacturing of an aircraft requires high level of precision work, 
involving the intricacies of incorporating various technologies that apply increasingly segmental and 
specialized production practices. In the case of the Quebec aeronautical industry, the sector consists of 
traditional layers of primes and subcontractors with highly specialized suppliers forming the basis of 
the hierarchical production structure. 192  The primes forming the first tier are mainly the system 
designers, integrators, and marketers of the final end product. The second tier consists of subcontractors 
that provide engines, propulsion systems, and other major subassemblies such as fuselage and 
undercarriage systems. Often times these second tier subcontractors are considered system integrators 
themselves because of the major end item produced in this sphere embody a high degree of complexity 
and completion. Opposed to other industrial fields, these second tier subcontractors hold the proprietary 
rights and brand titles of their own products, thus maintains equitable relationship within the prime and 
subcontractor relationship. The third tier are the more traditional subcontractors that supply a large 
spectrum of services such as mechanics, thermal and surface treatments, electronics, and other 
composite materials. Figure 1. shows the hierarchical structure of Quebec’s aeronautical industry, which 
shows the complexity of technologies presenting untenable challenges for a single firm to master all the 
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knowledge and skills required to manufacture a modern aircraft, thus representing strong demands for 
subcontracting, inter-firm partnerships, or strategic alliances unfolding not only horizontally, but 
globally. Throughout these vertical or horizontal efforts of subcontracting, either considered 
collaborative or simple outsourcing, substantial volumes of technology transfers take place. 
 
Figure 5. Production Pyramid of the Aeronautical Industry; Source: Reproduced from Amesse (2001) and Niosi 
& Zhegu (2005) (Incorporate AT Kearney’ description on different manufacturing tiers) 
 
Systems of Learning and Knowledge Diffusion in the Aerospace Industry 
 
Although the effects of globalization continue to grow in the overall aerospace industry, the 
military sector is referred to as the epitome of national innovation systems because of its physical 
presence residing within national borders. The secretive and self-sufficient nature of the military 
aerospace sector restrictively places collaboration with foreign entities inside national borders, in which 
national interests protect the proprietary rights of technology transfer processes and corporate 
ownership structures.193 The systems that constitute the national innovation systems of the military 
aerospace sector are no different from the conventional constructs of national innovation systems. 
Primarily, the aerospace and defense sector in major developed countries, which is often termed the 
‘Iron Triangle’ or the ‘Military Industrial Complex’, consists of the interlocking and self-reinforcing 
interests of the military, defense industry, and political linkages within the executive and legislative 
branch, who are all motivated to pursue their own respective objectives.194 Institutionally, the aerospace 
and defense sector is held within a supply chain network between primes and subcontractors; supported 
by an independent research and development program that combines government sponsored research 
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programs and in-house private R&D; the deployment of the critical workforce, or also termed as 
‘revolving door’ movement, between the military, government agencies, Congress, and defense firms. 
The network is also reinforced by interwoven connections of university researchers engaged in 
government sponsored R&D programs, and a number of think tanks serving in advocacy roles.195 
Knowledge flows of tacit information take place in the course of informal communication 
between the parties involved in the transfer process, of which most of the interaction occurring in the 
workshop level when passing down critical design technology and manufacturing skills. In a business 
relationship aspect, such transfer is realized through formal collaborative efforts such as strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, cooperative development arrangements, and various other prime-
subcontracting relationships. This is also a valued feature proven important and effective throughout 
product development in complex industrial sectors such as the automotive industry. The transmission 
of tacit knowledge is especially evident in the aerospace industry where patent citations or licenses are 
rarely published due to the industry considering these materials as ‘secret’. Therefore, supply chain 
linkages between the OEM firm and its subcontractors serves as a critical force that drives the flow of 
knowledge flows in this sector. These supply chains are mostly internationally and dispersed throughout 
critical industrial clusters of the world. Aerospace supply chains has transformed from arm’s length 
American style procurement practices to a more Japanese way of collaborating with OEMs and supplier 
firms exchanging critical information on manufacturing processes, subassembly items, and costs. 
Aerospace clusters are specialized based on the manufacturing specialty of the respective product. For 
instance, aircraft assembly clusters.196 
 
3.2.2. Regulated Technology Transfer Mechanisms: Defense Offsets 
Defense offset trade are reciprocal contracting instruments commonly practiced in defense 
contracts between purchasing countries and the service providing firm as an arrangement for 
compensations in a non-monetary form over a certain procurement of an article or service. It is typically 
undertaken when the selling company accommodates the formal or informal demands made by the 
purchasing entity. Definitions vary by different organizations and individuals, but a common description 
used by the U.S. Department of State defines offsets that cover a wide range of industrial compensation 
practices required as a pre-condition of purchase in either government-to-government transactions or 
commercial sale arrangements of defense articles and/or services as defined under the U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).197 Offsets are very 
important features in the exports of U.S. aerospace and defense products since defense firms employ 
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offset strategies as a primary means of inducement or promotion schemes for purchasing countries when 
making procurement decisions. The program of record between 1947 and 1980 that accounts for the 
number of U.S. aerospace articles co-produced with foreign firms totals 28 programs. Recent records 
range as high as 98%, which means nearly the entire value of exports in the aerospace category is offset 
by countervailing purchases or the transfer of technology.198 
Direct offsets occurs in cases where a purchasing arrangement between the selling company 
and purchasing country over goods or services directly related to the primary equipment the purchasing 
country originally acquired. 199  For instance, a purchase made by the selling company on 
subcomponents produced by the purchasing country for the primary equipment, such as engine parts 
for a jet aircraft or turret structures for a main battle tank, would be considered a direct offset transaction. 
Indirect offsets are transaction practices of goods or services that has no relevance with the primary 
equipment itself, but more as incentives that include foreign investments or countertrade such as in 
barter, arrangements for technology transfer, co-production, counter-purchase, or buy-back deals.200 
Foreign countries utilize offsets as a conduit for cost saving, obtaining advanced technology and 
manufacturing knowledge/skills, increasing local employment opportunities, building sector specific 
capacities for defense firms, and making effective use of the tax payer’s money. Second tiered supplier 
groups in aerospace, rather than first tiered prime contractor groups, benefit mostly from both of these 
offset arrangements attributed to the agreements providing for technologies related with machine tools, 
production capacity, repair and maintenance functions, and so forth. In the longer term, the current trend 
in aerospace offsets implies that there will be higher pressure for offsets considering the competitive 
structure of the industry in a period of declining military budget. This reflects competition between 
prime contractors such as Boeing, Airbus, and Lockheed Martin in airframes, and competition between 
engine manufacturers such as Rolls Royce, General Electric, and Pratt and Whitney. In this regard, 
skeptical perspectives over the utility of defense offsets argues the net benefits from these trade 
transactions are hard to measure and define since the opportunity costs of these offset arrangements 
mostly result in higher price levels of the original acquisition.201 
However, public perspectives in the selling countries over defense offsets come in two divided 
ways, where one perspective views it as positive and indispensable for doing defense trade business 
with foreign partners, whereas another perspective argues mostly on the negative impact on local jobs 
and the industrial base. In the U.S., the subcontracting of a foreign supplier over a domestic company 
results in lost business opportunities and reduced local jobs. Most of the foreign supplier subcontracting 
arrangement are established as long-term commitments, which makes it even harsher for domestic firms 
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to endure, especially when dealing with large scale production programs associated with high tech 
product items. In another sense, provisions through defense offsets may contribute to the emergence of 
a potential competitor in the sector. In this regard, with the objective of restraining the adverse impacts 
on offsets, the U.S. Department of Defense has been engaged in series of negotiations since 1992 with 
partner countries such as Canada, U.K., Netherlands, and France, to discuss the possibilities of reducing 
offset provisos in defense trades.202 
 
3.3. High Technology Barriers and International Technology Security Regimes 
Growing volumes of international defense trade has facilitated the transfer and diffusion of sensitive 
military technologies from first-tier advanced industrialized countries to fast following late 
industrializing countries. Especially, highly advanced U.S. defense products dominate the international 
defense export market in sophisticated military technology product groups.  
Globalization of arms transfers, or defense exports in other words, have consequently placed a 
dilemma on advanced defense exporters in terms of attaining strategic interests while looking out for 
economic pursuits. In one sense, international arms transfers imply significant efforts of alliance 
building with countries that share a common threat perception towards a collective resolution. 
Conversely, the increasing statistics of U.S. defense exports in high tech has adversely eroded America’s 
commanding lead in military technology. Thus, for countries like the United Kingdom or the United 
States, the connotations of defense exports resonate as a foreign policy tool that is instrumental in 
building partnership capacities. On the economic perspective, with the diminishing defense budget in 
the Post-Cold War era, defense exports have been sought out as an alternative marketing opportunity 
against the saturated domestic demand pull. Sustaining the production like by promoting defense 
exports has been deemed critical in not only securing local employments, but most of all in maintaining 
a sound defense industrial base. These elements constitute the motivation of promoting international 
arms trade for both strategic and economic objectives.203 
However, the second part of the predicament relates to the adverse effect of defense exports. 
The proliferation of arms, especially the platforms and systems that contain cutting-edge technology, 
have unfavorably resulted in eroding the comparative advantage of global military powers in a 
technological sense. Technology transfers or production workshares that grown out from defense offset 
trade arrangements have enhanced the technological capacities of potential competitors in the field. As 
discussed in previous sections of this chapter, the work-breakdown structure between prime contractors 
and international subcontractors have impacted on shrinking employment rates in the advanced defense 
industrial countries, while improved technological competitiveness of later entry firms or countries in 
the defense sector. As long as the global defense firms view international arms transfers as a vehicle of 
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bolstering financial viability, the issue of regulating these transactions have been raised to preserve both 
the strategic interests and economic objectives of global defense giants. Regulating international arms 
sales is a matter of optimally balancing between strategic and economic intentions.204 
The United States presumably institutes the most stringent technology security measures among 
all advanced defense industrial countries. The conventional arms transfer policies in the United States 
was announced to serve for this purpose. The primary means of U.S. defense exports are through 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS0 and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). In the line of executing defense 
exports as a foreign policy tool, the Department of State servers as the primary agent of approval under 
close coordination with the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce. FMS is a 
government to government transaction where the U.S. Government makes the purchase of the 
respective defense product, or government-furnished equipment, on behalf of the customer country. The 
arrangement constitutes a total package approach that include product acquisition, education and 
training, sustainment, and other supporting services for countries intending introduce the capability. 
DCS is a transaction arrangement between the original equipment manufacturer and either the customer 
country or private entity making the purchase. U.S. defense products subject to restrictive control 
measures in terms of end use monitoring and third party transfers are strictly controlled under the FMS 
regime, whereas items that entail lesser control standards are available through DCS. The export 
approval is processed and granted by the Department of State, after going through a rigorous 
interagency review board that scrutinizes the political-military implications of potential arms transfer 
impacts. In order to promote U.S. defense exports, the number of hybrid cases that combine both FMS 
and DCS purchasing methods are growing in big numbers lately.205 
Because of the high value of technology associated with national security matters in the 
aerospace industry, various control measures are imposed on critical technology, which inhibits the 
affluent flow of technology transfers to new entrants in the industry. Thus, existing control measures 
over defense exports and technology transfers become challenging for new entry firms or countries 
when negotiating technology transfer deals or concluding on technical assistance agreements. The flow 
of international arms transfers is regulated by two legislations – Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 
1976 and the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979. The AECA administers the import and export 
of defense articles and services to foreign countries. The implementing provisions of the AECA are 
covered in the International Transfer of Arms Regulation (ITAR), which define the scope of defense 
articles and services under a controlled manifest called the United States Munitions List (USML). The 
retransfer of the defense articles to third party entities are also subject of continued monitoring under 
                                                          
204 Ibid., pp. 13-17. 
205 Chapter 15: A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales, Security Assistance Management 
Manual, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2015, p. 15-6. 
 61 
the ITAR regime. The EAA contains a more complex application of arms transfer as it deals with dual 
use technology that has significant implications for diversion into military use. 206 
Strategic interests of U.S. foreign affairs policies are considered the priority over economic 
performances. Still the dilemma of arms exports as a foreign policy tool against critical economic 
interests continues to place major security cooperation decisions into complicated junctures. 
3.4. Globalization of the Industry: Changing Dynamics of the Aerospace Supply Chain 
The aerospace sector has been experiencing a healthy growth in overall performance the past decade. 
As of 2015, the global aerospace industry employed roughly around 1.2 million, in which 49 percent is 
employed in the U.S., 35 percent in Europe, 7.5 percent in Canada, and 2.7 in Japan. The workload in 
these countries between military and commercial aircrafts is roughly 60 percent (military) and 40 
percent (commercial). Reflecting the decreasing defense budget in each country worldwide, there was 
a lost in about 185,000 jobs in the military sector, which presented serious risks in sustaining critical 
skill bases in the industry. This lost was partially offset by improved performances in the commercial 
sector through increased sale in products and manufacturing efficiency. 207  
Based on a survey of top 100 aerospace and defense firms, the industry earned revenues of 
USD 674.4 billion in 2015, which is a 3.8% growth from the previous year’s revenue of USD 649.7. In 
an effort to reduce costs, substantial efforts of the manufacturing process are outsourced to external 
entities such as in engines, landing gears, structures, and avionics.208 This factors into the growing 
demand from burgeoning Asian markets and the declining military budgets from the US and major 
Western European countries, primary OEMs and Tier-1 firms in aerospace are relocating major business 
operations to China, Russia, and the East Asia, and partnering with competent regional suppliers in this 
area in order to stay connected with the changing market conditions. For instance, Boeing has 
established a design center in Moscow209, while Airbus opened a new engineering center at Bangalore, 
India.210 In conjunction to these efforts, major aerospace firms – such as Rockwell Collins, Pratt & 
Whitney, GE Aviation, Rolls Royce, and so forth – have been rushing into China, clustering in areas at 
Xi’an, Harbin, Tianjin, Shanghai/Suzhou, Chengdu, etc. Thus, as global aerospace OEMS continue to 
seek global partners in fast growing markets, the competition to secure positions in Tier-2/3/4 supplier 
markets is becoming more intense. Because of the growing manufacturing costs in aircraft components, 
the global supply chain in aerospace has trickled down from first-tier system integrators to second-tier 
subsystem manufacturers. The spread of the manufacturing workshare has become the source of 
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technology diffusion and knowledge accumulation for second-tier subsystem providers. In the case of 
Boeing, the global aerospace giant has shifted its focus from technology development to restraining 
program costs and development schedules. Retaining domestic jobs was not of utmost importance to 
the company compared to delivering products and systems to its customers. In this regard, substantial 
volumes of manufacturing work have been transferred overseas, of which the benefits went to three 
Japanese subcontractors – Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Ishikawajima-Harima.211  
 In addition to this global repositioning of OEMs and Tier-1 firms, new contenders, supported 
by government driven aggressive catch-up strategies, gaining access into the global value chain is 
injecting more fuel into this fierce competition. Bombardier and Embraer are moving up to the ranks 
from their traditional regional jet aircrafts and striving to enter the turf of Boeing and Airbus, whereas 
midsized OEMs such as Gulfstream, Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation, and Sukhoi are pressuring the 
upper-tiered groups for market access.212 Additionally, the client-supplier relationship is becoming 
more integrated since OEMs have been reducing the number of suppliers in new development programs, 
while increasing more collaborative risk sharing partners as the design and performance features of 
aircrafts are becoming more sophisticated, thus requiring closer collaboration between OEM, Tier-1 
system integrators, and supplier firms. For instance, Embraer has been reducing the numbers of 
suppliers from 346 to 22 between 1999 2004, while increasing the number of risk sharing supplier firms 
from 4 to 16. This is the result of OEMs refocusing their core competencies to design, system integration, 
and marketing fields. Therefore, manufacturing activities have been concentrated down the supply chain 
towards major component suppliers. Through the practices of outsourcing, international transfer of 
knowledge and technological spillovers took place and created new growth opportunities in this rigid 
industrial sector, especially in East Asia.  
 Sustaining a solid percentage of a highly skilled workforce is also presenting some challenges 
in this industry as well. The aerospace industry has been confronting challenges in talent shortages 
lately. Unlike other industrial sectors, the aerospace industry was not able to enhance employee 
productivity by vast introductions of automated techniques through IT investments because of the 
complex nature of the technical materials that must be assembled into the aircraft system.213 The 
industry is knowledge intensive but also exhibits features of labor intensive performances because the 
actual engineering and production techniques are executed by individual technicians and not automated 
machines. The number of new employments that obtain competent skills has been falling behind the 
number of high skill technicians retiring from work, hence the workforce is turning gray and aging. The 
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restrictive employment situation that extensively scrutinizes background checks of new entrants is 
considered the main reason why firms are losing talented workers in this field.214 
 The aspects of innovation in the global aerospace supply chain depend on risk-sharing 
partnerships established and efforts to sustain this relationship. In a way of characterizing four types of 
innovation promoters through this partnership structure in the global aerospace supply chain, there is 
first the power promoter, mainly performed by the airframe manufacturer (i.e. prime contractor), who 
drives the project with necessary hierarchical power. Secondly, there is the expert promoter, performed 
by subsystem integrators or component suppliers that obtain specific technical knowledge required for 
the innovation process. Thirdly is the process promoter who obtains requisite know how in 
organizations and network building within the supply chain. Lastly is the relationship promoter that has 
strong individual ties with outside organizations.215 Because of the long enduring relationship between 
prime contractors and suppliers in the aerospace value chain, technological innovation under this 
relationship structure is driven by coordination and integration amongst customers and suppliers. The 
instruments to develop and sustain this partnership is advocated by transparency and trust through 
replacing individual benefits with mutual benefits, and to some extent, shared ownership in building 
the aircraft, thus requiring early participation in the design and exploratory research phase. 
 A developing pattern in the global supply chain is the growing demands in massive 
customization and network virtualization as a result of ICT development. The vast dispersal of supplier 
networks that are no longer bounded by physical proximity, as well as the growing dependency on 
software design and control mechanisms, has promoted the need to design aircraft structures in a 
modularized form. Product modularity was possible with the development of ICT capabilities, which 
facilitates communication and coordination work within the prime contractor-subsystem provider-
customer relationship. Modular products allow higher degrees of flexibility without incurring 
unnecessary costs in the development and production phase in such ways the customer has the option 
to choose from each module. 216  Modularity in system design also permits efficient management 
controls for parallel development such as in customized system upgrades or life cycle management, 
tailored in a way that meets customer needs. The case of A380 integrated modular avionics is an 
example where modular solutions were proven suitable for robustly integrating different system types 
compatibly with other system modules for hosting different applications.217 
 
3.4.1. Industry Characteristics 
 
Prime contractor and subcontractor relationship 
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Based on the assessment of labeling aerospace under the technological regimes of Schumpeter 
Mark II, the sector mainly displays technologically transformative patterns close to incremental 
innovation, with the exception of the introduction of the jet engine during the 1950s.218 The prime 
contractor and subcontractor relationship in the aircraft industry during the earlier development period 
used to be highly fragmented. But because of the increasing complexity of aerospace technology, the 
subcontractors, or the supplier base in other words, have become more important in terms of providing 
for integrated products and systems. Similar to the Toyota practices in production system, inter-firm 
learning in the global aerospace industry show strong relational characteristics between prime 
contractors and supplier firms. This is attributed to the complex nature of development and production 
of an aircraft have presented conditions where subcontractors become required to actively participate 
in the early phases of the drawing board, thus contributing significantly to the overall development 
process of an aircraft.219  
The seeming complexity of aerospace products and systems shows that no firms can 
singlehandedly manage a vertical supply chain in development or manufacturing aircraft systems. The 
complexity of an aircraft structure makes relevant knowledge and diversified component structures 
highly interdependent to the overall system architecture, which requires deep involvement of supplier 
firms early in the development and production phase. In a detailed econometric study conducted on 243 
industrial contracts of Airbus, the conclusion was that the earlier the subcontracting supplier firms 
interact with the system integrator, the more efficient the production of the aircraft in terms of 
effectively overcoming inherent technological risks and efficiently managing manufacturing costs.220 
In other words, the earlier the supplier becomes incorporated into the integral design and development 
phases of aircraft manufacturing, the more authorities and responsibilities are delegated to the respective 
supplier firm with higher degrees of interaction with the prime contractor.  
Traditionally a unidirectional learning pattern from the prime contractor to the subcontractor 
was considered a norm. But recent trends in the aerospace industry show often reverse conditions where 
supplier companies provide more learning opportunities to the prime contractor. Here, the best 
contractor holds a particular competitive advantage in areas either intangible, difficult to imitate, or not 
easily transferable. Through this trend, prime contractors and system integrators are outsourcing 
structural and component production instead of performing the efforts themselves in order to draw more 
attention towards their genuine core activities.221 This outsourcing trend is more obvious not only 
because of technological competencies, but also because of market access challenges as well. Due to 
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the increasing demand from the purchasing entity towards the prime contractors when making 
subcontracting choices, prime contractors are compelled to abandon the traditional local subcontracting 
base and choose to establish contracts with firms dictated by the purchasing entity. Thus, the purchasing 
entity is exerting more influence to prime contractors regarding the choice of location for subcontracting 
activities.222 
In order to cope with the fierce competitive circumstances of the global aerospace industry, 
Lefebvre asserted that the critical capabilities required for ideally performing subcontractors were 
mainly highlighted in the domains of Total Quality Management (TQM), managerial skills, and network 
stabilities. 223  In the technical aspects, TQM is considered a non-negotiable standard in terms of 
accrediting safety certifications in aerospace technology. R&D investments assess subcontractor 
absorptive capacity for acquiring and maintaining the required level of knowledge and technical skills. 
In the management piece, coordination and integration of activities and functions including the ability 
to ensure durable relationships with customers and suppliers, plus marketing skills are highly 
appreciated. In this aspect, quality of customer service obviously serves to maintain enduring 
relationships with prime contractors. Here, the combination of technological expertise and managerial 
capabilities defines continued excellence in a high-tech industry. Lastly, Stability of networks between 
customers and suppliers are considered a more important element in large domestic markets whereas 
reputation between customers and suppliers has bigger impacts in smaller markets such as Canada and 
UK. 
 
Strategic Alliances 
Alliance formulation in the global aircraft industry show trends of matching core competencies 
such as skills and resources among a network of partners and suppliers in order to spread increasing 
technical and financial risks associated with aircraft development and production. Especially, the 
inherent technological complexities, financial burdens, and market barriers compels the aircraft 
manufacturing firms to form various forms of alliances with partner firms, both domestically and 
internationally. For instance, the development of a long-range transport aircraft such as the Boeing 707 
in the 1950s costs approximately $2 billion, whereas an Airbus A380 in the 2000s costs have grown 
around $12 billion, which exemplifies no single firm can sustain a large aircraft development 
program.224 Strategic alliances is a commonly chosen strategy for latecomers in the sector as well. The 
highly complex nature of the systems engineering and manufacturing process, alongside the highly 
politicized institutional barriers of sector, addresses the need to align with international forerunners in 
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aircraft-manufacturing to overcome initial limitations in the technological and program management 
perspective.225 
In order to reduce these development risks and financial burdens, recent trends in the aircraft 
industry observed the build-up of complex network relationships among major firms and its partners. 
One way of labeling this alliances trend show extensive partnering between firms centered on new 
development programs. For example, a European consortium of firms, which consists of Aerospatiale, 
BAE, DASA, and CASA, formed up as Airbus to develop the A330 and A340 transport aircraft in the 
1990s. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman partnered up to form the Advanced Tactical 
Fighter (F-22 Raptor) and Joint Strike Fighter (F-35 Lightning II). Together with the industrial crisis 
that hit the worldwide aerospace and defense sector in the Post-Cold War era and the compounding 
technical and financial barriers for new development, the global aircraft manufacturing industry 
consolidated and integrated into six major clusters, two formed in Europe and four formed in the United 
States.226 
Aerospace is a relationship-specific sector where the supply chain of firm specific products 
proves most effective under established supplier networks. Tier-one system integrators have become 
selective in choosing Tier-two subsystem manufacturers, in which secondary supplier networks have 
assumed more responsibility in the design and manufacturing phases of aircraft manufacturing.227 For 
instance, with the objective to introduce competition in jet engine manufacturing, the U.S. Navy 
directed Pratt & Whitney to produce an alternate source jet engine for the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 
Hornets, at which General Electric provided the F414 turbofan engine as the primary propulsion system. 
To the dismay of General Electric, a volume of engineering diagrams and blue prints were provided to 
its arch rival, but the second sourcing efforts eventually became frustrated after Pratt & Whitney failed 
to replicate an engine commensurate to the performance level specific to support the F/A-18 
capability.228 A similar case in a reverse situation was shown in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Alternate 
Engine Program, at which the two engine giants collided once again over the most complex and 
troublesome fighter aircraft development programs of all time. Despite the advanced performances of 
the General Electric F-136 as an alternate propulsion source for the F-35 program against the primary 
Pratt & Whitney F-135 turbofan engine, the rising development costs and insurmountable system 
integration challenges have forced the cancellation of the second sourcing process.229 Thus, although 
considered a global contender that splits the international market share of jet engines, relationship 
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specific arrangements between the system integrator and major subsystem provider creates challenging 
circumstances for other firms to penetrate the established supply chain.  
Resource challenges also necessitate aircraft firms to build horizontal alliances as well. 
According to a study conducted on 310 aircraft production programs from 1945 to 2000, the main factor 
that compels firms to make horizontal alliance choices depended on the matching between available 
firm resources and required project resources.230 The greater the resource requirement is to what the 
firm can afford in developing new products, the higher the likelihood the firm will choose to establish 
horizontal alliances rather than to pursue an autonomous route. Specifically, horizontal alliances were 
driven not only by resource challenges but by decisions for product expansion in this regard. However, 
larger firms with established engineering reputation, or firms receiving larger shares of military 
expenditures from its originating country, choose to expand autonomously rather than making choices 
for horizontal alliances. Ostensibly in a technologically more complex setting, the tendency to establish 
horizontal alliances to achieve product expansion objectives grows larger.231 
Alliance formulation has become a norm in the aircraft industry that takes the form of joint 
ventures or mergers and acquisition of different firms. Most notable case is the second largest 
shareholder of the international market (32%), Airbus consortium, that constitutes four major European 
contenders in the industry; Deutsche Aerospace, British Aerospace, CASA, and Aerospatiale. The 
merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, joint development research between Boeing and Deutsche 
Aerospace on jumbo jet aircrafts, or the 50/50 joint venture between GE Aircraft Engines and SNECMA 
are just a few cases that exemplifies this trend.232 Consequently, as a result of constant efforts to reduce 
technological risks associated with supplier networks, major aircraft manufacturing firms exercised 
strong control over the members that constitute these alliances. Major aircraft firms dictate which 
suppliers they will ally with in addition to precept design and manufacturing details.233 
 
Aircraft Aircraft Engines Components or Materials 
Aerospatiale/Deutsche 
Aerospace/British 
Aerospace/CASA⇒Airbus 
Boeing/Deutsche Aerospace 
⇒jumbo jet research 
MBB/Fokker 
Boeing/Mitsubishi/Kawasaki/Fuji 
⇒Boeing 777 
GE/SNECMA⇒CFM International 
GE/SNECMA/IHI/FiatAvio⇒GE90 
BMW/Rolls Royce⇒BR710 
Rolls Royce/Avio/ITP/MTU 
⇒EuroJet Turbo GmbH 
FiatAvio/GE⇒gearboxes 
Hispano-Suiza/Grumman 
⇒NACELLS 
Hispano-Suiza/SPECO⇒gearboxes 
Table 4. Strategic Alliances in the Aircraft Industry 
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The industry concentration is polarized in the engine sector with dynamic competition among 
major firms, but maintains a stable duopoly structure and lesser cutthroat competition. Surveys 
conducted on turboprop and jet engine sectors indicate that the engine industry shows high levels of 
industrial concentration but differs in the level of market share from the past 50 years of industrial 
observation. The turboprop engine sector shows a certain degree of oscillation but maintains a stable 
level of concentration where primary contenders of the market consists of traditional players such as 
Rolls Royce, Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, and so forth. Whereas the jet engine sector shows 
obvious trends of decrease in industrial concentration, from which the dominance of Pratt & Whitney 
diminishes to third in place, giving ways to General Electric and Rolls Royce. This indicates the 
oligopoly of the jet engine sector was substantially affected by new entries into the market such as CFM 
International and the growth of the commercial jet engine sector while orders from the military sector 
gradually decreased.234 The relational aspects of the engine industry represented in network structures 
show conditions of more intense competition as both sectors endeavor to retain a central position in 
relations with the buyers. The relational aspects results in an oligopolistic industrial structure with a 
low level of concentration caused by such intensity, which conclusively disapproves any attempt to 
drive a competitor out of the industry, opposed to the aircraft manufacturing industry.235 Strategic 
alliances between firms are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
3.4.2. Industrial Structure and International Competitive Environment 
Vertical and horizontal mergers can lead to better efficiencies in regards to innovative 
development of new products or significant reduction in costs due to synergy effects from economies 
of scopes. In the case of industrial consolidations with regards to competition and innovation, the 
outcomes and impact results in various forms. The economic case against undue concentration on the 
supply side of a particular market is relatively well known. If a particular product is dominated by a 
monopoly, then the producer has little incentive to minimize cost to the buyer, especially where cost-
plus reimbursement systems are the rule. Much of the defense economics literature grapples with the 
problem of how to price weapons, especially when the market is restricted to a monopsonist end user, 
namely the government.236 
 In regards to the impact of mergers on innovation, on a separate note, is likely to be negative. 
Enjoying the higher returns on production than on research and development, contractors tend to favor 
larger runs of existing weapons over riskier R&D contracts. Therefore, under this context, the difference 
among markets with multiple contenders can be quite substantial. A monopolist will shun risk in a new 
design and offer only marginal improvements whereas other competitors will trend to replicate each 
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other’s strategy, leading to nearly identical outcomes despite the non-presence of collusion amongst 
each other.237 
 
U.S. Aerospace and Defense Industrial Structure 
The Cold War attributed different aspects of military technological development and 
manufacturing from the conventional norm, in which previously the norm was formed by state-run 
facilities constituting the foundation of the military production base. However, because of its lasted 
longevity extending into almost a half century, and the significant amount of dollar values invested into 
the development and manufacturing of arms, a large number of private entities have entered the market 
and continue to compete among them to date.238 Cold War defense businesses were continuously 
refueled through major, but regionally contained, conflicts in addition to regulatory shifts caused by 
changes in U.S. government policy lines; The Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Reagan military 
buildups. As the defense budget in arms procurement were ranging roughly between an annual figure 
of $250 billion to $400 billion in FY1998 dollars, private contractors were able to find lucrative business 
opportunities in national defense. Hence, what was before called state-run arsenals, shipyards, or depots, 
has evolved into a form of a complete industrial type, dubbed the “defense industry” because of the 
concentrated family of products and scaled economy that sprung off from these major military buildup 
programs. The established government acquisition pattern that kept private contractors willing to 
maintain its edge in military technology as well as the U.S. government’s initiative to enhance its 
defense capabilities sustained the continued large scale production run of weapon systems. However, 
such long standing supply of arms blew off as excess capacity after the fall of the Berlin Wall which 
triggered the end of the Cold War. At 1992, the U.S. aircraft industry operated a production line capable 
of manufacturing 75,000 first-line fighters, but the U.S. Air Force and Navy could field less than 3,000 
aircrafts. The tank and automotive industry had a running production line for manufacturing 8,000 M-
1 tanks, but the U.S. Army and Marine Corps had only six heavy divisions organic to its order of battle, 
fielding no more than 2,100 tanks in maximum levels. The shipbuilding industry, with less than the 
force requirement of new ships and submarines on the waiting list for the U.S. Navy, also suffered from 
over capacity of maintaining six private shipyards producing large military ships.239 
Throughout the days of fat defense budgets in the late 1980s, the decline of U.S. defense 
spending in actual terms predates the East-West rapprochement, which started in 1987. In the early days 
of the Clinton Administration, the government projected the defense budget would experience a further 
decline of 37 percent until FY2000. In addition to ailing defense industry’s chronic excess capacities 
was the continued decline of defense procurement budget, which also included R&D funds for new 
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platforms and systems. The U.S. defense procurement budget went through a straight decline between 
1985 and 1995, a decade referred to as the Lost Days. Such cuts in defense procurement directly 
impacted the workforce of the industry; defense related employment have dropped 39 percent between 
1989 and 1997, which is a rate that constantly dropped 5 percent annually. In numerical figures, there 
were losses of almost 600,000 jobs between 1987 and 1992, with another loss of 600,000 jobs until 
1997.240 The U.S. defense industry was already going through a significant transformation phase that 
required immediate public attention. 
The end of the Cold War has opened a new era of innovation and competition for the global 
aerospace and defense industry. The Western Alliances led by the United States and European countries 
no longer had to face a technologically advanced opponent such as the Soviet Union. Shrinking needs 
for a large scale standing conventional military and the excess of weapons production capacities have 
compelled governments to appropriate lesser defense budgets for force requirements, which 
subsequently had direct impacts on the right sizing of the global military R&D fundamentals and 
defense industrial base. Nevertheless, the declining numbers of aerospace and defense prime contractors 
have disputably deteriorated competition and innovation in this sector. The driving forces to the 
developing trend of the global aerospace industry constituted by global primary contractors were the 
United States and Western Europe. 
 The Bottoms Up Review (BUR) drafted by the Pentagon on 1993 determined a strategy to 
rationalize the structure of the defense industry in order to address the challenges and concerns of the 
post-Cold War world order. The BUR stressed the need to retain a force structure that can fight two war 
fronts simultaneously, while building force capabilities with increased mobility and advanced 
information technology.241 It signified major decreases in defense budgets and downsizing of the Cold 
War military strength. Between 1993 and 1998, the total outlays of U.S. defense budget were reduced 
an average 4% annually, in addition to the $69 billion reduction during the first Clinton Administration. 
The gloomy economic forecasting of the U.S. defense business prompted the Department of Defense to 
orchestrate a massive restructuring of the U.S. arms industry, the so called ‘Last Supper’ between the 
Secretary of Defense and executives of major defense firms, which presented daunting challenges of 
the post-Cold War aerospace and defense sector in terms of downsizing the arms manufacturing 
business while preserving the research and development base.242  
In this respect, during a time of receding defense budgets while maintaining a robust military 
force in overseas deployments with enhanced defense readiness posture, the U.S. government needed 
to maintain a hot production capacity as well as the ability to develop next generation systems in all 
major weapons categories. Inasmuch the downturn of the defense budget, the government encouraged 
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merger and consolidation among large defense firms. One reason was to bring down fixed costs of 
weapons per unit. The sole source contract managing system of the Department of Defense (DoD) made 
it almost impossible to assess an accurate analysis per unit weapon costs. In the late 1980s, most of the 
larger companies had a number of systems under sole source contracts that were in the mid-streams of 
its production cycle. With the perceived knowledge that the contracts were unable to be paid within the 
given timeframe, the DoD induced the contractors to consolidate in a fashion where the terms of these 
predated contracts remains to be intact whereas the companies to be able to cut down significant indirect 
and overhead costs, which was believed to have constituted 50 percent of major weapon programs, by 
eliminating redundant R&D and manufacturing functions anticipated through the consolidation 
efforts.243 
Another encouraging factor of merger efforts from the U.S. government was the need to offset 
revenue losses in the U.S. domestic defense market through large scale exports to allied countries. The 
two major legislations for defense exports, the Arms Export Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act, 
are considered one of the most restrictive laws existing within the U.S. Code, which hindered and 
discouraged arms exports to overseas partners before the end of the Cold War. However, the Persian 
Gulf War resulted in an effective marketing campaign of U.S. defense products as the world observed 
the advanced targeting technology of precision guided munitions and the stealthy maneuvering of 
tactical bombers behind enemy line of sight by watching CNN. The end of the bipolar international 
security structure and the ensuing insecurity apprehended in a uni-polar world by the sole existence of 
a lonely super power emboldened a new arms race in other parts of the world that opened new business 
opportunities for U.S. firms. The Clinton Administration, in this regard, lowered the barriers of defense 
exports in the two legislations. The defense firms, on the other hand, significantly lacked extensive 
marketing and negotiation capabilities to promote their respective defense products overseas since most 
of their efforts were focused on the U.S. domestic market.244 Such condition influenced relatively small 
and mid-sized firms to seek mergers with larger firms that obtained overseas marketing and distribution 
networks. 
The third motivating factor initiated by the government was the provision of direct subsidies 
to defense firms on mergers. On July 1993, DoD allowed to add subsidies in the form of restructuring 
costs that included severance pay, plant closure costs, and unemployment payments, within the terms 
of contracts with defense firms that are engaged in merger deals with other defense related firms. In 
return of these subsidies, defense firms promised to pass on future savings in the form of lower prices. 
An estimation of industrial consolidation on five large defense firms indicated that restructuring costs 
equaled $1.3 billion, with costs for reimbursement amounting to about $180 million until 1997. A 
survey performed by the Government Accounting Office asserted that the DoD has enjoyed savings of 
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$347 million or about $1.93 in procurement costs for every dollar spent on subsidizing defense firms.245 
However, the government’s subsidy policy has created a whirlwind of debate within and outside the 
Clinton Administration, mostly originating from fair trade and anti-trust authorities claiming 
organization costs incurred from the private sector is not subject for government subsidies. The 
argument mainly criticized the unilateral decision of the DoD leadership on the implementation of such 
subsidy costs claiming the estimation of future savings for DoD by private companies on the anticipated 
reduction in price tags is baseless, and the DoD should have no business encouraging or shaping the 
restructuring of defense industry for the reason of promoting the rational downsizing of the defense 
industry.246 This was also supported by past cases that similar mergers of these kinds end up costing 
rather than saving the government money, referring to a 1994 overruling by the DoD Inspector General 
on the claim that the merger case of Hughes Aircraft and General Dynamic’s missile division saved the 
Pentagon $600 million. 
In order to sustain its businesses and achieve economies of scale, a pro-consolidation policy 
took place that gave major defense firms in the U.S. the option to either go through mergers and 
acquisition or diversify into other sectors of the economy during the early 1990s with an ultimate 
objective to reduce both private and public sector assets allocated to the defense infrastructure such as 
property, plant, and equipment.247 Without reducing the excessive asset base, the shrinking defense 
budgets would surge unit costs and inevitably deteriorate the profit margins of the industry. Expectations 
of economies of scale in defense firm mergers were to bring down unit procurement costs by cashing 
out nonessential defense company operations, whereby introducing dual-use technologies into military 
applications. Large government subsidies were given to defense firms for mergers and consolidating 
the industry structure. However, such subsidizing efforts affected as a disincentive for defense firms 
when diversifying into other commercial sectors of the economy, which subsequently discouraged the 
diffusion of related technology into nondefense fields.248 
What used to be 50 plus in the number of major contractors specialized in the business has 
turned out to become less than five in 1997 as the result of massive consolidation; Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. Boeing has acquired the aircraft mogul 
McDonnell Douglas and the aircraft defense sector of Rockwell in 1996, and later the satellite and 
communication division of Loral, which became the largest manufacturer in the aircraft industry. 
Lockheed acquired the aircraft section of General Dynamics and the entire business of Martin Marietta 
on the same year, which formed the largest and diversified defense conglomerate in the United States. 
Northrop acquired its competitive partner Grumman Corporation, the formerly Chance-Vought LTV, 
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and the shipbuilding division of Westinghouse, while divesting its fighter aircraft division to Lockheed 
Martin, and formed to become the largest stakeholder in stealth-unmanned aircraft industry and C4ISR 
combat systems. Raytheon acquired the missile and space technology systems of General Motors and 
Hughes, in conjunction with the defense sector of Texas Instruments, and became the biggest contender 
in missiles and launcher technology. Other firms like Curtiss Wright or Fairchild Republic divested their 
businesses and exited from the defense industry to seek other opportunities in the civilian sector.249 The 
total value of mergers and acquisition in the U.S. aerospace industry alone between 1989 and 1997 
increased from a value which was less than $4 billion in 1989 to $53 billion in 1997, with an average 
of $34 billion between 1995 and 1997.250 At the time of merger works on 1997, the merger movement 
of Boeing was valued at $48 billion in annual sales whereas Lockheed Marin valued $28 billion. The 
third largest in scale was Raytheon culminating in $17 billion in annual sales. The sheer magnitude of 
these mega mergers left only two fully capable platform manufacturers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, 
remaining in the aerospace industry, opposed to the Cold War numbers of sixteen vendors. 
 
Lockheed-Martin Marietta Merger 
On 1994, Lockheed Corporation and Martin Marietta Corporation announced their intent to 
merge as a single entity. The $10 billion merger of the second and third largest defense contractor, which 
was worth in $23 billion in market value, would create the country’s largest defense firm surpassing 
McDonnell Douglas which then held the largest share in the U.S. defense market. The two companies 
represented that the merger would result in substantial savings to both the companies and the DoD by 
reducing excess industrial capacity and overhead costs. The merger outcomes resulted in the 
establishment of the most diversified defense firm in the U.S., spanning into all sectors of the defense 
business except for helicopters, tanks, and submarines. The product base of the two companies was 
complementary in nature; Lockheed holding strength in military aircrafts while Martin Marietta 
specializing in military electronics, components, and heavy launch vehicles. However, there were also 
some overlaps in the production of military satellites and big rocket launchers. In this regard, the merger 
had high expectations of having a near monopoly over the big rocket launch sector and satellites.251 
With concerns of antitrust complaints from competing companies, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) identified three broad product areas in which the merger will affect as a monopoly 
ruler – space based early warning systems (satellites and sensors), military aircraft, and Expendable 
Launch Vehicles. Considering the fact that mergers are permissible only when entry into the relevant 
market is guaranteed that market participants could not profitably maintain a price increase above the 
pre-merger levels, the FTC proceeded with the antitrust analysis by giving special attention to the 
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satellites, sensors, and LANTIRN.252 
The FTC expressed concerns that the merger will most likely eliminate competition in research 
and development as well as competitive pricing of satellites for the use of Space Based Early Warning 
Systems, in which the U.S. government was having immense interest. However, the biggest concern 
area was on maintaining confidentiality of proprietary information that could be used in anticompetitive 
ways, especially on the LANTIRN issue.253 The problem was that, the Martin Marietta, as the single 
market provider of the LANTIRN to the US Air Force, obtained access to proprietary information of 
the design specifics of the aircrafts the LANTIRN was being installed, which were mainly the 
competing aircrafts to Lockheed’s military aircraft division. The deliberate flow of proprietary 
information on the design specifics of the competing aircraft would provide an opportunity for 
Lockheed to outbid its competitor in the defense market by taking advantage, or free riding, of the 
innovative works by its competitor. 
As an outcome of the eventual endorsement of the merger case, the FTC placed a few 
restrictions on the company to reduce the anti-competitive effects of the merger. The most notable was 
the placement of firewalls in the form of communication barriers to prevent the flow of non-public 
proprietary information from the LANTIRN System division to the Military Aircraft division. Basically, 
the FTC made it impossible by federal regulation for the separate business entity within the same firm, 
Lockheed Martin, to internally communicate on these matters. A similar and equally restrictive firewall 
condition was mandated on the flow of sharing information about competitors between the divisions 
that build satellites and the divisions that launch them, for concerns mainly to prevent monopoly power 
in the field of space satellites and vehicular launch systems.254 
 
Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman Merger Attempt 
The attempted acquisition of Northrop Grumman by Lockheed Martin with a price tag worth 
$11 billion was a classic example of an antitrust case that could’ve impacted negatively on competition 
and innovation caused by the merger of two similar firms in a concentrated industrial sector. The 
primary reason for the two companies to consolidate was to reach economies of scale as well as 
collaborating for synergy effects. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, although supplementary 
in commercial aircraft components and stealth technologies, were mostly competitors in advanced 
tactical aircrafts, electronics, and missile warning systems.255 
 The attempted merger was blocked by the Department of Justice, with the support of the 
Department of Defense, which represents the how sever the case was handled by the authorities 
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compared to the other antitrust rulings in which the FTC, a subordinate entity of the Department of 
Justice, adjudicated the ruling on behalf of the government. The concern on competition was that the 
business portfolios of both companies significantly overlap in airborne early warning radar systems as 
well as sonar systems. Such combination of two overlapping dominant firms in the market would take 
a share of 38 percent of the entire procurement and R&D budget from the DoD, hence exerting 
significant monopoly power over the lives of the soldiers with the taxpayers money.256 Because of the 
gravity of these critical events, the attempted merger was terminated by both firms on July 1998, but 
the corporate aspirations to merge still remains even today. 
 
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger 
The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger case was somewhat unique as it spurred heated 
debates on the fact that companies in a globalized business environment must consider the anti-trust 
laws of not only of their home countries but also of the countries in which they do business. Although 
there were strong controversies within the FTC in regards to the two antitrust laws – the Sherman Act 
and Clayton Act – over possible merger movements between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, 
to the surprise of the public the FTC gave its blessings on the $14 billion merger case between America’s 
biggest aerospace firms, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas despite concerns on anticompetitive effects 
significant enough to jeopardize market competition. The Commission concluded that the merger would 
not substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the global commercial aircraft 
market because the market share of McDonnell Douglas was insignificant inasmuch of its ailing 
financial records would prevent the company to improve its worsening market performance. Such 
decision was attributed to the fact that the business areas of the two companies were highly 
differentiated, thereby not substitutes; Boeing committed to the heavy transport and utility versions of 
both commercial and military sectors whereas McDonnell Douglas more focused on the military jet 
fighter and attack helicopter sector.257  
In the aspect to the defense market of the two firms, the Commission considered that the two 
companies develop fighter aircrafts and military helicopters for different mission areas; therefore there 
was no anticipated procurement or marketing cases in which the two companies would compete in both 
the domestic and international market.258 Boeing has shown strength in manufacturing large transport 
cargo aircrafts including bombers in the 1950s such as the B-17, B-29, and B-52 bombers. But the 
company’s strength was paramount in the commercial airliner sector as it introduced the 747, 767, and 
the mega-hit 777 series during the 1980s and 1990s. Other representative family of Boeing products 
was the Ch-47 Chinook, the most popular heavy transport helicopter that was fielded in 1960 by both 
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the US Army and Marine Corps. The business areas of McDonnell Douglas were primarily in the 
military fighter jets and attack helicopter sectors with small successes in the commercial airline industry 
until the company divested the commercial sector to Boeing in the 1980s before the eventual merger of 
the two companies were realized. The representative aircraft of McDonnell Douglas was the F-15 
Striking Eagle for the U.S. Air Force and the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Marine Corps. McDonnell 
Douglas was also the manufacturer of the well-known AH-64D Apache Long-Bow Heavy Attack 
Helicopter after it purchased the rotorcraft section of Hughes Helicopter in 1984. However, it would 
not be entirely impossible to rule out the fact that the FTC decision was in support of the U.S. DoD’s 
tailored scheme to reap out the benefits of economies of scale through the merger deal between the two 
companies. 
The European Commission (EC), which is the European Union’s antitrust agency, has rejected 
the merger attempt over the concerns that the consolidation of the world’s number one and number three 
aircraft manufacturers will significantly damage the competitiveness of Europe’s aerospace giant 
Airbus. Although Airbus claimed to be the second largest aircraft manufacturer in the world, the 
company was relatively weak and essentially divided into regional headquarters because of the nature 
that it was a company financed by the European Union. In accordance with the Treaty of Rome, which 
is the companion law to the U.S. Sherman Act and Clayton Act, the EC initially disapproved the merger 
for three reasons; the merger will add more to Boeing’s dominant world market share for large 
commercial jet aircraft from sixty-four in the pre-merger period to seventy in the post-merger period, 
the likelihood of spillover effect of defense technologies from McDonnell Douglas to Boeing which 
will apparently improve the technological skill set of Boeing compared to its European competitors, 
and most importantly the merger would strengthen Boeing’s exclusive aircraft agreements with the three 
dominant U.S. airlines – American, Continental, and Delta Airlines. The last factor was the most 
troubling aspect for EC because Boeing’s enhanced leverage power would absolutely lock-in the three 
largest commercial airliners to non-favorable agreements for Airbus for an excessive period.259 
It wasn’t until Boeing and the U.S. FTC agreed to accept three major concessions that the EC 
finally approved the merger deal. The concessions were basically meant to implement a probationary 
period between the business entities of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, by placing McDonnell Douglas 
as a separate legal entity for ten years and to submit periodic reports on the business relations of the two 
companies to the EC.260 
 
Impact and Outcomes of International Aerospace and Defense Mergers 
Although there exists a number of different opinions questioning the effects of industrial 
consolidation, the impact of mergers and acquisition in the defense sector proved to show some positive 
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gains in terms of cost efficiencies and technological innovations.  
It appears that major defense merger activities were driven more by the vibrant financial 
markets in the commercial sector than by simply defense budget outlays.261 Hence, economic motives 
were prevalent over political pressure in the defense consolidation process. The general rule of thumb 
in corporate mergers is that firms in the post-merger period will likely gain increased market power, 
such that it has higher leverage to control the market price. Subsequently, firms may likely choose to 
execute monopoly pricing strategies, whereby resulting in higher market prices. On the contrary, 
defense consolidation resulted in plant rationalization and overhead efficiencies which eventually led 
to lower market prices. For instance, the top four major defense firms, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
General Dynamics, and Raytheon, all experienced significant reductions in per unit costs of their 
concentrated production categories, ranging between 30-40%.262 Most of the mergers took the form of 
market extension in order to diversify the business portfolio of defense firms instead of vertical or 
horizontal mergers.263 This was mostly caused by the changing landscape of warfare in the high-tech 
era. The development and fielding of state of the art defense systems have become ever more complex 
and costly. For instance, it takes a number of efforts to bring together a modern fighter jet; the integration 
of different systems such as advanced avionics, aerodynamics, electronics, special coating materials, 
propulsion, to name a few. The complexity of system integration and the development of newer 
innovative platforms requires closer collaboration, or to a certain extent, would favor mergers of 
supplementary business portfolios in order to gain higher competitiveness in the defense market. 
Although the pro-consolidation policy was encouraged by the government, the defense M&A 
process mostly relied on market forces, in which industry and capital markets, instead of governments, 
determined the best solution for the new consolidation policy. However, European defense restructuring 
process showed stronger state roles in the process. The consolidation of the U.S. defense industry 
implies aspects of industrial evolution in a highly restrictive market with stark expectations for 
competition and innovation in a time of growing technological development amid receding market 
needs for further expansion. As the industrial structure of the U.S. defense sector became more 
concentrated after such consolidation processes, it has become more difficult to introduce new firms in 
the competition. Because of the capital nature of the defense industry is highly capital/technology 
intensive, the growing monopoly power of defense firms have made it even more difficult to penetrate 
the defense market. The complications to mobilize efforts to prepare contract proposals, the ever 
growing complexities of weapon designs highlighted by precision guided systems and stealth platforms, 
the capability to carry out such scientifically daunting research, and the ability to hire the talents to 
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execute these tasks, are too much to ask from a new entry into the defense market. 
  
3.5. Catch-up Strategies of Late Entrants into the Sector 
 
Technological complexity, high capital costs, and established restrictive settings of international 
regimes hinders new entrants into the market. But growing globalization needs ironically induces 
second tiered and third tiered supplier countries to enter the market through collaborative efforts 
arranged between either government to government programs or industry initiated ventures. Such 
opportunities become potential conduits of technology transfer and diffusion. 
Normal phases for technological catch-up in the aerospace industry follows a three stage 
development phase, in which the country first acquires basic level knowledge and skills through depot 
level repair and maintenance efforts, followed by collaborating with established high-tech firms in the 
sector throughout the form of license manufacturing or co-development/production arrangements, and 
finally undergoing a process of developing an indigenous variant through its own efforts in system 
design and manufacturing.264 
State intervention is considered an integral part for sectoral development and promotion in the 
aerospace industry. Mostly considering the fact of aerospace being characterized as a highly capital 
intensive sector associated with complex technology and integrated systems, in order to sustain this 
business field requires a certain level of economy of scale, especially for late industrialized countries in 
this sector.265 Conventional wisdom tells that technology transfer from advanced industrial countries 
to developing countries is considered an important vehicle for learning and entering critical high-tech 
sectors. The effectiveness of technology transfers for developing countries, however, showed only 
marginal contributions to technology development when reviewing the development programs from 
Indonesia and Romania. Especially, it appears that developing aircraft specific industrial sectors seem 
to be more suitable for certain countries that obtain the appropriate absorptive capacity for learning and 
exploiting the requisite knowledge in the learning phase. 
 Determinants in the operational level that constitute success factors for technology transfer is 
to acknowledge whether the program can extend the destination firm into sustainable positions in the 
industry. Firstly, to discern a viable technology worth transferring, it is important to assess the age of 
the respective technology relative to the existing market size.266 For instance, the ROMBAC 1-11 
program launched by the Romanian IRMA (Enterprise for the Repair of Aeronautical Materials) 
arranged under production licenses provided by British Aircraft Corporation (along with BAe) shows 
the intent of transferring the obsolete BAC 1-11 manufacturing technology to the Romanians was for 
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BAe to exit the declining short range jet aircraft to concentrate on the BAe-146 Short-Haul Regional 
Airliner.267 Because of the deteriorating Romanian economy and no available international market to 
export the aircraft, the ROMBAC 1-11 production halted after delivering only nine aircrafts.  
 
 
 A second discernable aspect for technology transfer is the portion of R&D related capabilities 
included in the transfer package. Especially in a complex high-tech environment where platforms and 
systems are developed in a long term life-cycle, possessing the knowledge and skill base early hand in 
preparation for systems upgrade is critical. The knowledge base for systems upgrade is obtained relative 
to R&D investments in technology, whilst without addressing the professional knowhow on R&D in 
the technology transfer package, the program becomes less competitive and short lived. Therefore, the 
firm at the receiving end of technology transfers should consider not only production technologies in 
the transfer process but also the inclusion of knowledge and skillsets for system upgrade as well. 
 
3.6. Conclusion: Towards a Sectoral System of Innovation in the Aerospace Industry 
 
Over the past three decades, the global aerospace and defense industry went through substantial 
reorganization processes in regards to the competitive structure of the market and accommodated 
towards a structure prone to the growing complexity of the subject aeronautical technology. In this 
regard, the industry has become substantially streamlined to a handful of firms. Basically a duopoly 
between Boeing and Airbus, and reconfigured it supply chain more attuned to advanced industrial 
countries that already have a significant footprint in the sector. 
 In the military sector, the state still remains as the absolute supply source in revenues as well 
as innovation in terms of breakthrough technologies and new product layouts. State stands out as the 
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biggest customers in aerospace and defense where defense offsets emerge as a major conduit of 
technology transfers for late entries into the sector. Such arrangement intrigued the rise of subsystem 
provider networks under the purview of state-led industry development efforts, which further facilitates 
firm level capacity building initiatives. In this regard, the overall supply chain has transformed from a 
vertically integrated structure to a horizontal network structure that encourages strategic alliances in 
search of better engineering and manufacturing capabilities. In this regard, strategic alliances have 
reduced development risks and became a priority option for aircraft-manufacturing firms in the sector. 
This is especially true for Tier-Two late entry firms where a number of domestically initiated 
development programs deliberately partnered with global aerospace giants in search of prospective 
business opportunities in the aircraft-manufacturing sector.268 
 Entry barriers built around more intensified competitive industrial arrangements, resulted 
under shrinking defense budgets and grown out in parallel with highly capitalized technological 
requirements, have created apparent challenges against second-tiered countries vying to upgrade its 
domestic aerospace industry in part with international standards. The next chapter reviews the state 
driven industrial development efforts of Korea in science and technology, with a focus on the defense 
industry, and further examines the innovative prospects under its national construct. 
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Chapter 4: State Capitalism and the National Innovation Systems of Korea 
4.1 The Capitalist System of Korea 
The global economic setting remains no longer supportive for industrially developing countries. The 
concerted efforts demonstrated by major industrialized countries, promoted through international 
regimes such as the World Bank, IMF, or the WTO, show that lesser opportunities exist for state-led 
interventionist market policies. These intentions are seen as an act of ‘kicking the ladder’ for catch-up 
economies, which makes it increasingly more difficult to mind the technological gaps between the 
technologically advanced and less developed countries.269  
4.1.1. Overview of State-Business Relationship 
 Under the changing dynamics of international economic arrangements, the Korean model of 
state capitalism constitutes one of the main debates of the developmental state discourse. Largely 
utilizing bureaucratic instruments to develop and transform the country’s industrial structure from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive, and eventually to technology-intensive industries, the process 
implemented strong protectionist practices governed by elite technocratic systems under strong 
authoritarian rule. Prices were manipulated and labor rights were repressed in order to capture 
comparative price advantages in the market. Nonetheless, putting aside the reminiscence of the 
country’s developmental footprints, the dire performances of its economy is not all supportive to the 
current structural arrangement of its national competitiveness. Despite the aggressive investments from 
public and private sector R&D work, a comprehensive assessment of its effectiveness is comparatively 
low. According to a competitiveness ranking performed by the IMD World Competitiveness Center, 
Korea ranks in 5th place in R&D investments, 9th in workforce, and 10th in the number of published 
research. But in terms of public-private knowledge transfer the country ranks 25th in place, 41 in the 
number of world class engineers, and 31 in inter-firm technology cooperation, which shows the cost-
benefits in R&D investments is less vibrant and inefficient in performances.270   
 What distinguishes the Korean model from other developmental state cases is the discipline 
the government exercised over private firms. One of the disciplinary areas considered selective 
industrial competition polices that nurtured family-run companies into substantially diversified business 
conglomerates called chaebols that capitalized public resources under corporate business strategies. In 
order to optimally deploy scarce resources, the government was exclusive in picking private firms in 
select areas of investments, in which the selection decision was driven by observations of how much 
firms were submissive to government directives. Hence, private firms, also known as family run firms 
called Chaebols, chosen by the government was rewarded by extensive licenses to enter privileged 
business sectors such as the heavy and chemical industries under highs subsidies provided from 
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government resources. Although the government did penalized firms that performed below the level of 
expectations, the collusive relationship between state and private companies, supported by the fledgling 
bureaucratic machine, became the norm for economic development in Korea.271  
The second disciplinary tool was exercised through rationalizing overly expanded business 
sectors. The consequences of the collusive scheme between state and private firms were the 
diversification of Chaebols into unrelated markets. Often times, certain business sectors would suffer 
from excessive competition between private firms over a finite share of the market. Finances were 
strictly controlled by the government through state-run banks, which regulated interest rates and loan 
allocation. Underperforming firms would be either liquidated or bailed out, not only by market 
mechanisms but also by arbitrary decisions made by the government and not market regulations. The 
government would rescue important companies from financial failures through injecting bail-out money 
or manipulating interest rates in the financial market, while abandoning inferior firms into bankruptcy. 
Thus, strong state control over the supply of credit largely indebted these Chaebols under government 
intentions, which made these firms over reliant on government credit rationing, especially in high risk 
business sectors such as IT, energy, and aerospace and defense.272  
However, as the Korean economy entered into the 1990s, tremendous changes were imposed 
onto this conventional state-business arrangement. The end of the military regime in 1993 and the 
inauguration of a new democratic administration triggered strong momentums to reform the Chaebol 
centric economic structure. Efforts to reform the Chaebol dominant economy unfortunately backfired 
into the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Although various theories exist on the cause of the Crisis, the 
predominant argument culminates into the abrupt changes made in state-business relationship. 
Decoupling of government economic reform policy during the Kim Young Sam Administration 
regarding the democratization of the market place and Chaebol business system has inadvertently 
resulted in reduced government control over the domestic market and Chaebols, henceforth empowered 
more Chaebol initiated autonomy in corporate control. 273  Earlier government economic reform 
guidelines in 1993 was to abolish the crony capitalism between state officials and Chaebol executives 
prevailing in business practices that presented high favoritism biased towards big business 
conglomerates. However, with a diminishing institutional enforcement mechanism that disabled strong 
implementation and adjudication of convoluted reform processes, such ineffective reform efforts 
subsequently led to lesser government influence into the domestic market where the authority of the 
Chaebols amassed and, in some cases, overwhelmed the traditional control of the state. In a separate 
context, the strong globalization drive declared by the government in November 1994 to improve 
corporate competitiveness by easing restrictive market rules through financial liberalization and 
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deregulation have unwittingly allowed the Chaebols to pursue devastating management practices by 
means of exuberant borrowing and excessive expansion into diverse business sectors.274  
Thus, in order to extensively reform such malpractices inherent in the economic structure, the 
succeeding Kim Dae Jung Administration imposed five principles for its efforts to reform the Chaebols, 
which focused on ownership structures, corporate governance, streamlined business operations, 
financial conditions, and transparency. Streamlining business operations, termed “Big Deals”, related 
to selecting three or four core business lines while divesting unrelated subsidiaries through major 
mergers and acquisitions, or closure of business operations in some extreme cases. During this period, 
Korea went through a transformational process of liberalization, thus lifting regulatory barriers and 
adopting neoliberal economic norms as an effort to overcome the impending hardships of its ailing 
economy, which was an essential abandoning of its protectionist and collusive industrial policies. In the 
process of doing so, the debate on the authenticity of state capitalism and the developmental state theory 
collided with the idea of neoliberal statism. Restrictive state control over the financial sector was 
considered the classic model of the Korean developmental state thesis. Foreign takeover of domestic 
banks was prohibited and the share of total assets by foreign firms was limited to 6 percent. The situation 
in other non-bank financial sectors also remained dominantly controlled by domestic firms under strict 
government regulations. However, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis substantially transformed this 
situation, where now the domestic financial market has transformed to become predominantly foreign 
owned.275 Implementation of neoliberal economic reform was selective. Financial industry was more 
exposed to regulatory reform but other sectors of the economy, such as ICT and aerospace, remained 
mostly under restrictive government control. In this regard, substantial adoptions of neoliberal 
economic norms were enforced, but a highly imperfect neoliberal state came into fruition.276 
4.1.2. Late Industrialization through Capacity Building in Science and Technology 
The catch-up experience of Korea is described in various ways. Studies in technological 
innovation accentuate the institutional arrangements of public and private R&D activities. In the case 
of Korea, R&D investments exponentially increased over the decades. Throughout a span of 40 years 
between 1970 and 2010, the average rate of R&D investment increased 13.7%, which almost doubles 
the annual GDP growth rate of 7.3%. The government share of R&D initially accounted for 70.3% in 
1970 against the 29.7% mark of private industries, but the share flipped to 28% for government and 72% 
private in 2010.277 In the perspective of technology catch-up by acquiring a competent knowledge base 
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through R&D consortia, Korea shows development patterns in duplicative and creative phases.278 In 
these phases, the evolving scope and capacities of the triple helix structure of government technocrats-
corporate industry-universities/GRIs represents the development patterns of each era.  
 The duplicative imitation phase, spanning from the 1960s to the late 1970s, represents constant 
efforts to build a trained technical workforce that can interpret explicit knowledge rendered from 
various foreign lending and transfer of technology. In order to exploit the building of the technical 
workforce, the industrial policy was to deliberately create the Chaebol with a high focus on export 
promotion. During this period, the biggest challenge was the recruitment of talented scientists and 
engineers to build-up a capable workforce. The Korean government introduced three institutions 
through legislation in order to resolve the recruitment problem. The first was the establishment of the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in 1966, which is known as the mother institution 
that sprung off approximately 27 GRIs and the prestigious educational institute Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) in later days. The second institution was the creation of 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in 1967, which served as the overarching government 
control tower for nurturing the national knowledge base in science and technology. A comprehensive 
government directive in S&T policy, planned for a 20-year outreach, was published in the same year as 
the Long-term Science and Technology Plan (1967-1986), which provided guidance to build up a 
competent S&T workforce. The third element was the creation of a consolidated S&T research park for 
GRIs in 1973, extending in a range of 27.8 square kilometers at Daedeok area. The Daedeok Science 
Park was implemented by the “Act on Development of Specialty Research”, which supported the 
creation of six GRIs to provide industrial research for ship building, chemistry, electronics, machinery, 
energy, and so forth. The legislations of these three institutional elements served as baseline cases to 
expand the S&T basic system into other platforms to acquire a higher caliber workforce, under secure 
funding conditions, with a firm institutional commitment to explore other scientific and technological 
fields.279   
 The creative imitation phase, spanning between the 1980s and 1990s, exhibits the transition of 
the government-led R&D efforts into other public and private entities that continues to wage the 
progression of technology learning and exploitation. The transition was motivated by the demand pull 
generated from national and social needs considering core capabilities in higher technology domains. 
In this phase, the Korean society experienced more involvement from the corporate sector considering 
in-house R&D, as well as increased volumes of collaboration between universities and government 
sponsored research institutes. The Basic Science and Research Promotion Act of 1989 responded to the 
growing involvement of university level basic research, which was in the incubation phase. Universities 
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have been establishing Science Research Centers and Engineering Research Centers supported by either 
government funding or corporate support. In the GRI community, the government and private industry 
collaborated on the Highly Advanced National Research Project (HAN). Throughout these public-
private partnership programs, a number of spin-offs and spillover effects were accomplished, such as 
in CDMA technology, nuclear reactors, satellite programs (KISTAT-A), among others. It was also 
during this phase in 1999 when the defense industry, which traditionally relied on government-led R&D 
projects, started to initiate in-house R&D efforts as well.  
 However, although the economy was experiencing a growing volume of corporate investments 
in R&D, the overall technical capacities of the country was still in a ripening phase and the majority of 
firms were suffering from the gap between high technological demands and low technological capacities. 
In order to mind this gap, in 1987, the government introduced through legislation a more comprehensive 
“Industrial Development Act” that consolidated the existing industrial promotion acts such as the 
“Machine Industry Promotion Act”, “Ship-Building Industry Promotion Act”, “Electronic Industry 
Promotion Act”, “Steel Industry Promotion Act”, and so forth.280 The intent for this legislation was to 
institute a more balanced industrial development policy in the exponentially expanding industrial 
sectors. Especially, the Industrial Development Act sponsors the development of critical technical areas 
that are in high demand in various corporate sectors by initiating collaborative R&D between GRIs and 
corporate laboratories. The Act signifies the transition from government-led industrial and R&D policy 
to corporate-led efforts. In the meantime, the vast diversification of public and private R&D programs 
expanding into various industrial and public areas rendered coordination issues within the government 
structure between the MOST and other Ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Ministry of Information and Telecommunication, Ministry of Public Health and Welfare, etc. In order 
to adjudicate the coordination challenges, government established the National Science and Technology 
Committee (NSTC) directly under the Office of the President to effectively improve oversight of 
resource allocation of national R&D programs.281 
 Lastly, in the current innovation stage after the Asian Financial Crisis, increased collaboration 
between university level basic research functions and mission oriented applied research at GRIs, in 
conjunction with intense corporate research activities in a globalized R&D setting, supervised under a 
diversified government R&D policy is observed. Especially, when monitoring the flow of corporate 
research grants282 awarded to universities and GRIs, the center of gravity has changed from GRIs in 
1985 (approximately 85% awarded vs. 9% for universities) to universities in 2010 (approximately 47% 
awarded vs. 40% to GRIs).283 The reason behind to this transition was primarily the improvement of 
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research capacities at the university level, but also attributed by the fact that GRIs have given more 
priority towards government granted research programs. The stronger bond in collaborative research 
between industry and academia was further encouraged by government policies during this period. The 
growing need to generate a new economic growth engine in a transitional period into a knowledge based 
industrial structure under rapid technological changes instigated the Roh, Mu-Hyun Administration to 
build a robust triple helix system between industry, academia, and GRIs. Institutional foundations were 
established after 2003 in forms of declaratory policy and detailed Presidential Directives, which was 
represented in the “Vision and Strategies for New Collaboration between Industry and Academia” (25 
September, 2003).284 
 During this period, the need to administer inter-agency R&D activities was growing. This is 
the result of the rising demands in technological development throughout all sectors of the society as 
the country transformed into a knowledge-based economy. Thus, almost every government agency was 
assigned with responsibilities to administer certain portions of S&T policy. The growing resource 
requirements to support these R&D demands under various agencies called for a stronger coordinating 
mechanism between government organizations to accommodate competing priorities in global and 
domestic issues such as climate change, job creation, social welfare, national security, and so forth. In 
this regard, a new S&T governance structure was established that appointed a more centralized authority 
on the Ministry of Science and Technology and the NSTC.285 Further description of the country’s S&T 
governance structure will follow. 
 
 
Figure 7. Dynamic Structure of Korea’s Innovation Triangle, adopted from Korea’s Strategy for Development of STI Capacity: 
A Historical Perspective, STEPI Policy Reference 2012-01. 
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 The case for catch-up economies has placed Korea in the main subject for scrutiny, mostly 
because it was considered a special case among the catching-up economies. Even though it remains 
substantially below the OECD average in terms of relative income levels, its R&D intensity is quite 
high and its accomplishments in patenting are growing rapidly. The changing dynamics of Korea’s 
performance in patenting and innovative activity has transitioned from the publicly driven to the 
privately led, as the government share of R&D expenditure, and consequently that of the higher 
education outputs, have significantly diminished the past two decades. The transitional case of Korea 
demonstrates the idea that larger firm sizes and economies of scale constitutes one of the driving forces 
behind the private sector taking over major portions of the overall R&D efforts.286 In the later phases, 
after the Asian Financial Crisis, R&D efforts reached a more globalized spectrum where firms started 
to establish overseas R&D outposts and strenuously pursued M&A strategies to overcome difficulties 
in obtaining advanced technologies from foreign countries through conventional technology transfer 
arrangements. Throughout this observation, the government involvement in national R&D efforts 
slowly dissipated where it transitioned to a firm-centric innovation construct while giving increased 
roles and capacities to basic level research from universities and mission targeted research in GRIs. 
Thus, the more the firm overtakes the research portion from the government, the more dynamic and 
vibrant the innovation system works. 
 
4.1.3. Transition from Capital Intensive to Knowledge Intensive Industrial Structure 
The rapid growth of the Korean economy was represented by large volumes of fixed capital 
investments in land, plants, and machinery. R&D investments were in a growing trajectory but were 
marked low in the overall investment portfolios of firms. The corporate growth model was based on the 
positive complementarity between aggressive capital investments made by large corporation, and 
consequent production activities of small and medium firms derived from this capital investment as 
such. This trend substantially changed after the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 Aggressive investments, but with consequently unpayable profits, were no longer permissible. 
Therefore, firms without the requisite technological competitiveness were unsustainable in the market, 
whereas firms equipped with the qualified technical skillset continued to strive. Most notably after the 
Asian Financial Crisis is the substantial increase in corporate R&D intensity, which represents the 
perceived interest of firms in R&D. In a recent study conducted by STEPI, the intensity of corporate 
investment in fixed capital decreased but the intensity in R&D investment substantially increased. Such 
trend is especially noticeable in small and medium firms where the R&D intensity ratio almost doubles 
that of large corporations from 4.9% to 2.1&.287 Especially, small and medium firms listed in the 
Kosdaq market show higher rates of R&D investments than those listed in the Korea Exchange market. 
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Larger R&D investments mostly result in improved corporate sales and employment rates. Thus, these 
trends occurring at the turn of the century signified the transition of the Korean economy from a capital 
intensive to a knowledge intensive industrial structure.288 
 In this aspect, inter-agency coordination has been raised by a number of countries to improve 
efficiency in effectively deploying public resources in S&T activities. An assessment proposed by the 
U.S. Government Accounting Office for inter-agency collaborative mechanisms highlighted 
collaborative structures and appointments within the Executive Office of the President, promulgation 
of national strategies and initiatives, building up inter-agency groups in the form of task force, councils, 
or committees, and the designation of leadership billets that can strongly administer these bureaucratic 
stovepipes.289 
 
4.2. National Innovation Systems of Korea 
 
As of 2015, the national R&D investment totals $17 billion with an S&T workforce nearly 440,000 in 
strength, with the production outcome reaching approximately $1.4 trillion, where $532 billion accounts 
for overseas exports.290 However, the country’s S&T construct is generally considered to be built 
around an industrially focused ‘fast-follower’ mentality, risk averse and passive in nature that lacks 
audacity and entrepreneurship.  
As the country went weathered the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and suffered a sluggishly 
low economic growth rate afterwards, a robust innovation system that can reinvigorate the country’s 
growth potentials has become in dire needs. In this regard, the proven effectiveness of Korea’s national 
innovation system attributing to its fast paced economic growth and technology catch-up strategies no 
longer places the country’s competence level sufficiently competitive in the global economy, both in a 
technological and financial sense. The Korean economy is now situated in a position where catching up 
through imitation is no longer a valid means to compete against its industrial peers. The country has 
entered an era where creativeness through innovative products and processes has become more than 
imperative to sustain its status in the global economy. An honest assessment of the Korean NIS show 
weaknesses in the overall S&T infrastructure, where insufficient institutional arrangements and 
inadequate S&T substructure continues to hinder the innovative potentials of the country. 291 The 
inefficiencies were cited in a recent survey by various agencies regarding the country’s R&D input and 
productiveness. Overall statistics show the country experiences a low rate of return in R&D investments. 
The amount of R&D investments committed into basic and applied research reached about 4.29% of its 
Gross Domestic Product in 2014 (US$60.5 billion), which outstrips that of the next runner-up Israel 
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(4.11%) in addition to other highly industrialized countries such as the U.S. and Japan. At the moment, 
Korea aspired to further invest into R&D as high as 5% of its GDP until 2017 with more coming towards 
its basic research programs. But the overall innovation pattern still remain within the restrictive confines 
of a ‘developmental-blindfolded fast-follower mentality’ in late industrialization, where major R&D 
efforts are generated primarily by large Chaebol conglomerates and has become narrowly focused on 
concentrated manufacturing sectors such as semiconductors, ICT, and other applied areas.292 In terms 
of strategic linkages with key innovation players, Korea’s collaborative relationship in R&D within the 
triple-helix construct of industry-university-GRI levels 4.6 in a scale of 7, which places the country in 
21st place out of the 35 OECD countries.293 
 A recent publication from Nature illustrates an even harsher review that shows the naked 
reality of Korea’s S&T competitive standing. As stated in previous paragraphs, the country is 
internationally recognized for its high spending patterns in R&D investment, which places Korea 
number one among any other country in the world. The figure showing more than 4% of GDP in R&D 
investment represent a commitment level higher than Israel, Japan, and the U.S., and double the level 
of China and the European Union. As portrayed in the later stages of Figure 7, the majority of the 
investment originate from industry where corporate investment account for over 75% and government 
23%. Experimental development and applied research constitute over 82.5% whereas basic research 
only takes up a marginal share of a mere 17.5%. Even so, the figures representing public S&T 
sponsorship further raises stronger doubts on actual productiveness and effectiveness of these 
government investment efforts. In terms of publications in scientific and technological journals, Korea 
lags far behind the front runners such as China, UK, Germany, and Japan, where the country stands in 
par with Spain, which spends far lesser in proportion on public R&D programs.294 The number of 
patent application displays similar circumstances as well. Since 2010, the country’s exponential rise in 
patent applications per 1 million people, which placed Korea in the top tiered group, do not necessarily 
extend into actual commercialization. About 72% of the patent applications developed by GRIs never 
materialized into a solid commercial program. Over half of these applications eventually become 
disposed of, and never see light in the commercial market afterwards. Thus, the steep increase in patent 
applications degenerate into mere paper practices.295 
In respect to a culture with deep rooted Confucius conventions, the Korean society traditionally 
placed technological significance lower in priority against conceptually abstract ideologies, thus does 
not share a consensus in bolstering S&T capacities and the need to nurture scientists and engineers in a 
socially respectful manner. Despite the strong state sponsored academic fellowships available for 
national S&T programs, competition in university level basic science and engineer departments have 
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been lagging behind business or law departments. 296  Surveys show that 41% of the 814 Korean 
scientists and engineers who received PhD degrees from U.S. universities decided to stay in the U.S. 
and not return to Korea because of the comparatively poor research environments and social 
treatment.297 Despite constant government efforts to reinforce technological capacities, such lack of 
awareness, vulnerable S&T substructure, and deficient institutional settings consequently resulted in 
scant linkages between principal innovation agents such as GRIs, universities, and corporate firms, 
which presents chronic challenges in the diffusion mechanisms for innovative technologies and its 
learning routines. In a technological sense, these arrangements are described as technology supply 
(development)-demand (commercialization)-diffusion (exploitation) policies. The principles of 
technology innovation rigorously arrange this connection through workforce professionalization, 
financial support, and knowledge management.298 The following subchapters further illustrate this 
arrangement. 
 
4.2.1. National S&T Governance Structure 
Perhaps no government organization in Korea went through various structural changes driven 
by different political anxieties and exploits as much as the S&T governance structure. Because of the 
frequent organizational changes and inherent challenges latent under the guise of inter-agency 
coordination, Korea’s S&T governance structure has to endure low fidelity from the S&T community. 
The country’s S&T governance experienced evolutionary changes and setbacks until the structure was 
assigned with its highest political stature during the Roh, Mu-Hyeon Administration in 2004, when the 
Minister of Science and Technology was elevated to a Vice Prime Minister level and assumed all 
coordinating authorities for national R&D programs. The following Lee, Myung-Bak Administration, 
on the contrary, abolished the MOST and disseminated the S&T functions to other government agencies 
such as the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, and the Korean Communications 
Commission. This received high criticism from the S&T community because the dissolution of MOST 
implied the elimination of a national level control tower that should administer highly anticipated and 
complex R&D programs sponsored under government supervision.299 Despite the frequent changes in 
the country’s S&T governance structure, the current evolutionary setbacks are reflected in a general 
sense through the multiple layers of various agencies that perform planning, programming, and 
implementation roles in an overarching fashion. 
 
                                                          
296 김용훈, “이공계 기피현상 분석을 통한 과학기술자의 사회적 위치 재구조화 정책방안 연구,” 
인적자원관리연구 제 17 권 제 2 호, 2010, pp. 183-189. 
297 David Wessel, “U.S. Keeps Foreign PhDs,” The Wall Street Journal, 26 January 2010. 
298 김진용, 국내 이공계 박사의 해외유출 특성 및 요인 분석, KISTEP Issue Paper 2010-09 
299 황의봉, 과기부 해체! 기로에 선 과학기술계, 신동아 2008 년 3 월호. 
 91 
 
Figure 8. Figure 1. S&T Governance Structure of Korea, adopted and reproduced from OECD Governance of Innovation 
Systems (2005), Erik Arnold et. al., Research and Innovation Governance in Eight Countries, Technopolis, Vol 28, 2003. 
  
The overall S&T governance structure considering the interdependent relationship and 
coordinating mechanisms between the upper-tiered executive apparatus and the lower-tiered 
implementing agencies can be more easily understood by reviewing the structure in four hierarchical 
levels (Figure 1). Level 1 represents the highest governance authority, the Presidential Office, and 
entails a coordinating body, the National Science and Technology Council, which performs 
accommodation and adjustment roles over competing R&D priorities between different cabinet 
ministries and agencies in terms of planning and resourcing. Level 2 considers planning and funding 
agencies that mostly consists of Ministries and cabinet level committees. Level 1 and Level 2 constitute 
the upper-tiered executive level policy planning and coordinating apparatus in this structure. Research 
labs such as GRIs and other support institutions are under Level 3 categories that mostly perform policy 
implementation such as R&D activities, technology planning, transfer, policy research and analysis, etc. 
Level 4 includes public and privately funded research labs and the business/R&D clusters such as 
science parks. Level 3 and 4 constitutes the lower-tiered implementing and execution agencies.300 
 
Upper-tiered Executive Apparatus: National Science and Technology Council 
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Before the Kim Dae Jung Administration of 1998, the MOST suffered from low political 
prestige and was placed under the Prime Minister’s Office as merely an implementing agency for 
distributing R&D resources, while a substantial portion of planning and programming functions stayed 
under the jurisdiction of the cabinet ministries. The decentralized authorities imposed additional 
challenges in interagency coordination.  
In the 1990s, the number of GRIs increased to 21 expanding into various scientific fields of 
basic research, applied engineering, and so forth. However, the general consensus was that these 
institutions were not producing the expected outcomes compared to the initial resources invested earlier. 
Whatsoever, the difficulties to coordinate differing ministerial opinions based on strongly prevalent turf 
wars, and the nonexistence of an institution that can adequately translate the coordinated results into 
actual government budgets, have hindered to create an effective innovation system in S&T affairs. In 
the previous decades, in order to overcome competing bureaucratic politics in drafting and adjusting 
complex inter-agency R&D needs, the General Science and Technology Council under the Prime 
Minister’s Office, which was established in 1973 and restructured in 1992, assumed major coordinating 
responsibilities in terms of planning, programming, and budgeting government sponsored R&D 
programs, but the organization could not effectively cope with the growing interagency coordinative 
demands. In response to such public needs, the Kim Dae Jung Administration, as part of strengthening 
the country’s national competitiveness in science and technology, has elevated the status of the Ministry 
of Science and Technology to an official Ministry level from the previous Agency level. Additionally, 
in 1999, in the course of streamlining government R&D resources dispersed under the authorities of 
various Ministry offices in order to improve effectiveness and efficiencies in government sponsored 
R&D programs, the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) chaired by the President 
and chiefly administered by the Minister of Science and Technology was launched. The primary 
responsibilities of the Commission were to serve as a coordination venue between the various GRIs that 
were assigned and administered under different branches of the government, in which the Minister of 
Science and Technology would serve as the administrational chief in integrating research agendas, 
supervising GRIs, and allocating R&D funding.301  
 If the purpose of the General S&T Council was to augment the low political stature of the 
MOST, the purpose of the NSTC was to adjust diverse R&D requirements incurred from different 
cabinet ministries as well as to support private sector R&D needs. Starting with the 1980s, a strong 
demand pull from various sectors of the economy called for resource assistance from the government. 
Various cabinet ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Resources, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs, and so forth, initiated their own ministry specific 
R&D programs, while the planning, programming areas, and resourcing needs became increasingly 
redundant and overlapped in many ways. For efficiency and improved effectiveness, there was a strong 
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justification to impose some cooperative division of labor between different bureaucratic sectors of the 
government. In this regard, the NSTC was established, which charters the President as the Chairman 
and the MOST Minister as the deputy, and gathered 15 ministers that administers sector specific R&D 
programs.302  
 However, the NSTC has been under constant criticism for its inconsistencies and discontinuity 
in policy executions caused by the frequent restructuring work driven by different political aspirations. 
After its creation in 1998, NSTC was overhauled five times until 2015, which was associated with 
continued degradation and elevation of the organization’s authorities. The NSTC is a non-standing 
organization, in which the MOST mostly served in secretariat responsibilities. In comparison with 
similar S&T governance institutions in the United States and Japan, which are established as permanent 
entities exercising strong executive level national S&T coordinating authorities under complete 
independence from other cabinet departments, the non-permanent status of Korea’s NSTC and the 
MOST serving in mere secretariat functions causes discontinuity and biases in decision making within 
this coordinative venue. This becomes troublesome and often discredits the NSTC when deliberating a 
consensus over critically differing inter-agency priorities.303 
 
Table 5. Reorganization Milestones of the National S&T Council 
 1999 2004 2008 2011 2013~ 2013 2015 
Standing 
Status Non-standing Non-standing Non-standing Standing
304 Non-standing 
Composition 
Chair: President 
 
Vice Chair: Non 
 
Members: 
14 Cabinet Ministers 
8 External members  
 
Secretary: MOST 
Chair: President 
 
Vice Chair: 
 Deputy Prime Minister  
  for S&T 
 
Members: 
14 Cabinet Ministers 
8 External members  
 
Secretary: MOST 
Chair: President 
 
Vice Chair: MEST 
 
Members: 
14 Cabinet Ministers 
8 External members  
 
Secretary:   
    Senior Presidential  
        Secretary of 
S&T 
Chair: 
   NSTC Chairman 
 
Vice Chair: Non 
 
Members: 
2 standing members 
7 External members  
 
Secretary: 
NSTC Secretary 
Co-chairs: 
Prime Minister,  
Politically appointed 
external member 
 
Member:  
 14 cabinet members 
 10 external members 
 
Secretary: 
 MOST Minster 
Secretariat MOST Office of S&T Innovation MEST NSTC Secretariat MOST 
Center for 
S&T 
Strategy 
 
Lower-tiered Implementing Agencies: R&D Agencies and Support Institutes 
As the national S&T competency continued to grow more complex and somewhat convoluted, 
the increasing need to create a supporting organization that covered overall planning, project 
management, and program evaluation roles amassed into higher demand. However, establishing such 
support functions within a government system presented challenges in efficiency and effectiveness 
considering the slow response time caused within the bureaucratic S&T governance structure. 
Responding to these growing programmatic demands for administrative efficiency, R&D support 
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304 NSTC existing as a standing committee in 2011 is illusive because it was merely a political gesture to alleviate the public 
outcry of abolishing the MOST and dissemintating its functions to other cabinet ministries during the Lee Myung Bak 
administration. 
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institutions (aka Specialized R&D Management Institutes) were created as an entrusted R&D 
management organization under each cabinet ministries that operated sizable R&D programs, which 
gradually increased in numbers since 1987.305 Starting with the creation of the Center for S&T Policy 
and Evaluation under the Korea Advanced Institute of Technology in 1987, additional R&D support 
institutions were erected in various and diversified S&T fields to manage the growing national R&D 
budget since 1999. Currently, there are a total of 18 public R&D support institutions operating under 
various ministries that employ about 3,300 in manpower supported with an annual budget of $320 
million. As of 2013, these institutions administers about 56% of the $15 billion national R&D budget.306  
 However, each ministry competitively created these institutes without considering the overlaps 
and redundancy with other ministries. Thus in 2006, R&D support institutes accounted for 31 in number 
under 12 cabinet ministries, in which many overlapped in function while rated deficient in 
professionalism. In order to streamline these lavishly excessive support functions, the government 
redefined the scope and responsibilities of R&D support institutes under Executive Order-27369, 
Regulations to Manage National R&D Programs, in July 2006, and established government review 
procedures under the NSTC when proposing the need for creating a new R&D support institute, in 
addition to providing assistance for rationalizing project management and evaluation routines. 307 
Despite these streamlining efforts, there still existed 14 R&D support institutes under 7 cabinet 
ministries in 2008, which continued to overlap in a number of research subjects without creating any 
cooperative linkages or productive synergies. In more detail, the 6 R&D support institutes managed by 
the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (formerly the Ministry of Commerce Industry & Energy), and the 
3 R&D support institutes operated by the Ministry of Education and S&T all had similar but 
compartmental operative functions in planning, evaluation, and program execution. For instance, in the 
field of components and materials technology, R&D planning was conducted by the Korea Industrial 
Technology Foundation, program evaluation was covered by the Korea Institute of Industrial 
Technology Evaluation & Planning, and program execution was managed by the Korea Materials & 
Components Industry Agency.308 Professionalism in leadership continued to discredit the validity and 
effectiveness of institutional research performances as most of the R&D support institute chair positions 
were politically appointed, who mostly had no science or engineering background. The lack of S&T 
professionalism in the upper leadership positions of these institutes caused impulsive and populist 
decision making in various R&D program management domains.309 In this regard, rationalization 
efforts over these support institutes were continuously raised as a public agenda item during a number 
of election campaigns, but the dispute still remains unsolved even now. 
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4.2.2. Establishment of Technological Standards 
The establishment of national measurement standards was a critical step for Korea towards 
upgrading its technical status acceptable to international specifications. Such efforts instituted 
compatibility with international S&T and industrial standards, which accelerated learning and diffusion 
of advanced technological competencies. Notably, the 21st century global supply chain and technical 
standards strongly demand commonality in measurement and performance evaluation, improve 
component interoperability, and protect end users through ensuring safety and durability in products 
and services. In this regard, instituting technical standards into a country’s S&T capacity is accounted 
as a critical component to enhance national or sector specific technological competence. 
Korea was mostly dependent on international assistance for institutionalizing measurement 
standards in the initial stage of industrialization, with the majority of the assistance provided from U.S. 
and Japanese sources until the early 1970s. The standardization efforts concentrated on measurements 
in micrometers, machinery, and electricity voltages as part of building the technical basis of its nascent 
industries. Especially, the provision of U.S. Government aid in the early years of development was 
considered a critical enabler that facilitated the country’s standardization process. During the 
Presidential Summit meeting of 1966, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson presented three sets of 
measurement instruments as a symbolized gift for S&T assistance. The motive for such provision from 
the U.S. Government was to garner additional military support from Korea over the on-going U.S. 
military campaigns in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.310 Subsequent to the high-level exchanges, follow-
up assistance was provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce in July 1968 with objectives to create 
a formal measurement standards laboratory in Korea. The suggestions made during this period were; 1) 
Build stronger consensus to establish national measurement standards agreeable with international 
norms; 2) Stronger government leadership in establishing institutional structures for national 
measurement systems. To support this initiative, a series of surveys were conducted by the U.S. National 
Bureau of Standards up until November 1974, which provided not only advisory services, but also 
financial assistance with a funding package amounting USD 5 million in international development 
loans.311 
The period from 1975 to 1988 marked the stage of rapid development and technological catch-
up through imitation and reverse engineering.312 As the country entered into the period of building 
heavy and chemical industries, and embarked upon initiatives in self-sufficient military modernization 
                                                          
310 Korea dispatched one Corps level element, nearly 330 thousand troops, to Vietnam from 1964 to 1973, which constituted 
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through constructing its defense industry in the mid-70s, a more sophisticated level of technical 
measurement standards came into practical need. In order to address the growing domestic technical 
demands, the Korea Standard Research Institute (later renamed to Korea Research Institute of Standards 
and Science in 1991) was founded in 1975 under the Ministry of Science and Technology.313 It served 
as a momentum to build more indigenous capacities in standardization measurements. The efforts were 
supported financially through various development aid programs lent from the Asian Development 
Bank, United States Agency for International Development, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 
and so forth. A number of government officials, scientists, and engineers that attended four iterations of 
intensive training in the National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB) returned to create stronger 
grounds for technical expertise in equipment and facilities required for further refinement of domestic 
measurement standards.314  
Moving into the 1990s, various social issues in aging, welfare, public safety, environment, etc., 
have emerged. Also in order to enter the wealthy class countries while fend off third world developing 
economies, Korea was in dire need to upgrade its industrial structure to more high-tech and 
sophisticated systems. In the process of addressing these concerns, a diverse number of measurement 
fields such as in analytical chemistry, material science, safety engineering, and radiation therapy was 
included into the standardization requirements. 315  Institutionalizing and sustaining measurement 
standardization efforts took part through constant legislation work and organizational build-ups. As a 
late starter in industrialization, the first legislation introduced on technical standards was in 1961 as the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry enacted the ‘Industrial Standards Act’ and created the Bureau of 
Standardization under its organizational structure. The Industrial Standard Act was considered in its 
rudimentary stage since the domestic industry was simply built-up around the light industry sector. The 
initiative, however, developed into the Korean Standards (KS) in later stages, which reviewed and 
processed manufacturing permits for industrial products. 
In 1979, there were movements to invest national measurement standards into constitutional 
importance. During the political turmoil that followed the assassination of President Park Jung Hee in 
late 1979, the S&T authorities attempted to utilize the momentum in favor of instituting stronger 
grounds to cultivate domestic R&D capacities, such that the political vacuum of out-casting the 
authoritarian Yushin Constitution, and replacing it with higher democratic values opened opportunities 
to build in foundational technological establishments. After a yearlong deliberative effort, the National 
Standard Systems was included in Paragraph 2 of Section 128 of the 9th Constitutional Amendment.316 
The inclusion was the first of its kind effort worldwide where national measurement standards 
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comprehensively became a written paragraph in a country’s constitution. But it wasn’t until 20 years 
later in July 1999 when national measurement standards actually became legislated supported by 
institutional mechanisms, stipulated in the “Framework Act on National Standards”. In the interim, the 
“Weights and Measures Act” was enforced in 1993 but was not implemented in full length until the 
Framework Act was introduced. The supervisory office administering the Framework Act was 
traditionally designated to industrial authorities, i.e. Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy – 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy – Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. Subsequent to the 
Framework Act, a number of supporting ordnances such as the “Operating Regulations of Standard 
Materials Certification”, “Designation and Operation of National Calibration Institutes”, and so forth 
were implemented.317 
Based on the enactment of legislating measurement standards, a number of implementing 
agencies were established to execute the proposed policy objectives. Two primary metrology institutes 
that administer and execute national measurement standards are the Korea Research Institute of 
Standard and Science (KRISS) under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Korea Agency 
for Technology and Standards (KATS) under the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. KRISS is 
represented as the national metrology institute and is responsible for accrediting, developing, and 
maintaining national measurement standards. The responsibility of KATS is on calibrating and 
supplying scientific and technological standards to the end users such as firms, laboratories, public 
agencies, and so forth. In order to execute the calibration and accreditation functions and facilitate 
diffusion of technical standards, the Korea Laboratory of Accreditation Scheme (KOLAS) has been 
organized under KATS.318 
Institutionalizing national measurement standards provided the basic infrastructure for rapid 
economic development. Starting with the Korea Textile Inspection and Testing Institute in 1961, the 
nine government-run test laboratories on quality assurance created to date have generated certified test 
reports recognized by international standards, which enabled the exports of Korean products to overseas 
markets. According to a 2004 study conducted by Bearing Point on the economic impact value of 
Korea’s national measurement standards, the standardization, calibration, and accreditation services 
provided by KRISS between 1994 and 2003 grossed to an amount near USD 860 million. The amount 
is a value worth 150% of its original investment considering cost-benefit ratios, which continues to 
grow. Accounting for the economic impact value for only 2003 alone, the effectiveness grows even 
higher to 1,276%.319 
The aspirations of reaching out for enhanced compatibility with international accreditation 
standards became crucially important as the domestic industry aggressively pursued the objective of 
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upgrading its technical competitiveness status as an effort to proceed into more complex product 
systems. Especially after the government started to expand the national standardization categories in 
1985, the scale of public R&D investments has constantly increased to substantial levels. As of 2016, 
the government R&D budget appropriated for standardization activities reached KRW 52.18 billion. 
The trend reflected the increasing need to cope with the international trend in reinforcing technology 
regulations and overcome technical barriers in trade relations. As Korea continues to compete in high-
end technical products, the pressing requirements to accommodate its innovation system towards 
inherent challenges in exporting industrial commodities for improved compatibility and exchangeability, 
applicable to respective market needs, became an imperative factor for sustained growth.320 Thus, 
conforming the country standards to an expected level towards international accreditations emerged as 
a priority area for enhancing technology competitiveness. In this aspect, the government boost up its 
efforts to join the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) through signing Mutual 
Recognition Arrangements (MRA) by using ISO/IEC standards, and involving conformity assessment 
bodies such as calibration laboratories, testing facilities, medical testing centers, and inspection 
bodies.321 
In regards to institutional constraints, despite the well-established administrative structure in 
national measurement standards, there has been a number of confusion caused by bureaucratic rivalries 
between S&T authorities and industrial forces. Most of the confusion derives from jurisdictional 
authorities concentrated too much on industrial forces. KRISS is administered under MOST whereas 
KATS is controlled under MOTIE. The two organization has overlapping functions in areas of 
measurement, accreditation, and calibration, which hinders flawless interagency coordination. The 
jurisdictional authorities come from the Framework Act on National Standards, which is under the 
auspices of MOST (S&T authorities). However, the implemented ordinances are all administered under 
MOTIE (industrial authorities), which marginalizes the authorities of KRISS and the S&T apparatus. 
Based on the current arrangement, the only function effectively carried out by KRISS, under the 
auspices of MOST, is on developing measurement standards since the measurement tools remain within 
the possession of these two organizations, whereas the other major standardization functions such as 
calibration, accreditation, and dissemination are conducted by KATS and MOTIE, which do not obtain 
appropriate measurement instrumentation. Without an overarching coordination committee that can 
effectively mitigate these discrepancies, then duplicate investments in national standards and continued 
inefficiencies within bureaucracies will preclude the national standard authorities from developing a 
streamlined vision on technical standards. Table 2 encapsulates the overall discrepancies of these legal 
responsibilities.322 
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National Measurement Standards Principles Implementing Ordinances 
Agency Responsibilities and Legal Basis Actual Responsibilities Agency 
KRISS 
Measurement 
Standards and 
Dissemination 
Article 13: Representative national 
entity on measurement standards 
Representative national entity 
on measurement standards KRISS 
Article 14: Calibration Systems Calibration Systems 
KATS 
Article 15: Accreditation of 
standard materials 
Accreditation of standard 
materials 
KATS 
Technical 
Administrative 
Services 
Article 17: Legal Metrology 
Systems Legal Metrology Systems 
Article 18: Industrial Standard 
Systems Industrial Standard Systems 
Article 21: Conformity Test Conformity Test 
Article 23: Accreditation of Test 
and Evaluation Systems 
Accreditation of Test and 
Evaluation Systems 
Table 6. Jurisdictional Discrepancies in National Measurement Standards: 김동진 외, “우리나라 국가표준체계 현황과 
선진화 방안,” 한국기술혁신학회지 제3권 2호, 2000, p. 133. 
   
The discrepancies in legal responsibilities causes confusion in a number of national level 
standards where certain measurements differ from international standards. The technical expertise 
resides within KRISS where all the measurement tools are in possession, whereas in reality KATS 
executes not only the administrative services in terms of announcing national technical standards, but 
also perform calibration and accreditation functions, while not obtaining the technical expertise. The 
disconnect between these two operating agencies poses continued challenges for the country’s S&T 
potentials to join the ranks of international standards.  
 
4.3.3. System Linkages in Korea’s Innovation System 
 
Triple Helix Coordination: Public-Private Partnership (Industry-Universities-GRIs) 
Represented in major technological success stories such as the DRAM and TDX programs, 
cooperative R&D initiatives such as public and private partnership (P/PP) in product development 
between GRIs and industry showed strong collaborative relationships. The recent R&D investment 
patterns show higher percentages in partnership projects, in which P/PP account for 37% of the total 
national R&D expenses.323 
However, recent surveys show the previously close relationship between industry and GRIs has 
substantially diminished, while the partnership between industry and universities increased more than 
two fold. In an OECD conducted survey between 1997 and 2006 over the percentage of private sector 
funding to GRIs and higher education institutes such as universities, GRIs marked only one-third the 
level of investments (4.5%) compared to that of universities (13.7%). Such investment statistics 
sponsored mostly by the private sector to high education institutes is markedly at the highest level within 
the OECD, which places Korea behind Turkey and Germany as a percentage of higher education 
expenditure on R&D. The investment portfolio of government R&D to the private sector also marks 
some significant changes compared to trends from past decades. The R&D subsidies previously 
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awarded to large firms has dropped from 6.6% in 2000 to 2.7% in 2006, which continues to drop even 
now, while the R&D subsidies awarded to SMEs maintains a stable rate of 12% and higher. This 
indicates the contraction in collaborative relationship between government and large firms, and an 
upsurge of government support to small and medium businesses.324 
However, the patenting and technology transfer aspects of system linkages do not show much 
strong linkages in cooperative R&D efforts as illustrated in patenting and technology transfer data. 
Patent applications emerging from co-operative R&D partnerships have been hovering around 6% from 
all domestic patent applications. Industry-university partnership in patenting is still low in statistics but 
has been growing in meaningful paces over the past decade. But partnership between industry and GRIs 
have been declining significantly in recent trends.325 In the aspect of technology transfers from public 
to private sectors, universities and GRIs have been enthusiastically exerting efforts to transferring 
proprietary ownership of technologies to the private sector through various arrangements. Considering 
the technology transfer results of year 2005, about 30% of technologies owned by GRIs, and 9.3% of 
technologies owned by universities were transferred to the private sector through the form of licenses, 
direct sales, and technological alliances.326 The contributing element to such increase in technology 
transfers were realized through the operation of various technology transfer consortia and the 
designation of Technology Licensing Offices by the Ministry of Commerce-Industry-Energy. 
 
Technology Transfer and Diffusion Mechanisms 
The vicious competitive disposition of the global economy provokes countries to strenuously 
exploit novel technologies to maintain a sound position within the market. The transfer and diffusion 
process is therefore imperative in determining the commercial success of a country’s various technical 
business fields. It is through this diffusion process where the original technology interacts with other 
elements of innovation such as production systems, relevant technical domains, market demand, process 
engineering, and so forth. The Korean Government did not effectively sponsored technology transfer 
policies before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Until then, despite the tremendous appetite in 
technological needs deriving from the explosion of firm level capacity development, state sponsored 
R&D policy still placed priority on GRI research programs, thus the linkage between technology 
development and commercial exploitation lingered weak, and the diffusion of lucrative technology 
remained passive. Technology diffusion from the public to private sector was initiated by the gradual 
migration of scientists and engineers from these GRIs to corporate research institutes, which provided 
promising research grants and more liberty in research scope.327 
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 Korea’s technology transfers and diffusion policy is composed of objective-oriented and 
service-oriented policies. Objective-oriented policies are then categorized in technology-driven, 
agency-driven, industrially-driven, and regionally-driven.328 Technology driven programs are managed 
by government agencies, and are implemented through nationally sponsored R&D programs designed 
to promote collaborative research between the triple helix of industry-academia-GRIs. A representative 
program developed from this setting is the Super-High Speed Information and Communication Network 
sponsored by the Ministry of Information and Communication from 1995 to 2005, which established 
the country’s critical IT infrastructure for future dominance in this field for the next 10 years.  The 
government aggressively exerted efforts to deploy the initial ADSL based infrastructure in all regions 
of the country, which made Korea the most connected country in the world and enabled promising 
opportunities in future IT businesses based on this essential capacity.329 
 Agency-driven programs were designed not only to support large corporate firms but also to 
include technological support for small and medium firms that do not possess the resources to launch 
strong R&D programs. Government agencies such as the Small and Medium Business Corporation, 
Korea Productivity Center, and the Small and Medium Business Administration provides a number of 
programs in technology assistance, informatization support, training and education, venture capital 
support, and so forth, to assist the corporate needs generated from this sector.  The Systems 
engineering Research Institute under KIST, which later merged into the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute in 1997, executed technical initiatives in assisting 
informatization through its “Product Information System Development and Technology Training 
Program” in order to improve productivity and process engineering for small and medium enterprises. 
 Industrially-driven programs consider instigating diffusion initiatives launched by the 
respective government ministries responsible for specific industrial sectors, such as the Ministry of 
Information and Telecommunication for ICT related projects, Ministry of Public Health and Welfare 
for health services, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport for construction related technologies, 
and so forth. For instance, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport implements, by law, the 
“New Technology Designation” program to encourage the adoption of novel technologies introduced 
from domestic and foreign sources through undergoing processes of identification-assessment-
designation-application.330 However, industrially-driven programs are limited to a small number of 
business sectors that received huge government support during the development stages, and do not 
cover a wide range of business sectors.331 
 Regionally-driven programs promote regional clusters in diversified but relevant businesses 
for the purpose of creating a locally symbiotic industrial structure. The program started with Korea’s 
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initiation of the Local Governance System in 1995, and is considered one of the most vibrant and active 
publicly sponsored diffusion programs executed by both central and local governments. The program 
puts local university science ad engineer departments at the center of all planning and programming 
functions and creates a local technical business cluster tailored for the specific technology and relevant 
business area. MOST built up 14 Regional Research Centers to support the diffusion of knowledge and 
technology to the local economy. A recent standout program is the Gwangju High-Tech Industrial 
Complex (aka Gwangju Innopolis). The Innopolis houses the Gwangju Institute of Science and 
Technology as the high-tech research hub in the center of R&D related activities, supported by local 
branch offices of related GRIs such as ETRI, Korea Photonics Technology Institute, Jeonnam Techno-
Park, and 273 companies in the field of photonics and optical technology. 332  The technical 
specialization in the growing field of photonics and optical technology, in such areas of solar energy, 
LED, LCD, and so forth, was a huge success in attracting the attention of research labs and firms in this 
field, such that the business sales within the wider Gwangju area alone increased tenfold from KRW 
113 billion in 1999 to KRW 1.62 trillion in 2006.333 
 Service-oriented policies are not objective based but are applied in almost every domain, 
especially small and medium sized firms that are in need of technical assistance. The service categories 
are in technology-support, industrial exhibition support, and technical-information assistance. 
Technology-counseling services provide supervisory services for firms that are in need of the respective 
technology and information. The routine technical advisory services provided by the Small and Medium 
Business Corporation, Designation of Novel Technology Program sponsored by the Ministry of 
Information and Telecommunication, and the Robotic Automation in Production Process initiated by 
the MOST are one of the programs that show high return rates in technical needs from small and medium 
sized firms. Industrial exhibition-support services present opportunities for direct interaction between 
producers and consumers in certain technical fields through exposition events. Exhibition assistances 
for new inventions sponsored by the Korean Intellectual Property Office, Air and Defense Exhibition 
supported by the Ministry of National Defense and Korea Defense Industry Association, and various 
exhibitions on mechanics hosted by the Mechanical Industry Promotion Association are some of the 
examples. Additionally, these expositions in many occasions incorporate academic seminars and public 
hearings in order to fully enhance and exploit public awareness and attention focused around these 
events. 
Technical-information support is a service area that collects and reproduces, and disseminates 
technical information to entities in need of such information. Thus, the focus of the program is to make 
this information easily accessible to the required needs of the information consumer. The Korea Institute 
of National Industry and Technology Information (KINITI) under MOCIE and R&D Information 
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Centers under MOST, which developed into the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information 
(KISTI), were the two primary entities that fully operate under this diffusion platform. KINITI was later 
merged into KISTI in 2001 in order to create a more streamlined structure for the conversion and 
diffusion of S&T and industrial information. KISTI mostly concentrates on distributing S&T knowledge 
through publications, standardization, and statistical databases, and is supported by functional research 
centers that work on advanced information convergence, supercomputing, and innovation assistance for 
small and medium enterprises.334 On a separate, but very relevant area worth acknowledging is the way 
how diffusion experts are trained and educated as a professional career path. Most of the government 
officials assigned to technology diffusion related billets are mostly serving in rotational terms for fixed 
period and departs with no sufficient replacement training. Thus, the challenge of consistency and 
continuity always exist.335 Certain regional cluster programs are also abandoned because of political 
disagreements or popularity votes casted during election year, which is unfortunately a common theme 
observed across other democratic societies. 
 The government sponsored diffusion programs, however, do not necessarily result in high 
performance outcomes. The programs are criticized for being mostly piecemeal and not connected 
through inter-agency coordination mechanisms. Accordingly, the diffusion programs are not closely 
associated with the corporate commitments in niche business areas. The lack of situational awareness 
over the dynamically changing market conditions is attributed by the apparent disconnect between 
different government agencies. The stovepipe vertical structure of certain technology fields 
inadequately reflects the divergent needs of corporate firms competing against global competitors. As 
aforementioned in the industrially-driven diffusion programs, the diffusion initiatives are managed by 
only a handful of industrial sectors that traditionally received government support during the 
development periods. These programs are not horizontally coordinated with relevant components of the 
industry such as local governments, high education institutes, and so forth.336  
 
4.3.4. Structural Constraints in Implementing an Effective S&T Governance Policy 
 
Proprietary Restraints from Government Sponsored R&D Projects 
In the whilst of rapidly transitioning the country’s national innovation system from a closed-
door innovation system to a universally open-door system, the characteristics of intellectual proprietary 
rights (IPR) are also transforming from an ownership concept to a shared-utility concept. In this process, 
the utilization aspects of publically sponsored R&D projects, where the government generally claims 
ownership over the project outcomes, have been identified as an obstructing source of fostering national 
innovation.337 
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 Current Korean law and regulation defines the ownership of proprietary rights over a publicly 
funded R&D project exclusively falls under the sponsoring government agency. In contrast to the 
ownership rights, the law vaguely recognizes the contribution provided from the participating entities 
who actually performed the research itself. For instance, among the 9,521 government sponsored R&D 
projects in 2010, only 19% (1,802 projects) became commercialized by participating corporations. The 
statistics implies the IPR remains restrictively under government control, which precludes further 
exploitation by participating private entities seeking commercial objectives. Consequently, individual 
or corporate contributions become marginalized, thus degrades the potentials of the technological 
outcomes diffusing into greater innovation opportunities. 338  On the contrary, advanced industrial 
countries that perform in higher innovation categories, such as the U.S., Japan, and EU, recognizes the 
contribution of those who participated in the project, at which the R&D outcomes reverts to the entities 
that hold responsibility over the research project. Therefore, the IPR priority is rendered to the 
participating entities. Such condition presents favorable circumstances for technology diffusion by 
empowering the participating entities with higher motivations to successfully commercialize the 
processes and outcomes of the R&D project. However, the Korean practice of marginalizing the 
participating entities within government sponsored R&D projects substantially discourages the triple 
helix of industry-university-GRI partnership and international collaborative research initiatives.339 
 Differing government regulations regarding publically funded IPR ownership arrangements 
add an extra layer of difficulties in diffusing these R&D outcomes. As of 2013, the number of 
established regulations in support of specific R&D programs account for 379 across 19 government 
agencies. The different definition and standards over IPR ownership causes constant confusion and 
inefficiencies for participating private entities in these programs. Hence, in a survey conducted in 2012 
over publically funded R&D projects, 28% of the responses demanded a more coherent definition on 
IPR ownership regulations, 26% demanded a more flexible and convenient technology transfer and 
utilization process, 15% asking for a more standardized government regulation across agencies, and 14% 
requesting a single government authority when managing government sponsored IPR.340 
 
Competing Priorities against Economic Policies 
Technological innovations often times confront constant frictions against economic priorities. 
Economists tend to focus more on market functions and government expenditure than science and 
technology programs because of the embodying high development risks and long gestation period for 
capital investments in R&D programs. As a matter of fact, the statistics showing only 4 out of 53 Nobel 
Laureates in Economic Science being recognized for their contributions in researching technology 
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innovation subjects encapsulates the lopsidedness and marginalization of the studies conducted over 
technological developments in the economics literature.341 S&T policies were considered a subordinate 
category of economic development planning, at which many national level scientific programs were 
driven by bureaucrats with financial backgrounds who had less exposure to technological fields. 
Intangible economic impact factors and feasibilities were given priorities over assessing technological 
development risks and associated growth potentials. Although economists or government officials 
constantly advocate the achievements of scientific research, this is more easily said than done. The case 
of the Korean S&T apparatus is nowhere different from this conundrum.  
The MOST was constantly criticized for its incapacities in adequately planning and 
coordinating national S&T policies through inter-agency concertation. Despite the legislated 
responsibilities of the MOST, the budget and financial authorities mostly took over the planning and 
coordinating role in S&T policies. The policy coordinating roles, including S&T policies, were inherited 
from the Economic Planning Board (1991), Ministry of Finance and Economy (1994), and currently to 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Under this bureaucratic condition, MOST did not obtain the 
wherewithal to take leadership in S&T policy making, which included the authorities to allocate national 
R&D resources. 342  For instance, the ICT Promotion Act legislated during the Kim Young Sam 
Administration, which ruminates as the critical turning point for Korea’s advancement into the IT 
industry, was planned and coordinated not by MOST, but by the Presidential Secretary in Economic 
Affairs343 The inter-agency coordinating authority was also assigned to the Minister of the Cabinet 
Office under the Prime Minister, who also happened to be a finance official who came with extensive 
experience under the Economic Planning Board, not the technocrats from MOST. 344 Putting into 
consideration of the significant planning requirements in S&T management roles while recognizing the 
apparent marginalization, the political stature and authority of MOST was once elevated and 
strengthened to a Deputy Prime Minister level during the two subsequent administrations in the new 
millennium that succeeded the Kim Young Sam Presidency, but was then again degraded and eventually 
abolished by the Lee Myong Bak Administration as of 2008. Therefore, no matter how ambitiously an 
S&T strategy was proposed and drafted, it rarely materialized as a concrete program after being 
frustrated by the economic and budget authorities. 
Such aspect relates with the political stature of S&T agencies. National S&T policy was, and 
still is, an attractive subject that has accessible public appeal for politicians. In this regard, a number of 
Presidents fancied themselves as “S&T Presidents” and committed to a number of self-promoting 
declaratory policies in respect to upgrading the national S&T competitiveness up to a performance level 
in par with advanced industrial countries. However, most of these policies remained rhetorical campaign 
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strategies and did not develop into a solid program initiative.345 This mainly attributes to the relatively 
low profiled political stature of the MOST in comparison to other government agencies related with 
S&T activities. Until the Kim Young Sam Administration of 1997, the MOST was not an independent 
cabinet department, but was subordinated under the Prime Minister’s Office. Constant replacement of 
Ministers heading the Science and Technology Ministry was also a source of weakness that caused 
inconsistency and disconnection in policy. Accounting for the period MOST Ministers stayed in office, 
the average tenure was a little over a year or so, while not accounting for a handful of Ministers that 
were appointed during the earliest days of the Ministry when the military dictatorship endowed as much 
power to scientists and engineers for the country’s strong economic development drive.346 
 
Discouraged Entrepreneurship and Demoralized Social Status of Scientists and Engineers 
Conditions for R&D policy in Korea are captured in two words; inconsistency and 
unsustainability. Inconsistency stems from frequent policy changes and pointless organizational 
restructuring of Government Research Institutes (GRI) based on short-term performance assessments 
made by incumbent political administrations. Such destabilizing factor consequently resulted in the low 
esteem of scientists and engineers, and the perceived social status. The frequent reorganization work 
hammered onto public research labs under the initiative of GRI rationalization over the past thirty some 
years have left high caliber scientists insecure with their job security. The rationalization assessments 
of GRIs conducted in 1983, which consolidated 16 government sponsored research labs into 9, 
compelled thousands of S&T related officials to leave the workforce. Another rationalization effort that 
occurred in 1991 was revalidating the 22 GRIs considering its performances and achievements, which 
forced another batch of scientists departing their laboratory chambers. The third large scale 
reorganization work was caused by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which resulted in another wave 
of S&T officials eliminated from GRIs. However, these three national level reorganization work on 
GRIs, spanning within less than two decades, had incurred some subsequently unexpected diffusion 
effects into the private sector, in which motivated corporate R&D efforts of the five major Chaebol 
companies exceeding public R&D outcomes in absolute size and value.347 
The impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on national level science and technology policies 
confronted the same situation as with other sectors of the country. Compounding to the already worsen 
conditions of the R&D workforce was the inherent circumscription of bureaucratic inefficiency layered 
within populist government policies. Reigning Presidents and political parties mainly relies on popular 
votes, thus focus on near-sighted remedies instead of long-term solutions. Hence, R&D efforts, which 
                                                          
345 Some scholars refer to this conduct as ‘Exhibitional Bureaucracy’, namingly a policy that simply intends to instigate 
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normally require a tenacious mid-to-long-term strategy and incubation period, are often disturbed by 
such populist policy lines, therefore difficult to achieve the original research goals. Science and 
Technology Policy in Korea were coined to these traits since the 1980s. The Chun Doo Hwan 
Government that took power over a palace coup immediately started to streamline the GRIs through 
massive organizational consolidation under the guise of improving efficiency. The marching orders of 
the Ministry of Science and Technology to execute this policy were titled “Proposal to Overhaul R&D 
Systems and Improve Operations”, which consolidated 16 GRIs into 8 clustered research fields.348 The 
aftermath was a huge exodus of senior researchers from these institutions that were gathered as an 
extended efforts to build foundational capacities for the economy during the early developmental 
decades. For instance, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), after being 
compelled to consolidate with the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) experienced a 
departure of 41% of its senior researchers between 1981 and 1983.349 The subsequent Roh Tae Woo 
Government implemented a similar effort by conducting a comprehensive performance assessment of 
22 S&T related GRIs, which resulted in some internal structural adjustments of operational functions. 
Although not going through reform efforts in an equal magnitude of former Presidents, the Asian 
Financial Crisis erupted during the ensuing Kim Young Sam Administration has forced the government 
to substantially reduce public funding allocated to national R&D projects. The task for organizational 
downsizing was undertaken by the succeeding Kim Dae Jung Government, at which the national R&D 
budget was slashed by 20% and nearly a thousand scientists and engineers were forced to leave GRIs. 
A number of these experienced researchers sought asylum in foreign research labs instead of finding 
alternate employment opportunities inside Korea.350 
 
Unit: Number of researchers, ( ) marks % 
 Chaebol SME Venture Firms Total 
No. of departing 
researchers 92 (74.2) 9 (7.3) 23 (18.5) 124 (100) Researchers 
departing by year 26 (21.0) 82 (66.1) 16 (12.9) 
Table 7. Researchers Departing for Foreign Employment (1999-2001)351 
 
Unsustainability was also a major factor that obstructed national level S&T policies from 
fluently being implemented. One factor that attributed to this cause was frequent replacements of senior 
S&T leadership within the State Council. Especially after the 1980s, until the end of the Lee Myong 
Bak Presidency in 2013, only 8 out of 24 Ministers fulfilled their 24-month tenure as the Ministerial 
head to lead the MOST. Another notable factor is that over 15 Ministers served merely a year in office. 
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Administration Title Minister Tenure Duration (months) 
Park Chung Hee 
Minister of 
Science and 
Technology 
(Agency level) 
Kim, Gi Hyeong 1967.04 – 1971.06 51 
Choi, Hyeong Seob 1971.06 – 1978.12 91 
Choi, Jong Wan 1978.12 – 1979.12 13 
Seong, Jwa Gyeong 1979.12 – 1980.09 10 
Chun Doo Hwan 
Lee, Jeong O 1980.09 – 1985.02 54 
Kim, Seong Jin 1985.02 – 1986.01 12 
Jeon, Hak Jae 1986.01 – 1986.08 8 
Lee, Tae Seob 1986.05 – 1987.07 15 
Park, Geung Shik 1987.07 – 1988.02 8 
Roh Tae Woo 
Lee, Gwan 1988.02 – 1988.12 11 
Lee, Sang Hee 1988.12 – 1990.11 24 
Jeong, Geun Mo 1990.03 – 1990.11 9 
Kim, Jin Hyeon 1990.11 – 1993.02 28 
Kim, Young Sam 
Kim, Shi Joong 1993.02 – 1994.12 22 
Jeong, Geun Mo 1994.12 – 1996.08 21 
Ku, Bon Young 1996.08 – 1996.12 5 
Kim, Yong Jin 1996.12 – 1997.03 4 
Kwon, Sook Il 1997.03 – 1998.03 13 
Kim, Dae Jung 
Minister of 
Science and 
Technology 
(Ministry level) 
Kang, Chang Hee 1998.03 – 1999.03 13 
Seo, Jeong Wook 1999.03 – 2001.03 25 
Kim, Young Hwan 2001.03 – 2002.01 11 
Chae, Young Bok 2002.01 – 2003.02 14 
Roh, Mu Hyeon 
Park, Ho Goon 2003.02 – 2003.12 11 
Vice Premier in 
Science and 
Technology 
Oh, Myeong 2003.12 – 2006.02 27 
Kim, Woo Shik 2006.02 – 2008.02 25 
Lee, Myong Bak 
Minister of 
Education, and 
Science and 
Technology 
Kim, Do Yeon 2008.02 – 2008.08 7 
Ahn, Byeong Mahn 2008.08 – 2010.08 25 
Lee, Joo Ho 2010.08 – 2013.03 32 
 Table 8. Chronology of MOST Leadership Changes 
 
Also, the dualised enforcement of policy and execution functions between the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the Presidential Advisory Council for Science and Technology caused 
conflicts in overall decision making and redundancy through overlapping authorities. 
The poor treatment and abuses on scientists and engineers as a low esteemed social class 
resulted in weak technical links to technology exploitation and commercialization. Such aspects are 
detrimental to encouraging entrepreneurship in a science based highly technological field. In a recent 
survey conducted by Seoul National University, American top-notch engineering schools highly values 
venture business activities and collaborative research of its faculty members instead of simply 
publishing research papers in academic journals. Such valuation standards awards technology 
exploitation and accelerates technology commercialization, which adds real value into the economy. On 
the contrary, Korean universities, while sharing sluggish links in collaborative research with industry 
while honoring research publication work rather than technology commercialization efforts in the form 
of start-up companies, comparatively show lesser performance levels and insufficient contribution to 
innovation and further economic activities. A stunning survey shows the net worth of start-up 
companies established by graduates from Stanford University and MIT alone is valued $4.7 trillion, 
which more than triples the value of the same category within Korea’s GDP ($1.3 trillion). Faculty 
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members concurrently serving in start-up businesses are structurally banned in a number of top 
engineering schools in Korea. The collaborative research and start-up business activities for S&T 
faculty members at Seoul National University is restrained within 20% compared to teaching and school 
work. KAIST halves the annual salary of faculty members to those participating in external business 
activities other than school work.352 Thus, instead of exploiting or commercializing faculty research 
results, Korean university professors focus more on publishing papers to retain tenures, which has very 
marginal impact to innovation and economic performances. 
 
4.4. Innovation Systems in the National Defense Sector through Defense Technology 
Development 
 
The defense innovation system is rooted with the Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS), 
which accommodates the weapon system procurement process of the Armed Forces. The weapon 
system procurement process consists of domestic development and foreign purchase. The defense 
innovation system primarily relates with the domestic development programs with additional layers 
contributed from foreign purchases. The DAMS is subject to the country’s national security policy with 
an ultimate objective to keep the country safe from external security threats and foreign aggression. 
Thus, the DAMS is an outcome of vibrant interaction with the national security policy, military strategy, 
military tactics, and the incorporation of the country’s industrial capacity. The following section briefly 
introduces the history of military capability building and the evolution of the defense acquisition system. 
 
4.4.1. Early History: Dawn of Capacity Building in the Defense Sector 
Science and Technology policy during a stretch of twenty years from the early 1950s to the late 
60s was almost nonexistent. Such inability is a common theme observed throughout a number of 
decolonized countries after the Second World War, since the colonial occupation did not nurture a high 
skill workforce proficient in the language of science and technology. Such aspects were also applicable 
to Korea after the end of its colonial periods. As such, the Japanese Occupation discouraged the growth 
of S&T capacities in Korea. No public entity existed for a prolonged period over 36 years that was 
capable of administering government policies on education and research work related with science and 
technology.353  
 Throughout the Japanese Occupation, S&T subjects in high schools and colleges were absent, 
and only a small number of vocational schools that trained artisans and technicians were the only 
technical education available during that period. Secondly, the aftermath of the Korean War left the 
country into despair with no resources available to commit into S&T research. During this period, the 
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353 동아일보사, 원자력시대와 한국의 진로 좌담회, 1958. 8. 3. 
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organizations worth labeling as S&T research institutes were actually testing laboratories that 
performed surveys and quality assurance work for primary industries such as the Central Agricultural 
Testing Center, Central Meteorological Service, National Mineral and Geological Survey, Central 
Industrial Laboratory, and the Science and Technology Laboratory under the Ministry of National 
Defense.354 The entire nation living under international economic aid, while experiencing vicious 
inflation rates caused by over currency reform and manipulations, left the Korean public authorities 
with no wherewithal to expand the scientific boundaries of the country. Whatsoever, perhaps the sectors 
worthwhile considering for S&T development during this period were those related with national 
security affairs. 
 Development efforts committed to defense technology before the 1970’s were conducted in 
small armories existing sporadically without a centralized control agency, in such forms as technical 
branches of the arsenals under each military services, mainly focusing on replicating components and 
spare parts for repair and maintenance work on legacy defense platforms and systems leftover either 
from the Japanese Imperial Army or the U.S. Occupation Forces.355 On June 15, 1950, the Science and 
Technology Laboratory were established under the Central Directorate of Ordnance at the Ministry of 
National Defense, the first research institute organized under government funding at the time. The S&T 
Lab expanded its branches during the Korean War and was later legislated by Presidential Decree on 
July 1954 as the Defense Science Laboratory under the Ministry of National Defense. The motivation 
for this organization was, however, driven by concerns of scientists residing in the southern part of the 
Peninsula being mobilized by North Korea as an effort to establish research functions in the North. In 
this respect, the underlying intentions of the Laboratory was not to nurture fundamental capacities in 
research and development, but merely a scheme to retain indigenous technicians from joining 
communist incitements. 356  Because of such motivations, in 1958, even after four years of its 
commencement, the Defense Science Laboratory was confronting challenges in becoming a more 
organized and systematic research institute due to shortages in funding and capable scientists.357 The 
defense logistics of the Korean Military was still entirely reliant on the services rendered from U.S. 
Military Grant-Aid programs, thus the localization of spare parts and components were far-off from 
reality. A few years later, because of its unproductivity and ineffectiveness, the newly inaugurated 
military government that came into power through a military coup, disbanded the Defense Science Lab 
as part of its extended efforts to cut underperforming public organizations, and transferred the research 
functions under the Army Ordnance Bureau.358 In a more political context, the closing of the Defense 
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Science Lab moreover contained political implications to better serve for the principal forces of the 
military coup, which was in dour need to appeal as a legitimate government to the United States in order 
to sustain the military grant-programs in progress. Initially, the US Government had doubts on the 
legitimacy of the military coup in terms of its justification in addition to the suspicious socialist 
background of the coup leader, Major General Park Jung Hee, thus once considered to withdraw the 
grant-aid programs and transition into a simple loan program.359 
 
United States Military Assistance through Grant Aid Programs 
As part of stabilizing post-World War international order and containing the expansion of 
Communism worldwide, American foreign aid programs, which consisted of both economic 
development and military force build-up programs, initially started with the reconstruction of Europe 
under the title of the Economic Cooperation Act, also known as the Marshall Plan, in 1948. The plan 
later extended its scope in 1949 to non-European countries in the Middle East and Far East, including 
Korea and Japan.360  
 In furtherance of international aid efforts, the military assistance sector branched out and 
evolved into the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which assisted the rearmament of Europe, and 
was further extended to 40 other countries in the Far East, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and 
Africa. 361  However, despite the unconditional assistance furnished to peripheral countries, the 
effectiveness of these aid packages came into question in the outbreak of the Korean War. Hence, it 
became imperative that American foreign aid in military assistance be revalidated to include a direct 
force build-up program, including the transfer of technical knowhow and organizational capabilities, 
which shifted the focus from physical reconstruction to in-country technical capacity development. 
Following the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was the Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951, which 
emphasized additional weight on increasing military aid in equipment, services, and technology to 
American allies. Initially, nearly $7.5 billion was appropriated to the MSA in 1951 to support the 
military assistance efforts abroad, but was reduced to almost $5 billion due to concerns with the 
financial soundness of the US economy in the later years of the decade. The MSA was overhauled to 
the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 and continues until now.362 
 The technological knowledge and expertise in equipment maintenance during the Korean War 
period until the late 1960s was mostly provided by the United States Government through the 
provisional military elements performing security assistance missions primarily concentrated in 
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building-up the force structure of the Korean military as part of its nation building efforts in the 
Peninsula. The amount of U.S. military assistance provided to the Korean military after the Korean War 
until the 1960’s grossed approximately $8.7 billion in 1997 dollars value. 363  The assistance 
responsibilities were implemented by the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 
Korea (KMAG), which executed its statutory ordeals in regards to the development of Army, Coast 
Guard, and National Civil Police Force in various domains of the society, including organization, 
education and training, provision of weapons and support systems – including the assistance of technical 
manuals for basic maintenance work.364 Interestingly, almost no military assistance was provided to 
the Korean Air Force sector before the Korean War because the U.S. Government expressed reluctance 
to provide such attack capabilities due to concerns over the Seungman Rhee Administration taking 
offensive actions against North Korea with the risk of destabilizing the security situation of the Korean 
Peninsula.365 The majority of the assistance work in the pre-war period was concentrated to the ground 
components where about 40% of the KMAG manpower was committed to a number of 6 division level 
units under the Korean Army. Thus, the criticism over the role and scope of KMAG functions came into 
question regarding its effectiveness and appropriateness during this period, especially putting into 
account the instances when KMAG advisors turned down numerous requests from the Korean 
Government that demanded to provide more conventional weapon systems such as tanks, howitzers, 
and aircrafts for building up the military strength of the country. Most of the force build-up efforts were 
limited to creating a provisional constabulary enforcement with a capability no lesser than a normal 
police force.366 
 However, the condition drastically changed after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The 
U.S. Far Eastern Command launched a full scale war machine, including military assistance packages 
to support the entire force build-up program of the Korean military. In terms of security assistance work 
specific to the air force sector, the 6146th Air Force Advisory Group under the 314th Air Division, which 
later reformed to become the U.S. Air Force Military Assistance and Advisory Group, performed 
overarching responsibilities in the training of local Korean pilots and ground crews as well as in 
educating maintenance personnel assigned to various air bases, in addition to flying combat missions, 
during and after the Korean War.367 The group trained Korean Air Force technicians and engineers at 
Sacheon Air Base in 1951 regarding the operation and maintenance of L-4, L-5, and L-16, L-19, and F-
51 aircrafts. The unit relocated to Daegu in 1953 and continued the technical assistance training in a 
more advance level where the Korean Air Force also situated its primary logistics and maintenance 
depots such as the Aeronautical Maintenance Depot in the same area, while continued to train the 
                                                          
363  The Role of Foreign Aid in Development: South Korea and the Philippines, CBO Memorandum, September 1997, p. 23 
364 Agreement for the Establishment of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea between the 
Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America 
365 안정애, 주한미군사고문단에 관한 연구, p. 197. 
366 Ibid., p. 200. 
367 Judy G. Ednicott ed., The USAF in Korea: Campaigns, Units, and Stations, 1950-1953, Air Force History and Museum 
Program, 2001, p. 109 
 113 
remaining Korean Air Force elements at Sacheon in basic level materials and tactics.368 The group was 
disbanded on April 1971, and the command functions were merged into the Joint U.S. Military 
Assistance Group-Korea later that year.369 The Assistance Group later evolved into the Joint U.S. 
Military Affairs Group-Korea (JUSMAG-K) in 1999, which represented the shift of the organization’s 
mission statement from a grant-aid program to genuinely a project based organization. 
 
Vietnam War and the Brown Memorandum: Pathways to Build-up an Indigenous Defense Industry  
 A full-scale force build-up program was offered by the U.S. Government in the start of the 
1970s as the result of the Korean Government’s decision to assist the U.S. military campaign in Vietnam 
the previous decade. In an agreed diplomatic document, commonly recalled as the ‘Brown 
Memorandum of 1966’, the U.S. agreed to provide military and economic assistance to equip and 
finance all necessary needs of the Korean military modernization for the next several years.370 The 
delivery of these military and technical capabilities was slow in pace as an outcome of multiple 
negotiation sessions between Seoul and Washington D.C. Early in 1968, agreed by both countries 
against the imminent North Korea threat caused by frequent aggressions in the bordering areas, the 
USG offered a development package that would significantly modernize and strengthen Korean military 
capabilities. 371  From thereon, the following year’s Defense Ministerial talks (SCM: Security 
Consultative Meeting) agreed to initiate a 3-year defense industry organization plan in 1969. Based on 
the agreed terms for military modernization, the U.S. provided technology assistance in building local 
arms production lines for ordnances and M16 rifles. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which asserted U.S. 
military disengagement in East Asia, signaled the major initiation of a full-scale military modernization 
subsequent to the Brown Memorandum. Following the departure of the U.S. 7th Division from the 
Korean Peninsula in March 1971, the USG provided $1 billion worth of military assistance in terms of 
technology assistance and equipment support for the next five years to fill in the capability gap caused 
by the retrenched U.S. military presence in the Korean Peninsula.372  
 
4.5. Defense Acquisition Management System and Defense R&D Structure 
 
4.5.1. Overview  
The modernized concept of today’s defense R&D and defense acquisition management system 
was first reorganized into the defense acquisition structure in the 1990s. Until that period, most of 
Korea’s weapon system development programs were based on U.S. Technical Data Packages (TDP) 
provided through legacy military aid programs. However, the changing winds of the Cold War initiated 
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a new paradigm shift in U.S. East Asia policy, promulgated in the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI). 
The new paradigm raised the potentials of a three phased U.S. military retrenchment from the Korean 
Peninsula, followed by the transition of wartime operational control from U.S. Force Korea to the 
sovereignty of the Korean Armed Forces. In addition to the EASI, the remarkable technical impact of 
modern weapon systems demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War of 1990, all against an imminent North 
Korean conventional and asymmetric threat, compelled the Korean political leadership to make serious 
strides in military modernization.373 
 
1970s – 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Building Foundations Developing System Design Capacities 
Advanced System Design and Core 
Technology 
Conventional weapon systems 
Imitation/reverse engineering 
Analog systems 
Systems engineering approach 
Precision weapon systems 
Cooperative/indigenous 
development 
Mixed Analog/Digital 
Systems engineering/M&S 
Methods 
State-of-the-art advanced weapon 
systems 
Indigenous/cooperative 
development 
Digital systems 
M&S based design 
20mm Vulcan 
Multiple-Launch Rocket System 
Armor Piercing Ammunition 
Anti-Submarine Light Torpedoes 
Surface-Surface Guidance 
Missile 
Submarine Vehicle 
Improved Self-Propelled Howitzer 
Heavy Torpedoes 
Towed Sonar 
Torpedo Acoustic Counter Measure 
Short-range Surface-Air Guidance 
Missile 
KT-1 Basic Trainer 
Aircraft Mounted Electronic 
Countermeasure 
C3I Command Post Automation 
System 
Improved Main Battle Tank 
Improved Light Torpedoes 
Anti-Ship Guidance Weapons 
Man Portable Anti-Aircraft 
Weapons 
Surveillance UAV 
KO-1 Tactical Control Aircraft 
Ship Based Electronic 
Countermeasures 
Military Communications Satellite 
(ANASIS-Koreasat-5) 
Improved Infantry Fighting 
Vehicle 
LPX Combat Systems 
Maritime Helicopter ESM System 
284 Programs 48 Programs 20 Programs 
Total 314 Programs 
Table 9. Evolution of Defense R&D Capacities  
Source:강인원, 이재석, "국방R&D투자 및 성과분석을 통한 생산성 향상 방안," KISTEP Issue Paper 2010-08. 
  
Thus, the Ministry of National Defense substantially overhauled the existing defense 
procurement system and instituted a new regulation for weapon system development called the Weapon 
System Acquisition Management Regulation in August 1991. Here, the motto was “Made-in Korea”, 
which gave first priority on domestic development. Considering the development of sophisticated 
weapon systems, international partnership through co-development or license production became a 
norm, which allowed significant transfer of advanced military technology to the defense industrial base. 
The new regulation attempted to synchronize the force requirement generation phase and the weapon 
system development phase in order effectively manage weapon system development programs in 
response to warfighter’s needs. According to the new regulation, introduction of foreign weapon 
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eventually cancelled the initiatives of the EASI. 한용섭, 한미연합지휘체제의 평가 및 개선방향, 국방대학교 
안보문제연구소, 2003, p. 15., 
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systems was given less priority, where emergency procurement programs was the only window for 
direct purchasing.374 However, this was more easily said than done. The immediate war fighter needs 
made the defense authorities impatient over long gestation periods required for indigenous development 
programs. Thus, military spending on defense acquisition, especially over sophisticated complex 
product systems, heavily relied on foreign procurement. The following section reviews the overall 
structure and coordinating mechanisms of the defense acquisition management system under this 
framework. 
 
4.5.2. Governance Structure 
Looking back at the trends the country has accomplished from the past 40 years or so, the 
Korean defense innovation system is gradually transitioning from a conventional platform based 
imitation structure to a more high-tech CoPS focused creative development structure. Governing such 
transition is always challenging and troublesome. The Korean defense acquisition decision making 
apparatus consists of the planning, programming, budgeting and execution system called the PPBES 
cycle (Ministry of National Defense), requirement planning and management function represented by 
the force requirement generation and planning (Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the defense acquisition 
management system (Defense Acquisition Program Administration). Each of these generating routines 
are deeply intertwined and linked with causal relationships, and constitutes the overarching defense 
innovation ecosystem. In order to understand the Korean defense innovation system, it is important to 
comprehend the defense acquisition management system (DAMS) and its linkages with the other two 
decision making support systems. The technology aspects of these three systems are managed by the 
Agency of Defense Development (ADD) under the broader auspices of the overall DAMS, which is 
represented in the diagram below. 
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Figure 9. Key Players in the Defense Acquisition Management System, adopted and reproduced from ADD R&D introduction 
material (2014) 
 
The Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) 
The primary components of the DAMS are the force requirement generation institutes (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff/Military Services), policy and planning authority (Ministry of National Defense), 
programming agency (Defense Acquisition Program Administration), and sustainment elements 
(Military Services). Decision making is made by a vertically integrated process depicted in the flow 
chart below (Figure. 10), which briefly illustrates this working relationship. The guiding principles of 
major defense acquisition programs is the ‘Korea First’ policy by giving first priority on domestic 
weapon system R&D and production for the self-reliant defense of the nation. Throughout the 
underpinnings of ‘Korea First’ priorities, defense acquisition programs should set objectives to 
promptly introduce the most optimal weapon system solution to maximize combat readiness. In terms 
of institutional utilities and effectiveness, the program should incorporate an integrated logistics support 
system throughout the life cycle of the weapon system, obtain transparency and enhance 
professionalism, establish complementary relationships between the national S&T infrastructure and 
defense R&D practices, and construct cooperative R&D  arrangements with international partners.375   
 Hinging on the guiding principles above, the acquisition strategy is deliberated through a 
multilayered coordination process that starts with the Preliminary Studies phase. The Integrated Project 
Team (IPT) at DAPA launches the studies by conducting multiple feasibility research on the program 
to assess the expediency and appropriateness of the system being introduced in terms of cost benefit 
analysis, technological readiness levels, economic validity and industrial contribution, and so forth. The 
Preliminary Studies are often conducted by the IPT itself, but for major defense acquisition programs 
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exceeding a certain cost threshold, the studies are outsourced to public or private think tanks such as 
the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, Korea Development Institute, to obtain a more objective 
opinion. The baseline documents of the Preliminary Studies are the major policy documents considering 
force requirement generation and verification drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military 
services that provide guidelines on the weapon system operational environment, system interoperability, 
operational process, etc.376 Based on the recommendations of the Preliminary Studies, the acquisition 
strategy of the weapon system program is determined through an inter-agency coordination process 
called the Defense Acquisition Program Executive Committee (DAPEC). The DAPEC gathers the 
senior government executives from the defense apparatus (MND, DAPA, JCS, military services, ADD) 
and relevant government agencies (MOST, MOTIE, MOE). The DAPEC is chaired by the Minister of 
National Defense where DAPA serves as the secretariat for the forum. The underlying intention for the 
interagency process is to incorporate the country’s principle S&T agents together in pursuance of a 
better employment of national S&T resources.377  
 
                                                          
376 방위사업법 제 
377 방위사업법 제 9 조 방위사업추진위원회 
 118 
 
Figure 10. Defense Acquisition Management System Flow Chart, adopted and reproduced from 국방전력업무훈령, 
방위사업개론 
 
 Based on the national resources and force needs, the DAPEC decides the acquisition strategy 
of the program, whether domestic development or foreign procurement. The defense innovation system 
primarily considers the domestic development portion of the defense acquisition programs. In 
accordance with the technological feasibility condition, domestic development pursues either a self-
directed weapon systems development process or a cooperative development process. Depending on 
the form of R&D investment, the program is processed either through government-led development 
managed by ADD, or corporate-led development managed by defense firms.378 However, considering 
the complexity of weapon system development alluded in previous chapters, no country can go alone 
with complex weapon system development. Even though complex weapon systems are designed 
domestically, the development process follows a hybrid domestic development and foreign procurement 
that incorporates various system modules and components, and are integrated by the prime contractor, 
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or system integrator, at the end of the production line. Currently, with the growing technical capacities 
of the private sector, the form of R&D investment is rapidly transitioning from government led to 
corporate led programs, where defense firms are assuming more responsibilities and ownership over 
major weapon system development programs. 
 
Upper-tiered Policy Level Defense R&D Strategy  
 In order to understand the key parameters of the defense innovation system, it is critical to 
review the imperative linkages of the two main R&D programs, weapon systems development and 
defense technology development, within the DAMS. Weapon system development programs are intended to 
respond to military force requirement needs where the workshare is distributed to GRIs (Agency of Defense 
Development, other specialized research labs) and defense firms. Currently, the industry workshare in terms of 
R&D over Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) is growing with the industry assuming larger 
development responsibilities, which used to be assigned primarily to GRIs (most notably ADD). There are three 
major milestones that constitute the weapon system development programs.  
 In order to become a program of record (MDAP), the force requirements are prioritized into a 
planning document called the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP), which is an integrated list of 
capabilities consolidated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military services, with a purpose to 
support the country’s mid-to-long term military objectives. The technology support plan for the JSOP 
is drafted in the Defense Science and Technology Promotion Document (DSTPD). The baseline 
documents to draft the DSTPD are the Defense S&T Survey Report and the Critical Technology 
Planning Report. These two documents review the technological feasibility before launching a MDAP. 
The second step is the programming phase where the resources for the MDAP is deliberated in a 
budgeting schedule called the Midterm Defense Plan (MTDP). The programs reflected in the MTDP 
normally cover a five-year term and is annually updated before the program of record becomes fully 
deployed in the field. The third step is the actual execution of these documents at the program level. In 
this phase, DAPA orchestrates the overall development process where the Agency of Defense 
Development actively interacts with industry (manufacturer) and GRI/Universities. The technology risk 
factors for each development milestone are rigorously monitored by Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
standards throughout the program.379  
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Figure 11. Major Defense R&D Planning Documents 
  
Defense technology development programs are projects not necessarily associated with weapon 
system development, but programmed with the intention to enhance the broader Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) in basic research and core technologies. The research programs consist of basic research 
and core technology research, and are administered by the Agency of Defense Development, structured 
with a bottom-up development approach in collaboration with universities and other GRI projects in 
order to establish a broad infrastructure masterplan on high-tech driven technologies. The distinctive 
characteristics of weapon systems development programs are highlighted with the development of 
certain technological capabilities, whereas technology development programs nurture the overall 
infrastructure capacities and Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) through long-term commitments into 
basic research and critical technology development. Especially, the scope and attributes of defense 
technology development, and its structural linkage with weapon system development constitutes the 
key in the process of building a broader picture for innovative qualities.380 Such linkage between 
weapon systems development programs and defense technology development programs creates a 
lopsided and short-term strategy in improving TRL competitiveness by diverting public resources for 
long-term development efforts into short-to-midterm weapon system acquisition. One of the main 
strategic objectives for defense technology development is to become more technologically self-reliant 
by enhancing the TRL standards that leads to upgrading industrial competitiveness in critical 
technologies. Exerting the system’s main effort into weapon system development makes each 
development program more dependent on foreign technology and the import of major component parts, 
which has technologically subordinated the country’s defense innovation system and defense industry 
under foreign influence. 
 However, when examining the technology requirement process for high-tech complex product 
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systems, the majority of the R&D projects are eventually tied in with weapon system development 
programs. Defense R&D efforts are primarily concentrated on weapon system development programs, 
which takes about 63.4% of the entire defense R&D budget. The remaining resources are allocated to 
defense technology development programs. Throughout this process, DAPA serves as the governing 
institution for the development of high-tech source technology. All components of the defense 
acquisition management system submit each of its respective technology requirements to DAPA for 
further coordination and prioritization towards specific weapons development programs. 381  Such 
connection is reconfirmed in applied research and test development projects under defense technology 
development programs. In conjunction with the structural arrangements, the performance analysis of 
applied research and test development projects conducted in recent years show 34 out of 37 applied 
research projects and 15 out of 18 test development projects have transitioned to weapon system 
development programs. This implies that defense technology development programs are not separate 
from weapon systems development programs, but are essentially a supplement that mostly augments 
system development efforts. 382 
 
Lower-tiered Implementation Level Defense R&D Strategy: Civil-Military Technology Partnership 
(CMTP) 
Civil-Military Technology Partnership (CMTP) is understood in a broader term the use of dual-
use technology as an outcome of technology spinoff from the public to private sector, or spillover from 
the private to public sector. As described earlier in this chapter, private sector workloads and 
responsibilities continue to grow and overwhelm the traditional dominance of the public sector. The 
private sector becomes involved in the defense innovation system through participating in weapon 
systems development or defense technology development programs.  
 With the growing technological and program specific complexities in weapon systems 
development, introducing collaborative efforts between commercial and military technology was 
imperative. The guiding principles of CMTP are mandated in the Civil-Military Technology Partnership 
Promotion Act, revised from the previous Dual-Use Technology Promotion Act of 1997. The need to 
promote dual-use technology was advocated by the Presidential Council for Science & Technology at 
1997 as a five-year temporary legislation to build the necessary infrastructure of dual-use technologies 
and invigorate national competitiveness. However, the Act narrowly defined the scope of dual-use 
technology, which raised the need to comprehensively expand the concept to other business sectors. In 
this aspect, a subsequent legislation was introduced that broadened the term to almost every business 
field as part of addressing technological demands raised from both commercial and military needs.383 
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 Private sector participates either as technology co-developers or manufacturers in a weapon 
system development program, or as a co-researcher in defense technology development programs. In 
this case, the mode of participation determines the scope and responsibility of CMTP programs. Weapon 
systems development programs are composed of Critical Capability Systems and General Capability 
Systems. Critical Capability Systems are primarily under the technical leadership of the Agency of 
Defense Development considering the agency’s long accumulated experience in weapon systems 
development programs and critical mass in research capacities. The development programs designated 
under this category mostly considers high priority military force capabilities determined in the JSOP 
and MTDP such as Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, precision strike systems, 
electronic warfare, and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) defense. Technical leadership for General 
Capability Systems are mostly deferred to the private sector (defense industry) on technology areas with 
proven developmental track records such as naval vessels, air defense artillery, ground maneuver 
systems, command and control (C2), and so forth. Also, considering defense technology development, 
although most of the critical program elements fall under the auspices of ADD, generic programs are 
conducted under a triple helix consortium of Industry-GRI-Universities. 384  The development of 
aerospace technologies is a representative program that resulted from these CMTP initiatives.385 
  
Program Type Program Lead Programs 
Weapon System 
Development 
Program 
Critical Capability 
Systems ADD 
Strategic programs (ISR, precision strike), NBC 
defense, electronic warfare 
General Capability 
Systems Industry 
Naval combat systems, air defense, anti-tank 
guidance weapons, ground maneuver, etc. 
Defense Technology 
Development 
Program 
Critical Capability ADD Core technology for critical capability systems 
Generic Technology Industry-GRI-University Commercial off the shelf technologies 
Core Technology ADD Basic research 
   Table 10. Weapon System and Technology Development Program Leads 
  
CMTP performances since 2006 have facilitated the establishment of technology standards 
between commercial and military technology. Such effort saved significant cost and created a more 
efficient condition for civil-military technological collaboration. The Korean government is believed to 
have saved approximately $23 million in procurement costs and $200K in managing technology 
standards through the Civil-Military Technology Standardization Program. The standardization efforts 
managed to standardize 8,419 types of military technology out of the total 15,914 types.386 
 A notable construct of CMTP introduced in 2008 to the Korean defense innovation system is 
the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. The ACTD is suggested through 
a bottom-up process by a consortium of Industry-GRI-universities that applies a readily available 
commercial-off-the-shelf technology into a weapon system development program with a scheduled 
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386 조슬기나, “민군기술협력사업에 국고 1389 억원 투입,” 아시아경제 2016.02.28. 
 123 
objective of completing a prototype and new operative concepts within three years of program 
launching. The total investment into this program until 2015 was approximately KRW 53.4 billion ($50 
million) for 56 research projects. The significance of the ACTD is that it presents an opportunity to 
rapidly transform a proven commercial technology into a defense acquisition program by circumventing 
the lengthy and convoluted R&D process of regular defense research programs. The concept also serves 
as a strong conduit to attract the private sector into the defense business with more ownership and 
responsibility.387 
 
Project Duration Program Objective Budget Contract 
Mobile Tactical 
Computer 2008~2009 
An equipment that disseminates tactical 
information to construct a common operational 
picture to tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled 
howitzers through FM radios and critical data-links 
$50K Samsung Thales 
Unmanned Mine 
Detection 
Vehicle 
2008~2010 
An unmanned vehicle that approaches and 
eliminates the target mine with a visual connection 
with a communication buoy and returns to base 
$200K 
Ocean Research and 
Development 
Institute 
Mobile Aviation 
Information 
Display System 
2008~2009 
Displays enemy EW/GCI, SAM base, flight path, 
stationing point, track information through 
commercial PDA technology 
$80K Huneed Technologies 
  Table 11. 2008 ACTD Selected Programs, adopted from 2010-2015 Defense S&T Implementation Plan 
 
 However, the lower-tiered structure in defense R&D is constrained by its own weaknesses 
lamented within the coordinating mechanisms of the CMTP. The most challenging aspect is the absence 
of an effective policy control tower that administers the CMTP. The complexity of technology and 
bureaucratic processes places additional layers in maturing the program into high visible objectives. 
Therefore, the roles and responsibility of a government control tower that administers and coordinates 
these complexities is imperative. Unfortunately, DAPA, which is the designated government agency for 
the CMTP, has performed disappointingly over the years in this program. When the CMTP was first 
launched in 1999, there were a total of four government agencies – MND, MOST, MOTIE, MICT – 
that participated in the program.388 Currently, the Ministry of Trade-Industry-and-Energy and DAPA 
are the only two participating government agencies remaining within this construct. Other related 
agencies that hold competitive advantage in distinctive technological fields such as in ICT, 
biotechnology, and so forth, are no longer parties of the CMTP. Even in the case of MOTIE, its 
involvement into this program is declining since 2006 with the upsurge of more MOTIE specific R&D 
programs materializing. The cause of such constraints is attributed to the closed and classified nature 
of defense technology managed by ADD. ADD has shown reluctance to share technology information 
with other agencies on sensitive subject areas such as guidance missiles, propulsion, electro-optical 
instruments, and so forth. The incompetence of the Dual-Use Technology Promotion Center is another 
direct illustration of this situation. With no single government agency claiming ownership for 
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interagency coordination and technology transfer, the Dual-Use Technology Promotion Center has been 
lacking to show competence in planning and execution over collaborative programs with universities 
and industry. Especially, the Center being a subordinate organization of ADD further restricts the Center 
from reaching out to other public or private entities in terms of broadening its collaborative spectrum.389  
The absence of a government control tower in CMTP is believed to have grave impacts on the 
performing outcomes of the ACTD program in general. The ACTD started with a high anticipation to 
apply commercially proven technology into military applications, such that it presents less uncertainties 
and risks in maturing the subject technology into a weapon system program. But the end results as of 
2016 showed only one single research project out of the 56 projects funded under the ACTD the past 
ten years has entered into production and deployment. Three more projects have proceeded into the 
technology maturation and risk reduction phase, but it appears very uncertain at this point that the actual 
application of those three projects will materialize into military force needs. The reason for such poor 
linkage between the ACTD and military force needs is the bottom-up application process of the 
technology area identified. Normally, the private sector, through public-private partnership programs 
such as the CMTP, suggests the relevant technology to DAPA for application into the ACTD, rather 
than having the warfighter, who are the real consumers of the force requirement, initiating the 
requirement from a top-down process. Therefore, in many cases, the selected ACTD projects are 
technology-driven instead of needs-driven, which implies significant disconnect with real world 
warfighter capability requirements. Therefore, despite the low risks associated with the subject 
technology through the ACTD, it becomes challenging to find links to apply the technology into weapon 
system programs.390 
Public authorities endeavored to involve defense R&D within the national composition in order 
to reinvigorate the connection between defense and civil sector R&D efforts. In February 2007, the 
national S&T authorities determined to include the domain of defense R&D within the National Science 
and Technology Commission (NSTC) by organizing the Special Committee of Defense Research and 
Development as a subcommittee component. The objective of including the defense sector within the 
NSTC was to create a more integrated construct in the national R&D architecture. Defense R&D, 
despite the significant national resources committed to this sector, has been dealt separately apart from 
the national S&T planning and coordination apparatus, thus created systemic overlaps in planning and 
budgeting, and structural disconnects with other relevant R&D programs. According to the initiatives, 
the Subcommittee is administered by the Director General of R&D Coordination under MOST, which 
gathers senior executives from other NSTC member agencies such as MOSF, MOTIE, and DAPA, along 
with specialists from academia and private sector. Supporting legislations and implementing ordnances 
                                                          
389 TECHNOVALUE, 민군협력사업 법제화 방안연구: 민군협력 활성화를 위한 새로운 체제 및 사업제안,” 
방위사업청 용역보고서, 2008 년 12 월, p. 63.   
390 김종대의원실 2016 년도 국정감사 자료. 
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were enforced the year prior in 2006, which prepared the legal grounds to execute the new initiative.391 
However, the actual implementation of the new initiative did not take place until 2017 when the NSTC 
decided to preview defense R&D programs and budgets. Although the preview process is not associated 
with a compulsory provision, it presents the opportunity to assess the feasibility of the respective R&D 
program across the board and determine necessary measures for reallocating national resources.392 
4.6. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) 
The rationale supporting the establishment and sustainment of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), ever 
since its first indoctrination through the Yulgok Project of 1974, was to adopt a self-reliant national 
security identity against the continued North Korean conventional military threat, and to prepare against 
an evident U.S. military retrenchment from the Korean Peninsula. The government’s strong 
development drive to build a robust heavy chemical industry came in conjunction with the construction 
of a capable defense industrial base. Throughout the scope of industrialization, the DIB enjoyed 
privileges through various policy instruments such as financial, technology, and workforce promotion. 
 
4.6.1. Structure of the Defense Industrial Base 
 The supply chain aspect of the defense industry forms a typical pyramid structure that 
maintains a cooperative arrangement between the three layers of production. The prime contractor 
serves as the final system integrator of all components and parts, and normally handles all the system 
design and engineering aspects of a weapon system. The subcontractors are normally the main 
component suppliers of a weapon system such as engines, combat control systems, armaments, and so 
forth. Material and part suppliers constitute the third layer of the supply chain. The prime contractor 
obtains large manufacturing facilities and professional technicians that perform system design and 
integration work. In many cases, the prime contractors, mostly big business Chaebols, are widely 
diversified into other non-military business sectors, in which they show strong competitive advantage 
in market dominance within the respective commercial field. The subcontractors supply critical 
components for the final end item, therefore obtain core technology and long lasting experience in the 
respective field. The top two layers of the supply chain are mostly specialized as defense firms. The 
third layer material and part suppliers are businesses engaged in both defense and commercial sectors, 
and does not necessarily hold a specialized status in the defense industry. As of 2016, there are a total 
of 100 companies designated as defense firms, 1,322 items labeled as defense items, and sales reaching 
approximately $1 trillion.393 
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Figure 12. Supply Chain Breakdown of K1A1 Main Battle Tank (Proprietary Data of Hyundai Rotem) 
  
The defense industry has been a beneficiary to various government protection and support 
programs, and was nurtured under these privileges for decades. The below table illustrates some notable 
defense industry promotional measures since the inception of the defense industry in the early 1970s. 
 
Support Types Support Institutions 
Finance 
Defense Duty Tax Imposed (’75) → abolished (’90) 
Defense Material Cost Accounting Standards (’78) 
Defense Industry Promotion Fund (’80) → abolished (’06), replaced by Defense Industry Promotion 
Credit Loans as of 2006 
Value Added Profit Rate (’88) 
Technology 
Defense Offset Policy (’82) 
Specialization & Systematization (’83) → abolished (’09) 
Specialized R&D Center Designated (’94) 
Dual-Use Technology Promotion Act (’99) → Revised to CMTP Promotion (’13) 
Corporate led R&D Program Initiated (Program managed by Program Management Office of 
respective military service) 
Technology Innovation Support System for Small-Medium Businesses (’98) 
Exports Designation of Defense Materials and Firms (’73) 
Other Special Measures for the Law on the Defense Industry (’73) → Replaced by Defense Acquisition Program Act (’06) 
Table 12. Government Support Institutions to Promote the Defense Industry; adopted from 유형곤, “방위산업 육성을 위
한 효과적인 산업정책 시행방안,” 방위산업진흥회, 2015. 
 
4.6.2. Specialization and Systematization Act 
 Since June 1983, Article 4 of the Act on Special Measures for Defense Industry promulgated 
the protection and nurture of the defense industrial base through the Specialization and Systematization 
of defense firms. The Act, followed by an Implementation Directive, manifests the authority that the 
President, under close consultation with the Minister of Commerce-and-Industry and Minister of 
National Defense, shall designate certain defense articles and companies as specialized or systematized 
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for defense manufacturing to create a reasonably promotional condition to advance the defense industry. 
The purpose of implementing the Specialization and Systemization measures was to secure a stable 
weapon system production infrastructure, promote defense technology development and a high skilled 
professional workforce, and to prevent duplicate investment and unnecessary competition. Before the 
policy was abolished in 2009, there were 29 specialized firms and 48 systematized firms supported 
under this act. The contractual arrangement established under this competition structure designates one 
or two system integration firms under a certain product category, or prime contractor, as specialized 
firms, and one or two component supplier firms, or subcontractors, as systemized firms. In this regard, 
big businesses such as Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, etc., diversified into the defense industry under 
huge government subsidies, and was subsequently awarded major weapon system production work. 
Based on this special arrangement, the competitive structure of the defense industry maintained a 
monopolistic and oligopolistic structure.394 Although there were some exceptions made in terms of 
introducing commercial off-the-shelf technology or other civil-military technology partnership 
programs, the monopoly formation of the defense industry maintained adamant until the abolition of 
the Specialization and Systematization Act. 
However, just like other long lasting programs in public policy, the Specialization and 
Systematization Act ran into its own limitations. The long gestation of the Specialization and 
Systematization regime caused evident defects in firm performance and market competitiveness. 
Defense firms under this regime found little incentives to award technology development and seek cost 
saving efforts. Especially, the protection system prevented technologically competitive firms from 
entering the market. 395  Prime contractors did not have the liberty to contract better improved 
subcomponents from non-systematized defense firms, and were forced to establish sub-contractual 
arrangements with designated subcontractors. Mergers and Acquisitions between defense firms were 
prohibited. Therefore, defense firms exiting the defense business was disapproved by higher industrial 
supervisory authorities. 396  Such restrictions were especially pernicious for building innovative 
wherewithal in complex product systems such as fighter aircrafts and unmanned systems. In order to 
overcome these systemic difficulties, the Specialization and Systematization regime went through four 
amendments until 2001, which introduced a limited competitive bidding rule on certain defense items 
where the commercial sector obtained higher competence, such as military vehicles, electronics, 
communications, optical systems, and so forth, in regards to the compatibility and interchangeability 
with relevant systems.397 Eventually, with the objective to introduce an open and competitive structure 
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in the defense industry, the government decided to abolish the Specialization and Systematization 
regime on 2005 based on the recommendations of the Defense Acquisition System Improvement Group. 
After a three-year grace period, the Act was finally abolished as of January 2009, and the defense 
industry has entered into an era of competition with substantially reduced privileges. 
4.6.3. Financial Incentives to Defense Firms 
The first financial assistance program to support the defense industry was the imposition of 
the Defense Tax on 1975. The implementation of the tax program was to secure national resources to 
finance the massive defense industrial build-up of the 1970s that was instigated by the changing 
dynamics of the country’s military alliance relations with the U.S., raised by the concerns of the Nixon 
Doctrine in February 1970, along with the continued North Korean military provocations throughout 
the years. At first, the finances for defense industrial build-up was to be capitalized from public 
donations in 1974, but the collected amounts fell far less than the original expectations. Therefore, the 
government legislated a new tax item for national defense in July 1975 through the Defense Tax Statute, 
initially for a temporary enforcement until 1980, but was extended to the end of 1990 until its 
abolishment. The Defense Tax has substantially expanded the scope of financial resources for defense 
industrial development by increasing the defense budget over 30% compared to previous years.398 
 In parallel with the Defense Tax was the creation of the Defense Industry Promotion Fund in 
1980. In order to facilitate the efforts in industry level R&D activities, stockpile raw materials, and 
maintain idle production equipment, an amount nearly KRW 30 billion (currently valued at KRW 75 
billion) was endowed as the Defense Industry Promotion Fund under Article 7 of the Act on Special 
Measures for Defense Industry Promotion. Until its abolishment in 2006, the fund grew larger with a 
government endowment of KRW 110 billion and an interest earnings of KRW 30 billion. Although the 
original purpose was to provide finances to support various objectives, the majority of the Funds was 
committed to localizing core technology and critical component parts because of the resource shortages. 
For instance, from 2001 to 2006, the Fund endowed for expenses was programmed far shorter than the 
amount originally requested by the industry, accounting for an average of only 38.4%.399 In a similar 
context, Defense Industry Promotion Credit Loans was a program that replaced the previous Defense 
Industry Promotion Fund on 2006. The program provides low interest rate loans (1%) to defense firms 
and subsidizes the differences of interest rates from the open market with government funds to the 
loaner bank. The program was to put small and medium sized defense firms as a priority to support 
efforts to localize the technology base of critical components and parts. Additionally, such preferential funding 
support would assist competitive prototyping and the development of software operating systems, 
                                                          
398 The Defense Tax accounted for about 2% of the GDP and was invested entirely into force improvement programs and 
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alleviate management challenges in maintaining production facilities, and promote defense exports as 
well.400  
 But in reality, the majority of the loans were provided to big businesses (mostly prime 
contractors), in which small-medium sized businesses was granted a marginal amount. The track record 
of the credit loans since its inception to 2012 show a lopsided picture where the grants were given 
primarily to big businesses rather than small-medium firms. About $198 million out of $262 million 
was granted to big business, which accounts for 74% of the entire loans. Part of this result attributes to 
the poor R&D infrastructure of the small-medium defense firms opposed to the comparatively larger 
capital-intensive R&D infrastructure of big businesses. The original intention of the credit loan program 
was to promote the technological R&D foundations for small-medium defense firms, contrary to big 
businesses that already received significant government protection and support for decades. In this 
regard, the current pattern of granting loans more towards big businesses does not fully serve for the 
initial policy objectives.401 
 
Type 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Big Firms 178 (67%) 259 (81%) 683 (88%) 81 (59%) 502 (72%) 464 (65%) 2,166 (74%) 
S-M firms 89 (33%) 62 (19%) 94 (12%) 56 (41%) 196 (28%) 254 (35%) 751 (26%) 
Subtotal 267 321 777 137 698 718 2,918 
 Table 13. DAPA Report to the National Assembly on Defense Industry Credit Loans (2013) 
 
4.7. Adaptive to Change – Organizational Restructuring of the Defense Acquisition 
Management System 
Weapon system development business was always troublesome due to its shady political connections 
and service rivalry challenges. However, the Defense Acquisition Management System itself, which 
should effectively govern the development and procurement of highly complex product systems, still 
maintained an inherently compartmental and disconnected structure. Among the multiple attempts to 
restructure the defense acquisition system, the profound changes were implemented by two working 
councils driven by the Presidential Office between 2003 and 2013. One was the Defense Acquisition 
System Improvement Group of 2005 and the other was the Presidential Council for Future and Vision 
in 2010. 
 
4.7.1. Defense Acquisition System Improvement Group 
Weapon systems development programs were always considered a major conduit of political 
corruption, thus has been intensively scrutinized when new Presidential authorities came into power. 
Especially the corruption incident from the Yulgok Scandal, which prosecuted a number of Defense 
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Ministers and top brass general officers of the Korean military, has prompted subsequent 
administrations to initiate various reform measures to fix the deficiencies. The most notable milestone 
of defense acquisition system reform was the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration in 2006. The Roh Mu Hyun Administration that came into power in 2003, gave special 
attention to the exclusively cliquish hierarchical culture of the military and the immense influence such 
culture imposed on the decision making process of weapon system programs. Compounding to this 
situation was the absence of expertise in program management, in which the arbitrarily rotating 
personnel assignment system was believed to be the source of such inefficiency. Decision making and 
program management was predominantly monopolized by the military where civilian involvement 
remained minimal. Additionally, weapon systems procurement had very limited linkage and 
consideration to industrial competitiveness. Therefore, the contribution of the defense industry to the 
overall competitiveness of the national industrial architecture was rated insignificant. In order to 
overcome such systemic complications, the Roh Administration established the Defense Acquisition 
System Improvement Group under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2004 after a series of debates between 
the cabinet ministries and the National Security Council, with intentions to substantially overhaul the 
defense acquisition system under the guiding principles of building procedural transparency and 
workforce professionalism. From March 2004 to January 2005, after nine committee sessions within 
the cabinet and three consultation sessions with the National Assembly, the Roh Administration 
recommended to build a new organization that administers the defense acquisition management system, 
while maintaining self-autonomy apart from the military.402 In this regard, the Defense Acquisition 
Program Administration was established in January 2006. 
 The primary focus areas for reform were highlighted in four institutional aspects of the existing 
defense acquisition structure; institutional efficiency, workforce professionalization, organizational transparency, 
enhanced competitiveness. Firstly, institutional efficiency embodied the largest reform efforts, which included 
massive consolidation of overlapping organizational functions, streamlining onerous decision processes, 
elimination of service rivalries in force requirement planning priorities within the Joint Staff, synchronizing 
defense acquisition programs under the Midterm National Fiscal Policy, and so forth. Most of all, the 
organizational consolidation process involved the incorporation of eight (8) different agencies subordinate to the 
Ministry, direct supervisory units, Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and ADD into one single agency 
controlled under DAPA. The consolidation of these eight entities was believed to reduce 10% of the workforce 
and save about 5% in operating costs.403 Secondly, workforce professionalization exerted efforts to assign more 
civilian officials specialized in defense acquisition programs instead of relying mostly on military officers that 
constantly serve in rotating assignments. The program duration of an average defense acquisition program was 
set between 7 to 10 years, whereas military officers working in rotating assignments in these programs served 
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only a 3-year tour in maximum. Thus, there were apparent discontinuity and inconsistency caused under the 
incumbent personnel system. The professionalization efforts also aspired to establish a highly specialized 
education and training institute for defense acquisition specialists. Thirdly, instating organizational transparency 
strived to improve legal statutes on defense acquisition. The existing legal structure predating DAPA was based 
not on a formal law but a ministerial directive called the Defense Acquisition Regulation. Thus, strong regulatory 
implementation efforts were not enforced, where the regulation went through constant revision work in a 
piecemeal way without a strategic vision or guiding principle interlinking the acquisition system under the broader 
national innovation system. In this aspect, the legislation of the Defense Acquisition Program Act addressed the 
overarching boundaries of defense acquisition through strong enforcement measures. And lastly, in terms of 
enhanced competitiveness, the need to fix the protective and promotional measures imposed on the defense 
industry, represented by the Specialization and Systematization Act, subsequently led to the entire abolishment. 
Such measures granted open competition in the defense industry, which motivated defense firms to 
improve its productivity and become more involved and innovative in technology development.404 
 However, the establishment of DAPA has caused systemic challenges in terms of structural 
disconnect between the acquisition and operation and maintenance (O&M) authorities. Considering the 
breakdown structure of weapon systems life cycle costs over a thirty-year period, the general rule of 
thumb accounts that the system acquisition costs around 20-30%, while the operations and support piece 
costs around 65-80%. Thus, the opportunity to identify risk factors early in the life cycle management 
of a weapon system depends on how synchronized and integrated the acquisition and sustainment pieces 
fit together. As the acquisition process continues, it becomes increasingly difficult to influence life cycle 
costs for a weapon system.405 The autonomous stature of DAPA as a separate entity from MND has 
detached the acquisition function from the overall defense innovation system, which uncoupled the 
critical components of the defense acquisition management system between the force requirement 
planners, acquisition authorities, and the operation and maintenance apparatus. The defense budget was 
unsynchronized between acquisition and O&M, where an affluent amount was allocated for new 
weapon system procurement while insignificant amount was negotiated for weapon system sustainment. 
Because of this disconnect, the total life cycle management of weapon systems confronted enormous 
challenges in post-deployment phase operations. 406  Such disconnect has presented difficulties in 
securing sustainment resources from budget authorities. For instance, the K-series Main Battle Tanks 
and armored personnel carriers have been suffering from repair and maintenance overload due to 
shortages in the O&M budget, which has been exacerbated during the recent years since DAPA’s 
establishment.407 In another case, the Cheonma Surface to Air Guidance Missile was indigenously 
developed without considering to build-up a repair and overhaul support system, which subsequently 
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compelled the Cheonma Program Office to outsource the repair function to an unqualified private 
company under huge cost increases. After huge legal disputes, the military authorities finally decided 
to internally build-in the maintenance functions for the missiles, after significantly costing the tax 
payers money and time.408 
 
    Figure 13. Structural Disconnect and Coordination Challenges in the Defense Acquisition Management System 
 
4.7.2. Presidential Council for Future and Vision 
In order to overcome the systemic challenges emerged from DAPA, the Lee Myong Bak 
Administration initiated a series of reform efforts through the Presidential Council for Future and Vision 
in 2010. The Lee Administration especially viewed the defense industry in an economic perspective, 
and articulated a number of policy measures to reform the defense business as a new economic growth 
engine for the Korean economy.409 The Lee Administration’s reform objectives were to obtain state-
of-the-art advanced military technology driven not by government but by corporate sectors through 
increased investments in defense R&D, improve corporate competitiveness by utilizing commercial 
capacities in the defense sector, and promote defense exports in the global market.410 As the President 
hailed from a business background of big-business conglomerates, the center piece of these reform 
efforts focused on restructuring the defense industry through massive M&A strategies in order to build 
economies of scale commensurate to compete in the international market. The vision was to create a 
‘total solution’ defense corporation that can perform in technology development, manufacturing, and 
sustainment within a ‘Total Life Cycle Management’ architecture. The idea was motivated by the global 
defense business trend, whereby observing the creation of the Big 4 (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, 
Raytheon, Northrop Grumman) in the U.S. and the four major aerospace companies in Europe (BAE, 
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Thales, Finmeccanica, EADS).411 
 The M&A strategies confronted huge impediments as the weapon systems development 
institutions subject to restructuration vehemently opposed the government initiatives. The first agenda 
raised during this period was the downsizing of ADD. The Lee Administration intended to relieve about 
1,000 ADD researchers and transform the laboratory to a technology strategy and planning agency.412 
With the purpose of strengthening corporate R&D in defense firms, about 400 of these researchers were 
to be reassigned to companies such as Samsung Thales, Hanwha, and so forth. However, regarding the 
concerns of diminished R&D capabilities, the downsizing plan was not fully implemented and was later 
fizzled out to nothing after the end of the administration. The second agenda was to privatize 
government owned defense firms. The issue considered the selling of government shares of the Korea 
Aerospace Industries (KAI).413 However, alleged preferential treatment by Presidential authorities to 
certain business conglomerates and the shortages of financial resources for corporate acquisition have 
discouraged further M&A deals in the domestic defense market. The specifics of the privatization 
attempt will be covered in more detail in the following chapter. 
 In an institutional aspect, the coordinating relationship between MND and DAPA came into 
question. The structural disconnect between acquisition and logistics functions, and the separation in 
budget responsibilities between Force Improvement Program and Force Support and Sustainment 
Programs have prompted Presidential authorities from the Council for Future and Vision to migrate 
three critical policy functions from DAPA to MND. The three considered areas were Mid-term Defense 
Planning and Budgeting, Defense Research and Development, and Defense Exports.414 However, the 
National Assembly opposed the migration of all three responsibilities, with concerns related to an 
inadvertent disconnect between defense R&D and weapon systems development programs, which 
would still remain under the auspices of DAPA. In this regard, the eventual migration of responsibilities 
only involved the Midterm Defense Planning and Budgeting, and Test and Evaluation functions from 
DAPA to MND and JCS.415 
  
4.7.3. Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
 Defense offsets is a major channel for negotiating the transfer of highly advanced critical 
defense technology from global first tier defense contractors. In general, the purchasing country fully 
exploits its purchasing power from defense contracts to negotiate opportunities for technology 
acquisition and production deals. The ideal situation on defense offset trade considers a situation where 
the beneficiary firm acquires the subject core technology, proceeded with a learning-by-doing effort in 
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learning and accumulating the requisite production process. Afterwards, the beneficiary firm becomes 
a party of the global supply chain through cooperative production deals, which increases business 
earnings for sustained corporate operations. Such routines expand investment opportunities and 
generates a virtuous business cycle that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship.416 
 
 
Figure 14. Increased Competitiveness through Effective Defense Offset Trade 
 
The legal requirement to conduct defense offset deals was first institutionalized in 1983 as 
stipulated in the “Special Measures for Defense Industry” under Article 21 “Defense Offsets”. The 
motive to institute defense offsets was initially to build-up the domestic aircraft industry, which became 
the primary window for technology transfer opportunities.417 Currently, the responsibilities for defense 
offsets are mandated in Article 20 of the Defense Acquisition Program Act, administered by the Defense 
Offset Division under the Acquisition Planning Bureau of DAPA. At first, defense offsets focused on 
retaining production works from foreign firms to capitalize domestic defense firms with stable 
manufacturing quantities, and securing overseas export opportunities. As times progressed, the focus 
shifted from negotiating manufacturing works to acquiring requisite technologies. Since the defense 
authorities have set the priorities on consolidating the foundations of defense R&D infrastructures, and 
to build-up indigenous technological capabilities for weapon system development, defense offset 
negotiations further concentrated on acquiring critical core technologies. During the early 1990s, 63% 
of technology transfer cases and 32% of co-production work were negotiated through defense offset 
deals. 418 The rule of thumb is to negotiate over 30% of the contracting value for defense offsets 
adhering to the listed priorities of technological and production needs. The below table depicts the 
priority agendas of defense offsets specified in the Defense Acquisition Program Act. 
 
• Acquisition of core technology 
• Production of major components for exports 
• Obtain technologies, equipment, facilities, and 
tools to support major depot maintenance work 
• Product improvement programs 
• Secure defense export opportunities   
• Secure overseas maintenance and repair work 
• Participate in major co-production and co-
development projects 
Table 14. Defense Offset Priorities, adopted from the Defense Acquisition Program Regulation (2010) 
  
                                                          
416 박종호, “사례분석을 통한 부품 제작 및 수출성과 확대방안,” 2014 절충교역 발전 심포지엄. 
417 법률 제 3699 호, 방위산업에 관한 특별조치법, 1983.12.31 시행 
418 조달본부, 절충교역 20 년사, 국방부, 2003, p. 25. 
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From 1983 to 2003, a total of 408 defense acquisition programs were associated with defense 
offset deals with an estimated negotiation value of $99.72 billion. About 66% was negotiated from 
commercial defense contracts of major end items and 25% was from co-production programs arranged 
through technology transfers. In terms of negotiated countries, the United States accounted for the 
majority of all defense offsets (53%) followed by Germany (13%), UK (9%), France (6%), and Italy 
(6%). Domestic defense firms were the major beneficiaries of the defense offset deals, where a dollar 
value of $53.18 billion (54%) out of the $99.72 billion were provided in the form of technology transfers, 
component production, and defense export arrangements. About 22% of the dollar value was provided 
to ADD, which mostly constituted of core technology acquisition, and the remaining 24% was provided 
to the military services as part of technical assistance to construct means for depot maintenance. Such 
distributing results attributes to the legal requirements for industry promotion mandated in the Special 
Measures in Defense Industry, which continues in the current Defense Acquisition Program Act as of 
2016. In this aspect, the value added accrued from defense offsets during this period was estimated 
$84.47 billion, which accounts for a total of $184.19 billion in dollar value. Thus, defense offsets had 
impacted substantially to the technological growth of the Korean defense technological capacities and 
industrial development.419 
 
Type Offset Value Value Added 
Total $99.72B 100 (%) $84.47B 
Technology Acquisition 
Tech Data $10.85B 11 $10.52B 
Tech Assistance $33.7B 34 $32.69B 
Tech Training $4.36B 4 $4.22B 
Subtotal $48.91 49 $47.43B 
Overseas Exports 
Component Production $19.47 20 $19.47B 
Government Designated $12.49 12 $8.24B 
Subtotal $31.96 32 $27.71B 
Equipment and Engineering Tools $18.85 19 $9.42B 
    Table 15. Defense Offset Value between 1983 and 2003. DPA Update on Defense Offsets (2003) 
 
 However, defense offsets entail restrictions and limitations in the course of obtaining critical 
technological capabilities. The era of complex product systems in weapon system development are 
generally regarded as a national security consideration for all countries in terms of sustaining its industry 
and technological prowess. Therefore, demands for technology transfer of state-of-the-art technology 
is handled under special care and sensitivity, and often hindered by export controls and technology 
security regimes. Such traits are especially evident in critical core technology items. According to a 
defense acquisition program update on the Type 209 Chang Bogo Class Submarine Program to the 
National Assembly in 1993, the only core technology that was actually transferred from the original 
manufacturer Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) of Germany were two electric cable wires 
connected to the main propulsion battery. Other critical components such as engines, combat control 
systems, propulsion motor, armaments, emergency buoyancy control systems, and so forth, were not 
                                                          
419 Ibid., p. 43. 
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included in the transfer list for domestic development, and were simply provided as components for 
subsequent assembly work.420 Such restrictions appeared especially obvious considering defense offset 
deals with the United States, which accounted for almost 80% of foreign weapon systems acquisition.  
Opposed to countries like Korea that benefits from technology transfers offered from defense 
offset trade, the U.S. is strongly against the idea of defense offsets and considers it a necessary evil. The 
U.S. Government generally considers the ramification of offset trade distorts regular business 
transactions, increases foreign reliance in the global supply chain, gives away critical technology to 
foreign competitors, and takes away U.S. jobs to foreign manufacturers.421 When comparing through 
simple math between total weapon systems imports and defense offsets, the United States should 
proportionately account for almost 80% in dollar value in defense offsets comparative to the import 
value. However, the actual defense offset value of 53% falls considerably disproportionate from the 80% 
purchases, which represent the restrictive nature of technology transfer conditions regarding defense 
offsets. In real terms, technology transfers from the U.S. in defense offsets before 1997 averaged around 
70%, but this level was significantly reduced to 34% afterwards. The U.S. limited the defense offset 
value of the KF-16 procurement, dubbed the Korea Fighter Program (KFP), to only 30% in this respect. 
Such restrictiveness in U.S. tech transfer conditions is reflected in the Korean defense offsets 
regulations as well. According to the defense offset guidelines in the late 1980s, the overall threshold 
for defense offsets marked over 50% out of the entire contract value for every other country, whereas 
defense offset threshold over U.S. contracts constituted only a portion of 30%.422 The constraints relate 
to maintaining U.S. competitive advantages in an era of shrinking defense budgets and growing 
competition in the global defense market. Thus, the perception prevailed among defense acquisition 
authorities over the idea that the U.S. Government instrumented defense offsets to restrain further 
growth potentials of the Korean defense industry.423  
 In an institutional aspect, bureaucratic constraints structurally hindered efficient coordination 
efforts in successfully negotiating defense offset deals. Offset negotiations are not closely tied in with 
long-term strategic S&T documents. In this regard, the majority of the defense offset negotiations do 
not address the strategic objectives of Korea’s defense S&T capacities and weapon systems 
development guidelines. The highest level Defense S&T Promotion Document and its Implementation 
Plan are not effectively employed in negotiating critical programs under consideration for defense 
offsets. The current disconnect between defense S&T policy making, which is administered by the 
Ministry of National Defense, and defense offset negotiations, which is administered by DAPA, 
exemplifies this disconnect. The organizational disconnect is severed by the detached coordinating 
                                                          
420 동아일보, 율곡 전투기 등 기술이전 돈만 더 주고 받은 것 없다, 1993 년 10 월 3 일. 
421 Bureau of Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade: Twelfth Report to Congress, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
December 2012. 
422 국방부 훈령 제 733 호, 국방획득관리규정, 제 96 조 절충교역 적용기준 및 대상 
423 Since the November 1991 Defense Industry Cooperation Committee meeting, Deputy Ministers of Defense Acquisition 
made various attempts but were unsuccessful to relax some of the tech transfer restraints during various bilateral 
engagements, 김재홍, “방산기술 도입 미국장벽 높다,” 동아일보, 1991 년 11 월 20 일. 
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relationship between the policy control tower and actual program management offices leveraging the 
offset deal. The Defense Offsets Division under DAPA, which holds the policy authority for offsets, 
does not adequately obtain the requisite experience and knowledge in the negotiation table. The officials 
conducting the offset negotiations mostly serve in rotating assignments, which merely counts for three 
years in maximum. Major negotiations are conducted by officials assigned under a specific program 
office, such as the Aircraft/Fighter Program Office, C4ISR Program Management Office, Guidance 
Munitions Office, and so forth, that manages major program milestones of a weapon systems program. 
However, these officials have comparatively less interest in negotiating technology offset required to 
support the overarching defense S&T technological roadmap. Also, the actual defense R&D authorities 
that consist of ADD and domestic defense firms are not closely involved in the planning and policy 
making phase of defense offset trade either. For example, a number of defense offset negotiation 
sessions with foreign governments and defense firms often ran into roadblocks when negotiating 
officials from DAPA did not come prepared with the full technological needs required from ADD or 
other corporate entities.424 
 
4.8. Structural Challenges in Defense R&D and Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
 
The past forty years, however, have demonstrated intrinsic challenges in transitioning from a low-tech 
conventional production structure into a high-tech complex product base for the defense industry. 
Almost every government administration declared its commitment, with national pride and dignity, to 
upgrade the defense industrial base to the ranks of global frontrunners through a politically initiated 
top-down scheme in the process of promoting the defense sector as an economic growth engine. But 
the structural impediments in R&D and competitive constraints of defense firms have obstructed further 
evolution of the defense industry to an advance structure. 
 
4.8.1. Risk Averse Mentality Prevalent in Defense R&D  
Organizational inertia prevalent in defense R&D seems to be part of the impediments that 
discourages a vibrant corporate R&D environment. Defense R&D has been primarily conducted under 
the auspices of ADD, and this is where ADD officials refused to transfer such responsibilities to the 
corporate sector. The 1980s marked the dark ages of Korean defense R&D history. As part of 
rationalizing government sponsored research labs and institutions early in the Chun Doo Hwan 
dictatorship, the government relieved approximately 800 scientists and engineers from ADD who were 
mainly committed to missile development programs, substantially reduced the defense R&D budget 
from 3.5% of the overall defense budget to 1.2%, and gave priority to foreign procurement instead of 
domestic development in the course of rushing into early deployment of various foreign high-tech 
                                                          
424 최석철, 한승만, “국방연구개발과 절충교역의 연계방안에 관한 연구,” 한국방위산업학회지 제 10 권 2 호, 
2003, p. 86. 
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weapon systems. These measures were detrimental to the Korean defense industrial base, which 
devastated the S&T infrastructure in defense R&D and lowered the operational rate of industrial 
manufacturing.425 Chun-Doo Hwan regime came into power through a military coup in 1979. The lack 
of democratic legitimacy placed the regime under huge criticism by its western allies, especially the 
United States. In order restore trust and confidence as an authentic and legitimate military ally to the 
United States, it was imperative for the Chun regime to dispose of the earlier defense industrial build-
up efforts that the U.S. has been vehemently skeptical against, such as missile development and 
allegedly a nuclear development program. At the same time, Korean leaders turned less desperate of 
becoming self-reliant in the defense of its own country as the new Reagan Administration assured a 
stronger commitment to protect U.S. allies against potential communist aggression, which alleviated 
the prevalent concerns of a possible U.S. military stand down from the Korean Peninsula.426  
 
4.8.2. Rough Waters Ahead: Deep-rooted Impediments of the Defense Industrial Base 
Despite the remarkable development of the defense industry during the fast developmental days, 
the industry conditions deteriorated in the entering years of the 1990s and afterwards. The fundamental 
constraint falls on market saturation and the reduced military force needs that occurred after concluding 
the production and deployment phase of the respective weapon system program. As the force needs of 
conventional weapon systems became saturated, production runs of the defense industry have 
plummeted to a significantly lower percentage. In this regard, Korean defense firms being overly 
dependent on government weapon system procurement, and not being sufficiently competitive enough 
to market its defense products to global defense customers, has left the defense industry gridlocked in 
the domestic boundaries of its business operations.427 Hence, the root cause of the current crisis in 
defense industrial operations originate from the excessive investment in production capacities attributed 
to the disproportionate number of defense firms in the weapon system supply chain protected under the 
Specialization and Systematization Regime.428  
 In terms of competitive constraints, the overall management situation of defense firms shows 
poor business performances in operating rates, productivity, net sales, and net profits. An assessment of 
Korean defense industrial competitiveness in the corporate and national level compared against 
advanced American and Western European defense industries shows a low performing standard of 
70~80%. The competitiveness level in product price is 84%, technology and quality is 87%, and product 
is about 86%.429 Strong market protection and government subsidies rendered to the defense sector 
                                                          
425 이은영, ADD 무기개발 3 총사 의 핵미사일 개발 비화, 월간 신동아 2006 년 12 월호 
426 백곰 날다 
427 As of 2010, about 90% of the net sales ($8.5 trillion) of the defense industry were from domestic sales whereas overseas 
exports only accounted for less than 5%, 유형곤 외, 방산수출 확대에 따른 방위산업 선진화 방안 연구, 
안보경영연구원 연구용역과제, 2012, p. 48. 
428 Most defense firms protected under the Specialization and Systematization Act solely focus on the defense business, and 
are less diversified into other business sectors. 문종열, p. 40. 
429 안영수 외, 2014 KIET 방위산업 통계 및 경쟁력 백서, 산업연구원 정책자료 2014-226, p. 21. 
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over the years presented less incentives for defense firms to innovate and improve their management 
practices. The operating rates of defense firms from a span of thirty years has declined from an average 
77.8% in 1986 to a level under 60% in the 2000s. As shown in the table below, attributing to the 
saturated domestic defense market, the operating rates substantially declined in the late 1980s and 
continued to fall in the 1990s, while slightly improved in the 2000s. Such status shows comparatively 
lower performance levels than the average operating rates of other commercial manufacturing sectors, 
which shows an average rate of 80% during the similar period. Operating profits of defense firms also 
show lower returns compared to the regular manufacturing sector during the same period.430 Such trend 
shows that defense firms demonstrate considerably high levels of idled production capacity, which is 
considered significantly high when even accounting for the economic necessity in preparation against 
a national emergency situation. 
  
 
1986 1995 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2006 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014
Defense 77.8 56 52.8 50.8 48.5 57.3 56.1 61 60.3 61.8 59.4 59 61.4 66.8
Manufacturing 96.4 81.6 71.1 76.6 78.3 78.3 80.3 81 77.2 74.6 79.9 78.1 76.2 76.1
Defense 4.6 6 5 6.4 3.6 3 5 5 6.1 5.7 4.5 2.3 4.5
Manufacturing 6.9 4.9 5 6.8 6.7 7.2 5 5.9 6.1 5.6 5.1 5.2 4.2
Year
Operating 
Rates (%)
Operating 
Profits (%)  
     Table 16. Business Performance of Defense Firms, adopted from KOSIS Statistics 
 
In the technological aspects of the defense innovation systems, unlike the U.S. or other 
advanced Western European defense industries that conducts technology development as a priority and 
places system development in subsequent priorities under a Total Life Cycle System Management 
(TLCSM) framework, the majority of Korean defense R&D projects and associated production 
structure primarily focuses on system development, and places R&D in a peripheral category. As such, 
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Korea falls comparatively short in building a wide array of S&T infrastructure for critical core 
technologies, which compels the industry to rely heavily on foreign technology and components. Thus, 
the defense sector appears far less competitive against advanced foreign defense industries in many 
technical defense products, where the country has been placed in the lower-middle-tier within the global 
defense industrial landscape. Lower-middle-tiered defense industries are typically those that directly 
import critical military components or manufacture weapon systems under substantial technology 
assistance from advanced defense industries.431 
 
 
                  Figure 15. Defense Technology Competitiveness Compared to Advanced Countries, DTaQ (2010) 
 
In order to overcome the quagmire of over production and redundant manufacturing capacities, 
corporate strategies in a normally functioning market economy would seek options to streamline the 
industrial structure through mergers and acquisition, expand overseas exports, introduce more intensive 
competition systems, diversify products, establish co-development/production arrangements, or pursue 
other possible options available. Considering the fact that the Korean defense industry runs as a private 
business operation controlled under huge government subsidies, the streamlining efforts should’ve been 
regulated via market mechanisms. But the established institutions such as the Specialization and 
Systematization Act and Defense Industry Promotion Act have restrictively precluded defense firms to 
seek rationalization efforts under their own initiatives. As illustrated in the previous chapters, American 
and Western European defense firms went through intensive restructuration processes over the course 
                                                          
431 First-tiered advance defense industries are countries like US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the Upper-Second-tiered, 
or upper-middled-tiered, are Australia, Canada, Czech, Norway, Japan, Sweden, and the Lower-Second-tiered, or lower-
middled-tiered, are Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the Third-tiered are Egypt, Nigeria, 
Mexico, etc. 김종하, “한국 방위산업의 연구개발수행력에 따른 구조혁신의 방향,” 한국방위산업학회 제 17 권 
2 호, 2010, p. 157. 
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of advancing the competitive strength of its defense industry. Therefore, the oligopolistic structure of 
leading global defense industries appeared as an outcome of such intense competition. But because of 
the rigidities and inflexibilities prevalent in the Korean defense industry under the four decades of 
government protection and nurturing, these alternate solutions turned hardly achievable. Corporate 
competitiveness of Korean firms in the global defense market was seriously challenged by the R&D 
arrangement between GRIs and defense firms.432 
 Continued government scrutiny and public criticism over weapon system development 
programs also counts as a destabilizing factor that discourages innovative entrepreneurship in the 
defense industry. Ever since the Yulgok Scandal in 1993, a series of irregularities and malpractices were 
revealed in weapon systems development, and a number of politicians, senior military officials, and 
business people were prosecuted for program mismanagement and corruption. Afterwards, weapon 
systems procurement programs and the defense industry were condemned as a source of public evil, 
and the self-esteem of the defense firms was seriously damaged afterwards. Especially for major defense 
firms managed by big business conglomerates (Chaebol), the CEOs and owner families started to 
disfavor the defense business, which generally performed comparatively lower than other operating 
sectors within its business group.433 The significant cause for the low-preference was due to the rigid 
policies and regulations imposed over the entire manufacturing process. The current Defense 
Acquisition Program Act mandates the obligation of defense firms to disclose the production cost, 
financial statements, and other accounting documents to DAPA at the end of the year under the 
justification of transparency and efficiency. However, such information in other business sectors is 
normally considered corporate secrets and is rarely revealed to the public only on a necessary basis. 
Additionally, defense firms are subject to annual government audits conducted by the Board of Audit 
and Inspection (BAI) and the National Assembly, and are obliged to continuously update the 
progression status of its weapon system development programs to these authorities accordingly. Finally, 
but not the least, defense firms are subject to constant supervision by the counter-intelligence agencies 
such as the National Intelligence Service, Defense Security Command, and Police, because of the 
volume of secret information the company holds.434 On the contrary, in the case of foreign weapon 
systems procurement programs, foreign defense firms are not subject to disclosing any such information 
that can be labeled corporate secrets, and are neither subjected to constant supervision by the Korean 
authorities. Despite the comparatively higher potentials of fraudulent contracts and misdemeanor in 
these foreign procurement cases against domestic development programs, there is no enforcement 
measure that can legitimately monitor these foreign programs against domestic ones. In this regard, the 
                                                          
432 한남성 외, 방산물자 및 전문계열화제도의 효율적인 운용방안, 한국국방연구원, 연구보고서 무 02-1801, 
2002, p. 27. 
433 The estimates of defense sector performance in annual sales compared to other industrial sectors as of 2011 shows a 
relative performance level of 4.7% against the automotive sector, 6.1% against the steel sector, 11.3% against the general 
machinery sector, and 12.3% against the shipbuilding sector. 장원준 외, 우리나라 방위산업 구조고도화를 통한 
수출산업화 전략, p. 302. 
434 채우석, 삼성이 방위산업을 포기한 이유, 글로벌디펜스뉴스, 2016 년 4 월 20 일. 
 142 
control measures being imposed to Korean defense firms are comparatively harsher, and a number of 
firms have been expressing its willingness to exit the industry.435  
For instance, the top two Korean defense contractors, Samsung and Doosan, have been 
arduously seeking options to divest its defense businesses to other companies, and to permanently exit 
the defense business ever since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Especially, the defense sector of 
Samsung was traditionally considered the most diversified and comprehensive in scale and performance 
– spanning from command and control systems, self-propelled artillery, armor tracked vehicles, and 
aircrafts – and had the strongest and most respectful convictions to sustain its defense operations as part 
of returning its corporate achievements to the country since the creation of its defense branches in 
1977.436 Despite the relatively smaller footprint of the defense business compared to other business 
sectors within big business conglomerates, the frequent government audits and court appearances over 
various defense acquisition programs have accumulated constant work fatigue and market uncertainties 
among the Chaebols. Also, opposed to the 9% returns in margin rates of the defense industry announced 
by DAPA and other defense authorities, the actual profit margins of major defense system integrators 
hover around 2-3%, whereas its subcontractors perform far below this percentage. As such, the high 
risk factors existing both in technology development and political situation have discouraged innovation 
and entrepreneurship in the defense business from the past twenty years.437 These circumstances will 
be covered in more detail in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
4.8.3. Corporate R&D Efforts in Defense Acquisition Programs 
Depending on the lead organization responsible for the system development phase of the 
acquisition cycle, weapon system development and critical technology development programs are 
largely divided into government managed programs (primarily organized by ADD) and corporate driven 
programs (including GRI-Industry-Univ. partnerships). Based on the technology readiness level, risk 
factor assessment, and economic impact factors, the defense acquisition authority supervised by the 
Defense Acquisition Program Executive Committee (DAPEC) decides the acquisition strategy of the 
program, whether it be government managed or corporate driven. 
Until the 1990s, defense R&D in weapon systems development was an exclusive property of 
ADD where defense firms narrowly contributed in manufacturing roles such as in prototyping and full 
rate production. R&D of critical core technology and engineering design work was also primarily 
conducted by ADD where defense firms served in sub-contractual manufacturing arrangements. Hence, 
the defense industry was considered a government subsidiary in manufacturing weapon systems rather 
than an incubator of innovative technology and systems development. The dualized segments between 
                                                          
435 김종대, 방향 잃은 방산비리 수사, 경향신문, 2015 년 3 월 16 일. 
436 Samsung and Doosan each sold off its defense branches to Hanwha Corporation in 2015 and 2016, and have entirely 
exited the defense businesses. Interview with a former Samsung official. 
437 한국방위산업학회, 방위산업 발전을 위한 국방연구개발 활성화 방안 연구, 국가과학기술자문회의 
정책용역자료 2001-11, p. 30. 
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R&D (government-ADD) and production (industry) precluded the construction of a symbiotic defense 
industrial ecosystem that incorporates the total life cycle management of a weapon system including 
R&D, production, system upgrade, depot maintenance, and disposal. Under this arrangement, defense 
firms had little incentives to strive for obtaining critical core technology as a baseline capability. The 
negative effects of the prime contractor not holding R&D responsibilities of the subject weapon system 
program resulted in the technologically substandard capabilities of its subcontractors and component 
suppliers. In this regard, weapon systems development programs suffered from low localization rates, 
which forced the prime contractor to heavily rely on foreign components and technology. Therefore, 
defense firms not only lacked the most competitive foundations in system design and integration 
technology, but also failed to hold a self-reliant supply chain.438 In reference to the continued evolution 
of complex weapon systems development, the government was compelled to share R&D 
responsibilities with defense firms in a number of naval and aircraft development programs since the 
1990s. The advantages of corporate R&D efforts in weapon systems development programs contributes 
to reduced program cost and shortened development periods. Firms can fully materialize proven 
technology into a weapon system, which alleviates a number of challenges in risk management during 
the development process. The awarding of development firms through a competitive bid provides 
opportunities to save time and money for the government because it eliminates the esoteric cycle of the 
acquisition strategy generation phase. 
 Yet, firms have been reluctant to commit corporate resources into defense R&D work because 
of the domestic defense market presents little incentives to firms that demonstrate strong technology 
competitiveness. At first, the closed oligopolistic structure of the defense industry awards government 
contracts to a handful of defense firms protected under the Specialization and Systematization system. 
In this aspect, firms existing outside of the protective boundaries of the defense industry are unable to 
penetrate the domestic defense market. Secondly, the government does not guarantee to the 
development firm an appropriate compensation for development nor does it assures adequate quantities 
of procurement even after the successful conclusion of the systems development efforts. Consequently, 
the development firm bears all development and production risks, hence it becomes quite 
commonsensical that no firm will accept such risk factors in an unrewarding market. Thirdly, firms are 
concerned with the eventual ownership of the intellectual property rights in relations to the resulting 
R&D achievements. In this aspect, most of the proprietary rights that arise from the development project 
fall under the ownership of either ADD or the military authorities.439 Such contracting behavior is quite 
contrary to other advanced defense industrial countries. In the case of the United States, the Department 
of Defense, under a Technical Advisory Group, reviews and validates the investment costs and real 
value of Independent Research and Development (IR&D) projects, and sets the acceptable ceiling for 
                                                          
438 정진태∙김진호, 방위산업의 전문화∙계열화 발전방안, 국방과 기술, 2003 년 2 월, p. 38. 
439 고승석 외, 방산특성을 고려한 기업의 연구개발 관리시스템 구축에 대한 사례연구: 업체주도 
연구개발과제를 중심으로, 한국방위산업학회, 제 15 권, 1 호, 2008, p. 209. 
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compensation as a government share to the firm.440 The institutional structure that determines the 
proprietary rights resulting from technology development projects becomes especially troublesome for 
the R&D participating entities. According to the Act on the Agency of Defense Development and the 
Defense Acquisition Program Act, either ADD or DAPA appear as shareholders of the proprietary rights, 
even if the technology or manufacturing data originated from the corporation itself. The rationale 
supporting this ownership structure relates to the need of maintaining confidentiality in defense R&D, 
in conjunction with the general perception of the government as the original investor of the R&D 
activities retaining such ownership. On the contrary, the rule of thumb for proprietary ownership over 
collaborative R&D programs administered by other government agencies such as MOTIE and the 
Small-Medium Business Administration, show that the participating corporations or research 
laboratories also hold an equal share of their respective efforts, even if the R&D finances originated 
from the government. Thus, the restrictions over proprietary rights on defense R&D products have the 
potential of conflicting with a broader and higher legal arrangement that defines intellectual property 
rights of publicly funded research programs. Such restriction hinders defense firms from taking 
leadership roles and actively promoting R&D efforts to improve its own competitiveness, the entrance 
of technologically competitive firms into the defense sector, and promotional effects of the transfer and 
diffusion of technology to other sectors of the economy.441 
 A recent survey conducted by the Korea Institute of Intellectual Property on 18 defense firms 
reflects such reluctance in a cost benefit perspective. According to the survey, 38.9% responded that no 
special incentives or awards existed for corporate led R&D efforts such as in tax benefits, financial 
loans, etc. 16.7% expressed frustration over the idea of the government taking full ownership of 
Intellectual Property Rights that resulted from corporate led R&D. In a separate survey conducted on 
44 defense firms also showed similar results, where over 72% responded that the government 
guaranteed nothing in terms of properly compensating the development efforts of defense firm. More 
than 54% pointed out the situation where no implementing institution or regulation existed for properly 
compensating corporate defense R&D outcomes. Additionally, 36.4% expressed reluctance because of 
the ownership arrangements of proprietary rights, and 38.7% responded the lack of incentives that 
would motivate firms to engage in R&D work.442 
Only a small number of low-tech conventional weapon systems such as ammunition or armored 
vehicles, or electronic communication equipment such as radars counted as product categories where 
defense firms were able to exert efforts in corporate level R&D. However, in accordance with the 
various causes described above, some programs were inadvertently shutdown with no proper 
government compensation at all to the development firm. For example, the K-56 Ammunition Resupply 
                                                          
440 Subpart 231.2 – Contracts with Commercial Organizations, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. 
최치호, 국가연구개발사업의 성과 귀속 및 활용체계 개편 방안, KISTEP Issue paper 2013-13, p. 10. 
441 산업기술혁신촉진법 13 조, 중소기업기술혁신촉진법 
442 전성태 외, 방산업체 자체 R&D 투자 활성화 및 지원방안, 방위사업청-방위산업진흥회 정책용역, 2011, p. 
25. 
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Vehicle Program showcases the event where the government did not compensate the defense firm’s 
R&D work due to a sudden program cancellation attributed by changes in warfighter needs and defense 
budget shortages. The Army raised the force requirement generation of the K-56 in 1983, and the 
acquisition strategy was determined in 1986 as a corporate development program. The baseline 
configuration was to be adopted from the expanded version of the K-200 chassis, and the prime 
contractor role was awarded to Daewoo Heavy Industries in 1987. After a series of T&E failure and 
configuration changes, which substantially incurred additional development costs to Daewoo Heavy 
Industries, the K-56 ARV was finally determined ‘serviceable for combat’, and was subsequently 
qualified to enter into full rate production in 1998. But after conflicting assessments on its combat 
performance and effectiveness, and also compounded by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 
government unilaterally cancelled the K-56 ARV Program in 2000, without compensating the 
development costs incurred by Daewoo Heavy Industries.443 
 
4.8.4. Overly Reliant on U.S. Technology Transfers: Indispensable but Repressive 
Traditionally, Korea has been considered a big customer in the international arms market. In 
the case of 2014, Korea was ranked the largest importer of foreign weapons by marking $7.8 billion in 
contract value. This was the inevitable consequence of putting emphasis on delivering strong deterrence 
against North Korean asymmetric threat by introducing highly advanced weapon systems such as the 
RQ-4 Global Hawks, CH-47D aircrafts, among other things.444 The predominance of U.S. defense 
products in the Korean force structure as well as industry level collaborative efforts reflects the 
geopolitical situation of the Korean Peninsula. Putting into account of the rapid economic development 
and technological catch-up of the Korean innovation system, U.S. assistance in technology transfers 
and system procurement in the early phases of the economy was critical and indispensable. However, 
to a certain extent, such large imports of U.S. weapon systems placed Korea’s innovation engine in a 
predicament over the course of building fundamentals for its defense industrial sector. Majority of the 
weapon systems listed in the Defense Reform 2020 are high-end state of the art systems, which have to 
highly rely on foreign purchase. Contrary to the ‘domestic development first’ policy that was mandated 
in the 1970s, the dissipating commitment towards a self-reliant national security initiative and low 
incentives in technology upgrading through defense industrialization has altered major defense 
acquisition programs from domestic development to foreign purchase. Although the Defense 
Acquisition Program Act of 2005 asserts coherent weapon system development architecture focused on 
domestic development, the arrangement is more oriented towards economic feasibility through cost 
benefit analysis or military alliance considerations and not long term TRL upgrading for enhanced 
                                                          
443 이호석 외, 업체자체연구개발 실태분석 및 발전방안, 한국국방연구원 연구보고서 무 02-1783, 2002, p. 31. 
444 Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014, Congressional Research 
Servce, December 2015, p.7. 
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competitiveness.445 
According to a recent global arms trade report published by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), Korea was ranked in third place in global weapon system import between 
2004 and 2008. This accounted for about 6% of the global defense import quantities behind China (11%) 
and India (7%). During this period, over 73% of the weapon systems purchased from overseas were 
U.S.-origin, thus shows an obvious bias. Especially, as Korea continues to purchase more complex 
product weapon systems, the lopsided procurement pattern becomes even more apparent towards the 
U.S. 
Unit: $ million 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Canada 3 12 12 12 9 6 6 3                 63 
France 80 80 80 87 80 27 163 186 172 160 2   2       1119 
Germany  180 161 19 25 29 30 21 294 378 415 38 70 34 26 319 33 2070 
Indonesia   16 49                           66 
Israel 19   100                   35 28 24 40 246 
Italy 5                               5 
Netherlands 35     25 25 25   39 10   10   10       179 
Russia 29     10 32 86 102                   259 
Sweden                 3 12 12 20   24 29 11 109 
UK 110 41     12 12               12 12 24 222 
U.S. 935 463 268 593 873 619 1358 1233 1121 209 1188 1462 985 93 332 138 11870 
U.S. (%) 67.0 59.9 50.8 78.9 82.4 77.0 82.3 70.3 66.6 26.3 95.0 94.1 92.4 51.1 46.4 56.3 73.2 
Total 1396 773 528 752 1059 804 1650 1755 1683 796 1250 1553 1066 182 715 245 16207 
Table 17. ROK Defense Import Breakdown by Country (SIPRI)                                                                                 
  
In a slightly tweaked perspective, Korea is ranked first place worldwide that imported U.S. 
weapon systems in total between 2000 and 2015. Korea spent nearly $11.9 billion in equipment 
purchases from the U.S. during this period followed by UAE and Australia. However, the dollar figures 
will most likely rise because the statistics does not account for the purchase of components, spare parts, 
and other services associated with the weapon system procurement.446 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Total 7597 5680 4958 5616 6790 6827 7481 7800 6799 6806 8098 9104 9163 7687 10470 10484 121359 
Korea 935 463 268 593 873 619 1358 1233 1121 209 1188 1462 985 93 332 138 11870 
UAE 15 19 18 36 380 1259 994 472 677 394 153 863 923 1063 542 895 8702 
Australia 194 87 106 165 114 101 348 574 320 610 1389 1004 589 148 326 903 6977 
Egypt 823 809 477 345 500 588 429 372 263 82 249 160 177 494 190 585 6542 
Saudi 
Arabia 3 33 89 117 324 153 172 149 235 231 345 398 401 615 1383 1764 6412 
Japan 442 398 426 412 352 414 444 470 659 490 381 263 243 258 458 283 6393 
UK 814 1253 380 425 165 15 108 290 438 277 331 213 400 331 194 362 5997 
Israel 102 115 323 104 839 1114 1110 839 663 134 41 59 107 65 121 194 5929 
Taiwan 553 345 298 111 314 641 503 12 11  - 37 138 425 553 1081 681 5702 
Singapore 531 59 209 47 362 530 30 8 25 772 748 492 446 670 627 65 5619 
Table 18. U.S. Defense Exports from 2000-2015 (SIPRI)                                         Unit: $ million 
  
The justification for purchasing U.S. weapon systems primarily relates to the military alliance 
structure with the United States. The buzz word in this respect is ‘interoperability’, meaning the need 
to maintain commonality in command and control systems, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, 
strike capability, among others, all intertwined into a complex network of systems, which is the 
                                                          
445 For instance, only one out of the eight feasibility studies of the Korean Fighter Experiment Program was focused on 
technology strategy where the rest were mostly cost-benefit analysis. National Assembly KFX Seminar, Yoo Seung Min. 
446 김외현, 한국, “세계 8 대 무기수입국…미국산 비중 80%,” 한겨레신문, 2014.10.19. 
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prerequisite for effectively waging modern warfare. Because of this procurement pattern, international 
aerospace and defense firms considered the Korean arms market as a stronghold of the American Big 5 
arms dealers, in which other firms from Europe or Israel found almost no opportunities to penetrate.447 
 Moreover, because of the complexities associated with Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) as 
well as the restrictive control measures imposed on high-tech U.S. defense articles, the recent trend in 
procuring U.S. defense systems became more reliant on the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. 
FMS comparatively comes in handy for program managers because it provides a total package approach 
of the respective weapon system, which includes an integrated logistic support package, education and 
training program in operations and maintenance, U.S. government quality assurance in system tests, 
evaluation, and safety, and so forth, all contracted by the U.S. Government on behalf of the purchasing 
country. On the other hand, FMS is also more restrictive in nature because it does not render any 
technology transfer arrangements, or defense offset trades, with the purchasing country, while 
implementing stringent technology control standards to preclude any possibilities of reverse 
engineering.  But because of the convenience in contracting the subject weapon system, FMS contracts 
in Korean defense spending have substantially increased in recent years. Proportionately, FMS contracts 
accounted for only 14% in 2008, but reached a ratio to 66% in 2012.448 
 
Contract Type Total 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (August) 
DCS (%) 66% 37% 86% 52% 64% 61% 34% 
FMS (%) 34% 63% 14% 48% 36% 39% 66% 
Total 155,732 20,498 68,158 19,681 19,318 14,718 13,359 
Table 19. FMS Contracts, reproduced from contract updates to National Assembly provided from the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration, 2014 
  
The biased procurement pattern towards U.S. weapon systems not only puts Korea in a less 
advantageous position when negotiating for better terms in the contract phase, but also applies stringent 
restrictions in technology security and control measures when adopting highly advanced defense 
technologies. Defense technology in the U.S. is considered a national security interest, where relatively 
lesser attention is given to corporate benefits. Thus the primary objective is to preserve critical U.S. 
military technological advantages. As discussed in the previous chapter, according to the U.S. export 
control regime, foreign countries or corporate entities must obtain authorization from the U.S. 
Government prior to either initiating transfer or modification of the respective defense article or services, 
including technology, that are subject to the U.S. Munitions List.449 In this aspect, further exploitation 
of U.S.-origin defense technology with the purpose of modification and overhaul, is extremely limited. 
Therefore, defense cooperation in the technological realm is only feasible through legitimate means that 
serves for stewarding U.S. military technological advantages.450 Especially, Korea has been scrutinized 
lately by the U.S. Government for either stealing or taking advantage of high-end U.S. military 
                                                          
447 정승임, “웬만한 무기수입은 ‘미국산’으로 통한다?,” 한국일보 2016.1.13. 
448 이영하, 차성원, “FMS 방식의 해외무기 구매실태,” 계간 감사, 2013 년 봄호, pp. 62-64. 
449 Section 2753 of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act 
450 Fact Sheet: Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), The DISAM Journal, Spring 1997. 
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technologies for its own use in a variety of indigenous weapon systems. The items laid out by a recent 
publication of Foreign Policy showed suspicions on sensor devices, anti-ship missiles, and electronic 
weapon systems potentially developed through ‘copycatting’, in the midst of growing Korean defense 
exports to other countries.451 
4.9. Chapter Conclusion 
Korea’s economic growth engine and overarching innovation systems are in its crossroads. The 
institutional foundations that firmly supported the nation’s rapid economic growth and technological 
catch-up until the late 1990s ran into a roadblock after the Asian Financial Crisis, which proved the 
concept of a government driven fast-follower policy can no longer keep up with the innovation pace of 
an economy reaching its mature phases of industrialization. 
 Apparent handovers of publicly sponsored R&D efforts to the commercial sector resulted in a 
lopsided increase in experimental development and applied research, in which depreciated the 
significance of basic research. In this aspect, insufficient commitment to basic research resulted in the 
country lagging behind not only in cutting-edge advanced technology but also incapable of localizing 
critical core technologies required for producing components and modular products. In order to 
overcome technological insufficiencies, the country’s manufacturing sector has become excessively 
dependent on foreign technology and components. As a result, expenses payed to foreign sources that 
substitute local production has become higher in more high tech industrial sectors. The highly 
dependent situation applies even more directly to the defense industrial sector. 
The national innovation system of Korea, reflected through its S&T development and support 
architecture, shows indications of inefficiencies caused by vertically aligned bureaucratic stovepipes 
that consequently created barriers in flawlessly implementing interagency coordination. The structural 
challenges over the innovation construct of the defense R&D sector within the national innovation 
system extends to this argument regarding the restraints in conducting coordinated research with other 
GRIs. The defense R&D budget carves out almost 15% of the national R&D budget, which makes 
weapon system development and core technology programs the single most committed publicly funded 
projects where government resources are invested. However, with the center of gravity placed on 
weapon systems development programs, defense R&D exerts very little focus on basic research and 
core technology development, which becomes the reason for high dependence in foreign technology 
and components. The restrictive control measures and proprietary rights dictated on foreign defense 
technology also serves as a self-imposed constraint on localization efforts.452 The obstructive and 
secretive nature of defense R&D has placed the sector disconnected from the overall national innovation 
architecture, which resulted in redundancies and overlaps on the distribution of resources. Despite the 
accession of defense R&D into the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) in 2007, the 
                                                          
451 Gordon Lubold, “Is South Korea Stealing U.S. Military Secrets?,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2013. 
452 송위진, 국가기술혁신체제 관점에서 본 국방연구개발의 발전 방향, 대전발전포럼, 제 18 호, 2006, p. 16. 
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actual incorporation between the two sectors still seems to be far off. NSTC did not have oversight on 
defense R&D programs until 2017 when the Commission started to preview initial planning documents. 
But even so with the NSTC preview process in place, strong enforcement measures have not been 
instituted for execution yet. 
Such disconnect emerges from the upper tier of the R&D structure where the defense structure 
is not fully integrated into the national R&D construct, starting from the planning stage. The Total 
Roadmap on the National Mid-Long Term Investment Strategy (TRM), administered by the NSTC, 
does not include the defense sector. Neither did the TRM include the program components of the Civil-
Military Technology Partnership in the lower tier structure, which is the most relevant defense program 
connected with R&D programs managed by other agencies. Because of these poor links, the CMTP also 
suffers from disassociation with civilian technologies caused by incompatible technology standards. 
The Midterm Defense Program, which contains the 5-year defense expenses in Force Improvement 
Programs, has never had any well-planned ties with government initiated R&D programs ran by other 
ministry-level programs either. 453  The next chapter juxtaposes this situation to the aircraft-
manufacturing sector. 
  
                                                          
453 홍성범, 과학기술력 강화를 위한 국가과학기술자원 총동원체제 구축, STEPI Insight, Issue 60, 2010, p. 7. 
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Chapter 5. The Aircraft Manufacturing Sector: Background and National Level 
Innovation Systems 
 
5.1. Overview of the Korean Aircraft Manufacturing Sector: Industry Performance and 
Characteristics 
 
The magnitude of aircraft-manufacturing in terms of scale, scope, and technology sophistication, has 
branded the sector as a strategic industry where the Korean government selected and nurtured national 
champion firms by building capacities and technological competence in furtherance of upgrading the 
country’s industrial portfolio. For national security reasons, military force requirements have primarily 
driven the market demand in aircraft manufacturing. Although the industry has recently diversified into 
commercial businesses based on the technological progression and achievements obtained from the past 
fifty years of engineering and manufacturing, commercial aviation had marginal contributions to the 
overall industry construction and parallel technological development. Considering the minuscule 
footprint of the commercial sector into sectoral development, this chapter gives higher attention on 
government driven military build-ups in aircraft manufacturing. 
 Because of the exorbitant price tag associated with military aircrafts, it is imperative to 
synchronize these defense acquisition programs with development and manufacturing capabilities over 
a mid-to-long term industrial outlook in order to sustain production lines while fulfilling national 
security objectives. Unfortunately, defense acquisition programs were never in synch with industrial 
capacities, where systemic disconnects in policy coordination caused major structural confusion in the 
absence of an appropriate government adjudication mechanism. Government inefficiencies impacted 
negatively on production line sustainment and technology accumulation. Especially, frequent delays 
and cancellations of military aircraft programs caused by poor interagency coordinating efforts and 
ineffective decision making entailed uncertainty and discontinuity in military aircraft programs. 
Continued disagreements between military and industrial authorities were the source of organizational 
discrepancies, because the military preferred rapid procurement and internationally certified products 
proven from various deployment records, whereas industrial authorities put high emphasis on building 
industry capacities. In this regard, the military always placed high priorities on foreign procurement 
while industrial authorities prioritized on indigenous development.454 
 Starting in the 1970s with an ambitious strategic vision to fulfill national security objectives 
and industrial development aspirations, the Korean government launched the aircraft industry as part of 
its efforts to build a sound defense industrial base. Because of its short history compared to advanced 
industrial countries, knowledge and investment in consideration to the domestic market demand specific 
to the aircraft sector was insufficient. However, with the growing military requirements in aviation 
assets, the prospects of industrial growth were overly covered with wishful thinking. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
454 이기상∙이무영, “우리나라 항공기 산업의 발전 과제와 대책,” 항공산업연구, 제 68 집, p. 14. 
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short-term government visions and disconnected program synergy characterized the grim reality, which 
encapsulates the sluggish growth of the aircraft industry to date.  
Despite the series of government support packages and industrial investments, the foundations 
of the aircraft sector remained brittle and inconsistent. In the heist of the aircraft-manufacturing sector 
during the 1990s, the production output stayed at KRW 393 billion, which accounted for only 0.2% in 
proportion against the overall manufacturing output. Although in other domains of the industry, the 
aircraft sector was one of the fastest growing sectors between 1986 and 1992, marking a growth rate of 
35.5% compared to 13.1% of the overall manufacturing output. Foreign exports also showed remarkable 
growth rates during this period, marking approximately 20.8% compared to the overall manufacturing 
industry average of 13.1%, which showed a fast growing business sector within the domestic economy. 
Nevertheless, the inside story to these statistics presents a different dimension because the total 
manufacturing output of the aircraft sector started in only 0.05% against the overall manufacturing 
sector. In this aspect, the comparative growth factors appeared relatively higher than other industrial 
sectors. Overall foreign exports of the aircraft sector marked 0.2% in proportion of the entire overseas 
exports, whereas imports of aircraft components and related technology accounted for 2.4% of the entire 
foreign imports.455 
 
Rank Country 
2008-2009 Output 
Business Area Business Sales 
($ billion) 
Proportion in Global 
Performance 
Employment 
(10,000) 
1 USA 201.2 46.8% 64.3 Aircraft/Engines 
2 France 53.1 12.3% 16 Aircraft/Engines 
3 UK 43.1 10% 15.5 Engine/Components 
4 Germany 32 7.4% 10.6 Components 
5 Canada 23.6 4.5% 8.3 Mid-size 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
8 Japan 11.6 2.7% 3.1 Components 
9 China 8 1.9% - Aircraft/Engines 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
16 Korea 2 0.5% 1.1 Trainer/Components 
             Table 20. Global Aerospace Industrial Ranking, adopted from Aerospace Industry Association Facts and 
Figures (2014), Aerospace and Defense Facts and Figures (2014) 
 
As for the aircraft industry’s current performance status, the picture is nowhere different to the 
performance feature represented 25 years ago. As shown in Table 1, aircraft manufacturing in Korea constitutes 
only 0.5% of the global aircraft manufacturing output, in which the military sector comprises 69% ($1.35 billion) 
of the total industrial output compared to 20 – 30% of other advanced industrial countries. Unlike other 
competitive business areas such as automobiles ($119 billion), general machinery ($48 billion), and shipbuilding 
($37 billion), the annual sales of the aircraft-manufacturing sector meagerly shows less than $2.1 billion.456 
  
                                                          
455 산업연구원 항공기산업 분과위원회, 2000 년대 첨단기술산업의 비전과 발전과정-항공기산업, 1994 년 12 월 
456 Korea Aerospace Industries Association, 2010 Aerospace Industry Performance Statistics, February 2011. 
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   Million US Dollars 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Production 1,269 1,110 1,009 1,152 1,202 1,366 1,243 1,187 1,398 1,515 1,861 1,945 1,970 2,430 2,358 2,697 3,606 4,343 4,886 
Domestic 
Sales 3,112 1,972 1,831 2,005 1,744 2,468 1,951 2,226 2,911 4,161 4,393 3,765 3,170 5,141 5,930 5,193 5,766 6,408 7,215 
Exports 212 313 258 312 371 340 292 371 389 472 597 772 760 1,000 1,019 1,366 1,652 1,985 2,563 
Imports 2,055 1,175 1,080 1,165 913 1,442 1,000 1,410 1,902 3,118 3,129 2,592 1,960 3,711 4,591 3,862 3,812 4,050 4,892 
Table 21. Aircraft manufacturing Performance Statistics 
 
Figure 16. Aircraft manufacturing Performance Statistics, 산업통상자원부 항공산업 전망 통계 
  
Production capacity continues to grow, especially starting with 2010 as the industry initiated a 
number of government projects such as the Korea Utility Helicopter and T-50 Golden Eagle Advanced 
Trainer. Production capacity remains over $20 billion a year. The commercial sector also shows a 
parallel growth rate, which proportionately reduced the industry’s excessive reliance over military 
programs. Commercial production output contributes nearly 40% where the military sector contributes 
about 60% of the total industry output. However, there are apparent trade gaps in the balance sheet 
between imports and exports. As of 2015, overseas exports of Korean aircraft products mark about 
$25.6 billion whereas imports of foreign products mark around twice as much of overseas exports ($49 
billion), showing a near trade deficit of $24 billion.  
 The aircraft-manufacturing sector strived to diversify its military focused business programs 
to accommodate more commercial aviation outputs. Military programs are excellent force multipliers 
because it attracts government resources and technology development efforts sufficient to build up scale 
and capacities for a technologically complex capital intensive program. Considering the 20-year life 
cycle of a military aircraft, the production output rapidly recedes after the initial batch of production 
concludes. Therefore, in order to sustain the production capacity, it is crucial that the industry diversifies 
into other sectors of aircraft manufacturing, namely in the field of commercial aviation.  
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Programs Program Cost ($ million) Output percentage (%) 
T-50 Production 367 18.6 
FA-50 Development 68 3.5 
KHP Development 240 12.2 
KT-1 Production 76 3.8 
F-15K Subcomponents 32 1.6 
Commercial Aviation Components 468 23.8 
Engine Maintenance 267 13.5 
Airframe Maintenance 152 7.7 
Space Programs 124 6.3 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 4 0.2 
Other 172 8.8 
Total 1,970 100 
            Table 22. 2009 Aircraft Production Output, 항공우주 제4권 1호, 2010, p. 10. 
  
In this regard, aircraft maintenance, which considers maintenance work performed on engines 
and airframes, has become a growing business sector in this field. The total output in this sector in 2009 
marked $420 million, or about 22% of the entire production output, and growing. Thus, the growth 
potentials of the Maintenance, Repair, and Operations (MRO) market are auspicious. In a related 
performance report, because of the scale and complexity of aircraft manufacturing, the field is 
considered less profitable in operating returns compared to other machine sectors such as automobiles 
or general machinery. However, the sector definitely appears to be in a growth pattern in comparison to 
other machine sectors. Contributed from these prospects of growth, aircraft manufacturing is generally 
considered a likely growth sector despite its relatively small scale. 
 
Business Area 
Profitability Growth Potentials 
Operating Profits Ratio Net Profit Ratio Growth Rate of Sales Growth Rate of Operating Profits 
Aircraft 2% 2% 10% 32% 
Machinery 8% 5% 5% 10% 
Automobile 5% 5% 3% 4% 
Table 23. Profit rates and growth rates of domestic manufacturing industry, 항공기산업 경쟁력 강화방안 (산업은행 
2009) 
 
Because of the fact that military programs dominate the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector, 
the industry’s production output had fluctuated based on program schedules. According to Figure 2, 
there were two primary periods when the industry plummeted into negative growth rates. The industry 
became stagnated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 as commercial aviation was directly impacted 
from the crisis as well as the military sector went through extreme budget cuts and program 
cancellations. It was a period when major military aircraft programs entered into finalization phase. 
After a slight recovery from the crisis, the industry entered into another recession in 2002 after the 
supplementary production of the KF-16 (KFP-II) and the KT-1 program concluded, compounded by 
decreases in exports due to strong exchange rates of the Korean Won.  
Other than the two turbulent seasons, the industry generally performed with an annual growth 
rate averaged around 6.9% throughout the years. The essential cause of these industry performance 
outcomes are attributed to the fluctuating demand pull of the domestic market. Without a sizable 
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commercial aviation supply chain, the industry mostly relies on military programs, which immediately 
becomes short of business after program deliveries conclude. Based on these growth patterns, a 
conservative assessment conducted by the Seoul based Aerospace Industry Research Institute 
forecasted the production output of the industry would grow to $3.3 billion until 2020, about threefold 
since the time of the analysis was conducted in 2009. The estimates were under the premises that the 
government continues to support the industry by complying with its policy commitments to nurture the 
sector sufficient to compete with global standards.457 
The industry’s first boom period in 1996 was attributed to the production outrun of the Korea 
Fighter Program (F-16 license manufacturing). After a steep decline due to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
the growth rate recovered in the early 2000s as the government decided to produce 20 additional KF-
16 fighters to sustain the production line of the aircraft industry. After undergoing continued fluctuation 
in production and growth rates, the industry reached its second boom in 2005 and 2006 as the number 
of government orders for the T-50 advanced trainer started running in and component exports generated 
from the F-15K offset and other commercial aviation programs accelerated industry growth. However, 
the industry growth rates entered into another steep decline as the T-50 production concluded. Since 
then, the Korea Utility Helicopter program (Surion) entered the engineering and manufacturing phase 
with a prototype introduced in 2008, followed by full rate production afterwards. The military aircraft 
programs wait listed for either development or production to date include utility helicopters (KUH 
Surion), FA-50 light attackers, Light Attack/Commercial Helicopter (LAH/LCH), Mid-tier Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (MUAV), Korea Fighter Experiment (KF-X) and so forth. 
 
                                                          
457 최영진, 이인규, 이경태, “국내 항공산업 통계자료의 시각으로 분석한 항공산업발전기본계획,” 
항공경영학회 추계 발표 논문집, 2010, p. 67. 
 155 
 
        Figure 17. Industry Growth Rates and Major Programs,  
        Reproduced from 항공산업 통계, Korea Aerospace Industries corporate materials 
 
5.2. Technological Competitiveness 
In a nutshell, the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector show high competitiveness in manufacturing air 
frames and fuselage, and product assembly works but show low technical competence level in system 
design and development. The overall competence level was built up from license production and 
subcomponent production arrangements with advanced aircraft manufacturing firms from the U.S. and 
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Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In between the capacity build up process, Korea started to develop its own indigenous version 
aircrafts in fixed wing and rotorcraft such as the KT-1 Basic Trainer, T-50 Advanced Trainer, and the 
Surion Utility Helicopter. From this point, the country accumulated experiences and skillsets in a wide 
range of technical fields from concept/system design to production technology. According to a technical 
survey conducted by the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality in 2012, the country’s overall 
product assembly and manufacturing works reached almost 90% in technology competitiveness levels 
compared to global advanced technical standards. On the other hand, system integration technology 
was comparatively rated 60%, system design 70%, test and evaluation 70%, flight safety certification 
35%, and so forth.458  
System design capacities were acquired through the development of major military aircrafts in 
conjunction with a series of feasibilities studies over developing midsized business jets and associated 
safety certification systems. In this regard, interpretation techniques to comprehend aircraft system 
design and manufacturing works have stood on an equal footing with global standards, but the 
optimization technology in relations with system design and integration works still remain in mediocre 
levels. 
 
 
 According to a 2010 study conducted by the Korean National Defense University over military 
                                                          
458 한국산업기술진흥원, 2011 산업기술로드맵: 항공산업, 지식경제부, 2012. 3., p. 70. 
35%
35%
40%
45%
45%
60%
70%
70%
90%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Propulsion Safety
Certification
Flight Safety
Certification
Core Components
Air Vehicle Design
Structural Safety
Design
System Integration
System Design
Test and Evaluation
Production
Technology
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITIVENESS
Figure 18. Technology Competitiveness of Korean Aircraft Manufacturing Compared to Advanced 
Industrial Countries 
 157 
aircraft-manufacturing sector, the sectoral effectiveness and impact towards the overall national 
industrial output shows some varying indicators in terms of production, value added, importation, and 
employment. Considering production aspects, the aircraft-manufacturing sector show similar indicators 
to other general manufacturing sectors, while show high performances against service sectors. In the 
value added category, aircraft-manufacturing exhibits similar standards towards other general 
manufacturing sectors, but falls substantially behind the service sector. Under the import inducement 
category, aircraft-manufacturing displays the highest rate compared to other industrial sectors overall. 
Such aspect is a result of high dependence on foreign technology and components, which comes in line 
with the technology competitiveness standards featured in the above diagram. However, the highly 
advanced and complex nature of aircraft-manufacturing supported by broad production networks 
consequently induces higher employment levels compared to the general manufacturing sector. In order 
to overcome the weaknesses identified in this analysis, the study recommends to increase domestic 
R&D instead of overseas direct equipment purchases, and to expand localization rates of core 
technology and components. Giving priority to contracting domestic support industries through various 
public sponsorships in the form of easing technology transfer and diffusion processes was recommended 
as a viable solution.459 
 
 Production Inducement 
Coefficients 
Value Added Inducement 
Coefficients 
Import Inducement 
Coefficient 
Employment Inducement 
Coefficient 
Aircraft 
Manufacturing 
2.0764 0.553 0.447 12.3 
General 
Manufacturing 
2.072 0.556 0.347 5.4 
Service Sector 1.712 0.819 0.181 16.4 
Construction Sector - - 0.268 11.6 
Overall Industry 1.937 0.666 0.334 10.4 
Table 24. Inducement Coefficients Compared with Other Industrial Sectors                      
Source: 국방대학교, 함정 항공전력 방위력개선사업의 경제적 효과분석, 2010년 10월. 
 
Before diving into industry specifics, the next section looks into the unique developmental 
trends by reviewing the history of aircraft manufacturing in Korea. 
 
5.3. Daybreak of the Korean Aircraft-Manufacturing Industry: Individual Rushes by 
Military Services 
A typical development pattern of post-World War II aircraft manufacturing for catch-up industries can 
be highlighted in three categories. One is the Japanese case where the U.S. Military designated major 
Japanese industrial sites as forward operational depot level maintenance services, which resulted in 
building major technical infrastructure required to enter into the aircraft market.  
The second case is where developing economies such as China, Taiwan, and Brazil, have 
accumulated aircraft related technical skills and knowledge first through building other sectors of the 
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economy, and later entered into the aircraft manufacturing business. A last but very rare case is when 
developing countries like Indonesia entered into the global value chain first without the required 
infrastructure, with hopes of business opportunities spilling over into other sectors of the economy 
under the premise that there would be sizeable foreign direct investments and outsourcing programs 
from multinational corporations and prime contractors.460 The Korean case is more of a mix between 
the first and second case, where the required knowledge and skills were transferred through U.S. 
military channels in the early phase, but did not evolve into a business enterprise until three decades 
later.  
 
5.3.1. Colonial Gestation and Occupational Foundations 
The early start of the Korean aircraft industry finds its origin from the Japanese Occupation 
period, when Japanese aircraft manufacturers sought asylum from continued aerial bombardment 
threats of the U.S. military during the Pacific campaign of WWII. On July 1942, the Japanese Governing 
General founded the Chosun Airplane Production Company (朝鮮飛行機製作所) at Pyeongyang, and 
on October 1944, the Japanese Occupation Force Command partnered with a local Korean company to 
create the Chosun Airplane Manufacturing Corporation (朝鮮飛行機工業株式會社) south of Seoul, 
which mainly focused on manufacturing airplane components.461 Actual production of an aircraft as a 
major end item did not happen until the Japanese Imperial Navy established the Chosun Aircraft 
manufacturing Corporation (朝鮮航空工業) at Busan area in February 1944, as part of relocating the 
manufacturing facilities of the Nakajima Aircraft Company (中島飛行機株式會社) from mainland 
Japan. The Chosun Aircraft Manufacturing Company produced three airplanes for the Imperial Navy.  
Unfortunately, after the end of the Second World War and the ensuing disarmament of the 
Japanese Imperial Army by the US occupation force, these aircraft companies were dissolved and the 
production skills and knowledge acquired from this brief manufacturing experience never continued 
into the liberated Korean economy afterwards. 462  A small portion of the technicians from these 
companies were later employed into the maintenance depots of the Korean Air Force and Navy but the 
numbers and contributions to the technical foundations remained marginal. Additionally between 1946 
and 1949, the U.S. Far East Command and the American Mission in Korea turned down the Korean 
Government’s request for larger military aid, including aspirations for building a modern air force, 
concerning an escalation of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula.463 Thus, as soon as the supporting 
public entity pulled out its resources from the program, the skills and technical pool created during last 
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three years of the occupation had rapidly disappeared with no further chances of technical sophistication. 
As a typical progression of technology development and maturation, repair and maintenance 
work provided the technological foundations of the earliest Korean aircraft manufacturing before the 
Korean War, although the size and scope were considered insignificant, in which was simply regarded 
as machinery and tools. The Japanese trained technicians were neither qualified nor technically 
compatible to repair aircrafts of US-origin because of the different aircraft design configuration and 
structure. Language barriers also presented significant challenges to these technicians since all technical 
manuals were written in English. Small repair shops organized under flight lines, merely capable of 
conducting preventative maintenance and field level maintenance work, was the actual reality of the 
South Korean technological background in aircraft manufacturing opposed to the corps of technicians 
readily organized under the North Korean People’s Army and skillfully trained in various engineering 
specialties.  
 
Air Force: Setting the Foundations 
The introduction of aircraft manufacturing technology came into reality by the breakout of the 
Korean War when the Korean Military tremendously expanded its air component with the assistance 
granted by the US Government. From a mere size of only twenty trainers and liaison aircrafts, including 
10 North American T-6 Texan advanced trainers acquired from Canada, the Korean Air Force grew to 
a size of 110 aircrafts at the end of the war, with 79 fighter bombers under one organized fighter wing 
and three combat squadrons equipped with F-51D Mustang Fighters. Technical manuals of US aircrafts 
were passed down to Korean technicians by the grant assistance provided by US military advisors 
stationed in each fighter wing as flight instructors and technical advisors.  
Also, in the process of enlarging the engineering corps in aircraft repair and maintenance to 
fulfill the urgent needs of technical expertise in the military during the Korean War, the military 
mobilized scientists and engineers from local colleges in order to facilitate the learning efforts. As part 
of this recruitment process, on 20 December 1950, the Korean Air Force mobilized 423 scholars and 
engineering students from colleges to fill in critical technical billets at Engineering Departments of the 
Air Force Headquarters and repair depots, which later contributed to the modernization of the Korean 
Air Force. The scientists and engineers recruited during the Korean War period later served in influential 
positions throughout the Korean society such as Prime Ministers, S&T Ministers, college chancellors, 
and so forth.464 
During this period, the Korean Air Force became keenly aware of the apparent gap in air power 
between the South and North, thus drafted the Air Force Three Year Build-up Plan in late 1951 with an 
objective to build an air force of 300 F-84 Thunder-Jet fighter aircrafts organized under 4 combat fighter 
wings until March 1955.465 Support elements for this force structure included ground based command 
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and control facilities, airborne reconnaissance and control, transport, supply and maintenance, and 
various organizational components to train the future workforce of the Korean Air Force, at which the 
total program would gross about USD 80 million. However, the economic insolvency of the Korean 
Government compelled the Korean Air Force to seek funding support through U.S. grant aid channels, 
which at first was not supportive at all of such ambitious progression. The objective of U.S. military 
grant aid to Korea at the time was to build one combat fighter wing and ten military bases. In the 
meantime, the U.S. Air Force will reinforce into the Korean Peninsula in times of escalated hostilities. 
After a series of negotiations and executive level exchanges, the two countries reached to a compromise 
in December 1952 and agreed to build a much more advanced tactical strike capability in the Korean 
Air Force, of which accomplished the original goal drafted by the Korean Air Force.466 
The most significant turning point during the warring period in terms of acquiring aircraft 
manufacturing knowledge and skills was the establishment of the aeronautical repair depots. At first, 
the 80th Aeronautical Maintenance Depot established in 1951 during the heist of the Korean War was 
the conduit where the country acquired the skill base for knowledge and experience in repair and 
overhaul by performing maintenance work on the P-51 Mustang fighter and Cessna L-19 liaison and 
observation aircraft. The U.S. military through its advisory elements stationed in Korea provided 
substantial technical knowledge and skills for performing depot level maintenance work on the P-51 
Mustangs during this period. The significance of the technology transfer was attributed to the 
transitioning of the U.S. Air Force fighter aircrafts from turboprop engines to jet engine fighters, 
enabled by the introduction of the F-86 Saber Fighter. Thus, the technology for turboprop P-51 Mustang 
Fighters became rapidly obsolete in the U.S. Air Force, but still considered critical to fight the war in 
the Korean Peninsula, which consequently facilitated the decision of the top U.S. military brass to 
transfer substantial P-51 related technology to the Korean Air Force. 467  The 80th Aeronautical 
Maintenance Depot furthermore consolidated the disseminated technical training functions from 
various airfields in 1952, with the main effort absorbed from the 22nd Air Reconnaissance Squadron.  
By the time of 1953, technical standards of military depots reached the level capable of 
performing maintenance work on the L-19 Bird Dog liaison and observation aircraft including engine 
overhaul works. Several replication works on the design and configuration of the L-19 followed until 
October 1953 when the Air Force Technical Engineering School revealed the first Korean designed and 
manufactured twin seated trainer aircraft called Rebirth (復活號). The various engineering backgrounds 
from technicians educated and trained by the Aeronautical Department of Seoul National University 
were the leading figures at the Air Force Technical Engineering School that had the technical expertise 
to manufacture aircrafts. But most of the repair tools and parts during this period were provided through 
U.S. military grant aid channels, thus the Korean Air Force was not in full shape to repair aircrafts under 
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its force structure at this time. In order to overcome its excessive reliance on U.S. military assistance, 
the Air Force Technological Research Laboratory was created under the depot to localize the 
manufacturing of these tools and parts, in conjunction with conducting research on special purpose 
equipment or devices. In early 1962, under the full assistance provided by the U.S. military, the largest 
maintenance depot in East Asia at the time was constructed at Daegu Air Base, and was named the 81st 
Aeronautical Maintenance Depot.468 At this point, the 81st Aeronautical Maintenance Depot obtained 
the skill level of repair and overhauling of L-19 aircrafts, which later was awarded depot level 
maintenance work from the U.S. Air Force on aircrafts with similar nomenclatures, which was 
previously subcontracted by Japanese or Taiwanese firms as regional maintenance points.469 This was 
the first time the Korean aircraft manufacturing establishments contracted foreign sources orders, thus 
a source of revenue generated outside of its routine boundaries. 
With the engineering skills accumulated from the decade long experiences in repair and 
overhaul work, the 81st Aeronautical Maintenance Depot, in 1972, managed to localize the 
manufacturing of the two-seated Plazmany PL-2 trainer aircraft, named Sparrowhawk (Saemae) in 
Korean.470 The significance of this achievement was that the PL-2 Sparrowhawk became the first 
metallic aircraft manufactured by Korean engineers. The 81st Aeronautical Maintenance Depot 
manufactured four Sparrowhawk prototypes, but the program did not mature into full rate production 
and deployment.471  The Sparrowhawk, just like many other locally manufactured aircrafts that came 
before, simply remained as a prototype, although the achievement was highly appreciated in terms of 
advancement in repair and overhaul work. Nevertheless, Sparrowhawk never entered into full rate 
production and deployment into the Korean air fleet.  
 
Navy: Lonesome Aspirations to Build an Independent Air Wing 
 However, the situation developed slightly different for the Korean Navy. As briefly mentioned 
from previous paragraphs, the technical assistance provided by the United States military was essential 
in the earliest stages of aircraft manufacturing in Korea. However, the contribution was often 
contradicting, and in sometimes restrictive. The US efforts in military assistance was merely focused 
on maintaining the status quo in the Korean Peninsula, therefore was reluctant to provide a capability 
to the South Korean military considered substantially offensive. Although the US military provided 
unconditional technical support during the Korean War, the volume of support obviously dissipated 
after the end of the war. This was especially apparent in building-up the Korean Navy. The U.S. Naval 
Advisory Group, which was the service component that provided advisory services to the Korean Navy, 
focused more on building naval vessels such as littoral combat ships whereas gave little, or almost no 
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attention to naval aviation for the Korean Navy, since aviation assets were generally considered a more 
offensive capability. Neither did the Korean Government considered to build naval aviation 
capabilities.472 
 Interestingly, despite the lack of higher state level assistance, the Korean Navy in the 1950s 
demonstrated stronger willingness to build a more indigenous aircraft manufacturing capacity than other 
military services. The efforts were mainly based on collecting scrap components and pieces from 
disabled US military aircrafts gathered from crashed combat sites, and from Army and Air Force 
warehouses that stored grounded aircrafts disposed to become scrapped. During this period, the Korean 
Navy initiated several attempts to overhaul airframes for modified end-use purposes, including the 
rebuilding and modification of a crashed and destroyed Texan AT-6 into an amphibious aircraft named 
‘Sea Eagle’ (海鷲號). With the help of 14 technicians formerly trained by the Japanese military aviation 
authorities during the Colonial periods, the Texan AT-6 was overhauled with additional aluminum floats 
and transformed into the first amphibious patrol seaplane of the Korean Navy. Several modification 
works followed until 1954 when the Korean Navy designed a patrol aircraft called ‘Sea Vigilance’ (誓
海號) or codenamed ‘SX-1’ that used a spare engine from a L-5 liaison aircraft with additional airframe 
pieces collected from Japanese sources. 473  Unfortunately, with a lack of anti-salinity coating 
technology, Sea Vigilance suffered serious corrosive damages from the salty seawater, and was disposed 
of after nine month of its commissioning.  
 Utilizing the manufacturing experiences acquired from the two programs, the Navy created its 
first fully designed and armed amphibious aircraft called ‘Command of the Sea’ (制海號) or ‘SX-3’ out 
of the wreckages collected from a L-19 aircraft, which successfully completed its maiden flight on 
March 30, 1957.474 The significance of SX-3 was that it applied anti-salinity coating works adopted 
from coating technologies for vessels, thus made it capable of effectively performing maritime patrol 
missions with improved resistance against seawater.475 Based on the design and manufacturing skills 
acquired from the SX-3, the Navy produced a replicated version titled ‘Control of the Sea’ (統海號), or 
SX-5 and deployed it for patrol and reconnaissance missions on December 1958.476 The Korean Navy 
during this period did not have the resources to sponsor research and development for its aviation fleet. 
The defense budget allocated for naval research primarily focused on repair and depot maintenance of 
combat vessels, whereas aviation assets received no official budget at all. Furthermore, the majority of 
U.S. military aid on the transferring of technical knowhow and depot structures related with aircraft 
technology was concentrated primarily on the Korean Army and Air Force, whereas aircraft 
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technological assistance to the Navy was almost nonexistent.  In order to overcome these 
circumstances, the Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Jeong Geun Mo, announced a series of 
Navy Directives to establish the Navy’s Aviation Research Division under the First Research 
Department of the Naval Science and Technology Laboratory. The Division continued to develop air 
assets under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander Cho Gyeong Yeon, the pioneer figure of Korean 
naval aviation that previously administered the manufacturing of all naval aircrafts mentioned above. 
The technicians under the Division attended training programs provided by the Army and Air Force 
technical schools and maintenance depots to learn the technical skills and experience passed down from 
the U.S. military. The laboratory was more of a technical schoolhouse to train the Navy’s maintenance 
workforce rather than conducting genuine R&D work, thus was not a scientific research branch in 
reality and neither did it receive formal funding from the central government. These difficulties 
compounded the very existence of the research lab, and in 1958, the research lab was forcefully closed 
and consolidated its functions to the Navy General Maintenance Depot.477 
 Naval aviation in the 1950s was at first under the control of the fleet command and not a 
separate entity capable of conducting independent missions until the establishment of the Fleet Aviation 
Service on October 1957. The aviation service operated five aircrafts – SX-3, SX-5, three L-19 aircrafts 
assembled by the Navy – which performed patrol, rescue, airlift, and training missions. However, the 
U.S. Military Advisory Group known as KMAG refused to provide additional logistical support for 
these aircrafts, and later demanded to dispose of all aircrafts that did not qualify U.S. government 
technical standards. The primary reason was based on concerns over public safety, mostly under the 
perspectives that the U.S. did not wanted to hold responsibility over substandard aircrafts with no 
proven safety measures. All five aircrafts operated by the Fleet Aviation Service were US-origin defense 
articles, collected and assembled from disposed aircrafts, but did not obtain proper licenses or qualify 
under the technical standards of the US Government.478 In order to avoid the entire destruction of its 
aviation assets, the Navy decided to transfer all aircrafts and its maintenance units to the Korean Coast 
Guards on February 1961, and shut down the Fleet Aviation Service in 1963. The aviation fleet of the 
Korean Navy did not return to the Navy’s organizational branch a decade later until 1973, when the 
Navy reintroduced the Naval Aviation Service into its operational routines. 
 
5.3.2. Ambitious but Mediocre Transition into an Intermediate Level Manufacturer (1970s 
~ 1980s) 
Aircraft manufacturing in the 1970s was initially coupled together with missile development. 
On 15 September 1972, the Presidential Office drafted a secret missile development plan, covered under 
the name of “Aircraft Industry Promotion Plan.” The intent was to obtain a technological capability to 
                                                          
477 http://gdnews.kr/news/article.html?no=2877  
478 해군본부, 해군항공 50 주년을 맞이하여, 2006. 
 164 
build an intermediate-range rocket until 1974, intermediate range surface-to-surface guidance missile 
until 1976, and a long-range surface-to-surface missile until 1979. The short-term target program was 
to build a missile with similar performing features to the Nike Hercules surface to air missile used by 
U.S. and NATO armed forces. The primary forces driving this program originated from the continued 
North Korean offensive ground threat in the midst of a potential U.S. military retrenchment from the 
Peninsula. Thus, the need to build a self-sufficient defense capability was becoming an urgent priority 
for the Korean government at the moment. In order to execute this secretive mission, huge volumes of 
resources were committed to acquire equipment and tools for research, test flight, manufacturing 
facilities for propulsion systems, and so forth. The Daejeon Machinery Depot at Daejeon drew 500 
scientists and engineers to support this ambitious development task.479  
Because of the low technical skills and infrastructure at the time, most of the technology was 
acquired through U.S. military aid programs. For instance, a team of ADD researchers was dispatched 
to learn aircraft design skills and related aeronautical engineering information at Northrop and 
McDonnell Douglas. Essentially, the purpose was to acquire requisite knowledge to indigenously build 
surface-to-surface missiles, since the propulsion related aerodynamics between aircrafts and missiles 
were basically identical. About 20 box loads of technical documents and engineering dynamics were 
obtained at the end of the research. 480 At this point, the U.S. Government also provided a team 
organized under the Advanced Research Program Agency (ARPA), also known as the Hardin Team 
based on the name of the project leader Clyde Hardin. The U.S. Army Guidance Munitions Laboratory 
located at Huntsville Alabama provided additional support by allowing ADD scientists to visit as 
resident researchers and learn the engineering essentials to build missiles. The Korean government also 
dispatched a team of engineers from ADD to the McDonnell Douglas Huntsville facility, the original 
equipment manufacturer of the Nike Hercules Missiles. Throughout this effort, Korean scientists 
obtained critical designing knowledge in wind tunnel, inertial navigation and aerodynamics, and so 
forth.481 
 However, after six months into acquiring design information and learning technical skills at 
various U.S. institutions, the U.S. government started to impose restrictions over the development 
process, with concerns of Korea developing offensive capabilities that have grave potentials to change 
the balance of power of East Asia. Especially, the suspicion that the missile development program could 
eventually evolve into a nuclear program has prompted the U.S. Government to place more scrutiny 
over the technology transfer and assistance efforts. In this aspect, the U.S. started to put restrictive 
measures in transferring sensitive technology through the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group under 
the U.S. Embassy (JUSMAG-K). Officials from JUSMAG-K were stationed in the Daejeon Machinery 
Depot to make sure the missiles did not exceed 180km in range. Such restrictions later evolved into a 
                                                          
479 과학대통령 박정희와 리더십, p. 485. 
480 조한대, “박정희 지시로 쥐도 새도 가족도 몰랐던 미사일 개발,” 중앙일보, 2015.1.28.  
481 대한민국 역사박물관, 국방과학기술 발전을 이끈 주역들 구술채록사업 결과보고서, 2015 년 12 월, p. 23. 
 165 
diplomatic treaty governed under the United Nations called the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), which restricts member states to develop missiles with an effective range farther than 
180km.482  
5.4. National Level Innovation Systems 
5.4.1. Legislations and Administrative Support Systems of the Aircraft Industry 
Legislative establishments sustained the developmental pattern of aircraft manufacturing. The 
legislative support initiated by Aircraft Manufacturing Program Act of 1961 promulgated by the 
Ministry of Transportation focused on repair and air traffic-control rules. The aircraft industry before 
the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act of 1978 was mostly considered a public service field for managing 
transportation needs instead of a science and technology sector attuned to industrial development.  
Therefore, the supervising agency was initially the Aviation Bureau under the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation. The 1961 Act evolved into the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act, and 
the administrative authorities transitioned into the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in 1978. It was 
in this legislation for the first time when aircraft manufacturing became labeled as a strategic industry 
with objectives to broaden the scope of the country’s S&T competency. Supervisory jurisdiction was 
further transitioned over to the Defense Industry Division of the Machine Industry Bureau under the 
Ministry. The Aircraft Industry Promotion Act evolved over the years into the Aerospace Industry 
Development Promotion Act of 1987 and has been updated to reflect the developmental changes in 
technology and industrial circumstances ever since. 
 
Legislative Intent and Objectives of the Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act (AIDPA) 
The legal basis of aircraft manufacturing until the late 1960’s was the Aircraft Manufacturing 
Program Act, which was first introduced by the Japanese Colonial Government in 1938. This law had 
very restrictive limitations in terms of promoting aircraft manufacturing and development, in which it 
merely administered in-country production certification and licensing procedures to manage safety and 
control transportation in the airspace. There were no subsequent implementing ordinances that 
supported the law, in which the law did not further mature into an institutional system. Thus, the fact 
that the Ministry of Transportation assigned as an implementing agency of this law instead of major 
industrial authorities such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry or the Ministry of National 
Defense shows aircraft manufacturing was not considered a business area.483  
Aircraft manufacturing did not become a serious industrial sector until the mid-70s when the country 
started to initiate a number of self-reliant defense build-up schemes. Enacted in December of 1978, the 
Aircraft   Industry Promotion Act replaced the nominal Aircraft Manufacturing Act of 1961. The 
                                                          
482 엄정식, “미국의 무기이전 억제정책에 대한 박정희 정부의 미사일 개발전략,” 국제정치논총 제 53 집 1 호, 
2013, p. 171.  
483 항공기제조사업법, 1961. 
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declaratory objective was to develop technological capacities sufficient to build an indigenous fighter 
aircraft with state of the art avionics until the mid-1980s.484  
Within the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act, the main effort was concentrated on the 
localization of equipment manufacturing in support of a burgeoning defense industry. The primary 
efforts included aircraft component localization, building foundations for a professional technological 
workforce, financial subsidies to nurture industrial strength, and so forth. Other defense industry related 
promotion acts followed legislation as well. The driving force behind these legislations was to enhance 
the technological capacities for building a sound self-reliant defense industry with hopes to spill over 
into the overall manufacturing industry. Series of companion legislations were introduced during the 
span of ten years with the objective to build an indigenous defense industrial base. Other legislations 
introduced in this category were; Machinery Industry Promotion Act/Shipbuilding Industry Promotion 
Act/Science Education Promotion Act (1967), Steel Industry Promotion Act/Petrochemical Industry 
Promotion Act (1970), Textile Industry Modernization Promotion Act (1979), Electronic Industry 
Promotion Act (1981). However, the aircraft industry was not able to take off on its own compared to 
other industrial sectors, where the technology and infrastructure did not fully grow into a competitive 
and the Promotion Act had to remain as a separate legislation ever since. The supportive legislations of 
other industrial sectors, after having matured into a competitive business enterprise, consolidated into 
the Industrial Development Act in July 1986. Nevertheless, because of the underperforming business 
accomplishments of the aircraft sector in technological and industrial competitiveness, the Aircraft 
Industry Promotion Act continued to remain as a separate legislation.485 
Aerospace became the buzzword of the era in the mid-1980s after the Presidential Candidate 
of the ruling Democratic Justice (Minjeong) Party included aerospace industrial promotion as a 
campaign commitment during the Presidential Election of 1987.486 To support Roh’s campaign strategy, 
the “Special Research Committee for National Development in the New Millennium” under the ruling 
party initiated special initiatives to construct an ‘Aerospace Industry Policy Driving Committee’ in 
February 1986, and passed the bill sponsoring this idea at the National Assembly in December of 1987. 
The legislation consolidated the dispersed government authorities to the Ministry of Commerce, and 
Industry to underscore the importance of aerospace as a technologically intensive business field 
opposed to the previous notion of the industry as a service-providing sector (transportation airlines). 
The bill also included strategies to indigenously develop combat aircrafts until year 2000, and support 
the education of aeronautical scientists and engineers at the university level, including the renowned 
engineering departments of Seoul National, Inha, Korea Aerospace, KAIST, etc.487 
 In order to address the pending challenges in aircraft manufacturing, the Aircraft 
                                                          
484 유경현, “항공기로까지 가는 방위산업,” 동아일보 1978. 1. 9. 
485 임달연, 한국항공우주사, 한국항공대학교 출판부, p. 440. 
486 경향신문, 우주항공개발 적극육성, 경향신문, 1986. 10. 28. 
487 Before the 1987 legislation, aircraft-manufacturing responsibilities were assigned redundantly to public transportation 
authorities and industrial authorities. 매일경제, 2000 년까지 전투기 독자설계, 1987. 10. 1. 
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Manufacturing Act restructured into the Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act (AIDPA) in 
December 1987, with a long term objective to bolster the technological competitiveness of the industrial 
base in par with other business sectors such as in electronics and automobiles. The intent was to 
efficiently sponsor and promote research and development in aerospace related science and 
technological fields to a level capable of contributing to the national economy. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MOCI)488 was assigned the supervisory role to administer the AIDPA. In 
addition to the preceding Aircraft Industry Promotion Act of 1978, the AIDPA included additional 
elements to foster interagency cooperation as well as guiding principles to connect critical collaborative 
networks between the R&D consortia and business enterprises. According to the new Promotion Act of 
1987, the implementing agency shall draft a mid-term development plan that encapsulates government 
assistance in building a sound and competitive aerospace industry, and establish an interagency 
supervisory committee that reviews and determines the growth directions of the industry. Especially, 
the AIDPA legislation sponsored the establishment of a government-run institute in the field of 
aerospace related science and technology. The Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), which used 
to be a research branch under the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials specializing in aeronautics, 
branched out in 2001as a separate entity solely focusing on aerospace policy and engineering.489 The 
AIDPA 1987 also lowered the entry barriers of companies entering the aircraft industry by streamlining 
the corporate registration process from the previous multi-layered procedure into a single effort 
operation. This provision in the Act provided fodder for more corporate investments and motivated new 
entries into the aircraft-manufacturing sector, mostly pertaining to big business conglomerates. This 
action made all business entities with a keen interest in entering the domestic aircraft industry to freely 
join and compete. The AIDPA also streamlined overlapping functions by consolidating different 
verification and validation procedures such as performance tests and quality tests into a single process. 
Previously, performance tests were under the responsibility of MOCI, whereas quality tests were under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Transportation and Construction. The AIDPA placed these two functions 
into a centralized control under the MOCI. In February 1988, as the government labeled the aircraft 
industry as a technological field that can strategically lead the economy into the new millennium, MOCI 
drafted the “Strategies to Reinforce the Competitiveness of Aircraft Manufacturing” as a detailed 
execution plan to implement the AIDPA. Considering the competitive edge of the country still 
maintaining a comparative advantage in cost, the authorities intended to gather experience in business 
deals through building capabilities for original equipment manufacturing (OEM).490 
 Nonetheless, the efforts were easily said than actually done. The enforcement of the AIDPA 
was always compartmentalized and mostly remained declaratory in nature without seeing much tangible 
                                                          
488 Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) later evolved into the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy 
(MOCIE, 1996), Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE, 2008), Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE, 2013). 
489 항공우주산업 개발촉진법 
490 매일경제 88 년 2 월 9 일, 항공부품 OEM 식 생산 2 천년대 수출산업 유도 
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actions in terms of nurturing domestic aircraft manufacturing firms or boosting corporate R&D efforts. 
Authorities did not provide substantial support as stated in the legislative actions or in the pressroom 
when presenting illustrious and flamboyant speeches about the auspicious initiatives programmed for 
the industry’s future. The following section describes some of the major policy initiatives stated in the 
legislation and opposing criticism. 
 
Supporting Institutions of the AIDPA: Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council 
A notable element that differentiates the AIDPA from the previous promotion act was the 
institutionalization of an interagency policy coordination forum at the highest level possible under the 
Presidential monitoring radar called the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council (AIDPC). 
The Council attempted to effectively coordinate the dispersed industrial and technological capacities of 
aircraft manufacturing residing in different government agencies and business sectors. Before the 
AIDPC, there was an ad-hoc interagency coordinating body called the Aircraft Industry Promotion 
Committee, with a primary interest over the localization of the F-16 fighter, first established in May 
1985, which formed the basis of the ADIPC. The purpose of the Committee was to find new business 
areas in aircraft manufacturing after the production of the Korean Air’s F-5E/F fighter concluded in 
1983. The committee was formed by a collaborative effort between the industrial agencies, which 
composed of the Economic Planning Board, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of National 
Defense, and so forth. Government run think tanks and research labs such as the Korea Development 
Institute, Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, Korea Institute of Industrial Economics and Technology, 
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, etc., supported the organization of the Committee. 
The Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Board chaired the committee. 491 Later in 1985, the 
committee gathered into its membership the domestic aircraft industries such as Korean Air, Samsung 
Precision Engineering, Doosan Machinery, and so forth, to develop collaborative strategies for 
promoting the country’s aircraft-manufacturing sector to a higher competitive level in par with global 
standards.492 However, with the growth prospects of aircraft manufacturing based on the significant 
demand-pull initiated from the Eight Major Aircraft Development Programs in the late 1980s, the 
government strongly perceived the need to establish a standing coordinating mechanism that effectively 
incorporated inter-agency differences under a common objective of building a synchronized industrial 
capacity in aircraft manufacturing. Thus, after the legislation of the AIDPA, the ad-hoc construct of the 
committee directly transitioned into the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council. 
The AIDPA of 1987 assigned the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) to draft and 
implement an industrial development masterplan every five years, and provide an intermittent progress 
update to the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council at the end of the calendar year. The 
                                                          
491 매일경제, “정부 항공산업 중점 육성,” 1985.6.21. 
492 매일경제, “재계, 항공산업 공동참여 모색,” 1985.9.19. 
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Prime Minister presides over the Council and gathers fifteen (15) interagency members related to 
industry and S&T responsibilities. The council serves to decide on the industry development masterplan 
drafted by MOCI and mitigate nonperforming program elements within the process of implementing 
the masterplan. The Council has discussed a number of strategic industry development agendas that 
included R&D and manufacturing strategies for rotor wing and fixed wing aircrafts, industrial 
restructuring, international cooperation for technology transfer, and so forth. Below are the key policy 
areas discussed under the auspices of the Council. 
    
Dates Major Agendas 
3 July, 1997 
 
- Development Strategies of the Korean Trainer Experience-2 (KTX-2, T-50)  
- Program Updates of the Midsized Regional Airliner Development 
22 April, 1999 
- Review and Approval of the 1st Aerospace Industry Development Plan 
- Government Support Plan for Aerospace Industry Restructuring  
- KTX-2 Program updates and government subsidization options 
8 January, 2001 - Implementing details of the Aerospace Industry Development Plan - Industry Restructuration Updates and Government Support Plan 
19 March, 2003 - Korea Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) Program Development Strategies (Draft) - KTX-2 System Development Updates and Full-Rate Production Plan 
8 July, 2005 - KMH Program Updates - Prospects of Overseas Exports and Subsequent Marketing Strategies 
21 January, 2010 - Aircraft Industry Development Master Plan (2010~2019) 
8 November, 2010 
- Designation of Ten Core Technology Items and R&D Strategies 
- Development Strategies for Local Clusters and Functional Technologies  
- Updates on Major Aircraft Development Programs 
18 November, 2013 
- Program Updates and Development Strategies of Next Generation Regional Airliner 
- Korea Fighter Experiment (KF-X) Development Strategies (Draft) 
- High Speed Vertical Takeoff and Landing (Tilt Rotor) Unmanned Aircraft  
- Common Development of Light Armed/Commercial Helicopter Program 
Table 25. Agenda Items of the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council, Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Energy 
update to the National Assembly, April 2014. 
 
 The entitlement of the Council came through confusing and inconsistent terms as it evolved 
from various attempts to create control tower over the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. The 
previous attempts to create an Aerospace Industry Planning Group under the President’s Office in the 
mid-80s, and the undertakings to construct a Policy Council under the auspices of the Prime Minister, 
all count to these efforts. The convening of its first meeting was not an easy task either. Despite the 
designation of the Council in the AIDPA of 1987 and its more detailed description in the ensuing 
implementation ordinances of 1990, the first Council meeting was not held until July of 1997 due to the 
difficult accommodating circumstances in and out of the aircraft industry. Perceiving the need to 
establish a powerful coordinating mechanism that should mitigate the overlapping bureaucratic frictions 
and industrial performances, the Presidential Office proposed to establish an Aerospace Industry 
Planning Group in 1990, in support of the AIDPA.493 However, the Planning Group did not materialize 
                                                          
493 In 1990, the Implementing Ordinances of the AIDPA ambitiously stated a very rosy business prospect of the aircraft 
sector, with high hopes that the industry will generate an annual revenue of KRW 9 trillion within the next decade, 
매일경제, 항공산업 참여 적극유도, 1990. 1. 11. 
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until April 1993 when the government included the condition for the Aerospace Industry Planning 
Group in the “New 5-year Economic Development Roadmap” as a companion government project 
formed in conjunction to serve another industrial objective of boosting the domestic automotive 
industry. 494  Nonetheless, the initiative remained declaratory in nature and was not effectively 
implemented to fulfill its original policy objectives. The Council was frequently under criticism by 
various government auditing agencies for simply serving as a figurehead to decorate fashionable 
economic growth aspirations without presenting any concrete plans or effective solutions for industry 
development and promotion. Especially, the assignment of the Prime Minister as the presiding chair of 
the Council contained misleading connotations in various aspects. At the time of its inception, the 
number of interagency coordinating forums chaired by the Prime Minister sprang up like mushrooms 
after rain, accounting for a dozen policy areas including finance, medical, industrial sectors, education, 
and so forth. Thus, the multitude of auxiliary responsibilities, in conjunction with the main profession 
of the Prime Minister, diluted the significance of these interagency forums, including the Aerospace 
Industry Policy Council.495  
 It wasn’t until 1999 after the Asian Financial Crisis when the Council started to work on some 
serious business that had a real impact on the domestic aerospace industry. The second AIDPC meeting 
convened in 22 April 1999 endorsed the Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan and the 
restructuring of the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. It was here where the consolidation and 
divestment of aircraft manufacturing branches of the three Chaebol firms – Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai 
– was resolved into a single corporation called the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). The government 
support packages, including tax breaks, subsidies, and designation as a specialized defense firm for 
aircraft manufacturing, were discussed and voted in this session.496 During the April 1999 session, the 
Council also decided on the additional production of KF-16 aircrafts as an extended effort to sustain the 
production line of the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. The KF-16 additional production was in 
odds with the Air Force’s Fighter eXperiment (FX-I) program. The KF-16 fighter was produced under 
license between Samsung Aerospace and General Dynamics from 1991 to 2000, which later merged 
into Lockheed Martin, whereas the FX-I was the Air Force’s future capability force build-up program 
after the KF-16, which considered foreign procurement instead of indigenous development. After 
concluding the final production of the KF-16 aircraft in 2000, the domestic aircraft-manufacturing 
sector had no further workloads to sustain its production lines before the initiation of the T-50 advanced 
trainer program in 2005. In this regard, the domestic industry was demanding the government to 
manufacture additional KF-16 in order to endure the 5-year production gap between 2000 and 2005. 
Compelled to exercise an austere budget plan under the Asian Financial Crisis, the government was 
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495 임규진, 이용재, “유명무실한 위원회 많다.” 동아일보 1997.4.18. 
496 Minutes adopted from the 22 April 1999 Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council. 
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falling short of options to support both programs.497 Meanwhile, the Ministry of National Defense 
ostensibly welcomed the idea of manufacturing additional KF-16s for sustaining domestic industrial 
infrastructures, but in closed doors behind the scene, it vehemently opposed the allocation of defense 
budgets for this idea. At this time, MND absorbed the largest hit in budget cuts in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, and was determined to defend the remaining allocated budget to execute its 5-
year Midterm Defense Plan. The KF-16 production was introduced as a hot agenda item at the AIDPC. 
Here, the decision was to rebalance the budget from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy 
in support of producing twenty (20) KF-16 aircrafts worth KRW 1 trillion, while the Air Force 
reorganizes its fighter wings to receive the additional aircrafts. The defense budget for the FX-I 
remained intact.498 
 Afterwards, the Council was actively involved in the decision making of major defense 
programs such as the Korea Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) Program, Korea Fighter eXperiment 
(KFX), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs, and so forth. In 2010, the Council played a major role in 
developing the follow-up plan of the 1999 Aerospace Industry Development Framework. The updated 
2010 version highlighted the country’s strategic vision towards upgrading the domestic aerospace 
industry, the development of major aircraft technology areas, and the promotion of local clusters in the 
course of building a robust aircraft-manufacturing sector. Subsequent chapters will further describe the 
programs and initiatives resolved from the Council in more detail. 
 
Supporting Institutions of the AIDPA: Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan 
After the legislation of the AIDPA of 1987, there were efforts to draft a long term roadmap that 
provided guiding principles to foster the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. However, the drafting 
of this document was not materialized until July 1997 when the agenda was discussed during first 
convening meeting of the AIDPC. The agenda was subsequently discussed in an interagency workshop 
in October the same year that invited the stakeholders from industry, GRI, and academia. After a period 
of deliberation, the Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan (hereinafter Framework Plan) 
was endorsed by the Prime Minister in April 1999 during the 2nd AIDPC Plenary Session. 
 The Framework Plan of 1999 was the first documented government initiative to foster the 
domestic aerospace industry, which included the sectors of both aircraft manufacturing and space 
technology. The strategic objective was to upgrade the country’s industrial sectors to a structure suitable 
to assimilate knowledge intensive high-tech business fields. The Plan also served for self-reliant defense 
by localizing the production base of critical defense capabilities associated with military aircrafts such 
as in composite materials, avionics, armaments, aeronautics, propulsion dynamics, and so forth. The 
mid-term objective was to build technological and industrial capacities in maintenance, repair, and 
                                                          
497 최상연, “KF-16 추가 생산 논란,” 중앙일보, 1999.5.13. 
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overhaul (MRO), diversify into commercial aviation manufacturing, and obtain capacities for quality 
control and safety certifications. The suggested timeframe for these objectives took a two phased 
approach, in which followed; 1) 2005 for component localization and industry reorganization; 2) 2015 
for mid-sized regional jetliners and combat aircrafts (fixed and rotor wing). The guidelines for 
consolidating the scattered industrial capabilities into a single corporate entity, which subsequently 
created the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), was raised in companion with the on-going restructuring 
efforts by the Corporate Restructuring Committee under the Financial Supervisory Commission. Lastly, 
bolstering the triple helix of industry-GRI-academia technological partnership through robust 
coordinating networks in the regional industrial belts of Sacheon-Changwon-Gimhae Cluster 
constituted the core of the Framework Plan.499 
 A decade after the 1999 Framework Plan, industrial authorities perceived the need to review 
the outcomes of the Framework Plan and provide a new and upgraded strategic guideline to foster the 
domestic aerospace industry. The successful development of the KT-1 Basic Trainer, T-50 Advanced 
Trainer, KUH Surion Helicopter, and the twofold growth in industrial outputs ($600 million in 1999 to 
$1.3 billion in 2008) triggered the government to follow-up with a more grandiose plan to exploit the 
growing performances of the aircraft industry. In this sense, with a vision and objective to become the 
7th biggest country in aerospace (Global 7), the upgraded 2010 Framework Plan announced four 
strategies and thirteen priority projects to advance the competitive capacities of the industry. Especially, 
the 2010 Framework Plan presented two notable components. One was the designation of 10 core 
technologies in order to boost the competitiveness of the local industry to a competitive level in par 
with global standards. The second component was the building of regional innovation clusters based on 
industrial specialties of each respective region. Interagency coordination and incorporating industrial 
capacities by mapping the technological fields was the implementing instrument to stimulate 
technological development and innovation.500 
 The fostering of 10 core technologies was intrigued by the need to localize critical design and 
components derived from these technologies in order to become a competitive contestant. The 
technologies were generally considered state-of-the-art, for which countries imposed more restrictive 
measures in technology transfers through exercising stronger IPR control. Depending on the distinctive 
characters of each technological fields, the authorities designated the Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
(commercial aviation), Ministry of National Defense (military aircrafts), and Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transportation (aviation safety certification) to effectively manage the development 
efforts.501 
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Technology Systems Core Technologies Implementing Field 
System Integration 1 SC Integrated Design Features High Efficiency Air Vehicle Design Next Generation Eco Friendly Air Vehicle 
Cabin Design  
Convenience  2 UR 
Convenience/Comfort 
Improvement in Cabin 
Noise Reduction 
Ergonomic Design 
Flight Safety Design 3 UR Improved Flight Safety, T&E Technology 
Antifreeze Substance 
Ground Test Equipment for Dynamic System Design 
Airframe Structure 4 UR Composite Materials, Airframe Structure 
Composite Material, Integrated Structure 
Technology 
Advanced Material Components Molding 
Technology 
Avionics/Flight 
Control 
5 UR Next General Avionics IMA Based Avionic System 
Information Fusion Technology 
6 SC Intelligent Autonomous Flight 
Auto-pilot system 
Integrated Flight Control 
7 UR Weapons Integration Armament Integration 
High Performance 
Mechanics/Electrics/ 
Auxiliaries 
8 UR 
Higher Performance  
Subsystems/Auxiliary 
Components 
Higher Performance Landing Gear 
Precision Electric Hydraulic Actuator 
ECS Package 
Air Data Sensor / Integrated Design Architecture 
Fuel System Precision Control 
Hybrid Active Control Rotor System 
High Efficiency/Eco 
Friendly Propulsion 9 SC 
Eco Friendly High 
Efficiency Propulsion 
Multiplex FADEC Technology 
Interlocking Engine Starting System with Gearbox 
High Temperature Turbine Cooling System 
High Performance Eco Friendly Combustion 
Chamber 
High Performance High Powered Electric Propulsion 
System 
Eco Friendly Hybrid Propulsion 
MRO 10 UR Performance Improvement / Overhaul 
Airframe/Component Repair 
Airframe/Cabin Overhaul 
Table 26. Ten Core Aircraft Technology Areas                     SC: Strategic Core, UR: Urgent Requirement                   
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, November 2010 
 
 The building of regional innovation clusters specialized in aircraft manufacturing roamed local 
governments in the early 2000s as part of jumping on the government-driven Balanced Regional 
Development Strategies. The Roh Mu Hyun Administration enacted the Special Act on Balanced 
National Development in 2004 to readdress the economic imbalance between regions and enhance 
regional competitiveness in tandem with the quality of life of local residence by supporting development 
initiatives that fully reflects specific regional strengths. The government designated specialized 
innovation clusters to facilitate the development of these industrial hubs.502 By taking advantage of 
local aircraft manufacturing capacities dispersed in each respective regions, the local governments 
strived to win the government’s designation as an innovation city or become part of the innovation 
cluster. In order to avoid unnecessary competition and redundant investments, the government drafted 
the “Aircraft manufacturing Industry Regional and Functional Development Plan” appended to the 2010 
Framework Plan. 503  The regional plan highlights three developmental phases based on regional 
metropolitan councils divided into specialty areas of aircraft manufacturing, R&D, and MRO. 
                                                          
502 Special Act on Balanced National Development, Korea Legislation Research Institute. 
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Category Location Areas of Specialization Supporting Reasons 
Aircraft 
manufacturing 
Priority Base Gyeongnam Aircraft, Engines, Airframe Production/Export, KAI 
Supporting Base 
Busan Airframe, Materials, Machinery Production/Export, KAL 
Gyeongbuk Avionics Production, electronic cluster 
Jeonbuk Composite Materials Carbon materials, components 
MRO 
Priority Base Busan Commercial, Military KAL Depot Facilities Chungnam Military, Commercial Air Force Depot Facilities 
Supporting Base 
Chungbuk Commercial Cheongju Int’l Airport 
Gyeongnam Military Production/Export, KAI 
Daegu Military Air Force Depot Facilities 
Incheon Commercial Incheon Int’l Airport 
R&D 
Priority Base Daejeon Government R&D GRI infrastructure (ADD, KARI) 
Supporting Base Gyeonggi Corporate R&D 
High caliber research 
workforce 
Jeonam Test & Evaluation Flight Testing Center 
Table 27. Regional Aerospace Industry Development Plans       Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy, November 2010 
 
5.4.2. Aircraft Manufacturing R&D Policies and Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
In the case of big players in global aerospace, a streamlined R&D apparatus that incorporates 
the critical functions of both public and private capacities supports the industry. Such arrangement 
generates optimal synergetic outcomes that enhance competitiveness in the international market. In the 
case of Korea, most of the R&D efforts are state-driven with marginal contributions from the corporate 
sector and university laboratories. However, the national level R&D arrangement in aerospace shows 
substantial overlaps and redundancies, which often becomes a source of systemic coordination 
challenges with duplicative R&D projects programmed under different bureaucratic supervision. 
 
Research Institutions and Regulations 
Korea’s government sponsored research institute for aerospace related technology is 
represented by the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) and the 3rd R&D Institute of the Agency of Defense Development (ADD) under 
the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Corporate R&D also constitutes the third pillar of the 
domestic R&D apparatus. KARI mostly handles commercial aeronautical and space related R&D 
whereas ADD’s 3rd R&D Institute primarily focuses on defense programs.  
 Throughout the process of carrying out aerospace R&D, ADD has contributed the majority of 
capacity building. In the course of conducting basic and applied research, concept formation and 
exploratory development, followed by the actual weapon system development phase of system 
development, ADD acquired critical aircraft-manufacturing infrastructure through building wind 
tunnels for running structural aerodynamic experiments. Based on various experimental database 
composed of empirical codes provided under aid from the United States in the 1970s, ADD launched 
the Aerodynamic Integrated Design Program (AIDP) to start shape designs and measuring fluid 
dynamics for developing missiles and air vehicles. As the only laboratory in the country that owned a 
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wind tunnel test equipment, ADD performed a number of collaborative research with corporate industry 
and other engineering laboratories at local universities. 504  These capacities contributed greatly to 
developing indigenous aircrafts such as the KT-1, T-50, KUH, etc. 
As of 2010, KARI employs a total of 320 scientists and engineers with an annual research budget of 
KRW 70 billion whereas ADD’s 3rd R&D Institute employs around 500 scientists and engineers with 
an annual research budget around KRW 300 billion. Therefore, the total manpower in government 
sponsored research pool entirely dedicated to aeronautical engineering is about 800 with an annual 
budget of KRW 370 billion.505 This level is comparatively smaller in scale than other second tiered 
countries in aerospace R&D. Therefore, a well streamlined concentrated effort across each sector of the 
public sphere that incorporates the business sector and university level academia is imperative to 
productively employ scarce public resources. 
 However, despite the comparatively small scale in R&D investment, the efforts to mobilize 
such limited resources are unsynchronized and not well-coordinated into a coherent fashion. The efforts 
are mostly dispersed between KARI and ADD, which precludes the concentrated potentials of 
government research productivities. Most of the research projects conducted under these two agencies 
appear to have overlaps in infrastructure and facilities (85%), equipment (82%), technology (61%), and 
manpower (60%).506 Government R&D in aerospace conducted in other contending tiered countries 
such as Brazil, Taiwan, and Sweden are sponsored under a single state-led entity, which allows those 
countries to contrive consistent efforts in developing complex aeronautical outcomes. In the Korean 
case, there are a number of government entities that share a vested interest in the aerospace sector – in 
addition to the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Science and Technology, other public 
entities such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and 
Transportation, the Meteorological Administration, and so forth. Most of the public R&D launched 
from these agencies are not well coordinated with each other, which is the cause of the serious overlaps 
and redundant spending in government resources. In this regard, the intervention and adjudication of a 
national level coordination body would’ve been deeply appreciated in the course of preventing such 
wasteful spending in duplicate programs. As a matter of fact, based on the Aerospace Industry 
Development Promotion Act of 1989, the Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council (AIDPC) 
was chartered to effectively carry out this coordinating role amongst the stakeholders in aeronautical 
sciences. In addition to the AIDPC, competing priorities in national S&T projects should be mitigated 
through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). Unfortunately, neither of these two 
coordinating forums effectively performs its adjudicating role in aerospace related R&D projects. In the 
meantime, the institutional arrangement in the national S&T regime still instigates each respective 
                                                          
504 안동만, “ADD 의 연구개발과 국내 항공우주공항(산업)의 발전,” 항공우주학회지, 제 28 권 제 8 호, 2000, p. 
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government agencies to go separate ways in aerospace R&D projects. The Act on Special Measures for 
Defense Industry justifies and sponsors military projects managed under the auspices of the Midterm 
Defense Plan by the military sector (MND and DAPA). The Framework Act on Science and Technology 
allows the S&T apparatus to go its own way under the terms of the Mid-Long Term National Aerospace 
Plan. Dual use technologies related with aircraft-manufacturing is jointly managed by MND, MOTIE, 
and MOST based on the Civil-Military Technology Development Promotion Act. However, these 
legislations impedes inter-agency coordination, and justifies each government entity receiving separate 
R&D funding under less coordinated supervision.507 
 The less motivated commitment of the aerospace R&D workforce and their tendency to move 
into other promising business sectors is also a growing concern in improving the technological 
competitiveness in this sector as well. The mode of technology transfers from the two GRIs is facilitated 
through technology transfer centers ran by these organizations. However, the overall performance of 
these technology transfer activities does not sufficiently fulfill public expectations. According to a 
recent audit report conducted by the Korea Research Council of Public Science and Technology over 
the technology transfer performances of KARI, organizational efforts to transfer technology to private 
industry were rated inadequate and lacked any structural contents throughout the transfer process. KARI 
had no designated branch that supervises the technology transfer process, at which most of the transfer 
details are negotiated directly by the project offices. ADD had a designated organization called the 
Civil-Military Technology Cooperation Center that handled technology transfers and 
commercialization projects with local industries and universities, thus was rated better in performances 
than KARI in this aspect. However, both organizations were charging excessive amounts of royalty fees 
to private corporations over the application of publically sponsored R&D projects. The fixed royalty 
fee estimates is about 40% of the technology development costs, which makes technology transfer 
unaffordable to small and medium enterprises.508 Also, the two organizations appeared to show less 
enthusiasm in registering technology patents against independent publications. As stated in previous 
chapters, patents are considered an important component that facilitates technology transfer and 
diffusion while preserving the property rights of the original developer. Meanwhile, in the case of public 
research outputs from ADD in 2004, out of the KRW 41.6 billion invested by the government in basic 
research, ADD researchers avidly published 394 research papers in academic journals, while registered 
only 35 patents.509 The motivations of ADD researchers actively seeking publication opportunities in 
individual academic journals were broadly based on the intent to find university professorships in local 
colleges. The degrading treatment of ADD researchers compared to the social treatment offered in 
university professorships was the main cause of such research patterns.510  
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 Government regulations for managing aircraft manufacturing R&D programs mostly refer to 
the Defense Acquisition Management Regulation, but in some prominent programs such as the T-50 
Advanced Trainer or Korea Utility Helicopter Program, a separate and more specific regulation is 
enacted through legislation to serve for each program’s objective. Regulations for research and 
development were not completely established until the early 2000s. Before initiating the indigenously 
developed KT-1 Basic Trainer Program, most of the in-country aircraft manufacturing programs were 
license productions, in which most of the development technologies introduced from advanced foreign 
sources were already proven by global standards. Thus, critical development phases regarding test and 
evaluation in previous aircraft manufacturing programs was neglected and not fully inserted into the 
transitioning phases from concept development to production. In this regard, the technologies utilized 
for the KT-1 Program entered into the aircraft production phase without being fully tested and certified. 
 During the Full-rate Production Phase of the KT-1 Basic Trainer Program, there were a number 
of confusion and complications caused by vague and less established regulations in government led 
R&D programs throughout the years of 2000-2004. The problem occurred in the phase transitioning 
from Prototyping to Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), where the program development matrix did 
not clearly define the authorities and decision point to enter into LRIP. With the intent to deliver the 
KT-1 trainer early to the ROKAF, the authorities skipped LRIP and directly entered into Full Rate 
Production. Thus, a number of problems caused by less conformed technology and insufficiently tested 
systems led into significant periods of program delays and cost increases, which resulted in changing 
the design features of the aircraft in multiple occasions. In order to avoid the earlier mistakes made from 
the KT-1 Program, the Bureau of Audit and Inspection (BAI) recommended overhauling the Defense 
Acquisition Management Regulation to specify the detail procedures of T&E and the transition to full 
rate production in the R&D phases of aircraft manufacturing programs.511     
In this regard, insufficient authorities to effectively wage inter/intra-agency coordination efforts 
consequently resulted in the sectoral deficiency in system integration technologies. The aircraft 
manufacturing sector has accumulated acceptable knowledge and experience in building various 
military aircrafts throughout the short thirty-year history of license production and component 
localization. However, the integration of advanced avionics, weapon system mechanics, and 
aerodynamic applications add substantial layers of complexity into the country’s desire to become a 
major contender in the global aerospace market. The government, especially the Agency of Defense 
Development, claims to obtain the requisite technological capacities to build this mission equipment 
for aircraft manufacturing. But reality kicks in where workshop level coordination falls increasingly 
insufficient when attempting to create collaborative arrangements for these matters. ADD has been 
severely criticized for keeping these technological assistance to itself while being inherently reluctant 
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to provide the needed technological assistance to industries.512  
 
Defense Offset Trade: Primary Vehicle for Technology Transfer, Diffusion, and Knowledge 
Accumulation 
During the initial years of its execution in the 1980s, defense offsets was a principal vehicle to 
sustain the defense industry via securing production deals from foreign defense contracts. Thus, the 
majority of the efforts were concentrated in concluding on subcontracts for outsourcing production of 
aircraft parts and components. In the following decade, the national objective focused on the 
acquirement of advanced technology to indigenously develop major weapon systems such as the 
supersonic advanced trainer aircraft (KTX-2: T-50 Development). In this sense, the majority of the 
acquirement efforts through defense offsets not only focused on introducing fighter capability, but also 
concentrated on acquiring aeronautical technology to bolster the aircraft-manufacturing sector. Offset 
arrangements for defense exports were very rare during this period. Defense exports were included as 
a negotiation subject only after the new millennium when the domestic industry started to pursue 
international markets to expand its business operations.513 
In an overall effort of capacity building, defense offsets were proportionately concentrated in 
the acquisition of core technology (48%), defense exports (32%), and the acquisition of equipment and 
components (20%). However, corresponding to the complexity and sensitivities of high technology, 
foreign firms have been reluctant to transfer technologies through offset trade arrangements, at which 
foreign governments also imposed restrictive control measures in transferring high tech knowledge. 
Thus, recent trends in offset trade alternatively focused on combining core technology acquisition and 
defense exports through manufacturing critical components for overseas exports. Such practices present 
opportunities in easy market access for firms, but embodies repercussions in terms of favoritism in 
vendor selection. Also, in case the technology recipient firm does not follow up with continuous 
technology development efforts, the technology transfer deal may end up as a one-off event.514 The 
following section describes offset trade cases that contributed to capacity building for the aircraft 
manufacturing sector. 
Unit: $ million 
Total Technology Acquisition 
Subcomponents Equipment/Component 
Acquisition Subtotal Defense Products Commercial Products 
14,644 
(100%) 
7,045 
(48%) 
4,703 
(32%) 
3,129 
(21%) 
1,574 
(11%) 
2,896 
(20%) 
 Table 28. Defense Offsets by Type                      Source: DAPA Acquisition Planning Bureau documents, 2011. 
 
 In the subject of technology acquisition through defense offsets, the priority was focused on 
acquiring core technologies in areas of configuration design, flight performance analysis techniques, 
and key design phases in building concepts and structure. The aggregation of technology transfers 
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acquired from various aircraft related offset programs, ranging from license production of KF-16 
fighters, UH-60 medium lift helicopter, and a number of avionics modules and components, contributed 
to building technological capacities in this aspect. The primary beneficiary from this defense offset 
arrangement were government research institutes, notably the Agency of Defense Development (ADD).  
 
Program Acquisition type Technology Acquired Application 
KF-16 License Production 
Applied into KTX-2 Advanced Supersonic 
Trainer (T-50) 
Conceptual and preliminary design technologies 
Test, evaluation, and interpretation skills 
Quality assurance in component manufacturing 
Direct application into KTX-2 
development considering 
technology data for system design 
and component manufacturing. 
Hawk-67 
Advanced 
Trainer 
Direct Purchase 
Design technology for wing design 
Software development knowhow for flight 
simulation 
System design and integration work 
in designing and manufacturing 
wings, aerodynamics for flight 
simulation 
CN-235 
Transporter Direct Purchase 
Composite materials, airframe structure design  
Conceptual design for flight control systems 
Cooperative R&D relationship 
established with Spain CASA 
P-3C 
Surveillance 
Aircraft 
Direct Purchase Wind tunnel simulator manufacturing technology 
KTX-1, KTX-2 preliminary design 
and wind tunnel test 
UH-60 
Helicopter 
License 
Production 
Various display devices, design technology for 
mission hardware and software 
Localization of display devices, 
KTX-1 avionics 
Tactical 
Avionics Direct Purchase 
Design technology on electronic antenna 
Electronic wave transmission/receiver and 
remote control design technology 
Direct application into KTX-1 
avionics design and integration 
Table 29. Technology Acquisition through Defense Offsets 
 
The KF-16 offset originally started from the license production deal concluded between 
General Dynamics and Samsung Aerospace in aircraft structure, and Pratt & Whitney and Samsung 
Aerospace in engine structure. The manufacturing technology for aircraft components and parts had 
collateral influence in broadening the production capacity of the domestic industry in terms of 
technology accumulation and manufacturing skills. The technology and manufacturing experience 
acquired from the KF-16 offset program had direct contribution to the KTX-2 advanced trainer (T-50) 
program. The technology acquired from the defense offset arrangement of the Hawk-67 Advanced 
Trainer Program was in wing shape design, which facilitated the conceptual design and system 
development process in the aircraft wing sector of the KTX-2 program. The technological knowhow 
for composite materials and advanced composite structure was acquired from the partnership 
established between CASA and ADD from the CN-235 program. These were the representative offset 
cases that had substantial impact on technology acquirement for the fixed wing sector.515 
The by-products of defense offset were the learning and production opportunities conferred in 
component manufacturing and depot maintenance. Contrary to defense offsets in technology acquisition, 
which mostly benefited government research institutes, offset arrangements in component 
manufacturing and depot maintenance mostly benefited technology competitiveness of defense 
industries or depot maintenance capacities of military services. Between a stretch of a decade until the 
early 2000s, defense offsets generated around $900 million worth of overseas export deals, which 
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created approximately 11,500 jobs in domestic manufacturing. Improved capacities in domestic depot-
level maintenance have assigned critical maintenance needs that would’ve otherwise been awarded to 
overseas repair work to domestic depots run by the respective military services. Such condition 
substantially shortened cyclical lead time in repair and overhaul routines for military aircrafts, which 
saved cost and set conditions to perfecting technological expertise.516 
 
Program Technology Acquired Application Beneficiary 
LYNX 
Helicopter 
Design and production technology 
for landing gears 
Landing gear design for KF-16, UH-60, 
KTX-1, and overseas exports of $64M Hyundai WIA 
CN-235 
Transporter Cabin elevator for Airbus A-320 Import substituting effect of $60 million 
Hankuk Fiber 
Glass 
AH-1S Attack 
Helicopter 
Component production worth 
$58M 
Aluminum extruded material certified for 
exports ($13M worth) 
Samsung 
Techwin, DHI 
P-3C 
Surveillance Outer wing production technology Overseas export worth $27.8 million KAI, KAL 
HARPY UAV Avionics and engines Test equipment and depot maintenance technology Air Force 
UH-60 
Helicopter 
Assembly drawings of CT7/T700 
engines, technical documents for 
repair and maintenance 
License for CT7/T700 depot maintenance 
(applied to KTX-1/2), overseas export of 
$83M 
Samsung 
Techwin, KAL 
C-130 
Transporter 
Test and assembly work for 
engines, repair technology for 
propeller and transmission, repair 
technology over 70 types 
Improved repair and overhaul capabilities Air Force 
Air Combat 
Maneuvering 
Instrumentation 
S/W source code, technical data for 
depot maintenance Armament related avionics Air Force 
Electronic 
Countermeasure  
Technical data for depot 
maintenance Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ) Air Force 
KF-16 airframe 
Technical data for depot 
maintenance, wing shape 
production 
Aircraft repair and maintenance work, 
$79M worth overseas export 
Air Force, 
Samsung 
Techwin,  
KF-16 engines 
Technical data for depot 
maintenance, investment casting 
technology 
F-100-229 repair and maintenance work, 
overseas export worth $34M 
Air Force, 
Samsung 
Techwin, Kor-
Lostwax 
Table 30. Defense Offsets for Component Manufacturing and Depot Maintenance 
 
F-15K Offset Program 
The F-15K offsets embody significant implication to the conventional wisdom on offset trade 
as well as to the overall governance structure of international technology transfers through defense 
offsets. Therefore, it was worth describing the F-15K offset portion as a separate section to review the 
details of the technology transfers, government policy, interagency coordination, and so forth.  
The initial phase of offset trade negotiations concluded in December 2000, but the defense 
authorities abruptly changed the offset criterion by including technology transfers to prepare for the 
indigenous development of the Korean Fighter Experiment (KFX). Afterwards, in early 2001, the 
program management office included secondary requirements for technology transfers that considered 
advanced avionics, aeronautical engineering, armaments, system integration design and technology, and 
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so forth.517 The defense acquisition authorities applied a 70% rate in defense offset during the F-15K 
defense offset negotiations, increased from the former 30% rate, in order to acquire core technology 
and advanced manufacturing skills. The offset percentage against aircraft procurement eventually 
increased to 85%, which accounted for nearly $3.5 billion in dollar value. In a general sense, the defense 
offset trade obtained from the F-15K program alone acquired technologies and equipment in avionics, 
armaments, weapon control, flight control, etc., with a transfer value worth $1.5 billion.518 In terms of 
component manufacturing, the offset volume secured a collaborative production volume of nearly $1.4 
billion in value, which provided for over eight years’ worth of production contracts with an additional 
employment effect of 300,000 jobs. Lastly, to facilitate a fluent follow-up support in logistics and depot 
maintenance work, the offset arrangement provided a workload of $573 million in engine, plating, and 
structure reinforcement.519 
One representative technology where a domestic firm obtained international recognition and 
became a critical part in the global supply chain was in digital imagery displays. LIG Nex1 acquired 
both critical technology and subcontract production licenses to manufacture Head Up Displays (HUD) 
from the U.S. avionics giant Rockwell Collins through the F-15K offset program. The case is a 
representative example where domestic defense firms acquired critical technology in parallel with 
production subcontracts as a buy-back deal generated through defense offset arrangements. Based on 
the initial offset deal arranged in 2003, LIG Nex1 obtained the requisite production technology and 
secured a workload of 42 HUD sets delivered to the Air Force until 2007. Furthermore, after learning 
from the production experience, LIG Nex1 qualified all quality tests required from Rockwell Collins 
and became designated as a regional supply partner for HUD sets. This was a combined result of 
government efforts to acquire technology through defense offsets as well as firm level endeavors to 
enhance competitiveness by investing in equipment, facilities, and further compliance with product 
quality and management conditions. 520 Afterwards, LIG Nex1 received full contract awards from 
Rockwell Collins and secured an export volume of 156 HUDs in total until 2013. 
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Subject Transfer Technology Subject Transfer Technology 
Flight Control Fly-by-Wire Integrated Servo Actuator  System 
Design/ 
Integration 
Electronic Mock-up and Weight 
Systems 
RAM Analysis 
Systems engineering 
Weight System Prediction 
Avionics/ 
Weapon Control 
Head Up Display 
Mission Computer 
Data-Link 
S/W Design 
NVIS Test Equipment 
Interference Blanking Unit and Radio 
Aerodynamics Flight Performance High Angle Aerodynamics 
Structural 
Design 
Smart Structure Design 
Damage Assessment 
Molding Composite Materials Design 
Armaments 
1. System Integration 
2. Launcher Technology 
3. Air-to-Air Missile 
Propulsion 
System 
Electronic Engine Control Device 
Engine Air Intake Design/T&E 
Small Engine Design 
Gas Turbine Engine Design Test & Evaluation 
EMI/EMC Equipment/Technology 
Environmental Equipment/Technology 
Telemetry System Design Total 27 Technical Subjects 
Table 31. Technology Transfers through Offsets from F-15K Program  
Source: 2014 DAPA Updates to the National Assembly 
 
The Korean Government has been asserting that the substantial volume of technology transfers 
acquired through the F-15K Offset Program has upgraded the technological and manufacturing level of 
the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector sufficient enough to produce a combat aircraft commensurate 
to an F-16 fighter.521 However, the exact degree of learning skills required to absorb the transferred 
knowledge, and translate such knowledge into a new engineering design concept to develop an 
indigenous capability is still in question.522 Starting in the fall of 2014, the failure to acquire critical 
technology through another defense offset trade from the third round F-X Program (F-35A) for the 
indigenous develop of the Korea Fighter Experiment (KF-X) has ignited another layer of controversies 
over the technological competitiveness of the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. Comparing the 
political discourse between 2004, where the government claimed the F-15K program successfully 
negotiated technology transfer deals through offset that far exceeded the initial objective, and 2014, 
where the government fell under intense criticism for not obtaining the adequate skillsets to properly 
 
Technology Standardization in Aircraft Manufacturing  
Because of the vast numbers of components, modules, and systems, along with the sensitivities 
in terms of quality assurance for aviation safety measures, only approved materials and components 
that went through proven certification processes by publicly recognized authorities are allowed for 
usage in aircraft manufacturing. In this aspect, the scope of aircraft certification covers the entire life 
cycle of design, manufacturing, and operation. ISO/TC 20 (International Organization of Standards 
Technical Committee on Aircraft and Space Vehicles) administers the global technology standards in 
materials, components, and equipment related with the manufacturing of aircrafts and space vehicles. 
The expected outcomes of technology standardization through implementing the ISO/TC20 standards 
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consequently advance into cost reduction and enhanced production efficiency. The technical standards 
applied across relevant manufacturing sectors enable better quality control in supplied commodities, 
which reduces operating costs in areas of de sign and manufacturing activities. Additionally, unified 
standards saves significant money in repair and maintenance costs throughout the operating cycle of a 
product between different manufacturers in each respective countries.523 
As a late comer in aircraft manufacturing, technology standardization and certification systems 
in Korea did not come into fruition until the mid-1980s when the country started license manufacturing 
F-5E/F fighters and UH-60 helicopters. Government directed efforts on technology standardization 
propelled the standardization process over the aircraft-manufacturing sector. The establishment of 
Korean Industrial Standards (KS) in the 1970s facilitated quality improvement in Korean manufactured 
products, which enhanced product compatibility towards international standards, substantially 
increased industrial exports overseas, and further upgraded the technological competitiveness of the 
domestic economy. At this point, Korea adopted most of its early stage technology standards from the 
Japanese Industrial Standards, and re-engineered it suitable into Korean standards. The Korean Agency 
for Technology and Standards under MOTIE administers the KS certifications. On the other hand, the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) administers the technical standards and 
certification on aircrafts and associated components. 
The standardization process in aircraft manufacturing was initiated in 1975 by an academic 
forum called the Korean Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences (KSAS) where the organization 
shared the workload with other industrial entities. Standardization processes were primarily assigned to 
the Aviation Subcommittee under the Industrial Standards Council, which updates and verifies the KS 
engineering standards every five years. The main responsibilities and tasks of the Subcommittee are as 
follows.524 
 
• Standardization of Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Work 
• Localization of Aircraft Parts and Components 
• Establish Foundations for Aircraft Assembly and Manufacturing 
• Promote Indigenous Development 
 
 MOTIE and the MOLIT share the chairmanship of the Aviation Subcommittee, and is 
supported by experts appointed from corporate industry and academia. The inspection criterion of 
standard parts is stipulated by law reflected from internationally compatible standards, which is 
thoroughly implemented in various international trade and transactions. Especially, technically 
advanced countries strongly assert other countries and manufacturers to provide safety confirmation 
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documentations that comply with Aircraft Certification Systems (ACS). Standard parts in this system 
refer to those certified under a nationally accredited institution that requires the highest level of 
reliability and safety. The United States sets the international technical standards through the Federal 
Aviation Administration. European countries also follow the U.S. standards as well. It is only through 
this approval process where aircraft parts and components become officially certified onto international 
standards.  As a late starter in aircraft manufacturing technology, Korea has been complying with the 
technical standardization orders of the United States since 1993 as reflected within the Inspection 
Criteria for Aircraft Standard Parts administered by Korean Agency for Technology and Standards.525 
 Based on the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, all countries under contract 
with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) must establish its own institutional 
framework to enforce internationally agreed standards and recommended practices regarding the 
certification requirements for airworthiness standards.526 The certification process include the entire 
life cycle of an aircraft system including Type Certification (Design Phase) – Production Certification 
(manufacturing phase), airworthiness certification (operational phase). Korea implements the 
international norms and regulations of civil aviation through the Aviation Act and its implementing 
ordinances, as well as other associated laws and regulations such as the Aviation Safety Act and Military 
Aircraft Airworthiness Certification Act. The Korea Aerospace Research Institute performs the quality 
certification piece whereas MOLIT conducts the airworthiness certification process. 
 
 
Figure 19. Aircraft Certification Process 
  
However, most of the component manufacturers in Korea consists of small and medium sized 
firms that do not hold an effective quality management system. These firms lack an integrated control 
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structure that effectively accumulates the requisite knowledge and experience for capacity building in 
this field.527 
 Another critical part of standardization in aircraft manufacturing is airworthiness certification. 
Airworthiness attests the suitability of an aircraft for safe flight, in which the certification process is 
conducted by the national aviation authority respectively. Airworthiness certifications in military 
aircrafts were relatively lenient compared to the civilian aviation sector. Safety standards and technical 
specifications on military aircrafts were domestically oriented, at which public perspectives over the 
need to pay attention to global standards considering overseas export opportunities remained marginal. 
The motivation to establish airworthiness started in 2008 when the Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) 
successfully negotiated the export of KT-1 Basic Trainers to the Turkish and Indonesian Air Force. In 
the meantime, the Turkish Air Force demanded documentations for airworthiness certifications of the 
KT-1 before concluding the contract.528 From thereon, the defense acquisition authorities rushed into 
creating airworthiness certification standards through collaborating with existing government 
institutions and international networks. 
 In order to address the standardized certification needs, the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA) legislated on 1 August 2009, the Military Aircraft Airworthiness Certification 
Act, followed by its Enforcement Decree the same day. DAPA organizes the Deliberative Committee 
on Airworthiness Certification that gathers the expertise from the military MOLIT, R&D, academia, 
and so forth to coordinate policy, certification criterion, airworthiness planning and validation, 
interagency mitigation, and so forth. 529  In accordance with established laws and regulations, the 
government assigned the Air Force as the supervisory agency that administers standard airworthiness 
certifications on military aircrafts. Additionally, the Air Force and Defense Agency for Technology and 
Quality are assigned as specialized organizations that review functional details in areas of aircraft 
structural design, analysis, verification, compatibility, and other support areas. The technical basis of 
airworthiness certification standards derives from the U.S. DoD’s MIL-HDBK-516 airworthiness 
criteria.530 
 Whatsoever, the short gestation period to build a competent standardization institution 
consequently constructed a system that needs some serious reorganization efforts. Different certification 
authorities in technology standards and airworthiness between MOLIT, MOTIE, and DAPA created 
inconsistencies in interagency policy formulation and coordination challenges in constructing a 
competitive aircraft-manufacturing sector. The structure of the defense acquisition system restricts a 
clear coordinative relationship between defense acquisition apparatus and the operations and 
sustainment component. DAPA is the designated authority for defense industrial standards, but DAPA’s 
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administrative authorities in defense program management does not extend to product support 
management, which is within the defined area of expertise considering the operations and sustainment 
phase administered by the military services. Industrial standards and airworthiness certification should 
effectively cover the entire life cycle of the aircraft, but DAPA’s limited authorities in military aircraft 
standardization only covers less than 30% of the total life cycle cost. 531  Such difficulties create 
challenges in building most up-to-date certification standards. 
Based on a 2011 survey performed over the industrial standards of the aerospace industry, about 
18.8%, or 98 items, of aerospace industrial standards were deemed incompatible to international 
criterions. Without sufficing international standards, it would be extremely challenging for the 
respective product group to become marketable in international transactions. For instance, about 5% of 
the Korean Industrial Standards in aircraft technology applied Japanese Industrial Standards. However, 
approximately 13 technical items were considered obsolete, and were already eliminated from the 
Japanese Industrial Standards. 532  Therefore, without updating the Korean Industrial Standards in 
aerospace to international criterion, the domestic industry will continue to import foreign products 
against domestic products. 
As discussed in previous chapters, however, poorly coordinated interagency R&D programs 
and certification standards demonstrate insufficient government staffing in high profiled national 
defense projects. Especially, the consequences of constant overlaps and redundancies between military 
and commercial programs in aircraft manufacturing eventually resulted in inefficient spending of 
government resources while contributing marginally into innovation or technological development. 
Airworthiness and safety certification efforts were no way different from these instances. Airworthiness 
and safety certifications require a total life cycle management approach, which encompasses major life 
cycle components in development, production, and deployment. However, the reality show policy 
disconnects and unstructured performances in interagency coordination levels. In early 2016, the 
auditing agency revealed that a number of aviation safety projects launched by MOLIT did not go 
through proper feasibility reviews and did not comply with existing national standards established by 
MOTIE. Thus, substantial amounts of the taxpayer’s money, surmounting about KRW 390 billion, were 
wasted in inadequately examined programs. The worst case example was the employment of the 
Advanced-Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS), which is a combination of 
systems displaying actual airport traffic for airport controllers. The near KRW 20 billion invested in 
building up the system was wasted due to the system not complying with domestic and international 
standards.533 
Despite the amount of government funding provided for manufacturing military aircrafts, 
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insignificant accomplishments in indigenous technology development resulted in immaterial 
construction of technology standards. Most of the technology standards developed from military aircraft 
production were merely measurements for functional components, thus considered as technology 
descriptions or specifications instead of actual certifiable technology standards. The standards 
established by aircraft manufacturing companies were used for firm level internal usage that did not 
have close linkages to national standards. Most Korean aircraft manufacturing firms showed low 
enthusiasm in either utilizing or developing indigenous standards. The overarching cause of such slow 
progress in building a viable technology standard system is due to the matter of the domestic industry 
mostly relying on technology and components imported from foreign sources. High percentage of 
domestic companies is subcontracted by major global aerospace giants such as Boeing, Pratt and 
Whitney. In this regard, it makes more sense for domestic firms to comply with firm specific standards 
used by these global firms in order to sustain its business operations instead of contributing to the 
development of domestic standards.534 
The existing Aviation Safety Act also conflicts with the operation of the indigenously developed 
KUH-Surion helicopter employed in non-military sectors including public usage by the government. 
Only the National Police is allowed to operate two KUH-Surion helicopters for surveillance and 
transport missions. This was made possible because the end-use purpose of the NPA helicopters was 
considered an extended function of routine military duties. The cause of the problem originates from 
different airworthiness standards implemented by DAPA (military) and the MOLIT (commercial), 
which are not interchangeable to each other. The only case permitted for an interchangeable solution 
within the boundaries of current law is when the two different entities participate in a joint fashion 
during the initial design phase of the aircraft. If not, then it would be almost impossible to accredit the 
KUH-Surion helicopter under commercial standards. 
Certification of radio communication equipment onboard the aircraft is also subject to different 
safety standards as well. Radio communication equipment validated by military standards are allowable 
in military, police, and coast guard helicopters, but prohibited in other public sector utilities such as in 
forestry or firefighting because of differences in safety standards. On the contrary, radio equipment 
introduced from foreign sources are qualified in both military and commercial standards. The different 
safety standards and certification methods in air worthiness and radio communication prevents the 
ROKG to fully exploit both domestic and international markets that should sustain and further expand 
the production capability of the ROK domestic aircraft industry.535 Korea is ranked the 7th largest holder 
of military helicopters and 35th in commercial helicopters. Projection of the domestic helicopter market 
for the next twenty years, considering the replacement cycle of the current helicopter fleet, is between 
a 60-80 demand pull of rotor wing aircrafts to fulfill various purposes. Thus, without any significant 
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legislative changes made to the current law, then the Korean public sector will inevitably have to 
purchase helicopters from foreign sources instead from its domestic industrial capacities. This is the 
result of insufficient policy coordination among government agencies and pure negligence of due 
diligence despite the fact the issue has been raised by various players throughout the development of 
the aircraft. 
 
5.5. Structural Constraints  
 
Because of the small scale and constraints in building technological capacities, a strong and consistent 
government industrial policy over aircraft manufacturing was critical. However, government policy 
decisions in this sector constantly suffered from indecisiveness and inconsistencies, which obstructed 
the aircraft-manufacturing sector from building the required foundational capacities.  
 
5.5.1. Indecisiveness and Inconsistencies in Government Defense Acquisition Policies 
During the early phases of the Aircraft Industry Development Promotion Act of 1978, the 
government directives were to select a handful of major business conglomerates with specialized 
manufacturing assignments as an ingredient to nurture technological competitiveness and corporate 
capacities. In this aspect, Korean Air was assigned primarily with airframe manufacturing and Samsung 
Aerospace was assigned with engines. However, with the industry growing and diversifying in scale 
and scope, in addition to new entrants into the domestic market, the assignment was rearranged based 
on the Specialization and Systematization Act. After the astonishing turnaround of Samsung Aerospace 
being awarded the KF-16 license production program in the summer of 1991, the specialization 
construct was reframed as Samsung Aerospace for fixed wing fighter aircrafts, Korean Air with 
helicopters, and Daewoo Heavy Industries with light rotor wings.536 This arrangement was revisited in 
1993 as Samsung Aerospace was awarded to manufacture the T700 engine for the UH-60 Batch-II 
program. Initially, the Batch-I program was awarded to Korean Air, where the company manufactured 
both airframes and engines under license from Sikorsky and General Electric. But the Ministry of 
National Defense abruptly changed the engine manufacturer to Samsung Aerospace in November 1993 
for the second batch program. The primary reason was to consolidate all aircraft engine manufacturing 
programs under a unified company (Samsung Aerospace and its subcontractors) to cut costs and to 
better implement the specialization and systematization policies with a long-term product life cycle 
perspective considering improved efficiencies in repair and maintenance work.  
At first, the engine manufacturing work for the Batch-II program was to continue the Batch-I 
contract between Korean Air and General Electric, which was to manufacture 81 engines for the Army’s 
Heavy Helicopter Program. Samsung Aerospace participated as a subcontractor for Korean Air during 
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the Batch-I engine program and was able to localize the production of 16 components.537 Apparently, 
Korean Air challenged the new contract arrangement over engine manufacturing and refused to hand 
over the technological skills and experiences transferred from General Electric during the Batch-I 
program, claiming that Korean Air already invested about KRW 15.2 billion with a program 
achievement of localizing 36% of the T700 engine. In order for Samsung to enter into a new technology 
assistance agreement with General Electric, there would be about KRW 10 billion in unnecessary 
program costs incurred from redundant investments.538 On the other hand, the counter-argument from 
Samsung and the Ministry was that Samsung already obtained the requisite technological readiness 
levels from the experiences of manufacturing and maintaining over 2,000 engines the past 16 years. 
Also, Samsung disputed the original contract that awarded Korean Air to manufacture the T700 engines 
defied the essential principles of Specialization and Systematization in the first place. Therefore it was 
highly necessary to restore this construct for better efficiency purposes.539 The cause of such confusion 
and unnecessary cost increase was the inconsistencies in policy making from the defense acquisition 
authorities. Also, the underperforming coordination mechanism between the Ministry of National 
Defense and Ministry of Commerce and Industry is believed to have substantially attributed to such 
turmoil as well. 
The Korean F-4 Phantom-II Upgrade (KPU) Program was another case where indecisiveness, 
inconsistencies, and poor interagency coordination work of public authorities emerged as causes of 
major business losses and developmental setbacks. The development of the program in 1989 originated 
from the need to improve aircraft performance and life cycle extension of the Korean Air Force’s F-
4D/E Phantom Fighter before the final delivery of the KF-16 fighter. The first batch of F-4D/E 
Phantoms were delivered to Korea in 1969, so the aircrafts were already reaching close to the end of its 
lifespan in the late 1980s. The program objective was to improve avionics, armaments, and structural 
reinforcements to a performance level equivalent to the F-16 with a durable lifespan until 2012 for 
retirement. The role model of the KPU was the German F-4 ICE upgrade performed by DASA, which 
included the installation of the AN/APG-66 radar and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles.540 The program 
was raised by the Agency of Defense Development and not the Air Force. ADD’s perspective was to 
utilize the KPU Program as a stepping stone to follow the regular learning path for late comers as it 
provided opportunities to gather knowledge from tech transfer deals and system upgrade experience. 
On the contrary, the Air Force strongly pushed for modernization programs instead of extending the F-
4’s service life. Considering the F-16 program (KFP) still under progress at the time, the Air Force did 
not want to divert the resources into the KPU.541 Also, the Air Force favored a more advanced fighter 
because the F-4E presented very questionable performances in air-to-air dogfight against the MiG-21 
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during the Vietnam War.542  
The Ministry of National Defense awarded the contract to Samsung Aerospace in 1992 with an 
estimated program budget of USD 400 million. Major program milestones were to perform the required 
SLEP (Service Life Extension Program) works on two prototypes until 1994 and on the remaining 40 
aircrafts until 1998. Big players in the international market such as the German DASA and McDonnell 
Douglas competed for the KPU, but Samsung Aerospace eventually collaborated with Rockwell 
International to perform the avionics upgrades and SLEP works. But the constraints imposed on 
technology transfers over sensitive weapon system source codes and Rockwell’s corporate proprietary 
rights precluded Samsung Aerospace from acquiring the necessary technology for the KPU. The 
restrictive technology transfer circumstances also aggravated the price tag of the program where the 
worsened cost-benefit situation turned the fate of the KPU Program close to cancellation in March 1994. 
At this point, Samsung Aerospace already committed a KRW 60 billion since 1990 in equipment and 
services in preparation of the KPU Program, and was on the verge of losing the entire investments.543 
After avoiding near program cancellation, only a portion of the planned F-4D/E air fleet were 
programmed for minor avionic upgrades with AN/AVQ-26 Pave Track laser targeting pods, along with 
the Lockheed Martin/Rafael AGM-142 Raptor/Popeye standoff missiles.544  
Criticism over the KPU Program primarily focused on the fact that the government neither 
saved program costs from downsizing the program, nor did the military find adequate resources to 
finance subsequent fighter modernization programs in the aftermath of program cancellation. Even to 
this date of May 2017, over 70 F-4E Phantoms are operational under major fighter wings of the Korean 
Air Force. The F-4Es will still stay in service until 2025 when the KF-X Indigenous Fighter will replace 
the Phantom-IIs, serving 13 years more than the expected life span of the original KPU Program.545 In 
the 1990s, McDonnell Douglas, the original equipment manufacturer of the F-4 Phantom-IIs, already 
discontinued the production of concurrent spare parts or contractor logistics support. In order to support 
the shelf life of this old aircraft, item managers, air repair crews, and military logistics authorities 
extensively searched for spare parts worldwide, and also localized the production of about 120 aircraft 
components to sustain the life span of the Phantom-IIs. 546  The monolithic and rigid component 
procurement methods, which accounted on old competitive bidding contracts, also aggravated the fluent 
sustainment efforts of the Phantom-IIs.547 The cancelling of the KPU Program also eliminated the 
opportunity to accumulate knowledge and experience for developing fighter aircrafts. System upgrade 
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and system life extension programs are considered a prerequisite to gather critical knowledge base 
before launching a full scale indigenous fighter program. The highly anticipated KPU was considered 
to provide the springboard for local industries before committing itself into license manufacturing of 
the KF-16 fighter program.548  Discontinuation of aircraft manufacturing caused by policy disconnects 
between warfighter requirements and corporate objectives are a critical factor that hindered sustained 
industry growth. International technology transfers through license production or co-production 
programs were a major source of technology acquisition in the early years of industry development. 
Between the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, a total of $330 million was spent as royalties to pay for the 
technology transfer deals of five major aircraft development programs. 
 
Aircraft Type Program Contractor International Partner 
Program 
Date Transfer Type 
Rotor Wing 
500MD Korean Air Hughes 1976 – 1988 License 
UH-60 Korean Air Sikorsky 1991 – 1998 License 
BK-117 Hyundai  Kawasaki 1989 – 1994 Co-production 
Bo-105 Daewoo Heavy Industries MBB 1990 – 2000 License 
Fixed Wing F-5E/F Korean Air Northrop 1980 – 1985 License F-16 Samsung Aerospace Lockheed 1994 – 1999 License 
Engine 
End 
Item 
T700 Samsung Techwin/Korean Air General Electric - License (UH-60) 
F-100 Samsung Techwin  - License (F-16) 
Parts 
PW4000 Samsung Aerospace Pratt and Whitney -  
J79/85 Samsung Aerospace General Electric - Subcontract /Maintenance 
A250 Samsung Allison - Subcontract 
Table 32. Major Aircraft Development and Manufacturing Program. Reproduced from 산업연구원, 21세기를 향한 항공
기산업 발전방향, 1994; 2000년대 첨단기술산업의 비전과 발전과제 – 항공산업 (1994) 
 
As shown in the table above, there was a 2-year gap in helicopter production between the 
500MD Program and the UH-60 Program. However, the actual gap between the two programs was 
nearly 8 years after the ceasing of the main production facility at Korean Air. In the case of fixed wing 
production, there was nearly decade long gap between the F-5E/F Program and the F-16 Program. 
Because of such discontinuity in government launched programs, Korean Air did not see much future 
opportunity in the aircraft-manufacturing sector, and decided to eliminate all production facilities in 
order to concentrate on other business operations.549 Therefore, the knowledge for technology and skill 
sets acquired through the 500MD and F-5E/F program experience did not fully accumulate and 
transfuse into the succeeding programs. In the case of the BK-117 helicopter development, there were 
no follow-up program that would’ve continued the development efforts because of the consolidation of 
the aircraft-manufacturing firms after the Asian Financial Crisis. Thus, the aircraft industry was not able 
to fully seize the momentum of exploiting the knowledge accumulated from these experiences. 
A bit different but similar case was the F-5E/F local assembly. The program was a representative 
example where the development authorities launched a highly ambitious program that had no strategic 
vision towards both military force build-up and economic spin-offs. The local assembly of the F-5E/F 
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concluded with insignificant efforts of tech transfer or diffusion, in which the R&D and manufacturing 
capacities has short-lived an unsustainable life span. Because of the disconnect and unsustainability of 
the F-5E/F, the subsequent KFP or KTX programs had to start from scratch because the production 
experience from the previous program marginally transcended into ensuing fixed wing programs. The 
country’s attempt to build a combat aircraft started with the license production of the F-5. In 1979, 
Korean Air was awarded the main assembly of the airframe through manufacturing licenses arranged 
with Northrop, while Samsung Precision Industries (later Samsung Aerospace) license produced the 
General Electric’s J85 engine. Korean Air was recognized as the country’s most advanced aircraft 
manufacturing firm at the time based on the license production of 500MD Helicopters, depot 
maintenance work awarded from US Pacific Air Force’s F-4D Phantom-II and C-123 transport 
aircraft.550 From 1982 to 1986, Korean Air locally manufactured a total of 68 F-5 fighters (localized 
variants called KF-5E/F) at the firm’s Kimhae Technology Center. The first 30 aircrafts were localized 
by assembling directly imported subcomponents from Northrop, whereas the remaining 38 aircrafts 
were manufactured using localized components developed by Korean Air.551   
The reason for the early shutdown of the KF-5E/F program was because the aircraft was not 
the fighter variant the Air Force preferred in the first place. The F-5 was an augmented version of 
Northrop’s T-38 Talon jet trainer. In this aspect, it wasn’t the ideal pick to cope against a large 
conventional army that was militarily supported by another world super power. The force requirement 
of the Air Force in the late 1970s was to compete against the North Korean MiG-21 jet fighter. In order 
for the Korean Air Force to obtain air dominance against the maneuverable speed range and armaments 
of the MiG-21, a jet fighter that had at least the effectiveness commensurate to the F-4 Phantom-II, the 
A-7 Corsair II, or the F-16 Fighting Falcon. The KF-5E/F was already considered obsolete against the 
contemporary Soviet MiG variants. The Air Force wished for the F-4E Phantom-II, and laid out a plan 
to license manufacture the F-16 in the 1980s. But this scheme was rejected by another group of Air 
Force officers that advocated the F-5E/F variants. At the time, the US government and Congress banned 
the introduction of the F-16 capability to Korea with the concern for an implied escalation of a Korean 
arms race.552  
General Joo Young-Bok, the 13th Air Force Chief of Staff from 1974 to 1979, eradicated the 
force improvement plan drafted by his predecessors, and programmed the Air Force’s future force 
structure centered on the F-5 capability. For a comparatively smaller force in size, numbers really 
mattered for the Korean Air Force. The relatively cheaper price of the aircraft and the fact that the F-5s 
were widely in use by the Korean Air Force was the main reason for General Joo to select the F-5 over 
the F-4s or other fighter capabilities. But most of all, it was known that the vast affordability of the F-5 
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allowed the Korean Air Force to expand the force structure of the Air Force.553 
However, the overall technological and industrial contribution of the F-5 license production 
was insignificant. The government forcefully compelled Korean Air to proceed with the manufacturing 
work, but did not adequately compensate the firm with the developmental risks at all. Korean Air 
invested a net worth of KRW 70 billion in facilities, equipment, and engineering tools in the process of 
manufacturing the F-5 aircraft. In addition to the upfront costs, the unit cost of the aircraft increased 
about 30% during the localization process, but the government never compensated the losses to Korean 
Air. Because of such harsh circumstances, only 43% of the airframe subcomponents and 17% of the 
engine subcomponents were localized.554  
Also, because the F-5 was already an obsolete version in the mid-1980s when the final unit 
rolled out of the production line, the Air Force did not follow-up with additional production. 
Furthermore, by defying all odds, the government consequently selected Daewoo Heavy Industries for 
the basic trainer program (KT-1), and Samsung Aerospace for the advanced trainer program (KTX-2), 
instead of Korean Air as the lead corporation in the field. In a systems engineering aspect, Korean Air’s 
KF-5E/F did not go through a single refurbishment work until 1993. In comparison to Korean Air, the 
Taiwanese Aero Industry Development Center (AIDC) went through about 113 system design changes 
over its F-5 fighters, which enabled the country to accumulate the experience in system dynamics and 
implement applicable changes to the aircraft.555 Therefore, after assembling 68 aircrafts under license, 
while having to absorb all the developmental risks breaking out, but not being recognized for these 
developmental efforts, and eventually being eliminated from subsequent development opportunities, 
Korean Air abolished the KF-5E/F production line and decided to concentrate in manufacturing 
helicopters afterwards.556 
Another recent case where a defense firm took its own initiative in a certain weapon system 
development program, but was not awarded the final contract is shown in the Active Electronically 
Scanned Array (AESA) radar project for the Korea Fighter Experiment (KF-X) Program. The AESA 
radar is a highly advanced radar system that detects multiple targets simultaneously and allows ships 
and aircrafts to broadcast stronger radar signals than conventional radars while still remaining stealthy. 
The significance of AESA radar development was not only confined on the radar itself, but was linked 
with other critical performance systems of the KF-X program such as data-links, electronic counter 
measures, and sensor modules (IRST, FLIR, MAWS, IFF, etc.).557 The development program of the 
radar itself is government led, where ADD partnered with a foreign firm, most likely negotiating terms 
for collaborative development with Swedish SAAB as of December 2015, for system development. The 
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domestic defense contractor is responsible for low rate initial production, and the subsequent full rate 
production of the radar. Although the defense firm is not entirely awarded the R&D portion of the 
program, the defense firm takes substantial responsibility in radar manufacturing and demonstration 
work.558  
Considering the radar business requires highly sophisticated skills and expertise due to the 
complexities of the system, the experience factor in corporate R&D was heavily weighted for contractor 
selection. In this regard, a domestic firm called LIG Nex1 was regarded the strongest candidate for the 
AESA development project as the company gathered significant experience in the radar business in the 
past, specifically regarding AESA related technology for nearly a decade. LIG Nex1 was the partner 
company of ADD that conducted the first and second phase feasibility studies from 2006 to 2013, and 
was in the course of conducting the test development phase of the AESA project from 2014 to 2019. 
The corporate R&D budget LIG Nex1 invested into this program until 2016 was approximately KRW 
14 billion.559 Also, LIG Nex1 extensively conducted collaborative research with the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) on the X-band 30W GaN Photovoltaic Devices, which 
is a technical level highly pertinent to AESA development and also known to have longer detection 
ranges than the AN/APG-63(v)1 radars installed inside the F-15K.560 
However, the defense acquisition authorities identified an alternate company, Hanwha Thales, 
instead of LIG Nex1 as a preferred bidder for  the AESA program, and asserted the decision was 
weighted on all aspects of corporate capabilities including technology readiness levels and development 
cost.561 Hanwha Thales, previously Samsung Thales but acquired by Hanwha in 2015, claims to have 
built-up significant radar related capacities throughout the history of the firm, which include Search and 
Detection Radars for the Cheonma Air Defense Artillery System and Active Protective System, 
Improved Multi-function Radar Systems for Cheolmae-II (M-SAM), and so forth. Hanwha Thales was 
given higher grades in the score card regarding its experience in and relevance with other systems 
integration work related with the KF-X. Most evidently, Hanwha Thales was awarded the Mission 
Computer module development and Large Area Display (LAD) module program for the KF-X as well, 
which must be critically interlinked with the AESA radar.562 But Hanwha’s actual experience and 
expertise in AESA radar development remained questionable compared to that of LIG Nex1, which 
continues to raise skepticism in program success even in October 2016. 
 
5.5.2. S&T verses Industrial Authorities 
In 1991, MOST initiated a development project, dubbed the G7 Project, to join the ranks of 
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advance technical countries in high-tech industrial sectors. The strategy included 184 R&D subjects 
under 11 S&T categories that included information technology, new materials, machinery and 
automation, aerospace, electronics, maritime engineering, environmental sciences, and so forth.563  
The program budget of the G7 Project grew up to approximately KRW 420 billion between 
1992 and 1994, with an overall program estimate of KRW 3.48 trillion until 2001. The pool of S&T 
workforce committed to this project was about 11,052 researchers from 327 GRIs and university 
laboratories. The implementation scheme was arranged through linking the triple helix of public-private 
partnership between industry, university, and GRIs.564 Especially, the G7 Project endowed Samsung 
Aerospace Inc. with public funding for subcategories regarded most pertinent to aeronautical 
engineering under advanced manufacturing systems such as automation, precision machinery, and 
system design. 565  Defense acquisition priorities and R&D policies constrained potential growth 
opportunities of the aircraft-manufacturing sector. The military favored foreign system purchases 
instead of initiating indigenous development projects because of reasons justified by the immediate 
need to deploy warfighter needs to cope against imminent North Korean hostilities. Defense R&D 
projects is complex, exceedingly capital intensive, and requires a high degree of knowledge and 
expertise throughout a protracted period of time. Defense R&D programs have a high possibility of 
failure, and there is no guarantee a R&D project will successfully materialize into an actual weapon 
system program. Even so, it is extremely challenging to maintain a strong supply chain of an indigenous 
weapon system, especially with complex defense systems, within the forecasted life-cycle because it 
relates to business survivability to firms supplying the components and auxiliary parts. Large scale 
defense R&D programs were abruptly canceled and replaced by foreign systems. The Maritime 
Operations Helicopter Program (AW-159 Wildcat), Army Attack Helicopter Program (Apache / Scout 
Helicopter), Air Force Electronic Countermeasure Training Program are the typical examples of these 
kind of patterns where proposals for indigenous development were overridden by foreign capabilities. 
Due to these reasons, domestic defense firms slowly disengaged and diversified its businesses out from 
military contracts, or in some cases completely exited the defense market.566 
 The comparative cap of indigenous development programs in contrast to foreign procurement 
also remains as a big hurdle. Unlike countries such as Israel, Japan, and Taiwan where indigenous R&D 
is given preference over foreign procurement for the sake of sustaining a competitive defense industrial 
base, Korea was not always loyal and respectful to building its local defense industrial capacities. The 
general threshold is to limit the overall R&D and production cost to 130% in comparison to direct 
foreign procurement when making domestic R&D decisions. Considering not only the high risks 
associated with development, but also the fearsome challenges to maintain a healthy supply base, 
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constraining both development and production costs within 130% compared to foreign direct purchase 
is an insurmountable task. In this regard, high-risk development programs such as aircrafts or complex 
subsystems are always ruled out and the eventual contract is awarded to foreign systems.567 
 
5.5.3. Alliance Politics, Tech-Transfer Restrictions, and American Dominance in the 
Korean Defense Market 
The U.S. has been exhibiting inherently ambivalent behaviors in its cooperative relationship 
over defense technology transfers and industrial exchanges with Korea. U.S. technology assistance was 
undoubtedly a critical catalyst of capacity building during the early years of Korea’s defense industry.  
However, as Korea’s industrial capacity reached the level global competitiveness, U.S. military 
assistance policy steered to more restrictive control over technology transfer arrangements. On the 
contrary, major U.S. defense firms still regarded the Korean defense market as a lucrative business 
opportunity. In order to address these two conflicting dimensions of defense industrial cooperation, the 
U.S. technology security policy served as a pivot that leveraged these differing aspects. Thus, 
considering the vast volume of defense articles and technology provided from the United States, Korea’s 
been constantly subject to restrictive control measures under the U.S. technology security regime. Most 
of the controversial items considered aviation assets such as in avionics, engines, and sensors. Such 
restriction has posed significant challenges in pursuing pure indigenous solutions in areas related to 
aircraft manufacturing. But under the same motives and circumstances, such condition worked 
ironically for U.S. government and industrial entities in the process of retaining predominance in the 
Korean defense market. 
On 6 January, 1991, after four years of negotiations, Korea and the United States signed a 
provisional memorandum entitled the Patent Security Agreement (PSA), which was enforced as one of 
a series of restrictive control measures over defense technology development between the two 
countries.568 Korea had to provide assurances that it will protect sensitive U.S. military technology in 
order to become an eligible party to receive or share such technology. The core concept of the agreement 
was to reciprocally safeguard patents that contain applications for defense purposes. Thus, if one party 
of the PSA registers a specific technology under defense applications, the other party shall provide the 
same level of protection on the subject technology in return. Under the PSA, Korea was able to receive 
a number of military technologies from the U.S. for domestic R&D purposes. In the case of re-
engineering or exporting the subject technology to a third party, the applying party must obtain prior 
authorization from the other country that holds the property rights over the subject technology. Even 
when the subject technology obtains authorization, the applying country must pay a certain amount of 
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royalty fees to the parent country. The General Security of Military Information Agreement signed in 
1962 and revised in 1989 serves for the same purpose of the PSA. These agreements originated from 
different interests evolved between the two countries. In the mid-1980s, Korea was in need of state-of-
the arts military technology in order to build-up its military forces as well as its defense industrial 
foundations. The United States was in need of expanding its alliance network that would support the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) against the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. Therefore, there 
existed a common interest between both parties in establishing such technological arrangement, which 
embodied significant restrictions for the recipient country, mainly the Korean government and its 
defense industries. The preceding memorandums and the PSA established between the two countries 
have provided access to advanced state of the art defense technology to Korea. However, further 
technological exploitation was extremely limited because of the restrictive nature of these arrangements 
that restrained modification and overhaul work over these technologies. Moreover, starting in the late 
1990s, Korea has been subject to a number of technological scrutinizations by U.S. defense technology 
security authorities over suspicions of reverse engineering copied from U.S sources. Especially, the 
growing concern of Korea becoming a global contender in the international defense export market has 
exacerbated this threat perception within the U.S. Government and its defense industry. 
For instance, in June 2011, the export of an airborne electronic warfare system to the Pakistani 
military called ALQ-200K manufactured by a local Korean defense contractor called LIG Nex1 was 
frustrated by the U.S. Department of State with suspicions of reverse engineering U.S. origin defense 
technologies as well as concerns of transferring sensitive defense technology to a potentially rogue state 
such as Pakistan that’s been building military relationship with China. The ALQ-200K jammers were 
to be loaded on F-16 fighters operated by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF). At the time of system design 
of the ALQ-200K jammers, LIG Nex 1 confidently believed the technology was indigenously 
developed and free of any technical restrictions based on the claim made by ADD that the product 
evolved from indigenous development efforts. However, it turned out the technology was a complete 
product manufactured from U.S. sources, which subsequently resulted in complete humiliation of 
Korean defense products in the international defense export market.569 An interesting story subsequent 
to the State Department’s denial of issuing export license to LIG Nex1’s ALQ-200K sale to Pakistan 
came in a completely opposite narrative. The State Department approved the sale of the U.S. firm ITT-
Exelis’ airborne electronic warfare pod ALQ-211 (v)9, which is considered an improved version of 
Korea’s ALQ-200K, to the PAF for operations into its F-16 fighter fleet.570 The basis of the export 
approval completely contradicted the rationale of denying the Korean case, which argued the Korean 
export may lead to a possible leakage of airborne jammer technology to Chinese authorities. Thus, it 
was quite evident the U.S. Government was exhibiting concerted efforts to obstruct the growth of a 
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potential competitor in the international market, such as the Korean industry. 
Another yet controversial technology security case that hindered Korean officials in pursuing 
further utilization of U.S. origin defense technology regards the alleged unauthorized examination of 
the Lockheed Martin Tiger Eye Infrared Search and Track sensor attached to the F-15K Slam Eagle. In 
August 2011, a U.S. Government delegation claimed the possible compromise of U.S. controlled 
sensitive sensor technologies of the Tiger Eye targeting pod by Korean Air Force technicians who had 
malicious intents of reverse engineering. The U.S. Government places anti-temper seals to prevent illicit 
transfer of sensitive U.S. defense technologies against third countries in order to protect U.S. national 
security interests as well as the technology competitiveness of its defense industry. The case was not 
fully resolved and was escalated to the higher Ministerial-Secretarial level, in which both the U.S. 
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense strongly complained the possibility to their Korean 
counterparts in a high level bilateral venue.571 It was later revealed that the U.S. defense authorities had 
strong suspicions against the Agency of Defense Development over the attempted opening of the anti-
tampered secure box of the sensor. U.S. officials expressed concerns over the continued public 
description `of ADD’s experience in reverse engineering U.S. technology such as the Korean version 
of the Nike-Hercules air defense missile system.572 
In reference to the two memorandums on technology security arrangements between Korea and 
United States, compounded by the number of controversies over tech-security compliance, the U.S. 
authorities strongly recommended the establishment of a defense technology security regime within the 
Korean Government, and the creation of a bilateral forum that discusses and coordinates tech security 
agendas. In this aspect, under the legislated jurisdiction of the National Assembly, the Defense 
Technology Control Bureau was established under DAPA in 2014 as well as a bilateral forum between 
the two countries called the Defense Technology Security Consultative Meeting (DTSCM). 573  In 
parallel to these controversies, U.S. authorities exerted efforts to retain its competitive advantage in the 
Korean defense market by leveraging their tech security concerns. What was quite notable was when 
the Korean Government decided to choose a foreign platform against a U.S. weapon system, which 
raised grave concerns within U.S. defense industrial authorities considering the possible Korean defense 
market drifting away from traditional U.S. predominance. As described in Chapter 4, U.S. defense 
articles enjoy a commanding lead in the Korean defense market attributed to the on-going military 
alliance structure under strong justifications of building stronger strength in command control 
interoperability.  
However, the sudden agreement in 2005 between the two countries to transfer wartime 
operation control from the Commander of U.S. Force Korea to the Korean military created new 
circumstances of the alliance to relinquish the former patterns of giving preference over US defense 
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products in weapon systems procurement. It was a time of retrenchment and disengagement from the 
conventional belief of which the withstanding 60-year alliance system was about to change. Such aspect 
was evident in the Korean Government’s unsuspected decision to partner with Eurocopter regarding the 
Korea Helicopter Program in 2005. A similar observation was the competition between Boeing’s E-737 
and the Israeli Elta System’s G-550 over the Airborne Early Warning and Control Program (E-X) in 
2006. Although the Korean Government eventually selected the Boeing proposal, the entrance of a third 
country contender in the U.S. dominated Korean defense market was certainly perceived as an absolute 
threat to U.S. defense authorities.574 The huge price tag associated with these aircrafts made these two 
programs the most lucrative weapon system procurement at the time for the global defense industry, 
and the significant fact that the Korean Government no longer rendering its absolute loyalty to US 
products subsequently compelled US officials to ease existing regulative control measures over Korea 
in its defense export control system. In this sense, several restrictions in terms of export procedures 
stipulated in the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system were removed, for which Korea was given 
an upgraded status commensurate to NATO member states as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan 
(NATO+3).575  
Another similar case during this period was the US government decision to approve the export 
of four RQ-4 Block 30 Global Hawks to Korea in 2011. Before the decision, the Korean Government 
requested earlier in 2005 to approve the sale of the surveillance drone as part of building up its 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacities. However, the restrictions stipulated in the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) precluded the overseas export of the Global Hawk.576 
For the same reason, countries like Japan, Singapore, and Australia were not able to acquire this 
enduring capability. Despite the restrictive clauses of the MTCR, the US authorities strived to lift the 
ban by categorizing the Global Hawk as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform and 
not an offensive strike system.577 The US defense industry’s deep involvement in this endeavor further 
facilitated the export approval process. With the continued rigidness of the US Government over the 
release of the Global Hawk, Seoul was considering an alternate option such as Boeing’s Phantom Eye, 
AeroVironment’s Global Observer, and the Israeli Heron-TP or Hermes 1500.578 The restrictive clauses 
of the MTCR were harming U.S. industries while other MTCR countries such as Russia and China were 
finding loopholes to avoid the constraints in other ways. Thus, it made little sense for US authorities to 
comply the MTCR while others were finding circumventing routes for its industries, which is another 
representative case of industrial concerns overwhelming conventional policy lines.579 
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It was also understood that the primary reason why the U.S. Government did not fully engage 
into an investigation over controversial technology security cases was because of the high profiled 
defense acquisition programs announced by the Korean Government. The third round bidding of the F-
X program, which considered the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, second batch bidding of the Aegis 
Destroyer program, which had in mind of products from Lockheed Martin, Aerial Refueling Tanker, 
and so forth, provided lucrative opportunities for the U.S defense industries. Therefore, it was argued 
that the more the U.S. authorities raise tech-security concerns, the lower the possibility of U.S. defense 
contractors winning these lucrative bidding opportunities.580 
 
5.6. Chapter Conclusion 
By fully riding on the rapid development experience driven by the historical mindset and institutional 
construct of the developmental state, the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector took off with an 
ambitious objective to enter the global aerospace industry during the industrial reformist period of the 
mid-1980s. However, the inherent challenges brought up from domestic institutional arrangements, 
international norms and regulation, and the technological complexities of aircraft-manufacturing in 
general have discouraged the growth prospects of the industry from becoming an innovative player, at 
which the industry still lingers as a catch-up sector compared to global standards.  
 The Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan of 1999 constitutes the basis of the 
development drive. However, considering the circumstances from the past twenty-years, declaratory 
policies of government driven development initiatives restrictively transcended into less competitive 
strengths for industrial growth. Unlike the country’s industrial champion products such as automobiles, 
ships, and electronics, the government showed apparent limitations in coordinating the country’s 
industrial capacities and S&T foundations into highly complex product system like aircraft 
manufacturing. The finite domestic demand-pull in commercial aviation, inconsistent decision making 
in indigenous military aircraft development, limited corporate R&D capacities, and less coordinated 
efforts in promoting domestic aircraft products in the international market have all constrained the 
industry from building competitive calibers in the field of aeronautical engineering, jet propulsion, 
avionics, and so forth. Government efforts to overcome the self-evident shortages of dedicated 
aerospace R&D budget were conflicted by organizational rivalries between the military and commercial 
authorities holding a major share in domestic aircraft manufacturing, which resulted in insufficient 
sharing of knowledge and experiences and poor interagency R&D cooperation581 
 The military initially took the lead in nationalizing the development of critical weapon systems 
during the 60s and 70s. However, in the 80s, the seemingly complex nature of modern weapon systems, 
especially in military aircrafts, has hampered the strong drive of the military. It is a rare case to see the 
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military to become the anchor tenet of nurturing high technology, because weapon systems were 
urgently required for rapid deployment within a set time to serve for clear strategic and tactical 
objectives. Therefore, military R&D becomes reluctant to take risks and explore new projects. It merely 
focuses on technologies that are relatively easy to reach or already proven from foreign sources. In the 
meantime, aircraft technologies in the other sectors lack a strong pull as well. MOCIE has other 
priorities to worry about in reference to the country’s competitive business areas, whereas business 
fields that embody high technological risk such as the aircraft industry is not within the Ministry’s 
nearest interest areas. Although MOCIE continued to serve as the chair for the domestic aerospace 
industry promotion boards, it did so with low esteem and lesser motivation. 
 Most of the inconsistencies in government industrial policies towards the aircraft-
manufacturing sector occur from these organizational characteristics. Considering the total life cycle 
management routines, the discrepancies derive from the structural disconnect between the critical 
components between force requirement generation, R&D, acquisition management, and operations and 
sustainment. In terms of the joint requirement generation process, the military is the sole government 
agency that raises the warfighter’s force needs in the weapon systems development process. However, 
most of the planners residing in the military – Joint Chiefs of Staff, military service headquarters – 
receive almost no professional training nor consider the force requirement generation as a career 
enhancing profession. Most of the officials assigned to force planning rotate out from the position to 
another staff duty in less than three years, which precludes the officials from accumulating requisite 
knowledge and experiences to establish a solid force development plan that meets the strategic interest 
of the country’s national security and economic engine base. Considering the complexities of the aircraft 
manufacturing and indigenous development, most of the decisions made by the military favored foreign 
procurement. Thus, the decision to go either indigenous or foreign in the process of introducing a 
weapon system was often distorted by foreign platforms lobbying for the domestic share of the 
market. 582 Additionally, the Korean Air Force (ROKAF), which is the principal agent of military 
aircraft programs, have been constantly marginalized in the decision making process over major defense 
acquisition programs, which misrepresented some military aircraft programs favorable for foreign 
influences. The Army-Centric decision metrics of the defense sector gave higher priorities on political 
benefits than on strategic visions that should have incorporated both military and economic 
endeavors.583 In this regard, such policy patterns caused unnecessary discrepancies between foreign 
platforms and indigenously development systems where the government had to expend double the 
amount of resources to maintain both systems. Under these circumstances, accumulating sophisticated 
knowledge and engineering skills in system design and integration were unattainable, at which 
indigenous development programs had to rely most of the technological expertise to its foreign partners. 
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Because of these inconsistencies, discontinuities in government development decisions, and risk averse 
attitude toward technology development, the technological readiness level of the Korean aircraft-
manufacturing sector was restricted to license production with low localization rates. The technological 
capacities in system design and integration fell considerably short from that of other forerunners in the 
global aerospace industry. 
 The next chapter describes the regional and sectoral systems of innovation in the aircraft-
manufacturing sector, and reviews how the two apparatus functioned and interacted under the 
established national level innovation systems. 
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Chapter 6. The Aircraft Manufacturing Sector: Regional and Sectoral Level Innovation 
Systems 
6.1. Building Absorptive Capacities through Industrial Networks: Regional Aircraft 
Manufacturing Clusters 
The government’s clustering strategy has tallied with the developmental objectives of the local 
governments. Based on the clustering game plan outlined in the in the 2010 AIDP, the local governments 
rushed into developing their own strategy to attract both government incentives and corporate 
investments based on in its respective regional area of expertise.  
 
6.1.1. Overview of Regional Clusters 
The AIDP highlights regional strengths based on manufacturing (wider Gyeongnam area), 
R&D (wider Daejeon), and Information Technology (wider Seoul metropolitan area). In terms of 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), the traditional Busan/Kimhae complex as well as the central 
Cheongju area were recognized for its growth potentials. But most of all, the forerunner in this race was 
Gyeongam Province, which is the home of KAI (Sacheon), Korean Air (Busan/Kimhae), Air Force 
Education and Training Command and tactical airlift squadrons, and the country’s largest industrial 
complex (Changwon). As of 2016, the industrial output on aircraft manufacturing at Gyeongnam 
Province, together with the Busan/Kimhae production output, accounts for about 88.4% of the entire 
country, where the province hosts nearly 70% of the country’s aircraft-manufacturing companies. 
Through the established industrial beltway that connects Sacheon-Changwon-Busan/Kimhae, 
Gyeongnam Province has aspired to become the lead figure in entering the sectors of highly complex 
product systems such as aircraft manufacturing and MRO business altogether. Gyeongnam Province is 
also endowed with the regional industry linkages between aircraft manufacturing (Sacheon/Kimhae), 
automobile (Busan/Changwon), and shipbuilding (Geojae), as all three industrial clusters reside within 
the close proximities of each other.584 
  
     Unit: $ Million 
Location 2008 2009 2010 2011 Market Share (%) 
Gyeongnam 1,298 1,390 1,704 1,677 72.0 
Busan/Kimhae 330 264 388 451 16.4 
Gyeongbuk 229 242 193 152 8.2 
Choongnam 55 42 40 30 1.7 
Daejeon 29 24 26 27 1.1 
Incheon - 3 3 2 0.1 
Gyeong-gi 2 2 2 3 0.1 
Gwangju 2 2 2 2 0.1 
Seoul - 1 7 5 0.3 
Total 1,945 1,970 2,365 2,349 100.0 
Table 33. Production Output by Region; Adopted from 2012 항공산업통계 (항공우주산업진흥회) 
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In 2004, the Gyeongnam Provincial Government designated the aircraft-manufacturing sector 
as a regional strategic industry in order to fully exploit the region’s industrial strengths in high tech 
complex product systems. In the course of doing so, the Provincial Government selected the JINSA 
(Jinju-Sacheon) Industrial Complex, which is situated nearby KAI’s Sacheon headquarters, as the 
region’s aircraft-manufacturing cluster. The presence of the country’s sole aircraft-manufacturing 
system integrator at this location made the industrial structure of the Jinju-Sacheon area absolutely 
reliant on the aerospace business, where the respective business sector employed nearly 60% of the 
entire residence in this area.585 As of April 2017, after three years of deliberations and feedback, the 
Korean Government, represented by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, approved the 
JINSA Complex as a national industrial complex specialized in aircraft manufacturing. The designation 
as a national industrial complex provides various incentives and support packages in terms of tax breaks, 
capital investments, policy priorities in sectoral promotion opportunities, and so forth. The JINSA 
Industrial Complex will be receiving an approximation of KRW 340 billion in both public and private 
investments for a 4 year period until the infrastructure construction concludes.586 
Three organizations primarily support the aircraft-manufacturing business within the 
Gyeongnam Province. In the grand scheme of instigating innovation in each industrial sector, the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy during the Roh Mu Hyun Administration included the aerospace 
industry as a mini-cluster within the broader Changwon Mechanical Industry Cluster Project. The 
project strived to connect university (R&D/education/training)-corporation (manufacturing)-GRI into a 
coordination network in support of introducing greater innovative opportunities within the 
manufacturing sector in the region. A small but very meaningful success story from this effort was the 
commercialization of a molding technology developed by a local firm called Sooseong Airframe inside 
the mini-cluster. The firm developed the technology but was not able to commercialize it for value 
added goods. In November 2005, the Mini-Cluster project identified the commercialization needs and 
arranged the support from various technical and business groups within the cluster, which eventually 
resulted in a $60 million export opportunity to the Fuji Heavy Industries at Japan, with a sustained 
supply chain support until 2015.587 
The Gyeongnam Provincial Government, in 2007, provided a vast part of land about 392,000 
m2 in the southwest banks of Sacheon City to build the JINSA Aerospace Cluster (or Industrial 
Complex). As part of the Provincial Government’s long term aspiration to build the innovative 
Gyeongnam Techno Park, which links the industrial beltway from Sacheon to Kimhae, the Aerospace 
Center assists corporate investments into the region over business areas such as work space support, 
collaborative equipment sharing, overseas marketing and export promotion, workforce 
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professionalization projects, cooperative R&D, and coordination networks.588 Sacheon City revised its 
municipal ordnances to augment city functions that supports the creation of the industrial complex in 
terms of cultural exchanges (Aerospace Expo), Southern Coastline Economic Zone (Sun Belt), Sacheon 
Aerospace Museum, real estate support for industrial land use, and so forth.589 
Around the period when the Provincial Government decided to sponsor the aircraft-
manufacturing business, the overall industrial infrastructure of the JINSA Complex was examined 
substandard compared to the competitiveness and productivity level of other regional industry clusters. 
At the time around 2003, the productivity (KRW 3.5 trillion) and economic value added (KRW 1.25 
trillion) assessed over the JINSA Complex accounted slightly over 5% of the entire industrial output of 
Gyeongnam Province, which was comparatively lesser than other competing cities in the same 
region.590 Therefore, in order for the JINSA area to emulate as a serious contender in this high-tech 
business, it was imperative to find ways to build-up the necessary infrastructure in the area. A notable 
aspect about the JINSA Complex was the high concentration in aircraft manufacturing. Sacheon being 
the home of the country’s sole aircraft system integrating company (KAI), the associated small and 
medium sized manufacturing firms all concentrated in the close proximity nearby this area in order to 
seek the best synergetic effects. As of 2016, the Sacheon area accounts for nearly 82.5% of the country’s 
entire production output in aircraft manufacturing, in which hosts about 32% of the country’s 
manufacturing firms registered in the aircraft manufacturing category. The proportion of aircraft 
manufacturing in the regional areas surrounding Sacheon itself also accounts for about 60%, which 
signifies the high concentration rate of sector in the wider Sacheon area in general.591 
JINSA Complex also houses education and training centers focused on aircraft manufacturing. 
The technical manpower pool educated and trained in nearby universities (Gyeongsang National 
University) and vocational schools (Korea Polytech, Aviation Technical High School) support the gist 
of the requisite technical workforce. The portion of capital intensive R&D is supported by local branch 
laboratories of GRIs. Less than a mile away from the JINSA Complex is the Aviation Research Center 
under the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DTaQ). The Korea Aerospace Research 
Institute’s (KARI) Test and Evaluation Center is within less than an hour distance from JINSA, in 
addition to the Korean Institute for Machinery and Metals (KIMM) that performs comprehensive 
research in aircraft related composite materials and components. JINSA is also the headquarters of the 
major training centers of the Korean Air Force such as the Air Force Education and Training Command, 
3rd Training Wing, Air Force Aviation Science High School, and other specialty technical training 
schools. Thus, the area is abundant with the nutrients to nourish aircraft related business.592 
  
                                                          
588 Gyeongnam Technopark webpage, accessed on July 17, 2017, http://eng.gntp.or.kr/sub3/sub5.jsp  
589 강인범, “항공우주산업 미래, 사천에 물어보라,” 조선일보, 2008.4.4. 
590 안영수, “경남 항공우주산업 클러스터 구축의 타당성분석과 발전전략,” 항공산업연구, p. 14. 
591 Ibid., p. 78. 
592 Ibid., p. 16. 
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   Figure 20. Support Structure of JINSA Aerospace Industrial Complex 
 
However, despite the extensive developmental assets, the inconsistencies and discontinuities in 
government decision making over aircraft manufacturing restrained bold investment decisions within 
the broader Gyeongam Provincial area. Attributing to the plain reality of minimal corporate anxieties 
and low foreign investment interest in the aspect of investing into a provincial aerospace project, most 
of the capital flows are expected to come from public sources, mainly through government initiated 
national programs. Clustering requires high degrees of concentration and sustained regional support. 
Based on the AIDP Framework, however, the government identified multiple regions as potential 
candidates for regional aircraft-manufacturing clusters. Such decision has instigated unnecessary 
competition between different provincial governments and metropolitan cities in order to seize the 
opportunities for increasing local jobs through government support and corporate investments. This is 
déjà-vu all over again of the intense competition against Chaebol firms over the finite share of the 
domestic aircraft-manufacturing market during the late 1980s. The conditions are remarkably identical; 
rosy expectations of the future aircraft-manufacturing market; excessive competition against contending 
entities; overlapping investments and false promises made to local corporations. The competition spills 
over to contenders residing in the same region. The Busan/Kimhae MRO complex, Changwon 
Industrial Complex, and Jinsa Complex are all competing against each other instead of finding ways to 
build effective cooperative networks. 
Based on a survey conducted by the Gyeongnam Development Institute between 2007 and 2009 
over the effectiveness of the national and regional level policy support on the aircraft-manufacturing 
sector, the results from the firms residing within the Changwon Industrial Cluster showed mixed returns 
in terms of competitiveness sectors measured in price, product quality, and technology. But overall the 
survey indicated slightly above average performances in each sector examined. According to the survey, 
the corporations expressed difficulties in securing the right size and skilled manpower (32.6%), 
sufficient quantities of workloads (30.2%), adequate finances (27.9%), and so forth. The difficulties in 
manpower was mostly on securing quality technicians (37.2%), but also on shortages in R&D workforce 
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(20.9%), preference over big business corporations (14%), and scarce numbers in system designers 
(9.3%).593 
 
City Average Sectoral Competitive Category Price Product Quality Technology 
Average 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.9 
Changwon 3.8 3.4 4.2 3.9 
Gimhae 3.7 3.5 3.8 3.9 
Sacheon 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Hahman 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.0 
 Table 34. Aircraft Manufacturer’s Competitiveness Survey (Gyeongnam Province)       Measured in Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
 
In areas of competitive strengths and weaknesses extracted from the same survey, the JINSA 
Complex, or the overall aircraft-manufacturing sector in general, showed weaknesses in three primary 
areas. Firstly, in terms of the presence of a pivotal figure capable of adjudicating shortages in 
competitive resources, the JINSA Complex or the wider Gyeongnam Province showed weaknesses in 
such functions. The Complex was mostly reliant on corporate capacities in these adjudicating functions, 
in which corporate capacities fell far short in reaching out to other competitive surveyed areas such as 
in securing appropriate workforces, capital investments, technological opportunities, etc. Secondly, 
structure in educating and training the right workforce shows weak linkages with outside training 
institutions, which degrades further opportunities in attracting talented workers finding jobs in this 
sector. Structural linkages with local universities and training institutes also show weak connections in 
terms of building strong curriculums or R&D structures in support of constructing strategic networks. 
Lastly, weak linkages between the manufacturing base and service providers make it harder for firms 
to market aircraft products in the international markets. The significance of the aircraft-manufacturing 
sector requires extensive public and private partnership when promoting the respective end item against 
the apparent contenders in the international market. The capability shortfalls in these primary areas 
continue to pose challenges for the JINSA Complex, and the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector in 
general, in terms of upgrading the industrial structure into a high performance innovative area.594 
 
Components Sources of Competitiveness Strength Weakness 
Motivating 
Force 
Nationally designated strategic industry 
Nationally driven industry promotion 
Strong development motives by local government 
High reliance on government policy directions 
Insufficient support in attracting skilled workforce 
Insufficient local start-ups 
Environment 
Strongest concentration rate in aircraft manufacturing 
Close proximity of manufacturing firms 
Firms actively engaged in cooperative relations 
Avionic firms located in remote location 
High reliance on foreign components 
Limited supply chain and public finances 
Resource 
Strengthened R&D capacities in related sectors 
Close linkages with R&D institutions 
Strong cooperative linkages with global firms 
Increases in labor costs 
Poor corporate management skills 
Limitations in expanding public R&D capacities 
Coordinative 
Mechanism 
Business based network established 
Strong cooperative network between intermediate 
inputs 
Inadequate venture capital raised 
Weak linkages between manufacturers and service 
providers 
Lack of marketing functions 
                                                          
593 김영표, 경남의 항공산업 육성방안, 경남발전연구원 기본연구 2009-5, p. 49. 
594 Ibid., p. 65-68. 
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 Table 35. JINSA Complex Competitiveness Survey 
6.1.2. Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) and Component Manufacturing 
In conjunction with national and regional level clustering strategies, the associated industrial 
areas of component manufacturing and various engineering work were equally designated as a parallel 
business sector with high hopes to bolster the development of the aerospace industry. The MRO 
business has especially become a highly anticipated business area for aircraft-manufacturing firms 
considering the growing civil aviation market in both transport and cargo shipments. Almost all regional 
aerospace clusters associated the MRO field as a primary business sector to support its development 
strategies. For instance, the number of total civilian aircrafts managed by public authorities and 
domestic commercial airliners more than doubled from 290 in 2004 to 653 in 2014.595 The MRO work 
required to sustain the operation of this fleet of civilian aircrafts has become a self-sustaining business 
area of its own. 
The governing framework for MRO promotion is mandated in three separate legislations; 
Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act (administered by MOTIE); Aviation Act (MOLIT); 
Special Measures for Defense Industry Act (MND/DAPA). The field of component manufacturing is 
stipulated in the implementing marching orders of these baseline frameworks. Covering for both 
military aircrafts and commercial aviation, MOTIE’s 2010-2019 Aerospace Industry Development 
Framework Plan selects the MRO business as a strategic industrial sector for future development. In 
support of building local infrastructures and industrial competencies, the Framework Plan designated 
primary development regions for local clusters.596 The Aircraft Policy Framework Plan of 2015-2019 
describes the marching orders of MOLIT’s Aviation Act regarding the MRO segment. MOLIT is 
accountable for building industrial competencies in terms of land, transportation infrastructure, and 
supporting facilities. Therefore, MOLIT’s Framework Plan highlights a phased strategy to develop 
aerial transportation and MRO based on regional economic characteristics and competitiveness. 
According to the Plan, the MRO functions are clustered and distributed in civilian aviation (Incheon, 
Kimpo), engine repair (Changwon, Bucheon), and airframe repair (Kimhae).597  
In addition to the competitive dynamics represented in these MOLIT’s Framework Plan, other 
local governments expressed strong intentions in entering the MRO market. Aggregating its competitive 
advantage in electronics and precision science, in 2010, the Gyeongbuk Provincial Government mapped 
out a grandiose plan to aggressively invest public resources to establish a special industrial district 
highly specialized in avionics, aka the “Youngcheon Aero Techno Valley”. The investment scale 
grossed up to KRW 350 billion within a five-year period that supports a three phased development plan, 
including the construction of requisite R&D infrastructure for test and evaluation, associated component 
                                                          
595 Extracted from Aviation Data Portal System, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
596 2010-2019 Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan 
597 국토교통부 보도참고자료, 항공정비산업(MRO) 육성방안, 2015.1.15. 
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production, and research and education facilities.598 Most significant aspect of Gyeongbuk Province’s 
development strategy was the successful investment of Boeing Corporation to build a regional MRO 
center in support of providing performance based logistics (PBL) services for F-15K Fighters, E-737 
Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircrafts, and AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter Fleet used by 
the Korean Armed Forces. After a $20 million investment into the region, the Boeing avionics MRO 
center started business in June 2015 inside the Youngcheon Aero Techno Valley, which constitutes 
avionics production facilities, test, analysis, and certification centers, and so forth. The creation of 
Boeing’s regional facility has shortened the delivery lead time of critical components for the F-15K 
fleet from 8 months to 3 weeks. The presence of major Korean defense electronics firms such as LIG 
Nex1, Samsung Thales, and the Gumi Industrial Complex provides symbiotic business opportunities 
for the Boeing MRO Center. Also, the close proximity of local military airbases and airports also 
portrays the significance of the Youngcheon area as well.599  
In the defense sector, the Act on the Management of Military Supplies stipulates the legal 
credentials of MRO responsibilities. Traditionally, military depots performed the majority of 
maintenance and repair works, but the changing trend in system complexities reflects Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL) as an operating vehicle for military MRO. The essential concept of PBL 
considers the outsourcing of MRO work through an established contract with a commercial firm that 
partially or entirely covers the required spectrum of maintenance and repair responsibilities. The 
military still assumes the majority of maintenance and repair work, while the selection criterion for PBL 
contracting mostly relates to weapon systems that demonstrate low operational reliability in repair 
works, critical components with long lead delivery time, complex systems that require professional 
repair works, and so forth.600 The Ministry of National Defense first introduced the PBL concept in the 
2008 Defense Reform Framework Plan, and designated 13 programs in April 2009 as a demonstration 
project case. 601  Based on the objective of maintaining a full readiness posture in operational 
effectiveness, the expectation of this contractual arrangement is to hold the PBL firm accountable in 
retaining such military goals. 
Based on these growing MRO requirements for PBL contracting, the scope and scale has 
substantially increased in recent years. The defense budget for PBL contracting started with a modest 
KRW 48.1 billion in 2010, and increased almost tenfold to KRW 390 billion in 2014. Military aircrafts 
accounts for a major portion of the PBL contracts in this respect. 
 
                                                          
598 서대봉, “아태 항공부품 소재산업 허브는 경북,” 매일신문, 2010.5.26. 
599 하인식, “미국 보잉사 항공전자 MRO 센터 준공,” 한국경제, 2015.6.2. 
600 이경생 외, 성과기반군수(PBL)지원 계약제도 적용방안 연구, 안보경영연구원 09-021 방위사업청 용역과제, 
p. 8. 
601 The thirteen programs considered UAVs, K-10 Resupply Vehicle, decontamination equipment, torpedoes, KT/A-1, FA-
50, T/TA-50; 국방부, 전평시 장비가동률 향상으로 최상의 전투준비태세 유지, 정책브리핑 2009.4.23. 
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        Table 36. PBL Contracts on Aircrafts                    Source: 2015 Ministry of National Defense 
 
The performance outcomes of adopting PBL contracting methods in military MRO works 
resulted in shortening around 63-321 working days’ worth of contract administrative periods. This was 
a direct result of eliminating the supply chain risk factors by securing components and materials early 
enough at the time of signing the PBL contract.602 
 
*ICS: Internal Countermeasure Set 
Aircraft Type Scope Before PBL  After PBL Difference 
KT-1/KA-1 Component, Repair 209-220 days 10-145 days ↓ 64-210 days 
UAV Component 260 days 36 days ↓ 224 days 
KF-16 Engine Component 119 days 17 days ↓ 112 days 
T-50 Component, Repair 191-248 days 11-65 days ↓ 126-237 days 
F-15K Repairing ICS System 427 days 106-364 days ↓ 63-321 days 
Table 37. Shortened Procurement Period                                Source: 2015 Ministry of National Defense              
 
As of 2014, the domestic MRO market is estimated around KRW 3.2~3.4 trillion, accounting 
for both military aircrafts and civilian aviation. This is a 26-33% increase from the market size of 2003 
(KRW 2.4~2.7 trillion). The military sector constitutes about 56.9% in the domestic MRO market (KRW 
2 trillion), which is a 15.2% increase from that of 2003. Civilian aviation constitutes about KRW 1.4 
trillion, which is subdivided into airliner repair work (KRW 1.1 trillion), and aircraft manufacturing 
MRO work (KRW 370 billion).603 The growth potentials of the MRO business into the next five-year 
projection (2020) show a positive growth rate of 23.5%, which accounts for approximately KRW 4.25 
trillion. The growing projection of civil airliner transports (18% increase) and military aircrafts 
(between 1,400 to 1,500 aircrafts) represents the basis of such growth potentials.604 
                                                          
602 우제웅∙장기덕, 수리부속 조달 효율화를 위한 발전방향, KIDA 주간국방논단 제 1487 호, p. 8. 
603 안영수·민현기·김별아, 국내외 항공 MRO 산업의 최근 이슈, 산업연구원 Issue Paper 2015-387, pp. 15-17. 
604 Ibid., p. 68. 
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Unit: KRW 100 million 
 2003 2007 2014 
Commercial 9,063 10,576 14,400 
Military 15,000~18,000 15,000~18,000 18,000~20,000 
Total 24,063~27,063 25,576~28,576 32,400~34,400 
 Table 38. Domestic MRO Market 
 
The domestic MRO market share is primarily divided into workloads managed by airliners for 
local maintenance and repair functions, and aircraft manufacturing companies for military aircrafts or 
MRO contracts outsourced from overseas vendors. In terms of workloads covered by airliners, most of 
the MRO workshare is performed by domestic airliner companies such as Korean Air (airline sector) 
and Asiana Airlines. The two airliners run their own repair shop, but the scope of these repair functions 
exclusively cover the workload of the two respective domestic airliners and not the repair requirements 
available from other domestic or foreign airliners.605  Considering MRO workloads shared by aircraft 
manufacturers, three major companies compete over military contracts as well as foreign contracts. 
Korean Air operates the largest commercial depot maintenance programs for the Korean Air Force and 
U.S. Pacific Air Forces. Since the late 1970s, Korean Air conducted Programmed Depot Maintenance 
(PDM) over U.S. military aircrafts such as F-4, F-15, F-16, C-130, and so forth. Considering rotor wing 
aircrafts, Korean Air performed Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) and Preventative 
Maintenance Inspection (PMI) on CH-53, UH-60, CH-47 refurbishment, and so forth. In total annual 
sales, Korean Air earns about KRW 230 billion in overall maintenance work.606 The business portfolio 
of Hanwha Techwin, formerly Samsung Techwin, mostly consists of military engine repair works. 
Starting with the repair works in the late 1970s over the J79 gas turbine engines applied on F-4 
Phantoms aircrafts, Hanwha Techwin earns a revenue of approximately KRW 100 million a year.607 
KAI primarily engages in Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracts with the military over the KT-
1 Basic Trainer, KF-16 fighter, T-50 Advanced Supersonic Trainer, KUH-Surion Helicopter, and so 
forth. 
  
                                                          
605 Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, which accounts for almost 80% of the market share, dissect the domestic MRO market. 
However, the rapid growth of Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) airliners as well as the growing need of a regional MRO center for 
foreign airliners that connects into Incheon International Airport as a regional hub, calls for a strong initiative to promote 
domestic MRO  
606 Korean Air Tech Center briefing on U.S. Government Program History, Korean Air, December 2010. 
607 안영수·민현기·김별아, 국내외 항공 MRO 산업의 최근 이슈, 산업연구원 Issue Paper 2015-387, pp. 15-17 
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Unit: KRW 100 million 
Major Players Market Size Remarks 
Air Liners 
Korean Air 7,650-8,100 airframe, engine, internal aircraft repair cycle  (90% of workloads) 
Asiana Airlines 2,000-2,200 Internal aircraft repair cycle (40-50% of workloads) 
Low Cost Carriers 400-500 Internal aircraft repair cycle (20-30% of workloads) 
Subtotal 10,050-10,800 - 
Aircraft 
Manufacturers 
Korean Air 2,300 
Repair work outsourced from U.S. aerospace firms  
(KRW 75 billion annually) 
P3-L system upgrade and overhaul (KRW 400 billion) 
Hanwha Techwin 1,000 Major military engine repair and maintenance 
KAI 300-350 PBL work on KT-1, T-50, KUH 
Subtotal 3,600-3,650 - 
Total 13,650-14,450 - 
   Table 39. MRO Workshare by Major Aircraft Firms (2014    Source: KIET Annual Report on Domestic Aircraft Firms 
 
However, a number of structural issues become problematic in improving the competitiveness 
of the domestic MRO sector. At first, the domestic MRO businesses being locked into wasteful 
competition against each other becomes a factor that obstructs industrial growth in this sector. Domestic 
MRO firms can fully capitalize on the growing MRO needs not only generated from the domestic 
market demand, but also from international airliners connecting into Korean airports. Korean Low Cost 
Carrier (LCC) airliner services also seek quality MRO work in order to sustain its daily flight operations. 
But unfortunately, domestic airliners view the MRO sector as an auxiliary support branch that assists 
the air carriage and transport, and not as a promising business opportunity. The current work breakdown 
structure shows the two biggest domestic commercial MRO firms, Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, are 
restrictively constrained on its own airliner repair work, while not taking advantage of the expansive 
MRO opportunities offered from other international or domestic airliners. Hence, the domestic MRO 
business does not enjoy any economy of scale in this sector. Such aspect represents the domestic 
industry’s short sightedness and a dearth of strategic vision to bolster the MRO sector into a larger 
market.608 
The second element of wasteful competition is the absence of an effective adjudicating 
authority over the market. The intense competition among local governments to win government special 
subsidies in the MRO business shows indications of excessive investment and overlapping program 
developments. Such phenomenon is déjá vu of the 1990 competition structure of the aircraft-
manufacturing sector. The Aircraft Industry Regional and Functional Development Strategies under the 
Aerospace Industry Development Framework Plan describes the need to prevent overlapping 
investments among regions and industry sector in order to maximize capacity development. However, 
each provincial or municipal governments that hold a piece of involvement in the aircraft manufacturing 
sector have aspired to gain a chunk of government subsidies in the MRO business as an effort to attract 
external investment and grow local jobs. As of 2015, eight provincial governments – Incheon, 
Choongbuk, Choongnam, Gyeongbuk, Gyeongnam, Busan, Daegue, and Jeonbuk – were competing for 
the government’s exclusive designation as a local hub for MRO work. In the midst of such competition, 
                                                          
608 최영재, 항공정비산업 발전방안 정책기획연구, 국토교통부 정책용역과제, 2010.1, p. 58. 
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the lack of a strong coordinating mechanism that effectively controls and adjudicates overlapping 
industry interests and regional policy priorities causes another round of inter-industry and inter-regional 
competition.609 Especially, the fierce but prolonged competition between Gyeongnam (Sacheon) and 
Choongbuk (Cheongju) over hosting the MRO national industrial complex is a case where the absence 
of an adjudicating authority resulted in unnecessary investments and wasteful efforts in the same 
business field.610 
Thirdly, high labor costs and poor component localization worsens profitability of MRO firms. 
The business categories of MRO work consist of airframes, engines, components, and lines. Depending 
on the business categories, the proportion of labor costs and component purchases differs. For instance, 
components and material purchases constitute about 91% for engine repair work, whereas component 
and material purchases for line repair work constitutes about 23%. Therefore, considering the MRO 
business as a service intensive area for repairing and maintaining aircrafts, labor costs constitute a major 
factor in gaining comparative advantage against other firms.611 As of 2013, the average MRO wage 
scale on labor rate parities for Asian firms was $47 and growing, whereas U.S. firms was nearly $70. 
The business areas of Asian MRO firms were mostly concentrated in low tech/cost areas, whereas U.S. 
firms were mostly engaged in high tech/cost areas. On the other hand, the wage scale for Korean firms 
marked around $70~80 in 2013, which degrades the country’s competitive advantage in price in this 
field. 612  Profit margins per aircraft MRO units are low because of the high reliance on foreign 
components and technology. Due to the high reliance on foreign technology and components, about half 
of the net sales, approximately KRW 760 billion, from domestic MRO works is spent on purchasing 
foreign components and technology, which eventually shrinks the overall profit margins.613 
Fourthly, the division in responsibilities between different government agencies resulted in 
desynchronizing government policies. Instead, the uncoordinated implementation of agency-specific 
policy initiatives precluded each respective government entity from mobilizing public resources 
towards an agreed objective. Each government agencies, MND, MOLIT, and MOTIE initiated their 
own respective initiatives on MRO with different objectives and intentions, but resulted in overlapping 
programs and resources. Such agency differences in the absence of a strong coordinating mechanism 
subsequently resulted in overlapping business sectors. Especially, overlapping policy initiatives 
between MOTIE and MOLIT resulted in similar policy lines regarding concepts between industrial 
clusters (MOTIE) and industrial complex (MOLIT) in the aerospace sector. The MRO sphere comprises 
a key business sector within these agglomerated concepts. 
                                                          
609 안영수 외, “항공전자산업 연계형 거점부품단지 조성 기본계획 수립 및 타당성 조사 연구용역,” 
산업연구원, 2014, p. 72. 
610 최우영, “경남 vs. 충북 MRO 단지 유치전에 답보 상태,” 머니투데이, 2015.3.27. 
611 TeamSAI Consulting Services, Global MRO Market Economic Assessment, Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 
January 2014, p. 19. 
612 TeamSAI Consulting Services, A Time for Renewal: The Global MRO Forecast 2013–2023, 2013 MRO Americas 
Conference, p. 14. 
613 강윤경, “손 놓은 항공정비 시장…외국에 다 뺏길라,” 월간 마이더스, 2016 년 8 월호. 
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Government Policy Highlights Responsible Agency Remarks 
Aerospace Industry 
development Framework 
Plan (2010-2015) 
Designates primary and 
supporting regions in cluster 
and MRO policy 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, 
and Energy (MOTIE) 
Part of the 13 original 
strategic industry 
development agendas 
Aviation Policy 
Framework Plan (2014) 
Technologically upgrade the 
sector into high tech through 
MRO 
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and 
Transportation (MOLIT) 
Requires KRW 60 billion in 
national budget between 
2015-2019 
Directives on 
Performance Based 
Logistics Support 
Open defense R&D 
functions to commercial 
entities (MRO functions) 
Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) 
In order to enhance military 
readiness posture 
Table 40. Overlaps in MRO Related Regional Development Policies 
 
Because of such insufficient coordination structure, the MOTIE initiated component 
localization efforts concluded with a disappointing scorecard. The original intent of aspiring to become 
a world class aerospace manufacturer by developing competitive technical capacities in components 
and composite materials, supported by enormous government subsidies proportionate to the proposed 
program scale. Government subsidies provided with no collateral, noninterest incurring matching funds 
was to sponsor the development of new technology, acquirement of core technology, and 
commercialization of those findings. Nevertheless, the complex and difficult application-review 
structure managed by the MOTIE-Korea Institute of Economy and Trade-Aerospace Technology 
Research Association, discouraged small and medium firms from seeking government assistance in this 
respect. Thus, after less than three years of its initiation, the program application rate plummeted 
substantially, rendering the review board meaningless, and the subsequent reduction of the sponsoring 
resources.614 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
Competition Rate 1.6:1 1.3:1 1:1 
Public Funding KRW 850 million KRW 1.12 billion KRW 646 million 
    Table 41. Competition for Government Subsidies on Component Localization 
The uncoordinated structure also caused overlaps in distributing public resources in terms of 
maintaining government owned aircrafts. The number of helicopters operated by government entities 
other than the military such as the National Police Agency, Forest Service, medical institutions, and a 
variety of other local governments account for about 180 units. As of 2010, the Forest Service 
outsources 100% of its heavy maintenance needs to foreign companies. Other agencies contract their 
own MRO services with mostly foreign entities as well. Neither of these organizations show combined 
efforts in the sense of streamlining the overlaps or making use of existing domestic resources regarding 
routine depot maintenance and repair work. The Korean military runs six (6) maintenance depots 
specialized in aircraft MRO. None of these depots accommodates the public maintenance and repair 
services generated from the government side at all. Thus, despite the government’s declaratory slogans 
over the efforts to bolster the MRO sector, the amount of public resources, as well as future business 
opportunities, become wasted in the seeming numbers of overlapping contracts with foreign services 
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without fully utilizing its current capacities due to the lack of non-existent coordination authorities 
claiming responsibility over these technical needs.615 
Lastly, in the military sector as of 2017, PBL contracting still remains in its nascent 
implementation stage within the Korean Armed Forces, in which the concept needs further scrutiny in 
order to revamp this method as a new business platform to bolster the aircraft-manufacturing sector. 
The current PBL practice mostly remains in a low point where most of the awarded contracts primarily 
focus on promptly delivering component support to shorten the delivery lead-time and reduce 
procurement costs of critical spare parts to the customer. The scope of PBL contracts do not adequately 
reach out to system upgrades or overhaul work that requires substantial systems engineering designing 
capabilities and accumulated technical experiences. Thus, most of the PBL firms currently serve simply 
as component suppliers, but not system providers.616 Thus, PBL concepts contributes marginally in 
promoting domestic firms to localize components and secure a long lead time for accumulating critical 
technological experiences in concept design. 
The military’s emphasis on deploying military aircrafts instead of acquiring the requisite 
knowledge and technology experience has placed the status of the component manufacturing sector low 
in priority. In this regard, the localization rate of military aircrafts marks less than 55%, which makes 
the aircraft-manufacturing sector highly reliant under foreign components and materials, intellectual 
property rights, and furthermore under stringent technology security measures. Such aspect holds the 
domestic deployment of these aircrafts under restrictive foreign export control regulations in terms of 
technology development and MRO work related opportunities. 617  The low rates in technology 
localization has consequently resulted in poor collaboration between local clusters and the defense 
sector. Overseas outsourcing of a number component support and services brought about high reliance 
on costly foreign resources whereas low utilization of locally available industrial capacities.618 Such 
aspects pose significant challenges in building up a robust MRO sector in support of a robust regional 
industrial cluster. 
 
6.2. Sectoral Level Innovation Systems: State Business Relations: Industrial Settings 
and Competition Structure 
Not only does the small and constrained scale of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector obstruct 
further growth opportunities, but the structure itself continues to preclude the industry to evolve into 
global standards. The industry is dominated by one or two big business conglomerates associated with 
subcontractors arranged in a production life cycle intertwined in research and development, 
manufacturing, and licensing, where the major customer base is overly reliant on military programs that 
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are tightly under international technology security restrictions. Thus, the overarching landscape is an 
inflexibly inverted pyramid structure, where a volatile supply chain presents unstable business 
conditions for subcontractors and component suppliers. In this regard, the industry is in dire needs to 
diversify into international markets and production lineups into more commercial categories to expand 
marketing opportunities. 
 
6.2.1. Competitive Dynamics of Aircraft manufacturing before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis 
In the late 1980s, with the growing market demand generated by lucrative military aircraft 
projects, the aircraft manufacturing business emerged as the next gold mine for big business 
conglomerates and was publicized by the government with high anticipations to upgrade Korea’s 
industrial and technological competitiveness to a more advanced playing ground. The primary 
motivation was the perception that the Korean industry can no longer maintain its competitive edge in 
labor-intensive manufacturing sectors with the continued increase of labor costs and apparent 
limitations in productivity. As such, the aircraft-manufacturing sector captured the attention of industry 
strategists as a window to transition the domestic industry structure into capital intensive advanced 
technological fields. In this aspect, the government and major conglomerates strived in every part of its 
dimension to promote an overly promising business forecast in order to lure domestic and foreign 
investments into the sector.  
A very typical industry forecast publicized by the government and major conglomerates 
illustrated that the demand pull of the commercial aviation sector until year 2000 will likely be worth 
of 5,311 aircrafts ($278.3 billion), while the military aircraft sector until year 1995 will likely be 21,752 
aircrafts ($350 billion).619 The major defense projects dubbed, ‘Eight Major Aircraft Development 
Program’, which included heavy helicopters, fighter aircrafts, advanced trainers, and so forth, along 
with de-regulation policies that lowered entry barriers into the market, created a strong demand pull 
that motivated both public and private investments into a growing industrial field. The government 
initiated a number of incentives to lift the ban of the restrictive aircraft-manufacturing sector for local 
businesses by providing tax breaks, financial support, and enacting deregulation measures. Earlier, the 
support structure of the Promotion Act of 1978 was to classify aircraft business permits into three 
categories (designated, licensed, registered). In relations to the Special Measures Act of the Defense 
Industry, the aircraft sector was subject to Specialization and Systemization. Within the designated 
category, the competitive structure was shared between Korean Air (Total Airframe Manufacturer) and 
Samsung Precision (Engine Manufacturer), where Daewoo Heavy Industries slid into the niche market 
as a component manufacturer.  
On 9 May 1986, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced a mid-term development 
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plan with lowered entry barriers that included government subsidies for companies to acquire special 
tools and appliances, reduced customs for raw material imports, and additional tax breaks on corporate 
investments in the aircraft-manufacturing sector. Thus, the underlying intent was to overcome the split 
competition structure of the industry between Korean Air and Samsung Aerospace by removing the 
restrictive barriers and encouraging new entrants for improved competition.620 The intent was further 
reflected in the AIDPA of 1987, where the clauses for permits in the previous Promotion Act was 
streamlined to only require a simple registration process to enter the aircraft industry. The registration 
process was later eliminated in the revised AIDPA of 1999, which allowed full competition within the 
domestic industry.621  
 
Business Rivalries: Cutthroat Competition over Eight Major Aircraft Development Programs 
During the early incubation period of aircraft manufacturing in the late 1970s, state-led strong 
industrial directives and government authorities shaped the initial construct of the sector. However, as 
the economy entered into the 1980s, state driven initiatives and control over the sector turned weak and 
were replaced by market forces, in which the competitive dynamics between established firms in the 
sector, notably the big family led conglomerates, chaebols, became more evident. 
The continued entry of new firms into the domestic market during the mid-1980s has created a 
dog-eat-dog situation where multiple firms were excessively making overinvestments in competition 
over the same defense program. New business entries into the market was prompted by government 
instigation to attract more private investments over a definite share of business opportunities, while 
providing no regulative buffers to safeguard corporate resources and commitments. Intense competition 
over a finite amount of business opportunities was deteriorating technological competitiveness of the 
domestic industry. The opportunities announced by the government were the ‘Eight Major Aircraft 
Development Project’, that included the Korea Fighter Program (KFP: F-16 Fighting Falcon), Heavy 
Helicopter Experiment (HX: UH-60 Black Hawk), Korea Light Helicopter (KLH: Bo-105), and so forth. 
Approximately 40 domestic companies responded to these promotional forecasts and swiftly organized 
corporate strategies to enter the domestic aircraft market. 
Big businesses such as Korean Air, Samsung Aerospace, and Daewoo Heavy Industries 
predominated the domestic market, but late entrants such as Sammi, Hyundai, Daewoo, etc., attempted 
to penetrate the entry barriers by strategically aligning with global aircraft firms such as Sikorsky, 
Augusta, Bell, and so forth. 622  In order to streamline the competition structure, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, on 20 July 1990, designated three primary companies within the sector – 
Samsung Aerospace, Korean Air, Daeweoo Heavy Industries – as specialized firms for aircraft 
manufacturing, and expressed intentions to concentrate public resources to nurture these firms into 
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global standards. Other firms that were not blessed with this specialized designation was forced to leave 
the industry.623 Henceforth, both government and industry heralded aircraft manufacturing as a new 
gold rush to secure better business deals within the fledgling sector. 
 
Aircraft Type Program Name Contract Awarded 
Fixed Wing F-16 Production (KFP) Samsung Aerospace (SSA) 
T-50 Development (KTX-2) Samsung Aerospace (SSA) 
KT-1 Development (KTX-1) Daewoo Heavy Industries (DHI) 
F-4 / F-5 Upgrade – program downsized Korean Air 
Mid-sized Commercial Airliner – program canceled Samsung Aerospace 
Rotor Wing UH-60 Production (HX-Heavy) Korean Air 
Bo-105 Production (KLH) – program downsized Daewoo Heavy Industries (DHI) 
UH-1H Upgrade (HX-Light) – program canceled DHI / SSA 
 Table 42. Eight Major Aircraft Development Programs raised in the late 1980s  
 
The other side of the story, however, portrays a very contradictory anecdote. The government 
designation of the three chaebols as specialized aircraft-manufacturing firms created an onset of 
unnecessary competition over a limited share of a small market. Most other countries vying to promote 
the domestic aircraft-manufacturing base select a national champion that become beneficiaries to a 
bundle of state-led industrial stimulation policies, spanning from R&D support, financial assistance, 
international marketing efforts, and so forth. The selection of three chaebol firms, who mostly 
performed in overlapping business sectors with similar technological competencies, resulted in creating 
a vicious rivalry composition against each other. As a matter of fact, business earnings in aircraft 
manufacturing remained low in proportion. For instance, in 1991, Samsung Aerospace earned 28.4% 
from aircraft manufacturing, whereas Daewoo Heavy Industries and Korean Air each earned about 3.4% 
and 5.9%. Reviewing the business performances of aircraft manufacturing firms, the entire industry 
suffered from constant deficits where the overall balance sheet was marked KRW 30 billion in red ink, 
which represents 14% of business losses from the industry’s sales statement. 624 This implies that 
aircraft manufacturing stayed low in priority within the businesses and was not considered a major 
business area for Chaebol conglomerates despite all the auspicious statements made by government and 
top management about the highly anticipated outlook of the industry. 
The government stance against such excessive competition was considered almost incompetent. 
Various declaratory policy lines to support and nurture the industry were dubious and received large 
skepticism from the industry. Basically, the public authorities such as the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Science and Technology, and so forth seem to have 
almost no control over the ferocious competition among the major aircraft firms.625 While government 
mitigation roles were in question, aircraft manufacturing firms seriously perceived the redundancy and 
superfluous competitive industrial structure. On February 1988, under the adjudication of the Federation 
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of Korean Industries, thirteen aircraft manufacturers agreed to establish a coordinating mechanism 
within the industry that can mitigate excessive competition and redundant investments within the 
industry. The Korea Aerospace Industries Association (KAIA) was created under this expectation. The 
corporate objective of KAIA was to promote cooperative research and share marketing knowledge of 
Korean manufactured aircraft products – while alleviating unnecessary rivalries and avoiding cutthroat 
competitions.626 However, industry cooperation never took place in the domestic market. Government 
mitigation efforts were inconsistent and ineffective, major conglomerates refused to cooperate, and 
industry R&D activities ceded to international aerospace giants and never efficaciously came into 
fruition. The delayed establishment of KAIA exemplifies the tardy movement of this cooperative 
mechanism. Despite the general consensus to create a government-industry coordination mechanism, 
the opening ceremony of KAIA had to wait until September 1992, after nearly four years since its 
inaugural announcement. Between the incubation periods, the major conglomerates continued to 
fiercely compete against each other over the chairmanship of the association. The conglomerates viewed 
the chairmanship as a position to exert preferential influence over contractor selection in the proposed 
Eight Major Aircraft Development Projects. In this regard, Samsung Aerospace, Korean Air, and 
Daewoo Heavy Industries furiously battled each other to take over the KAIA chairmanship position 
throughout the years.627 
Low performance margins and the unpredictable domestic market during the early to mid-1990s 
also brought uncertainty into industry integrity. Market mechanisms did not properly function because 
of inadequate government intervention into the market. Instead of interacting as a catalyst to strengthen 
the technological foundations and business qualities, government support packages were manipulative 
and distortive towards the market. Under the guise of providing protection against external competition, 
the government’s industrial sponsorship was not necessarily shaped to build firm competence or 
bolstering a healthy technical base. Government policies were more likely implemented towards simply 
sustaining the production base by constantly pumping in revenues to prolong the scanty existence of 
domestic aircraft firms. Despite the big business conglomerates, such as Samsung, Daewoo, Hyundai, 
and Korean Air, constituted the major players of the industry, most of the workload of these companies 
were not on manufacturing major end items but merely on subcontracted workloads from global defense 
firms such as Boeing or Airbus. Technology development efforts were primarily dependent through 
technology transfer mediums from U.S. and Western European firms, while the domestic basis for firm 
level R&D stayed under insignificant standards. Government deregulation policies forced corporations 
to seek international alliances instead of building internal technological capabilities, because companies 
were compelled to acquire requisite technical components in a compressed timeline in order to comply 
with major milestones of a defense acquisition program. Major defense programs such as the UH-60 
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and F-16 coproduction was about to end in 1998 without a solid commitment to pursue follow-up 
programs. Samsung Aerospace allied with Bell Helicopters to enter the international and domestic rotor 
wing market by license producing the commercial B-407 Light Helicopter. Daewoo Heavy Industries 
attempted to acquire a Polish helicopter firm while sought strategic alliance opportunities with 
European firms such as Augusta and Eurocopter. Hyundai and Korean Air aligned with McDonnell 
Douglas and Sikorsky to broaden the spectrum of international markets and technical partnership.628  
In this regard, domestic firms became unduly reliant on international partners as subcontractors, 
whereas building technical competence in system design and integration capacities became far more 
restrictive. 
 
6.2.2. Asian Financial Crisis and the Consolidation of the Aircraft-manufacturing sector 
The predominance of the developmental state theorem was seriously disrupted by the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997. As the structural deficiencies of the Korean economy amassed in the 1990s, a 
series of deteriorating economic performances such as sluggish growth rates, reduced international trade, 
and the resulting heavy pressure on the thin margins of firms have consequently weakened Korea’s 
durability against external shock. As a result, a chain reaction of corporate insolvency and bankruptcy 
over large family run business conglomerates, Chaebol, started to bring down the entire economy, which 
eventually placed the country into financial default that urged for an immediate bailout by international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.629 
There are a number of studies that reviewed the causal effects of the Asian Financial Crisis based on 
international and domestic motives. One of the main explanations focuses on the domestic reasons 
where moral hazards in state-business relations manipulated the government’s role of supervising high-
risk firm investments. As such, instead of the Chaebol firms taking full responsibility of their 
mismanaged investment portfolios, the highly privatized corporate risks were effectively socialized and 
deferred to public.630 Other arguments relevant to the line of debate considers the reduced capacities of 
the government in disciplining businesses in the process of the diminishing influence of authoritarian 
rule after the country’s transition into a democratic society.631 In addition to these factors, the constant 
trending of market liberalization initiatives implemented through deregulation efforts lifted entry 
barriers for corporations entering traditional stronghold sectors where a handful of domestic firms used 
to enjoy monopoly privileges.632 In this aspect, unregulated market disorders disproportionately grew 
out of government control, where public authorities were unable to supervise and adjudicate corporate 
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behaviors. The investment boom, especially in the heavy and chemical manufacturing sector, between 
1994 and 1996 demonstrates such unregulated firm investment behavior in the period of diminishing 
government control over the market. During the three-year period, investment in facility tools and 
equipment increased by 38.5% per year. Especially between 1994 and 1995, investment grew at rates 
each year by 56.2% and 43.5%. These investments were heavily capitalized by short-term overseas 
borrowings, in which the proportion borrowed from foreign financial sources accounted for nearly 21% 
of the entire capital investments.633 
After the country’s debts were put on hold by international financial authorities, a series of 
structural reform processes over the public and private sector ensued. Corporate reform process was 
predicated over the assertion that the Chaebol centric industrial structure engendered exorbitant 
investments and superfluous diversification, where public authorities can no longer effectively regulate 
and control due to the lack of appropriate restraining instruments to administer despotic business 
decisions made by the founding family of the Chaebol firms. Hence, a new institution that gives 
weighted value on checks and balances over Chaebol firms, financial establishments, and shareholder 
interests was introduced after the Asian Financial Crisis. At first, the government announced the ‘Big 
Deal’ program with the objective to swap overlapping business sectors among Chaebol firms, and the 
‘Workout’ program with the objective to rehabilitate financial difficulties. Fair trading regulations and 
financial supervision were strengthened to restrict overinvestments of Chaebols into high risk areas and 
prevent redundant program transactions. Lastly, market regulations to protect minority shareholder 
rights were implemented to hinder despotic decision-makings of majority shareholders, who were 
predominantly the Chaebol owner families.634 
 
Industrial Sector Big Deal Arrangement Post Big Deal Status 
Automobiles/ 
Electronics 
Divestment of Samsung Motors, Daewoo Motors, 
and Daewoo Electronics 
Samsung Motors acquired by Renault 
Daewoo Motors acquired by General Motors 
Daewoo Electronics primarily acquired by 
Dongbu Group 
Semiconductors Merger between Hyundai Electronics and LG Semiconductors 
Hynix formed and subsequently acquired by 
SK  
Oil Refining Divestment of Hanwha Engergy’s oil refining sector to Hyundai Oilbank Hyundai Oilbank 
Petrochemical Merger between Hyundai Petrochemical and Samsung General Chemicals 
Canceled due to disagreement with Japanese 
creditor (Mitsui) 
Electricity 
Generation  
Divest the electricity generation business of 
Samsung and Hyundai Heavy Industries to Korea 
Heavy Industries 
Korea Heavy Industries (state owned) 
privatized and sold to Doosan Heavy 
Industries Marine and Boat 
Engine 
Divest Samsung’s marine engine sector to Korea 
Heavy Industries 
Railway Vehicles Joint establishment between Hyundai, Daewoo, and Hanjin 
Korea Railway Vehicle Co. in 1997 sold to 
Hyundai Rotem 
Aerospace 
Merger of aircraft-manufacturing sector of 
Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Heavy Industries, 
and Hyundai Space & Aerospace 
Establishment of Korea Aerospace Industries 
in October 1999 
Table 43. Big Deal Business Arrangements, reproduced from October 1997 FKI News Release and News Archives 
                                                          
633 Stephan Haggard and Jongryn Mo, “The Political Economy of the Korean Financial Crisis,” Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000, p. 200. 
634 Jang-Sup Shin and Ha-Joon Chang, Restructuring Korea Inc., Routledge Curzon, 2003, p. 84. 
 222 
 
Restructuring Process: Preconditions of Industry Consolidation before the Asian Financial Crisis 
During the mid-1990s, the aircraft-manufacturing sector already went through intense debates 
over the possibility of consolidating the industry structure into a unified government sponsored 
corporation. After observing the trend of mega mergers and acquisitions in the global aerospace and 
defense industry, the Korean government undertook a slim attempt in early 1995 to restructure the 
domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector by consolidating the three major Chaebol firms – Korean Air, 
Daewoo Heavy Industry, and Samsung Aerospace.635  
Considering the long gestation period, only large firms that can withstand the volatile market 
demands, which is directly reactive to economic and political challenges, are suitable to survive in the 
global value chain of aircrafts. This sectoral characteristic of the aircraft industry triggered the massive 
consolidation activities between firms, which eventually concluded in the duopolistic structure of the 
global aircraft industry, predominated by Boeing and Airbus in the commercial sector, and Lockheed 
Martin and EADS in the military sector. Putting into account of the global trend of mega mergers and 
the need to create a scaled economy for the domestic industry, the Ministry of National Defense initiated 
a directive to streamline the disseminated R&D and production capacities in order to effectively manage 
the Eight Major Aircraft Development Programs. The Consolidation Strategy for Military Aircraft 
Development Programs, which was directed by the Ministry on March 21, 1996, intended to manage 
the industry under restrictive government control by an interagency effort called the Aircraft Industry 
Planning Group, create an industry consortium for cooperative marketing and R&D, and designate 
aircraft manufacturing firms as Specialized and Systematized firms under support of defense industrial 
subsidies.636 However, because of the sharp disagreement between the Chaebols and the incapacity of 
the government, the consolidation effort never materialized into a real plan.637  
 As a precursor of the industry Big-Deal project, government authorities and aircraft 
manufacturers engaged in a series of discussions in June 1997 before the shock wave of the financial 
crisis impacted on the Korean entire economy. The industry forecast showed gloomy prospects of 
business opportunities because there would be no new orders after the F-16 license production ceded in 
1998. Government authorities showed extreme reluctance and hesitance in making program decisions 
on the Eight Major Aircraft Development Programs because of stark differences over budget availability 
and technical challenges even before the financial crisis became real.638 In the technological sense, 
despite the twenty years of running the aircraft manufacturing business, the industry failed to effectively 
accumulate critical knowledge and technology that would successfully upgrade the sector into the 
domains of high value-added opportunities. With a short term narrow vision to win military aircraft 
programs, the major firms committed most of its resources primarily into component production and 
                                                          
635 김성걸, “항공산업 통합 추진,” 한겨레, 1995.3.16. 
636 동아일보, “군용기 개발사업 통합추진,” 1995.3.23. 
637 김성걸, “방위산업 업체별 나눠먹기,” 한겨레, 1996.10.9. 
638 홍성범, 민군겸용 패러다임과 기술개발전략, 과학기술정책관리연구소 정책보고 94-01, p. 82.  
 223 
subcontracted assembly work instead of exerting efforts to accumulate experiences in the realm of 
system design and integration. The government also preferred direct purchases through foreign sourcing 
instead of indigenous development, in which compelled domestic firms to concentrate on subparts and 
components instead of complete aircraft forms. Because of these aspects, the overall technological 
readiness level in system integration, which included system design, manufacturing, program 
management, and marketing capacities, was comparatively marked less than 30% against other 
advanced aircraft manufacturing countries.639 
The collapse of the ROK-China Regional Airliner Program provided the catalyst for the 
consolidation movement. On 18 June 1996, after three rounds of negotiations, the Aircraft 
Subcommittee of the ROK-China Industrial Cooperation Committee broke down and concluded to not 
pursue the cooperative development of the regional airliner program. The objective of the co-
development program was to expand the aircraft manufacturing portfolio into the commercial sector in 
order to secure a sound amount of new orders. As a result of two Presidential meetings, the two countries 
agreed to initiate a cooperative development program to manufacture midsized regional jet planes that 
can absorb the growing East Asian market. Initially, the two countries agreed in principle to split the 
70-80% share of development costs, while introduce a third partner that can invest 20-30% into the 
program. After fierce competition over the joint development program, Samsung Aerospace was 
awarded the contract among the three aircraft manufacturing companies to manage the Korean portion 
of the overall development and assembly work of the main airframe. But in order to maintain the 
production capabilities of the domestic industry, the arrangement was adjusted by MOCI to equally 
distribute the remaining share of the development and manufacturing work with the other two 
competitors, Daewoo Heavy Industries and Korean Air.640 On the other hand, the Chinese counterparts 
withdrew from this proposal and insisted the Korean investment be limited to 12%. Also, the Chinese 
suggested to establish the final assembly line at Shanghai. The Korean position was acceptable with the 
Shanghai assembly line, but the 12% share of the program was not acceptable. Korea intended to at 
least take part in the special coating and interior work of the aircraft by introducing engineering 
techniques adopted from Airbus, but the Chinese did not accept this counter proposal.641 At this point, 
after witnessing the trilateral agreement between the European Union, China, and Singapore to establish 
a joint venture for developing a regional airliner, the Chinese did not seem to have much enthusiasm in 
pursuing a joint aircraft development program with the Koreans in the first place.642 Hence, securing 
additional workloads by structural right sizing of the industry turned into a more desperate undertaking 
for domestic firms. 
In this respect, a consensus was built among the four major aircraft manufacturers regarding 
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the idea to divest the aircraft sector into a single entity, with high expectations that the government 
provide the requisite finances to sustain the industry until new defense projects materialized. However, 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry refused to participate in the new venture after a few months of 
deliberation. The government policy at that time was to commercialize existing public enterprises, 
whereas the industry’s request to transform the aircraft-manufacturing sector into a state-owned 
company would defy all the established rules and principles in terms of reducing the role of government 
control over the market.643 
What exacerbated the situation was the Asian Financial Crisis itself when the entire economy 
fell into the bottomless pit of short-term overseas debts. The net sales of the four major aircraft 
manufacturers – Samsung, Daewoo, Korean Air, and Hyundai – earned lesser than not only the 
companies of major G7 countries, but also lesser than peer competitors of the same tier group such as 
Israel and Taiwan. Despite the dire situation to build a scaled economy and foundational skills with 
associated infrastructures to compete in the global market, domestic firms were primarily engaged in a 
ruthless battle against each other over a slice of the finite domestic market share. On the contrary, 
foreign firms that strategically aligned with domestic firms gained a critical foothold to enter the 
domestic market. The public finances subjugated under the financial stewardship of the International 
Monetary Fund forced the government to exercise fiscal austerity, which compelled the cancellation or 
postponement of major defense programs. The Korea Multiple Helicopter (KMH) development 
program, a multibillion-dollar deal to build a multi-purpose platform for utility and attack functions was 
cancelled in 1997. Companies like Korean Air and Daewoo Heavy Industries that invested billions of 
dollars in equipment and production facilities in preparation for the KMH contract award had to 
consider the possibility of converting the capital investments into other business opportunities. Samsung 
Aerospace, who was awarded the Korea Trainer Experience-II (KTX-2: T-50 Development) in October 
1997, had to weather-out the production gap between the end of F-16 production and the KTX-2 full 
rate production phase.644 As mentioned above, the near cancellation of the Korea Light Helicopter 
(KLH: Bo-105) cost Daewoo Heavy Industries millions of dollars in business losses, which completely 
destroyed the financial solvency of the company’s defense sector.645  
 
Industry Restructuring Process and the Establishment of the Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) 
 The overall restructuring process was conducted under the auspices of the Corporate 
Restructuring Committee under the Financial Supervisory Commission, which was then again under 
strong control of the Presidential Office. Although the creditor group supervised the restructuring 
process, the Financial Supervisory Commission, represented by the Corporate Restructuring Committee, 
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took the actual lead in the overarching components of industrial restructuration. The implementing 
principles of the restructuring process followed five components; 1) business consolidation into core 
competence areas; 2) capital structure improvement; 3) elimination of cross-debt guarantee; 4) 
enhancement of management transparency; 5) improvement of management accountability.646 Only 
after complying with these principles shall the government exert efforts to salvage ailing companies 
with relief funds and public support. These principles were strictly applied to the restructuring process 
of the aircraft-manufacturing sector. 
As previously stated, aircraft manufacturing firms – Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Heavy 
Industries, Hyundai Space and Aviation, Korean Air – were constantly discussing the terms for 
consolidation even before the financial crisis as the industrial sector dived into overcapacity through 
excess investments. The financial crisis expedited the consolidation process, in which the four major 
firms agreed to establish the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation in the interim of continued 
restructuration efforts. However, Korean Air withdrew from the consolidation discussion, complaining 
that Samsung Aerospace was manipulating the consolidation process in favor of its own corporate 
survival. Thus, the remaining three companies became subject to the restructuration process. In 
September 1998, the three companies signed a memorandum of understanding to consolidate the 
aircraft-manufacturing sector of the three companies. Later that year, the three companies agreed to 
reduce 30% of its assets as an effort to reduce corporate debts, with a desire to receive government 
rescue packages in the process of saving its failing businesses. As part of the restructuring process, there 
was a need to substantially reduce the corporate debts of all three aircraft manufacturing companies 
combined in the outbreak of the financial crisis was about KRW 1.42 trillion. After disposing of 
approximately KRW 731 billion worth of corporate assets, including the entire estate and manufacturing 
assets of Hyundai Space and Aircraft located at the Seosan Manufacturing Line, the corporate debt ratio 
fell below 246%, with a remaining corporate debt of KRW 550 billion.647  
Despite these efforts, the Corporate Restructuring Committee assessed these efforts as 
insufficient and refused to inject immediate financial salvage funds to rescue the aircraft-manufacturing 
sector. The main reason for the refusal were; 1) unpredictable business opportunities caused by strong 
reliance on military programs; 2) high necessity to attract foreign capital investments. The first reason 
primarily refers to the fact of being too reliant on military projects, which have constantly presented 
foggy aspects of business development caused by government indecisiveness and inconsistencies. 
Therefore, there was a need to diversify the business portfolio of the newly consolidated aircraft 
corporation. If the new corporation does not overcome this aspect, then the future prognosis of the 
company would remain gloomy. The second element refers to the international creditor’s view of the 
Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector. Business investments into the consolidated Korean aircraft sector 
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by international creditor groups would indicate positive credentials for a bright future prospect of the 
industry. In that sense, the Corporate Restructuring Committee demanded to develop solid business 
opportunities in commercial aircraft manufacturing as well as to attract international investments in 
order for the new corporation to receive the financial support in need.648  
The solution provided to mitigate the concerns of the Committee was to have all three 
companies invest into the new corporation with equal share in stakes, provided that the board of trustees 
appoint a professional business manager as the Chief Executive Officer with demonstrated proficiency 
in corporate management practices and intact from external influence. Moreover, the three companies 
agreed to distribute 33% of the share to foreign investments.649 To attain this end, the consolidated 
corporate headquarters of the three aircraft firms proactively sought for foreign investments from each 
of their respective foreign partners such as BAe, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Aerospatiale, and so forth. 
Each of these international partners had a vested interest in the potential business opportunities of the 
Korean domestic market, primarily focused on the military sector. Thus, the companies were negotiating 
the terms over investing approximately $200 million in initial shares over this newly established Korean 
aircraft manufacturing firm.650 Only after showing the sincere efforts for restructuring the consolidation 
process did the government started delivering the support packages to rescue the aircraft sector.  
In April 1999, the government approved the restructuration process through the Aerospace 
Industry Development Policy Council. In reference to the Aerospace Industry Development Promotion 
Act and Special Measures on the Defense Industrial Base, the new corporation was designated as a 
specialized entity in aircraft manufacturing, which awarded government priority assurances in defense 
contracts. Later that year, in October 1999, under the auspices of the Corporate Restructuring 
Committee, Samsung Aerospace, Daewoo Heavy Industries, and Hyundai Space and Aviation divested 
each of their aircraft manufacturing divisions, and consequently established the Korea Aerospace 
Industries Limited (KAI). Bundles of preferential treatment were provided to KAI as it was awarded 
exclusive privileges as a specialized aircraft manufacturing firm under the Specialization and 
Systemization Act in support of the general defense industrial base.651 
However, despite these restructuration efforts, corporate management and business 
performance of the newly created KAI during the first five years did not sufficiently meet public 
expectations. The consolidation itself was incomplete where Samsung Aerospace did not divest its 
engine sector and Korean Air refused to participate and decided to go separate ways. Aircraft engine 
development requires highly accurate precision technology, which can spillover to other industrial fields 
of manufacturing. The international trend in aircraft manufacturing typically separates airframe 
manufacturing and aircraft engine development because the two areas require distinctively different 
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engineering skill sets, where aircrafts have high demands in integrative design and systems engineering 
technology, whereas aircraft engines concentrates in precision instrumentation. Samsung’s 
specialization in engine development allowed the sector to diversify into centrifugal air compressors, 
semi-conductor chip mounting, optoelectronics, and other high valued business areas that presented 
lucrative growth opportunities in the market.652 Also, the consolidation process had little incentive for 
Samsung considering its established partnership with major international engine companies such as 
Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. Samsung invested more in anti-corrosion technology and turbine 
blades in order to broaden its business areas as part of maintaining this partnership.653 
On the other hand, Korean Air was not in a position to participate voluntarily in the restructuring 
process. Korean Air claimed that the proposed terms for consolidation raised by the Council worked in 
contrary to the company’s demand for maintaining a preferential monopoly status within the aircraft-
manufacturing sector. However, there is another layer to this story that relates to the dark history of 
state-business collusion in Korea.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, the company was under intense public criticism for the number of plane 
crashes occurred in the years preceding the Asian Financial Crisis. Presenting favoritism to Korean Air 
                                                          
652 연합뉴스, “삼성항공, 회사명 변경작업 착수,” 1999.10.14. 
653 연합뉴스, “삼성항공, 엔진부문 민수사업 비중 확대,” 1999.9.9. 
Figure 21. Consolidated Aircraft Corporation Organizational Structure 
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in such deteriorating circumstances could risk political votes to the incumbent Kim Dae Jung 
Administration at the time. Moreover, Korean Air’s absence in the government led consolidation effort 
represented a case that symbolizes the malicious convention of crony capitalism between the state and 
family-run Chaebol firms in Korea. A direct accusation raised by Korean Air executives considered the 
marginalization of Korean Air in its own business sector against its rivals was strongly influenced by 
political forces at the time. During the early years of the Kim Dae Jung Presidency (1998 – 2003), 
Korean Air was penalized by tax authorities for tax evasion and money laundering. Also, Korean Air 
lost a number of opportunities to its archrival Asiana Airlines in inaugurating new international flight 
routes, as well as its prestige as the nationally chartered airliner for the President.654 In November 1999, 
in addition to the previous accusations, the company was charged for providing political slush funds to 
former President Roh Tae Woo, and was imposed a penalty tax of about KRW 542 billion.655 Additional 
rumors about the worst-fated relationship between the Korean Air founder, Chairman Cho Joong Hoon, 
and President Kim Dae Jung, which traces its origins back to 1973 in reference to the attempted 
assassination scheme against then opposition leader Kim and the possible involvement of Korean Air 
within that plot, has resulted in such politically biased reaction against the company amid the 
restructuring process.656 
Business performances fell far below public expectations. With a starting capital of KRW 290 
billion in 1999, KAI went through continued hardships in its business performances. The net loss during 
the year 2000 alone was KRW 111 billion, and the following year marked KRW 60 billion. At the time, 
market analysts assessed that KAI barely managed to stay alive through the efforts of capital increases 
made from shareholders and the rescue aids provided from the creditors group. As the business losses 
grew bigger during the first two years of the company, the three holding companies provided 
approximately KRW 100 billion in capital increases, and the creditor group converted KRW 73 billion 
debts into equity under the circumstances that KAI take efforts to reduce overhead costs and attract 
foreign investments. Additionally, just before falling into default, the company’s debts nearing KRW 
369 billion in payable obligations were relaxed to a four-year installment with a five-year grace period. 
Despite these propelling self-efforts for debt relief, however, about KRW 170 billion was encroached 
in corporate capital during 2001, whereas corporate debt ratio increased from 246% to 326% in 2001. 
The business earnings during this period was KRW 47 billion but the interest costs incurred from these 
debt payments in 2001 alone was KRW 54 billion.657 The manpower of all three aircraft-manufacturing 
firms before the consolidation accounted for 3,544 in total. The transition in 1999 and 2000 resulted in 
laying off about 344 workers. Business earnings during this period slightly experienced a 2% increase, 
but the 9.7% reduction in manpower represented the large-scale corporate restructuring process. In 
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parallel to these transformational undertaking, the consolidated corporation enjoyed an exclusive 
position in government contracts as demonstrated in continual programs awards in the T-50 Advanced 
Trainer, Korea Helicopter Program, and so forth.658 
 
Before Consolidation (1998) After Consolidation (2000) 
Company Name Business Earnings Manpower Business Earnings Manpower 
Samsung Aerospace ₩405.9 billion 1,802 
₩557.9 billion 3,200 Daewoo Heavy Industries ₩111.7 billion 1,042 Hyundai Space and Aviation ₩30 billion 700 
Total ₩547.6 billion 3,544 
      Table 44. Business Earnings and Manpower During Restructuring Process  
      Source: 산업연구원, 국내외 항공기산업의 환경변화와 대응방안, 1999. 
The company was swayed by political influences in corporate operations, in which the 
incumbent administrations literally managed the company as a state-owned enterprise without 
presenting many opportunities to innovate as a corporate entity. Government bureaucracy spread out in 
corporate management sectors where the chief executive officer, who had neither knowledge nor prior 
experience in running a business that manufactures highly complex product systems, ruined a number 
of critical negotiation deals with international partners.659 The collaborated process to attract foreign 
investments and diversify business portfolios was not easily attainable. Business deals to attract foreign 
capital from Boeing and BAE for improving the corporate financial structure were unsuccessful. 
Additionally, individual efforts to attract foreign investments initiated by executive members of KAI 
were frustrated by the government and public officials with very unaccountable reasons to comprehend. 
Corporate executives of KAI attempted to attract investments from Middle Eastern investment firms, 
which offered even much favorable terms for corporate operations compared to the Boeing-BAE 
Consortium. The investment deal proposed by Adnan Khashoggi, a Saudi-Arabian businessperson, in 
May 2002 was to provide $200 million in capital investments, assign three board members with Korean 
citizenship, and not interfere with daily corporate management. Khashoggi also offered an extensive 
opportunity to utilize his marketing networks where KAI can promote its products in the international 
market. On the contrary, the investment picture proposed by the Boeing-BAE Consortium was far too 
restrictive, with an investment package of only $37 million and exclusive rights to veto management 
decisions.660 Additionally, defense offset arrangements generated from combat aircraft procurement 
programs were not strictly enforced to diversify KAI’s business area into the commercial sector. 
According to the initial contract between the Korean Government and Boeing Corporation over the F-
15K offset trade, Boeing was to award approximately $346 million worth of manufacturing work in F-
15K components and $732 million worth of manufacturing work in commercial airliner components to 
Korean firms. Most of the F-15K related manufacturing work was agreed and implemented, but the 
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commercial element was not fully executed. Especially, the workload to manufacture approximately 
$255 million worth of components of the Boeing 747 Section 11 was terminated, and transferred over 
to an Australian firm instead of KAI. The stated reason by the Korean defense authorities regarding the 
cancellation of the Section 11 workload was due to the diminishing market demand of the Boeing 747 
and incomplete contractual terms between KAI and Boeing over the offset arrangement. But 
considering the remaining offset arrangements provided by Boeing were mostly in low-tech engineering 
parts, it was highly possible that Boeing called off the deal to constrain the future development prospects 
of a potential business competitor in the global aerospace market.661 
 
 
 
6.2.3. State-owned or Privately Managed? Attempts to Privatize KAI 
Stable business performance of KAI 
 Starting in 2005, after going through turbulent seasons of structural reform and overhaul, 
KAI’s management structure became stabilized and the business performances started to improve, 
where the company grew in business sales with an average rate nearly 20% annually. Securing a stable 
amount of workloads from defense contracts such as the T-50 Supersonic Trainer, KUH Surion 
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Helicopter, and various MRO contracts, KAI has experienced a stable growth rate since 2008. Notably, 
business earnings accrued from the export of the T-50 trainer to Iraq and the Philippines took a share 
over 25% (KRW 178 billion) in 2015 alone. Contracts awarded from international aerospace giants such 
as Boeing and Airbus over subcomponent manufacturing and airframe structure also constituted a 
significant amount of business earnings as well (KRW 265 billion in 2015). The improvement of 
business performances in recent years after the creation of the company was a result of reorganization 
through downsizing and cost cutting.662 
 In this aspect, the company value of KAI continued to grow since the firm went public in 2011. 
The value per share of KAI at the point of initial public offering in July 2011 was KRW 18,500. The 
highest performance per share reached KRW 106,500 in August 2015, growing nearly six times in scale 
compared between the years. Because of such high valued growth in company value, the anticipated 
price range for acquiring KAI vertically climbed from KRW 1 trillion to more than KRW 3 trillion. 
Putting into account the premium for company control rights, the price range would grow even higher.663 
 
 
Figure 22. KAI's Business Performance, Unit: KRW 1 million 
 
Politically Driven Privatization Policies over KAI 
In August 2010, the government decided to sell state-owned shares and parts of the stocks 
owned by the other three major shareholders, totaling about 40% of the entire shares of KAI. The 
privatization process was to be a block deal of selling out 41.75% of the KAI share owned by the state-
owned Korea Financial Corporation, Samsung, Doosan, and Hyundai, to a single private firm that had 
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the resources and willingness to inherit KAI and grow the country’s sole aircraft manufacturing firm 
into a world-class aerospace firm. However, since KAI became designated as a specialized defense firm, 
the local law prohibited foreign takeover of corporate ownership, in which the inheritor must be a 
domestic firm.664 
Privatizing state-owned enterprises, or corporations where the state is a major shareholder such 
as in the KAI case, was a major campaign commitment made by the Lee Myong Bak Administration. 
State owned enterprises were falling behind and performing poorly in business operations caused by 
negligent and reckless management practices. Additionally, quasi-state run enterprises where the 
government holds a major share of the firm, of which the acquired shares originated from providing 
financial salvation packages to failing private businesses during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, were 
considered for sellouts in the market. As of 2008, the number of state-owned or state-run enterprises 
marked 305 with a commitment of an astronomical national budget of KRW 338.3 trillion annually. The 
objectives for privatizing these state-owned or state-shared enterprises were to scale down the 
government’s involvement and financial burdens in managing these institutions. The driving principles 
for privatization were; 1) deregulate restrictive government control over industry; 2) improve public 
sector performances; 3) proactively engage public services into open competition. In 2008, the 
government announced the privatization of 305 state-owned or state-run enterprises, which included 
KAI.665 Especially, considering the privatization of KAI, the strong justification was the fact that the 
state-owned structure discouraged the growth of critical international marketing capabilities of the 
company in comparison to its standing technological readiness levels, which degraded the company’s 
competitiveness in the international aerospace industry.666 
 The potential candidates with the highest possibility that would’ve inherited KAI were Korean 
Air or one of KAI’s three major stakeholders – Hyundai Motors, Samsung Techwin, Doosan 
Corporation. Considering the foundations of KAI mostly being built up from formerly Samsung 
Aerospace, Samsung Techwin was the most likely firm that had strong justifications for the takeover 
scheme. Samsung was also the company that won the loyalty of the labor union regarding the 
privatization process. However, Samsung declared that it had no intentions to enter the aircraft 
manufacturing market through acquiring the majority shares of KAI.667 Furthermore, Samsung sold off 
its entire defense business branches such as Samsung Techwin and Samsung Thales to Hanwha 
Corporation and completely exited the defense market in the fall of 2014.668  
Hyundai Motor Group was also a strong candidate for acquiring the aerospace and defense firm. 
Considering the experiences of KAI in engineering design and system integration work over complex 
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product systems, there were many synergetic areas where Hyundai Motors could have benefited over 
the merger. Nevertheless, Hyundai was reluctant to move into a high-risk business field through 
investing an astronomical amount of capital to acquire a company that mostly finds its business 
opportunities in defense contracts. Henceforth, Hyundai Motors sold off its entire share of KAI (4.85%) 
in 2016 and decided to concentrate more on its main automotive sector.669 On the other hand, Hyundai 
Motor’s sister company, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), had a keen interest in entering into the 
aircraft manufacturing business by acquiring major shares of KAI. A shipbuilding company with global 
standards, HHI was determined to diversify into a high-tech field, although there were concerns over 
the synergetic effects between a shipbuilding firm and aircraft manufacturing firm. At the time of the 
public bidding, HHI had sufficient resources with a business cash flow over KRW 9.5 trillion prepared 
to acquire KAI.670 In December 2012, HHI entered as the sole bidding company in the privatization 
process, but the bidding was miscarried because the Korean law restrictively allowed only a competitive 
bidding of at least two tendering parties for cases like selling out government shares of state-owned or 
state shared companies. The Presidential Election of 2012 was perhaps the strongest contributing factor 
that frustrated the public sellout of KAI’s state-owned shares of December 2012. The two major 
Presidential candidates each expressed reluctance with privatizing the state-owned shares of KAI with 
reasons that the state had larger roles to grow the industry into higher competence levels.671 
Korean Air was the company that expressed the strongest interest in undertaking KAI through 
the exertion of consistent efforts in the years after the 1999 Big Deal, with high aspirations of taking 
over the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. During a business conference in March 2009, the 
Chairman of the company announced that Korean Air had all the intentions and interest to assimilate 
the corporate competencies of KAI. Korean Air mainly targeted the shares held by Doosan Corporation, 
which was always finding ways to exit the defense market, including aircraft manufacturing, in order 
to gain financial ammunition to focus on energy plants or other strategic business areas.672 Acquiring 
the country’s single largest aircraft manufacturer would provide synergistic benefits to Korean Air in 
areas of combining its MRO businesses with KAI’s competitive technological capacities as a system 
integrating firm. Additionally, the corporate identity of Korean Air had great pride in itself as Korea’s 
first pioneering company that advanced into aircraft manufacturing in the early 1970s. Thus, acquiring 
KAI had very symbolic implications for building up Korean Air’s corporate brand value.673 There were 
several attempts in the pass by Korean Air to acquire the majority shares of KAI. During three 
consecutive events in 2003, 2006, and 2009, Korean Air exerted efforts to acquire the shares, which 
were then owned by Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery, the successor company of Daewoo Heavy 
Industries and the predecessor company of Doosan Infracore. All three merger attempts failed because 
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of the financial shortages of Korean Air. Learning the lessons from the past over the failed attempts to 
takeover KAI, Korean Air made efforts to join forces with foreign partners such as EADS or Boeing to 
form an international consortium of investors.674 However, with Korean Air’s ailing financial status, it 
became extremely challenging to gather enough financial credits to acquire KAI. In order to acquire the 
shares of KAI as of 2012, Korean Air needed more than KRW 1.8 trillion to obtain the status as a 
majority shareholder. But because of the global financial crisis and high oil prices during the period, 
the company’s debt ratio as of the third quarter of 2012 marked over 1050%, the worst of all the major 
stakeholders. To make matters worse, the Korea Development Bank, which was the largest shareholder 
of KAI and the main creditor bank of Korean Air, expressed negative opinions over Korean Air’s 
intention to takeover KAI, considering Korean Air’s unhealthy financial status and the ramifications to 
the future management prospects of KAI.675 In this regard, even if Korean Air takes over KAI as a 
majority shareholder, it was highly possible that Korean Air may divest some of the primary business 
branches of KAI in order to save itself from financially falling into default. 
There were strong suspicions of state-business collusion between the incumbent Lee Myong 
Bak Administration and Korean Air during the attempt to privatize KAI. The chairperson of Korean Air, 
Mr. Cho Yang-Ho, had meetings almost monthly with the Korean President before the government 
announced the privatization program. 676  In January 2009, President Lee Myong Bak directed a 
financial overview by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy to assess the possibility of Korean Air 
taking over KAI. The initial assessment concluded negative against Korean Air’s takeover, judging that 
Korean Air’s debt ratio of 829% makes it less appealing to acquire a company with a lower debt ratio 
of 107%. But the Presidential Office insisted to selloff KAI after a meeting convened by the Policy 
Chief of the Blue House in 7 September, 2012, which also opened the possibility of a sole source direct 
sell-over with high considerations over Korean Air as the purchasing firm.677 The major political 
figures responsible for privatizing KAI were direct associates of the President. The primary authority 
that took the lead over KAI’s privatization process was the Korean Development Bank (KDB). The 
President of KDB, Mr. Kang Man-Soo, who formerly served as the Minister of Strategy and Finance, 
was a top lieutenant in economic policy making President Lee Myong Bak. The implementing agency 
for selling off the government shares of KAI was the Korea Finance Corporation. The chairperson of 
this organization, Mr. Jin Young-Wook, was the right-hand man of Kang since his service days in the 
Ministry of Finance. Mr. Kim Hong Gyeong, a retired deputy minister from the Ministry of Finance, 
and who contributed a major role in the Presidential campaign, was ironically the government appointed 
CEO of KAI. Interestingly, the financial institution assigned for advisory services over the selloff was 
Credit Swiss, which handled the financing of major overseas projects initiated by the Lee 
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Administration, and also believed to have connections with the President’s older brother.678 Another 
key figure in this connection was Dr. Kim Tae Hyo, the President’s senior staff in national security 
affairs. Dr. Kim also happened to be the son-in-law of the founding family of Korean Air. Although the 
position was not directly involved with the privatization process, Dr. Kim’s capacity in national security 
affairs had substantial influence over formulating defense industrial policies.679 
As of 2016, the privatization process of KAI has turned out even more difficult. In September 
2015, the state controlled Financial Services Commission directed the divestment of all non-financial 
institutions held by the Korea Development Bank in order to bolster policy-lending programs in support 
of industrial finances.680 At the same time, the corporate governance structure of KAI was going 
through substantial changes. Despite the stable business performances of the firm and the promising 
government defense contracts that would be exclusively awarded to KAI, the major stakeholders of the 
company, such as Samsung, Doosan, and Hanwha, were selling entirely or partially their shares in the 
stock market after the initial public offering of 2011. In 2015, Samsung agreed to sell Samsung Techwin, 
which held about 10% share of KAI, to Hanwha Corporation. Hanwha landed on a block deal of re-
selling its 6%share over KAI in the stock market. Doosan sold its entire share of KAI to institutional 
investors such as the National Pension Service the same year. From these block deals, within a week 
period the stock price of KAI plummeted from KRW 77,100 to KRW 65,400 as of January 2016. 
Because of the devaluation of KAI’s stock, it became challenging for Korea Development Bank to 
actively progress with divesting the remaining 26.5% share of the aircraft manufacturing firm. 
Especially, because KAI was designated as a defense firm, according to Korean law, the divestment of 
state-owned shares of KAI had to go through an intensive interagency review that involved the Ministry 
of National Defense, Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, the National Science and Technology 
Committee, and so forth.681 
 
Public Objections against Privatization 
The government’s attempt to privatize the company ran into a number of roadblocks and public 
criticism amid the stable business performances of KAI based on the exclusive contract awards on major 
military aircraft development programs. Especially with the continued valuation of KAI’s public shares 
in the stock market, selling out the majority share in a block deal to a single bidder became more 
unaffordable for potential buyers like Korean Air or Hyundai Heavy Industries.682  
In the perspectives of the KAI labor union and civil activist groups, the attempted move of 
Korean Air to takeover an outperforming company, under closely colluding with government officials, 
was simply nonsense. Up onto this point, the KAI labor union endured harsh reorganization processes 
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since the consolidation of the former aircraft-manufacturing sectors of the three Chaebol companies. In 
order to resurrect the insolvency inherited from previous business operations, KAI went through a series 
of corporate asset disposals, manpower reductions, wage freezes, bonus returns, and so forth, in order 
to normalize its business operations. 683  Accounting for only the aircraft-manufacturing sector of 
Korean Air, the business performances of the two companies at the time when the first privatization 
process was announced shows contrasting outlooks. Net sales of KAI were almost threefold compared 
to that of Korean Air. KAI had more than ten times the number of researchers than Korean Air, where 
each individual employee showed higher performance rates (net sales per capita. The dissent from the 
KAI labor union mostly spotlighted on job security and suspicions over the true investment intentions 
of interested parties. There was fear that KAI will fall under prey to vulture capitalists through various 
schemes of hostile takeover, where the country’s only aircraft manufacturing firm will eventually 
become dismantled by these speculative investments. Particularly considering the fact of Korean Air, 
which had the worst debt ratio marking over 1000%, revealing the highest potentials to inherit KAI, 
there were grave concerns of these debts spilling over to KAI.684  
 
Performance Category KAI Korean Air (Aircraft-manufacturing sector) 
Business Sales KRW 9,101 KRW 3,776 
Business Profits KRW 784 (8.7% of business sales) N/A 
Ordinary Profit KRW 191 (2.1% of business sales) N/A 
Assets & Liabilities KRW 1.055 trillion KRW 0.6278 trillion 
Workforce 2,852 1,651 
R&D Workforce 902 80 
Debt Ratio 132% 462% 
Sales per Capita KRW 320 million KRW 230 million 
   Table 45. 2008 Business Performance of KAI and Korean Air (Source: 2008 KAI document) 
  
Another element that discouraged the privatization process was the intense objection from the 
local industrial community and subcontractor groups. The Municipal City of Sacheon, where the KAI 
business headquarters was located, severely objected privatization, fearing it will divert future 
investment opportunities to other locations. Starting from 2006, Sacheon City invested heavily into 
building industrial districts specialized in aerospace under the premises that the government will 
continue to support KAI as a public entity. Under this belief, approximately 70 small and medium sized 
firms invested nearly KRW 100 billion into the newly constructed Sacheon Aerospace Cluster. The 
basis of these local concerns originated from the assumption of a potential takeover of KAI conducted 
by Korean Air. At that moment, Sacheon City was in fierce competition against Daegu and Busan City 
over hosting a larger portion of government investments in the aerospace sector. Busan was the foothold 
for Korean Air’s aircraft manufacturing base. Under the law of physics, it was highly unlikely that 
Korean Air would sustain the manufacturing capacities of KAI’s Sacheon facility while maintaining its 
Busan/Kimhae production line. Having this in mind, the National Assembly also rejected the on-going 
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privatization process of KAI, and strongly insisted the government to recalibrate its original intentions 
towards building the country’s only aircraft manufacturing firm into a more competitive world class 
player.685 
 
6.2.4. Public to Private Sector Technology Spillovers 
Based on the governing ordinances of the Technology Transfer Promotion Act and supporting 
institutions, the technological products of government funded public research shall be transferred to the 
industrial sector in pursuance of stimulating commercialization and innovation. The Korea Technology 
Transfer Center, through its regional centers and Technology Liaison Offices (TLO), administers the 
conditions to build assurances in complying with the transaction of intellectual property rights, 
promotion of selective technology development, and the construction of industrial infrastructures 
conducive for technology transfer. Successful technology spillover cases derived from this transfer 
process in the aircraft-manufacturing sector include products such as industrial gas turbines, turbo-
chargers, new composite materials, bullet-proof materials, and so forth.686 
 In the defense sector, the transfer process is administered by the Dual-Use Technology 
Promotion Center under the purview of the Agency of Defense Development through the initiatives 
stated in the Civil-Military Technology Partnership (CMTP). As briefly commented in previous 
chapters, the performance of technology transfer through spinoff is unimpressive as the program has 
been tamed with decreasing interests from other public and private entities. In order to address these 
inherent challenges, the government revised the CMTP Promotion Act in 2014 to expand the 
participation of central government agencies into this initiative. The revised legislation established the 
Special Committee in Civil Military Cooperation under the National Science and Technology Council, 
and empowered the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy to serve as the control tower that 
administers the CMTP by coordinating and adjusting inter-agency R&D efforts with 11 government 
agencies.687 The change reflected in the revised legislation was a direct consequence of the sluggish 
and dull performance of ADD in the overall technology transfer process. Since the start of the CMTP 
in 1997, the initiative supported 24 technology transfer projects as of 2011. About 96% of the transfer 
initiatives were conducted by corporate efforts. Not a single technology was transferred from ADD to 
the private sector. Although ADD claims that the agency exerts its own efforts self-regulate defense 
spinoffs, the initiative is not executed under the guidance of the CMTP.688 
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Unit: KRW 100 million 
Supervising 
Institution 
Number of 
Transfers 
Government Funding Private Investments Total 
Value Amount Percentage Value Amount Percentage Value Amount Percentage 
ADD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
Other GRI 1 7 77.8 2 22.2 9 100.0 
Business Firms 23 96 69.1 43 30.9 139 100.0 
Total 24 103 69.3 46 30.7 148 100.0 
Table 46. Public to Private Technology Transfers (1997 - 2011)      
Source: 산업연구원, 민군기술협력 기본계획 수립을 위한 용역, 2012. 
  
Defense contracts awarded to private companies functioned as major instruments of technology 
transfers in aircraft manufacturing, of which private entities took part in an undertaking of a larger 
defense acquisition program. According to a 2005 survey on the spillover effects of technology transfers 
in aircraft manufacturing, three primary technical categories developed under government sponsorship 
were identified as technologies that had critical diffusion effects into other industrial products. The three 
were propulsion devices, composite materials, and avionics. At first, propulsion technologies derived 
from the development and manufacturing of small gas turbine engines, which subsequently diffused 
into various engines and power units. Samsung Techwin acquired the requisite technologies for 
localizing small gas turbine engines by partaking in various military jet engine projects. Based on the 
experience accumulated from these programs, the company’s Power Systems engineering Laboratory 
successfully developed the 100kW Auxiliary Power Unit that further progressed into 12 new 
engineering products, from ultra-micro compressors to artificial joints. 689  As the country’s only 
manufacturer of gas turbines, Samsung Techwin accumulated extensive experiences in system design, 
aerodynamics, structure, and testing from developing and manufacturing nearly 4,000 turbine units that 
mostly came from military jet engine contracts. From 1991 to 2006, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, 
and Energy launched the first indigenous gas turbine development project, dubbed the TG1200 
Turboshaft Engine, which generated a 1.2MW electric output with a design life of 30,000 hours. 
Samsung Techwin was the prime contractor to build the engine under a co-development arrangement 
with the Kore Aerospace Research Institute, Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials, Seoul National 
University, and so forth.690 The successes in TG1200 and ensuing exploits in other variants were all 
possible based on the foundations built up from the thirty year experiences in defense contracts. 
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Military  
Service Program Product Developed 
Cooperative 
Partner Program Type 
Component 
Localization 
Air Force 
KF-5E/F J85-GE-21B General Electric License Manufacturing - 
KF-16 (KFP) F100-STW-229  Pratt & Whitney License Manufacturing 41.2% (110 items) 
KT-1 PT6A-62 Pratt & Whitney License Manufacturing 27% 
F-15K F110-STW-129A  General Electric License Manufacturing 29% (26 items) 
T/A-50 F404-STW-102  General Electric License Manufacturing 26% 
Army 
UH-60P T700-SSA-701C  General Electric License Manufacturing 35% (29 items) 
Surion KUH T700-SSA-701K 
(Evolved from 701C) 
General Electric License Manufacturing 48% 
Navy KDX-II/III LM2500  General Electric License Manufacturing 45% 
Under 
Development 
A380 (Airbus) 
- Commercial 
Trent 900  Rolls Royce Co-production Partner In Progress 
KF-X F414-GE-400  General Electric License Manufacturing In Progress 
Table 47. Samsung Techwin's Jet Engine Experience                             
Source: Sohn Young Chang, “Engine Development Program for Army Light Attack Helicopters,” 2014 ROK Air Force Air 
Power Seminar 
  
Secondly, the application of composite materials used from building aircraft structures into 
other industrial sectors spun off some meaningful outcomes.  The technology for light weighted 
aluminum materials developed by Korean Air contributed to significant weight reduction performances 
in railway vehicles. Such achievements were possible based on Korean Air’s long experience in 
developing light weighted composite materials for aircraft structural design with the assistance of 
advanced design analysis equipment using CATIA and NASTRAN modeling solutions. It was a case 
where structural design/analysis/test/production technology used for aircraft manufacturing directly 
applied into railway vehicle development. The transfer process was administered by MOCIE, supported 
by participating private entities such as Korean Air, Hanjin Heavy Industries, Hyundai Precision 
Engineering, Dongyang Steel, and so forth. Although immediate transfer efforts did not result into 
commercialization of the respective technology, the process contributed to improving the technological 
competitiveness of the domestic locomotive manufacturing firms.691 A similar bi-product of weight 
reduction efforts through material science processes is also found in bulletproof engineering on cockpits 
for utility and attack helicopters.  The S-Glass bulletproof materials were further applied into armor 
personnel carriers (K-21 IFV) and naval vessels (KDX-III destroyers and PK-X fast crafts), as well as 
Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCF-II 631).692  
 Thirdly, avionics in Korea is a sector that falls far behind the global standards. There are 
approximately forty some firms involved in the avionics business, but most of them contribute less than 
10% of its business portfolio into avionics, thus the sector falls far short of creating a scaled economy. 
Most of the avionics businesses are headed by big firms such as KAI, LIG Nex1, Hanwha Systems, 
Ucon Systems, with the support of its affiliated small-middle sized subsidiaries. Most of the workshare 
are concentrated in hardware production for small components whereas software development related 
with building integrated system architectures lingers in the second-rated field. Some of the technology 
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originating from control technology spun-off into flight control systems for unmanned air vehicles.693 
Despite the country’s competitiveness in the overall IT sector, avionics in Korea remain in mediocre 
performances due to the lack of system integration technology and requisite workload available in the 
sector. Nonetheless, with the backing of a strong electronics industrial infrastructure, the avionics sector 
enjoys some competitive advantages in technical fields such as in Electro-Optic/Infra-Red (EO/IR). The 
integration of Synthetic Aperture Radars into aircrafts requires highly advanced precision technology 
on EO/IR, which resonates into other radar capabilities in ground, air, and sea. The high resolution 
required for multiple image processing and time precision creates a ripple effect in both the upstream 
(mechanics, materials, IT, etc.) and downstream (weather forecasting, satellite, GPS, etc.) industries.694 
 
6.3. Structural Constraints within the Aircraft-Manufacturing Sector 
6.3.1. Risk Averse Mentality in Research and Development 
As covered in previous chapters, a critical factor that obstructs a conducive atmosphere to build 
talent for a vibrant research and development architecture is the prevailing risk averse mentality 
surrounding the overarching R&D defense industrial sector. According to an update brief to the 
President by the Ministry of National Defense regarding the current competitiveness status of the 
defense S&T and industrial outputs, the risk averse mentality in weapon system development was raised 
as a factor that hinders sustained advances in defense technology. Major defense firms involved in the 
weapon system development business share the same mentality in this aspect. However, the essential 
reason behind such passive attitude lies the harsh penalty fees imposed by government authorities over 
defense firms in case of a development failure.695 The government’s imposing of penalty fees to 
defense firms are justified by the fact that a glitch in weapon system development and manufacturing 
process leads to warfighter capability gaps. Therefore, penalty fees are believed to serve as an assurance 
against potential program mismanagement. On the other hand, the challenge here is that such penalty 
fees are imposed discriminatively, which discourage entrepreneurship and risk taking. 
In 2013 alone, major defense firms were penalized with substantial amounts of penalty fee. 
KAI was fined with a KRW 13.3 billion penalty, Hanwha hit by 6.7 billion, and S&T Motiv KRW 6.6 
billion.696 Domestic defense firms are not only forced to absorb heavy penalty fees but also have to 
deal with discriminative regulations compared to foreign firms. In the case of KAI, the penalty fee 
imposed in 2013 originated mainly from the delayed delivery of the P-3CK Maritime Surveillance 
Aircraft Upgrade Program. The main reason for the delayed delivery was caused by KAI’s U.S. 
subcontractor called L-3 Communications, which provided assistance in system and technology 
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transfers for the upgrade program. In this sense, L-3 Communication failed to comply with the original 
timeline on the part of providing technology transfers, technical assistance, and aircraft refurbishment 
services within the given contractual dates. L-3 Communication delivered the aircrafts two years later 
than the original contract date. However, despite the fact that KAI was imposed with substantial 
penalties, Korean government authorities exempted most of the penalty fees against L-3 
Communication, in which L-3 eventually ended paying no penalties at all.697 In consideration of this 
case as a classic example of discriminative government policies, defense firms became more focused 
on ways to avoid paying penalty fees instead of developing or learning requisite technology and 
improving production processes. 
The penalties imposed on test failures over weapon systems development programs also 
restrains sectoral efforts to bolster R&D productivities. In July 2017, the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA) filed a case against a team of five ADD researchers for damages charged over 
KRW 6.7 billion on a crashed unmanned aerial vehicle prototype that was undergoing test flight trials. 
The air vehicle was being tested for the Army’s corps level tactical surveillance program with a total 
program budget of KRW 118 billion. Failure to reverse a simple sensor circuit installed in the aircraft 
was identified as the cause of the crash. There was every means to avoid the incident from occurring, 
where there were trails of procedural negligence committed by the program researchers. However, 
charging a large penalty worth a life time fortune to individual scientist and engineers apparently 
discouraged innovative thinking and bold actions in the laboratory.698 In reference to U.S. standards or 
program guidance in military aircraft development, the first priority for consideration is to find an 
optimized economic solution based on trade-offs in costs between R&D, procurement, and maintenance. 
In this aspect, provisions on durability or precision allows deficiencies to a level that does not obstruct 
performances. Therefore, the criterion over the development process is amenable to certain failures and 
does not imply zero defects. For instance, if a lubricant leak from a component but does not impact on 
the overarching system performance, and the leakage can be controlled under routine inspections with 
low cost-bearings, then the defect is rated acceptable.699  
Referring to U.S. standards, critics against such harsh decisions argue the penalty criterion 
regulated by DAPA is overly too restrictive that restrains innovative development. A similar case is 
found in the K-2 Black Panther Main Battle Tank Program. The tank development was stalled for nearly 
ten months from 2016 to 2017 because of a durability test failure on the power pack transmission system. 
The indigenously developed power pack system gears the track vehicle to survive tactical maneuvers 
in harsh terrain. However, the excessively high technical standards and durability criterion established 
by DAPA constantly disqualified the transmission system. The ripple effect was a production suspension 
on the entire supply chain of the MBT program, which involved 119 companies and estimated business 
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damages of KRW 100 billion.700 A number of veterans in the defense industry business commonly raise 
the point of the lack of coordinative authorities and bad leadership practices under the auspices of the 
Agency of Defense Development (ADD) that discourages advances in technological development by 
corporate entities. To date, ADD has ruled over the defense industry with its monopoly power in defense 
technology development. The Agency dissuaded corporate R&D efforts under the guise of state-led 
technology development or national security assurances.701 These restrictions constrain the efforts of 
diffusing core technology to the commercial sector. But it turns out ADD has been simply copying 
sensitive technologies imported from foreign sources without adding much additional efforts for 
evolutionary development.  
In the grand scheme of considering risk averse mentalities, policy indecisiveness in determining 
aircraft development programs observed through the indigenously developed KF-X program 
encapsulates these abusive practices. The KF-X program, which intends to indigenously build a fourth 
generation fighter capability to replace the aging F-4 and F-5E/F fighter fleet, is conceived with the 
ambitions to achieve a commanding air superiority as well as to bolster the domestic aerospace industry. 
However, the program went through six iterations of feasibility studies before moving into the actual 
decision making for launching a full scale development program. Out of the six feasibility studies, only 
one study conducted by a local university engineering lab assessed the program as feasible, whereas the 
other five studies recommended either a negative or a more cautious approach. Interestingly, four 
feasibility studies were awarded to the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis under the Ministry of 
National Defense, which constantly expressed strong skepticism over the KF-X. Even within those four 
studies, the same researchers who have strongly opposed indigenous development continued to become 
part of the review board, which harbors strong suspicion over the credibility of the study results.702 
  
Review Period Review Agency Assessment 
March-December 2003 KIDA Necessary to bolster aerospace industry 
Dec 2005 – Jul 2006 KIDA Economically and technologically not feasible. Recommend 
international co-development, program estimate KRW 6 trillion 
Dec 2006 – Feb 2008 KDIA, KDI, ADD Economically not feasible, development estimate KRW 10 trillion 
Apr – Oct 2009 Konkuk University Economically feasible, development estimate KRW 5 trillion 
Jan – Oct 2012 KIDA Economically not feasible, development estimate KRW 10 trillion 
Nov 2013 KISTEP Economically not feasible, high uncertainty in development aspects 
Table 48. KF-X Feasibility Studies 
 
The risk factors associated with weapon systems development and emerging complexities of 
coordinating different organizational and technical components for systems-of-systems development 
are insufficiently addressed in senior corporate leadership appointments, which became marred in 
differing political interests driven by parochial factionalism. The absence of professional appointments 
to key leadership posts in defense acquisition systems and corporate management also causes serious 
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predicaments in sustaining capacity buildups in the aircraft management sector. A common theme 
observed when surveying executive level appointments at major defense and aerospace related 
institutions, such as the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA), it becomes quite rare to find a person who hails from a program management 
or defense acquisition background. The majority of the appointments either come from retired military 
or financial technocrats who were nominated based on political connections and interests, not by 
specialized competencies. Putting aside the bona fide argument of credentialing ‘core’ verses 
‘specialized’ competencies, the decision making behavior from these senior appointments mostly lacks 
the genuine understanding of the complexities affiliated with international norms and regulations 
meshed into weapon system developments, which results in risk averse behaviors or decisions that 
restrain circumstances that promote sustained learning and innovation. 
 
Agency Title Name Term Background R&D/PM Experience 
DAPA Minister 
Kim, Jung Il Jan 2006 – Jul 2006 Military O 
Lee, Seon Hee Jul 2006 – Mar 2008 Military O 
Yang, Chi Kyu Mar 2008 – Jan 2009 Military O 
Byeon, Mu Geun Jan 2009 – Aug 2010 Military X 
Jang, Su Man Aug 2010 – Feb 2011 Public Service (Finance) X 
Roh, Dae Rae Mar 2011 – Mar 2013 Public Service (Finance) X 
Lee, Yong Geol Mar 2013 – Nov 2014 Public Service (Finance) X 
Jang, Myeong Jin Nov 2014 – Jul 2017 R&D O 
Jeon, Jei Kuk Aug 2017 –  Public Service (Policy) X 
KAI CEO 
Lim, In Taek Nov 1998 – Sep 2001 Public Service (Development) X 
Gil, Hyeong Bo Oct 2001 – Sep 2004 Military X 
Jeong, Hae Joo Oct 2004 – Jul 2008 Public Service (Trade/ Industry) X 
Kim, Hong Gyung Aug 2008 – Apr 2013 Public Service (Trade/ Industry) X 
Ha, Seong Yong May 2013 – Oct 2017 Internal KAI promotion O 
Kim, Jo Won Oct 2017 –  Public Service (Audit) X 
Table 49. Senior Leadership Appointments at DAPA and KAI 
 
Corporate leadership appointments at KAI are even more marred with political interests. 
Although incorporated as a business entity, KAI is notionally considered a state-run corporation since 
the government holds the majority share of the company as a product of bailing out financially 
delinquent domestic aircraft manufacturing firms from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Contrary to the 
common notion of appointing a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who should be well versed in the 
language of corporate management and complex product systems, the appointment of KAI CEOs 
normally came from political judgments, mostly to those who either contributed in major political 
events or those considered close aids to the President.703 All of the CEO appointments were directed 
by the Presidential Office, or when reviewed in retrospect, all CEOs had some sort of contributions in 
the Presidential Elections but had no background experience in the corporate or defense acquisition 
program management. The appointment of the only CEO with a track record of having management 
experience in defense aerospace was later revealed to have been attributed to his family relationship 
                                                          
703 남희현, “항공우주산업 새대표 김조원을 보는 시각은 기대반 우려반,” Business Post, 2007.10.11. 
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with the President.704 
 
6.3.2. Disruptive Components: Political Disturbances in Knowledge Accumulation 
Defense business has been considered to the general public as a politically high risk area, not 
in a sense of complexities in technology, but more in a sense of illicit activities prone towards corruption 
and irregularities. The notion originates from the revealing of the Yulgok Force Build-up Scandal, which 
resulted in the arrestment of the top brass military leadership, including two Ministers of National 
Defense, and three four star generals. Since then, the defense industry has become discredited by the 
public as a source of irrationality and fraud. Under this notion, political authorities have frequently 
targeted defense acquisition programs as a means of exploitation to distract public attention over 
politically controversial subjects. 
 During the period of 2008 and 2017, the Prosecutor-General’s Office conducted three large 
scale investigations over domestic defense firms. Each investigation was triggered by political 
motivations instead of constituting a real case against an actual charge. The Lee Myong Bak 
Administration launched a large investigation force that targeted the defense acquisition programs 
contracted during the previous Roh Mu Hyun Administration. The motivations behind the 
investigations are known to be targeted against the political popularity of the former Roh Administration. 
In March of 2008, during the first several months in office, the Lee Administration experienced serious 
setbacks from the public over its unilateral decision to sign a Free Trade Agreement with the United 
States, which had serious repercussions in terms of agricultural and livestock products. Especially with 
the decision to open the livestock market to U.S. beef, the approval ratings plummeted to an all-time 
lowest rate around the 20 percentile level. Thus, with the upcoming general of 2008 and the ensuing 
municipal elections, the Lee Administration was desperately finding an exit strategy to win back public 
approval ratings. 705  The Lee Administration considered the loyalist group of the former Roh 
Administration was behind most of the public rallies and political disapproval against the new 
administration. Therefore, the political leadership perceived the need to suppress the rising criticism in 
a justifiable way, in which the defense contracts signed by the previous administration became a primary 
target for scrutiny. In this regard, under the directives by the President himself, the Chief Prosecutor 
initiated the full scale investigation over various defense contracts and defense firms throughout the 
Presidency of the Lee Myong Bak Administration.706  
Also, in order to carry out the enormous government projects pledged by the President during 
the election, the Administration had to find ways to cut the corners of the overall national budget to 
fulfill the campaign commitments. The defense sector in this aspect is always a good opportunity to 
carve out substantial amounts of tax payer’s money and reallocate the funds into other priority programs. 
                                                          
704 김동현, “KAI 사장 사임 하성용, 박근혜 정부 때 임명된 항공전문가,” 연합뉴스, 2017.7.20.  
705 이준한, “이명박 지지율은 올라갈 수 없다,” 한겨레 21, 제 714 호, 2008. 
706 김종대, “지난 정권 비자금 추적부터 실세들 뛰어든 개혁 논쟁까지,” 신동아, 제 603 호, 2009. 
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In support of rebalancing the national budget, the President justified the reduction of the defense budget 
by claiming the country can benefit from cutting nearly 20% of the rebate money paid as commission 
fees to defense brokers, which becomes a source of widespread corruption practices in defense 
contracts.707 The unilateral reduction of 20% in certain defense acquisition programs during the Lee 
Administration restricted the program managers to procure substandard components and equipment, 
which prompted the forgery of official documents, irregular quality assurances, and discouraged 
technology development efforts.708 
 In November of 2014, under the guise of ‘eradicating corruption and improving the defense 
industrial base’, the Park Geun Hye Administration inaugurated the Joint Investigation Department 
Against Defense Program Irregularities (JID) under the Prosecutor’s Office. The Department gathered 
officials from the military, tax service, law enforcement, and so forth, and created the largest 
investigation in the history of the prosecution office. To take advantage of this opportunity, the Bureau 
of Audit and Investigation also established its own investigative organization called the Joint Auditing 
Group to join forces with the Prosecutor Office against illicit activities in defense acquisition 
programs. 709  However, the actual motivation of the investigation was triggered by two political 
scandals at the moment. The first case considered the criticism against the Administration’s competency 
over managing defense acquisition programs. The Park Administration was under severe criticism over 
the decision with the third Fighter Experiment Program (FX-III), in which the authorities rescinded its 
earlier decision of selecting the Boeing F-15 Silent Eagle, and chose the Lockheed Martin F-35A 
Lightning-II.710 Public scrutiny over the legitimacy of rescinding a legal decision that properly went 
through all phases of the defense acquisition management system constantly burdened the political 
leadership in the Blue House. The FX-III decision had direct impact on the Korea Fighter Experiment 
(KF-X) development program, in which the development authorities were severely denounced by the 
public for not securing enough technology from the FX-III defense offset trade arrangements.711 After 
the issue was raised in the 2015 National Assembly Audit, the Blue House started scapegoating DAPA 
officials and the defense industry as a maneuver to disentangle its negligence in the FX-III and KF-X 
predicament.712 
What exacerbated the approval ratings of the Administration was the Sinking of the Sewol Ferry 
in April 2014, which caused the lives of nearly three hundred passengers. The government’s 
incompetence shown in the course of the rescue operation was severely criticized, subsequently 
                                                          
707 김범현, “이대통령 커미션 줄이면 무기구입비 20% 줄 것,” 연합뉴스, 2009.9.21. 
708 조성식, “위기의 방위산업, 박정희는 그렇게 하지 않았다,” 동아일보, 2016.5.24. 
709 김요한, “방위사업 비리 전방위 조준 합동수사단 출범,” SBS News, 2014.11.21. 
710 To have a better understanding of the reverse decision, refer to Jung Hyuk Choi, “Challenges of Institutional 
Coordination in Complex Defence Acquisition Programs: The Case of the Republic of Korea’s F-X Program,” Defence 
Studies, Vol. 16, No.1, 2016. 
711 The U.S. State Department refused to authorize the transfer of four core technologies (EOTGP, AESA, IRST, RF 
Jammer) under the premise of national security concerns. Donald Kirk, “U.S. Tech Rebuff Slams Korea’s KFX Fighter,” 
Forbes Asia, 16 October, 2015. 
712 최혜정 손원제 이제훈, “KFX ‘기술이전 불가’ 보고받고도 강행…주철기·김관진 책임론,” 한겨레, 2015.10.7. 
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plummeting its approval ratings. The media at this point started to highlight the Navy’s attempted 
deployment of a salvage/rescue ship named the ATS-31 Tongyeong to the disaster scene of the Sewol 
Ferry. Eventually, the Navy had to cancel the deployment because the vessel was grounded because of 
a number of performance deficiencies identified in the development and introductory phase. The media 
portrayed the substandard performance of the Hull Mounted Sonar (HMS) and Remotely Operated 
Underwater Vehicle (ROV) caused the sudden cancelation of the ATS-31 Tongyeong’s dispatch 
mission.713 Government actions came in pursuit of the media coverage and arrested the top defense 
acquisition officials responsible for the sonar and vehicle procurement of the Tongyeong. The 
incumbent Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Hwang Ki Cheol, was arrested for professional 
malpractice and government document forgery the following year as he was held accountable for 
signing the HMS contract while serving as the Director General of Navy Ship Programs at DAPA. 
Eventually, most of these allegations charged against defense acquisition officials and defense firms 
during the past decade turned out to be inordinate investigations, in which most of the accused suspects 
were acquitted in court against the indictment raised by the prosecutors. The representative case was 
the court decision over Admiral Hwang Ki Cheol on the ATS-31 Tongyeong case, which ruled the 
former Chief of Naval Operations innocent from all charges pressed on him. Other cases that filed 
similar accusations against weapons brokers or defense firms were also ruled not guilty, and discharged 
from all prosecutions.714 The allegations filed against the program managers of the AW-159 Wildcat 
Maritime Operation Helicopter Program (MOH) were also ruled innocent and acquitted from all charges 
by the court. The indictment of the MOH program was in fact considered the biggest achievement case 
for the district attorneys and was celebrated with high recognition, but the acquittal ruling afterwards 
casted the prosecutors in the Joint Investigation Department into public shame.715 The majority of these 
indictments and investigations over defense contracts and defense firms contained false allegations, but 
were fully executed anyway by the authorities, augmented with media publicity, in order to attract public 
attention and achieve higher approval ratings for the incumbent administration. As a representative case 
over these false indictments, the court ruled ‘not guilty’ in October 2017 over the BAI audit reports that 
claimed KAI gathered undue profits of KRW 54.7 billion throughout the Surion Korea Utility 
Helicopter Program. The judgement ruled the BAI audit did not reflect the accurate clauses of the 
program contract awarded to KAI, which complied with the terms highlighted in the indemnification of 
development costs.716 Most of the cases against domestic defense firms, if not all, did not have a 
particular intent to overhaul and improve the defense industry or the comprehensive defense acquisition 
process, thus lacked a clear policy objective leaving aside a coherent reform agenda. The investigations 
                                                          
713 ATS-31 Tongyeong later proved to have qualified all phases of Test & Evaluation, however, was not the suited vessel 
that could’ve salvaged the sinking Sewol Ferry at the point. 유영식, “통영함이 세월호를 구조하지 못한 진짜 이유,” 
월간조선, 2015 년 1 월. 
714 송원형, “검찰 내 모범생 방위사업비리 합수단, 요즘 체면이 말이 아니라는데,” 조선일보, 2015.11.18. 
715 문상현, “방산비리 합수단 성과 뻥튀기 후 논공행상 벌였다,” 일요신문 제 1287 호, 2017.1.8. 
716 안상희, “법원 2015 년 KAI 547 억원 부당이득 감사원 감사결과 잘못돼,” 조선일보, 2017.10.23. 
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in fact had a specific destination towards excavating potential slush funds secretly delivered to political 
opponents in the process of concluding defense contracts.717  
However, there is no doubt that these investigations had grave impacts on the domestic defense 
industry. The political pressure squeezing in from all directions towards the defense industry, associated 
with restrictively diminishing defense expenses for domestic development programs, resulted in 
reduced productions and financial difficulties of local defense firms.718 Because of the repressive 
investigations by the prosecuting authorities, multiple suicidal incidents arose from domestic defense 
firms, including the CEO of LIG Nex1 who took his life after returning from investigation, and the 
Senior Executive Vice President of KAI over a similar motivation. 719  Such results proved the 
accusations built around domestic defense firms were groundless, but the sheer size and magnitude of 
the state-led investigations also show another ill-fated dimension of political intents that are conducted 
with a mere purpose of saving face for popular votes, while not necessarily arranged for effectively 
implementing reform agendas or streamlining the defense business. 
 
6.4. Chapter Conclusion 
In regards to the multitude of aircraft development opportunities that emerged throughout the three 
decades, the government’s aspiration to upgrade the country’s technological competitiveness level and 
the industry’s desire to diversify into high tech business sectors created a strong consensus to promote 
the aircraft manufacturing business as a key area to expand the industrial boundaries of the country. 
Various high profiled institutions and regulations were created by the government in support of building 
a competitive aircraft manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, these strong motivations did not sufficiently 
translate into success stories. 
The decision to lower entry barriers of the aircraft manufacturing sector with the purpose of 
introducing competition for enhancing competencies over a finite domestic market share resulted in a 
cutthroat competitive situation amongst major domestic players, but with infrequent government 
mitigation efforts. Unlike previous cases where the government effectively managed and coordinated 
the prospects of industrial development, the aircraft manufacturing sector was far more complex that 
involved substantial challenges in technology, program management, global competition structure, 
proprietary rights, international security, and so forth. 
 Insufficient government oversight and control over industrial competition policies 
consequently deteriorated sectoral competitiveness in both technological and financial capacities. 
Government control in defense R&D, without constructing an effective technology transfer and 
diffusion mechanism into the commercial market, has marginalized sectoral technology refinement and 
                                                          
717 Prosecutions mostly strived to solicit evidence of defense firms attempting to bribe politicians from the opposition 
parties. 김종대, “정권에 등 돌리는 방위산업체, 중소 협력업체들의 들끓는 분노,” D&D Focus, 2010 년 8 월호. 
718 김종대, “비리 수사 폭격 맞은 방산업계,” 시사저널, 2010.8.10. 
719 Suicidal incidents also included defense contractors conducting research in the process of developing indigenous 
systems, 박지윤, “검찰수사 받던 방산업체 전 사장 자살,” 매일경제, 2010.6.10. 
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engineering competencies in the commercial subdivisions of the aircraft manufacturing sector. In order 
to comply with key program milestones of government awarded weapon system contracts, the 
companies had to rely heavily on foreign technological resources, which had contributed limitedly on 
building domestic technological capacities. Indecisiveness and frequent changes on the planning and 
programming of major defense acquisition programs in aircraft development placed higher risks and 
uncertainties in the defense industrial sectors of aircraft manufacturing. In this regard, the sectoral 
players had limited opportunities to accumulate critical knowledge and experiences, which is 
indispensable in building program management capacities for complex product systems. The disconnect 
between the technology development hierarchies of the public sector and commercial manufacturing 
apparatus of the private sector has obstructed the fluent evolution of the aircraft manufacturing business 
into becoming a robust technological field of the economy. 
 Whatsoever, the government continues to launch prospective opportunities for the aircraft-
manufacturing sector with hopefuls of inducing sectoral development and innovation. The following 
two chapters are case studies in this regard that represents recent events of the Korean Government and 
industry to build an indigenous R&D and production capability in the domains of fixed-wing and rotor-
wing. 
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Chapter 7. Case Studies: The T-50 Supersonic Advanced Trainer Program 
7.1. Sources of Capacity Building in the Fixed Wing Sector – From Tiger II to Fighting 
Falcon 
Under the banner of self-reliant defense of the country, the strong push to indigenously manufacture 
combat fighters originated in 1974 after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine, ensued by the simmering 
possibility of U.S. military retrenchment from the Korean Peninsula in 1977. As of 2018, despite the 
launching of the KF-5E/F Tiger II local assembly program in 1979, the country still does not own a 
combat aircraft of its own design even after forty years of commitment into the aircraft-manufacturing 
business. This chapter reviews the fluctuations of combat aircraft development, the sources of 
knowledge accumulation and technology diffusion, and the systems of innovation within the 
development efforts of combat aircrafts. It reviews three major military aircraft programs, with a focus 
on the development process of the T-50 Golden Eagle Supersonic Trainer. 
Introduction of military aircraft programs experienced a number of opportunities and 
challenges for both military and commercial entities in the recent history of force build-up efforts. The 
fixed wing sector went through the traditional phased evolution of aircraft-manufacturing; following 
depot maintenance – license manufacturing (KF-16 Fighting Falcon) – co-development (T-50 Advanced 
Supersonic Trainer) – indigenous development (KF-X in progress). Although a turboprop aircraft and 
not a jet fighter, the KT-1 Woongbi is also a platform developed and deployed under indigenous efforts. 
This chapter surveys the progress and achievements made in the fixed-wing sector, with a priority focus 
on the T-50 Golden Eagle Program.  
 
Period Program Lead Agency Program Type Proprietary Rights Modification Rights 
1981-
1986 KF-5E/F Korean Air (Corporate) 
License Manufacturing 
(Northrop) 
None (constrained 
under export control 
regime) 
Partial 
authorizations to 
overhaul 
1988-
1999 KT-1 ADD (Government) 
Indigenous (Daewoo 
Heavy Industries) Obtained 
Capable of 
overhaul and 
modification 
1984-
2006 KF-16 
Samsung Aerospace 
(Corporate) 
License Manufacturing 
(General Dynamics 
/Lockheed Martin) 
None (constrained 
under export control 
regime) 
Partial 
authorizations to 
overhaul 
1989-
2005 T-50 KAI (Corporate) 
Cooperative 
Development 
(Lockheed Martin) 
Limited 
(constrained under 
export control 
regime) 
Requires approval 
by foreign entity 
(USG/Lockheed 
Martin) 
Table 50. Major Aircraft Development Programs (Fixed Wing) 
 
7.1.1. KF-5E/F Tiger II Jegong-ho Program 
The need to build industrial infrastructures for an aircraft manufacturing base emerged in the 
mid-1970s in consideration of the country’s impending national security concerns and economic 
development needs. The end of the Vietnam War, the cessation of U.S. military aid programs, and the 
materializing risks of a possible U.S. military withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula alerted the urgency 
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to build a military readiness posture sufficient for self-reliant defense of the country. The surrounding 
circumstances instigated the need to indigenously develop military aircrafts until the early 1980s. 
 The first plan to introduce an indigenously manufactured fighter capability derived from a 
September 1979 Government Committee that identified the development requirements and industrial 
support to locally assembly a high-tech combat aircraft, which designated the Northrop F-5E/F as the 
potential program model. The F-5E/F model was already deployed for operations in the Air Force. The 
government was considering to introduce further more variants with a local assembly license to build 
domestic industrial capacities and infrastructure. In support of the KF-5E/F local assembly, the 
government legislated the Aircraft Industry Promotion Act to institutionally establish the technological 
support system in R&D, manufacturing, and project financing, and also transferred the development 
authorities from the Ministry of Transportation to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to 
address the strong willingness to bolster the domestic aircraft industry. On October of 1979, during the 
12th Annual Security Consultative Meeting between the defense ministers of Korea and United States, 
both parties agreed to proceed with joint efforts to co-assemble F-5E and F-5F jet fighters.720 This 
agreement made possible the local assembly of 68 F-5 jet fighters by Korean Air with a net value worth 
of USD 140 million under full US government technology assistance provided through a hybrid 
business package composed of commercial purchases and Foreign Military Sales offerings.721 At the 
time being, the Korean Government demanded the localization of the highly advanced F-16 Fighter, but 
the U.S. Government refused in concern of maintaining its decisive military edge as well as its 
technological competitiveness over other countries.722 Korean Air was handpicked by the government 
as the prime contractor of the KF-5E/F program, and entered into negotiations with Northrop over the 
terms and conditions of the local assembly work. After the Korean and U.S. Governments signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding for the local assembly of the aircraft in October 1980, Korean Air 
finalized the contract with Northrop for license manufacturing of the aircraft the following month. The 
engine contract was awarded to Samsung Precision Industries (later Samsung Aerospace) under a 
manufacturing license with General Electric for the local production of the J85-GE-21A turbojet engine 
system. The local assembly of the KF-5E/F culminated with a component localization rate of 23% 
throughout the production of the aircraft between 1981 and 1986.723 
 Because at the time the domestic industry lacked the industrial foundations required for 
airframe production and precision equipment, the government invested about 56% in financial support 
for building the initial infrastructure, whereas the remaining 44% finances came from Korean Air and 
its subcontractors. The government commitment to the program was shared by cabinet industrial 
agencies (17% by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) and the military (39% by the Air Force), 
                                                          
720 Joint Communique of the Twelfth Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, Seoul, 19 October 1979. 
721 The joint venture with Northrop included co-assembly of 36 airframes for F-5E and 32 airframes in addition to jet engines 
for F-5F fighters, 조중훈, “항공운송사업의 역할과 발전,” 군사논단 제9호, 1997, p. 281 
722 Jane E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, Macmillan Press, 1986, p. 72. 
723 공군본부, 항공산업 육성방안 연구, 1984, p. 52. 
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with a total infrastructure investment of USD 35.65 million. The local industry’s proportion into 
building the infrastructure accounted for about USD 28.7 million shared between Korean Air and 
Samsung Precision Industries. The entire program budget of the KF-5E/F reached nearly USD 684 
million, with about USD 584.4 million spent to overseas sources. The program cost for domestic 
development was comparably 20% higher than a direct purchase option from Northrop. But the annual 
direct employment of 800 jobs in high tech engineering, the acquisition of advanced technologies by 
manufacturing airframes and engines, automated ignition devices, broach machines, and the opportunity 
to collaborate with global aerospace contenders such as Northrop and GE, indefinitely presented the 
local industry with precious experience as starter in this high tech sector.724 
In the nascent stages of aircraft manufacturing, the KF-5E/F was a conduit of technical 
education for the domestic industry. Throughout the phases in license production of the airframe and 
turbojet engine, the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector acquired essential knowledge and technical 
experience in production/quality/material management, and obtained the opportunity to go through a 
focused overseas training program for 66 engineers in specialized areas of system assembly, flight 
performance test, chemical milling, honey comb production, to name a few. The learning and production 
experiences enhanced the interpretation of design, technical data, engineering procedures, and the 
production of precision machine tools. Especially for Samsung Aerospace, possessing basic knowledge 
and skills for producing precision machine tools enabled further production of more sophisticated 
aircraft engine components, which ruminates as an indispensable instrument to expand the 
manufacturing capability in this sector. Based on these experiences, Korean Air and Samsung 
Aerospace were able to win follow-up contracts as a regional maintenance and repair firm with the U.S. 
military for its F-16 Fighters and with Saudi Arabia for its C-130 Transporters.725 Thus, the KF-5E/F 
local assembly upgraded the technical standing of the local aircraft-manufacturing sector, from a 
maintenance and repair level to a system assembly standard. 
 However, the decision to co-assemble the F-5E/F aircraft under license did not further translate 
into building larger capacities for the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector because of discontinuities 
into subsequent development programs. Korean Air was not awarded further contracts from the 
government in manufacturing fixed-wing products, at which the contract awards for succeeding 
programs were given to other competing firms such as Daewoo Heavy Industries or Samsung Aerospace. 
Opposed to the initial idea of following up with a subsequent aircraft manufacturing program, the next 
aircraft program did not materialize until 1991 when the military decided to introduce the F-16 fighter 
under license production. Samsung Aerospace, a late comer in the sector, won the contract, in which 
Korean Air and Daewoo participated as component manufacturers in the program.726 As a result, 
Korean Air was forced to absorb substantial business losses from the KF-5E/F, and was compelled to 
                                                          
724 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
725 대한항공, 대한항공 20 년사, 1989, p. 278. 
726 조황희, 항공기 산업의 기술혁신 패턴과 전개방향, 정책연구 99-38, 과학기술정책연구원, 2000, p.  
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shut down the production line shortly after the conclusion of the program.727  
 
7.1.2. KT-1 Basic Trainer Program 
Although a different variant from combat jet fighters, the Agency of Defense Development 
(ADD) at the time has been vying to launch an aircraft program of its own initiative by attempting to 
build a basic trainer aircraft. Since 1977, ADD has been developing an experimental unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV), project name ‘Solgae’ (Kite), which completed its first test, flight in 1981. Under 
technology assistance from Cranfield University’s aeronautical engineering department, ADD 
engineers acquired the knowledge for baseline design and development processes to build the initial 
configuration of the UAV. In order to fully test the aerodynamics of the airframe, in May 1979, ADD 
started building instruments capable of examining supersonic wind tunnels and trisonic wind tunnel 
effects. The airframe and guidance devices were built by ADD whereas the propulsion system was co-
developed by ADD and British aeronautical engineers from Cranfield University. However, the project 
did not materialize into a formal program because the military canceled the Solgae project as an official 
warfighter requirement.728 Whatsoever, the Solgae UAV development experience directly assimilated 
into subsequent aircraft programs within ADD.  
Starting from 1983, after the establishment of the Air Domain Laboratory as a result of some 
organizational reshuffling efforts, ADD researchers surveyed the needs to indigenously develop a basic 
trainer level turboprop aircraft, on the grounds of building foundational skills and maturing 
technological readiness levels to develop more advanced combat aircrafts in preparation of ensuing 
engineering stages. Labeled with a project name ‘Korea Trainer Experience (KTX-1)’, ADD initiated 
the conceptual refinement process in 1986 for a tandem-seat trainer aircraft powered by a 550 shp 
engine. The KTX was also given a nickname ‘Yeomyeong’ meaning ‘daybreak’ that indicated a new 
start for the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. ADD developed 6 prototypes with this design. 
However, the Air Force preferred to own a basic trainer that can perform extended missions as a light 
attacker and forward air controller, and therefore rejected the initial KTX-1 Yeomyeong configuration 
offered by ADD.729 The Air Force was operating the T-41B and T-37C as its basic and advance trainer 
aircraft, which was reaching its shelf life, thus considered for replacement. In fact, the Air Force at the 
time being had in mind the Swiss-made Pilatus PC-9 trainer that can simultaneously conduct trainer 
and attack/observation functions. In order for the KTX to perform at this level, the aircraft had to go 
through substantial modifications in its aerodynamics design because it required a more powerful 
engine that can uphold additional armaments and mission equipment to fulfill the extended mission 
statements. Modifying the engine propulsion from the previous 550 shaft horsepower (shp) to a 
performance level 950 shp, and accommodating additional equipment on board implied an entirely new 
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design for an aircraft. A special task force, resembling that of the Lockheed Martin ‘Skunk Works’, was 
organized under ADD to accommodate the engineering alterations to the aircraft. In this regard, the 
KTX-1 Yeomyeong significantly overhauled its original design, and was reborn in 1988 under a new 
project name ‘KTX-1 Woongbi’, with Woongbi meaning ‘Great Leap’.730 
The initial program management structure of the KTX-1, after entering the technology 
development and maturation phase in 1988, started with a bizarre arrangement between the system 
developer and component manufacturers. ADD assumed overall responsibility in design and system 
integration, with Samsung Aerospace producing the forward fuselage and engine, Korean Air (KA) the 
main body and rear airframe, and Daewoo Heavy Industries (DHI) the main wing and tail wing of the 
aircraft, thus without designating a prime contractor that would manage the overall development and 
manufacturing phases of the program. 731  Among the three firms, DHI showed the strongest 
commitment and enthusiasm in the trainer development project. In January 1989, DHI collaborated with 
ADD and built a miniaturized wind tunnel that allowed the testing of aerodynamics simulated for 
measuring the effects of air movement around and through the aircraft.732 Putting into account of DHI’s 
corporate commitment into aircraft development, ADD teamed up with Daewoo in 1990, and awarded 
the contract for prototype development and overall responsibility for full scale manufacturing of the 
aircraft. 
At the time of starting the project, the circumstances of aeronautical engineering at Korea were 
under the worst of all conditions. There existed almost no home grown research base capable of 
developing an aircraft, nor any infrastructure established to perform adequate test and evaluation on 
prototypes. In order to mind the gaps in technology standards, the KTX-1 development department from 
ADD signed a three-year technology advisory contract with Pilatus Aircraft of Switzerland. Based on 
this arrangement, ADD dispatched a team of researchers to the Pilatus facility at Swiss to learn the 
conceptual design technology for a basic trainer. It was in fact Pilatus who reached out first to ADD 
after learning the agency’s ambition to develop a trainer aircraft. But the intent of the Swiss aircraft 
manufacturer was not merely on assisting a local trainer development project, but to expand new 
business opportunities in Korea. In this regard, Pilatus exhibited a restrictive attitude with disclosing 
cutting edge technology to ADD researchers. In some instances, Pilatus prohibited ADD researchers 
from bringing rulers in the design chamber to prevent potential disclosures of detailed measurements. 
ADD researchers had to improvise by using cigar boxes to make rough measurements throughout this 
duration. 733  With no surprise, the PC-7 and PC-9 trainers of Pilatus Aircraft later became a top 
competitor against the KTX-1 in the international market for basic trainer aircrafts.734 The KTX project 
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was formally named the First Korean Trainer (KT-1) as the program milestones neared the end of the 
engineering and manufacturing development phase, and qualified all performance standards defined by 
the Air Force in November 1998. 
The KT-1 has become a Korean bestselling aircraft as the trainer vehicle was offered to multiple 
foreign customers around the world. The significance of the KT-1 comes from the fact that it became 
the first aircraft designed and engineered through indigenous efforts. Despite the glorious national pride 
glittering over the first indigenously designed aircraft, KT-1 still had to consider international export 
control restrictions for its export models as some of the major components fell under U.S. technology 
security constraints. The first export case of the KT-1 occurred in 2003 when Indonesia decided to 
purchase 7 trainers from KAI. This case turned out to be a complex process that involved both 
diplomatic maneuvers as well as business promotional deals to resolve the restrictive limits of 
international technology security and control measures. The challenge with the Indonesian export was 
the fact that some of the major components fell under the U.S. arms embargo list against Muslim 
countries, in accordance with the Global War on Terrorism. The components subject to U.S. export 
license approval were precision devices such as air conditioners, brakes, and some avionics related parts. 
However, the United States also exerted efforts to build an international network of partnerships to 
effectively cope against rising terrorist cells in Southeast Asia. In this regard, cooperation with 
Indonesia was imperative. At the moment, Korean diplomats successfully negotiated with both Jakarta 
and Washington D.C. to include the export approval of the constrained items under license review as a 
Presidential Summit Meeting agenda. 735  Although the issue was miraculously solved, further 
innovation opportunities could not afford to rely on sheer luck factors any longer. 
 
Purchaser Type Aircrafts Program Value Year Remarks 
Korea KT-1 85 USD 400 million 1988 – 1999 Airworthiness Certified KA-1 20 USD 11 million 1999 – 2007 
Turkey KT-1T 40 USD 350 million 2007 – 2013 Type Certified 15 In progress N/A N/A 
Indonesia KT-1B 
7 USD 32.9 million 2003 
No Certification 5 USD 23 million 2007 
5 USD 35.5 million 2008 
Peru KT-1P 10 USD 200 million 2012 – 2016 Type Certified KA-1P 10 
Senegal In progress 4 In progress N/A N/A 
  Table 51. KT-1 Woongbi Manufacturing and Export Records as of 2018 
 
Following the successful development of the KT-1 Woongbi, the aircraft further evolved into a 
light-attack and forward air control variant with a project name XKO-1. In April 1999, the XKO-1 
project was formally initiated as a support aircraft that complements fighter jets in air-to-ground attack 
missions. The airframe remained identical to the KT-1, but the armaments and avionics have 
substantially transformed the internal design and system connectivity from the original design. The 
subtle change in the exterior showed two pylon ejectors attached underneath both sides of the wings 
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that loaded additional composite fuel tanks, and the installation of a launcher and gun pod to mount 
additional armaments. However, the avionics that supported the additional armaments and GPS guided 
inertial systems with advanced communication antennas, and pilot-assisting Night Vision Imaging 
Systems (NVIS) all represented substantial changes from the original baseline design. Additionally, the 
Head-up Displays built in as an advanced control panel, and Multifunctional Displays introduced for 
accurate navigation also improved aircraft performance as a light-attacker.736 Referring to the serious 
system design and manufacturing gaps that frequently occurred throughout the KT-1 development 
phases, the earlier engineering interferences were mostly resolved during the XKO-1 program. This 
was attributed to the program experiences accumulated from the previous development efforts, which 
directly channeled into the XKO-1 program.737  
A representative component localization effort of the XKO-1 development considered the 
power package of the aircraft’s hydraulic system. Initially, because of the domestic technological 
standards fell short of fully localizing the power package, the KT-1 project adopted the component from 
a British hydraulic system. However, because of the technological sensitivities, the British firm refused 
to further hand down the core technology required for localizing the component. The localization of the 
unit involved precision manufacturing and advanced test and evaluation processes, which necessitated 
collaboration with a forerunner in this field. In face against the impending limitations, the system 
developer ADD and prototype manufacturer Hanwha Corporation conducted a thorough analysis of the 
power package applied into one of the KT-1 aircrafts, reviewed the improvement processes of the unit 
that occurred during the operational periods, and derived the technical standards expected for 
localization. After overcoming component integration efforts reflected in the preliminary and critical 
design phases, the inexperience in test and evaluation phases regarding durability testing and high/low 
temperature fatigue testing presented extra challenges to the project. It was only after the resolution of 
these aspects, as a result of the tenacious collaboration between the development entities, where the 
power package became fully localized for domestic manufacturing. 738 In October 2005, after the 
successful completion of all development milestones, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally assessed the 
aircraft’s performance acceptable for combat missions, and presented an official name to the project the 
‘KA-1’ light-attack and forward air control aircraft. 
Despite the successful development of the KT-1 trainer, the program demonstrated a sense of 
frustration in state led program management. The process of contractor selection showed redundancy 
and overlap with other government initiated S&T programs, which caused unnecessary competition 
among the three major aircraft-manufacturing firms. Around the late 1980s and early 1990s, Korean 
Air already initiated the development of a four-seat single-engine light monoplane named Chang-Gong 
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91, which was awarded under a government led development project programmed by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. Three prototypes were developed where the monoplanes successfully 
conducted its maiden flight in November 1991.739 Chang-Gong 91 went through a one year technical 
inspection and 80-hours of test flight, and became the first indigenously developed aircraft to have 
received an airworthiness certification by the Ministry of Land and Transportation in September 1993. 
The prospects of international sales also marked meaningful possibilities after some Southeast Asian 
and Latin American countries expressed interest in purchasing the aircraft. Unfortunately, the export 
opportunities did not materialize into commercial sales after the Chang-Gong 91 project failed to obtain 
a bilateral airworthiness certification from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. 740 Although 
Chang-Gong 91 was a commercial commuter project launched by the national S&T authorities, a more 
intimate cross talk between the commercial and military authorities could’ve avoided any redundancy 
in resources and overlaps in development efforts. Korea Air had accumulated experiences from the KF-
5E/F license assembly as well as helicopter manufacturing. Nonetheless, government policies dismissed 
the idea of building concentrated capacities over a firm with an established record of aircraft 
development, and instead awarded a new contract to a relatively new comer in the sector, Daewoo 
Heavy Industries. As the Chang-Gong 91 did not materialize into a formal commercial commodity, 
Korean Air exited the fixed wing development efforts for good, and the accumulated technology and 
experience of the firm’s twenty year efforts did not further evolve into higher standards. 
 
7.1.3. Korea Fighter Program (KFP): The KF-16 Fighting Falcon Multirole Fighter  
In the late 1970s, the Korean Armed Forces confronted growing challenges in the conventional 
military balance between Seoul and Pyeongyang. Especially, the new introduction of MiG-29 Fighters 
in the North Korean People’s Air Force, and the aging of the early F-4 and F-5 variants generated the 
need to introduce advanced multi-role fighters that perform air superiority missions. In a parallel 
domain, the industrial authorities developed strong motivations of constructing a self-reliant defense 
posture supported by a sound defense industrial base. Hence, driven by these two initiatives, the defense 
and industrial authorities were instigated to pursue a concurrent strategy of building military capabilities 
and industrial capacities simultaneously. In this regard, the defense authorities intended to introduce F-
16 fighters, which was considered the most advanced fighter aircraft at the time being. 
The total purchase of 180 F-16 fighters took place in three different stages. The first stage was 
a direct purchase from the U.S. Government through Foreign Military Sales, at which the Korean 
Government introduced forty F-16C/D Block-32 fighters from General Dynamics, dubbed Peace Bridge 
I, under a direct purchase contract in 1981. The second stage was a mix of direct purchase and in-
country manufacturing in a slightly upgraded version (Block-52), at which twelve aircrafts were directly 
purchased from General Dynamics, with an additional 36 aircrafts introduced through licensed 
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assembly work under a manufacturing partnership established between Samsung Aerospace and 
General Dynamics in 1991. The remaining 72 aircrafts were produced under license by Samsung 
Aerospace, which later merged into the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in 1999, with the final 
aircraft delivered to the Korean Air Force in 2000. The third phase was an extended license production 
of an additional twenty aircrafts for the purpose of sustaining the production lines of the aircraft-
manufacturing sector, and was concluded in July 2003.741 
 
Program Model Block Direct Purchase Assembly Co-Production Quantity Delivered 
Peace Bridge I F-16C Block 32 40 - - 30 1986-1992 F-16D Block 32 - - 10 
Peace Bridge II 
(KFP-I) 
F-16C Block 52 12 36 72 80 1994-2000 F-16D Block 52 40 
Peace Bridge III 
(KFP-II) 
F-16C Block 52 - - 20 15 2002-2004 F-16D Block 52 - - 5 
  Table 52. F-16 Fighter Programs by Deployment Phases 
 
Since the designation of the aircraft-manufacturing sector as a strategically focused high 
priority industry in the early 1980s, defense offsets were considered as the principle conduit for 
technology transfers in the process of nurturing domestic industrial capacities. Defense offsets from the 
F-16 program were arranged in two phases. The first arrangement was offered from the Peace Bridge I 
program after signing the contract under Foreign Military Sales with the U.S. Government in 1983. In 
March the following year, the prime contractor of the Peace Bridge I Program, General Dynamics, 
responded with a defense offset package worth USD 8 million in business value that included the local 
production of the forward and center fuselage, inverted stabilizer, and related manufacturing technology. 
The offset package was handled by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which solicited applications 
from four domestic firms willing to enter the aircraft-manufacturing business – Daewoo Heavy 
Industries, Korean Air, Korea Heavy Industries, and Daedong Heavy Industries. The local firms had to 
invest in building the essential manufacturing infrastructure in order to accept the offers from the 
defense offsets. However, the investment cost associated with building the essential infrastructure such 
as in constructing facilities, purchasing production lines, recruiting and training engineers, etc., grossed 
approximately USD 30 million, all for a mere amount of USD 8 million worth of offsets. The applicants 
asked for government support in the form of subsidies, but the authorities denied the request for reasons 
of imposing a fiscal austerity policy at the time being due to the ailing economic situation. In early 1984, 
three companies eventually turned down their application, but Daewoo Heavy Industries remained in 
the competition and received the final offer for the offset deal.742  
Further aggravating to this situation, however, General Dynamics demanded an additional cost 
of USD 6 million under the title of ‘In Country Support Fees’ that covers travel and logistic support in 
providing technology assistance and training for Daewoo engineers and program managers participating 
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in the offset deal. The defense acquisition authorities managed to mitigate the cost down to USD 4.4 
million, but Daewoo still had to share USD 1.9 million.743 At the time being, Daewoo had a strong 
motivation to enter the aircraft-manufacturing sector as part of its corporate diversification strategy of 
expanding into other business opportunities. Daewoo has already showed sincere commitment in the 
sector by preparing new investments for building technological infrastructure in aeronautics required 
for the KTX-1 basic trainer program at the time. The top management at Daewoo had high expectations 
in the aerospace and defense sector as a new business area, especially foresaw the emerging 
opportunities in the upcoming F-16 program that would add a new strategic business branch into its 
aircraft-manufacturing portfolio once the company successfully lands on an exclusive contract deal with 
the government. In this regard, Daewoo Heavy Industries decided to take the inherent risks of the F-16 
offset deal with General Dynamics, and therefore committed substantial corporate resources with a 
long-term objective of being selected by the government as a prime contractor for the second phase 
Peace Bridge II co-production program. General Dynamics also reduced the high demands in cost 
sharing, in anticipation of winning subsequent defense contracts from the Korean Government that 
would follow the Peace Bridge I Program.744 
In order to forge an enhanced airpower structure that counters the mediocrities of Korea’s 
conventional military balance against North Korea, the Air Force generated new force requirements 
mindful of an advance fighter capability, reflected in a 1985 report to the President by the Air Force 
Chief of Staff titled “Developing Domestic Aircraft Industrial Capacities through KFP (Korea Fighter 
Program: Second Phase Peace Bridge) Co-Production”. The report highlighted the need to upgrade 
technological foundations and manufacturing competencies in order to reach a true self-reliant level of 
defending the nation and promoting industrial competitiveness. 745  The ad-hoc Aircraft Industry 
Promotion Committee was established in 1985 as an interagency coordination forum between the 
military and industrial authorities within the cabinet to plan and discuss the detailed strategy for building 
both military capabilities and industrial capacities in the aircraft manufacturing domain. Despite the 
comparatively expensive price tag associated with license production against a direct-of-the-shelf 
purchase, the Committee set the acquisition strategy of the program as a commercial license production 
program with limited elements of Foreign Military Sales in order to reap out the most optimal benefits 
from the program.746 The second phase Peace Bridge was a competition between the General Dynamics 
F-16 and McDonnell Douglas F/A-18, at which the Air Force and Aircraft Industry Promotion 
Committee’s initial F/A-18 selection in 1989 was rejected in 1991 over the F-16 by the Presidential 
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Office.747 In this regard, after a turbulent type selection process between the Air Force and primary 
defense authorities from the Presidential Office, the license production of the F-16C/D was finally 
selected for the second phase Peace Bridge program in March 1991, at which the program officially 
changed its title to the Korea Fighter Program (KFP).748 
As though a prelude to the surprise selection of the F-16 over the F/A-18, to the dismay of all 
aircraft-manufacturing firms, especially for Daewoo Heavy Industries, the defense acquisition 
authorities selected Samsung Aerospace as the prime contractor of the Korea Fighter Program (KFP) in 
October 1986. The selection of Samsung over Daewoo raised a series of public criticism almost equal 
to the debate over aircraft type selection. As mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, Daewoo 
Heavy Industries has shown a strong commitment in entering the aircraft-manufacturing sector by 
risking substantial upfront costs in infrastructure investments in order to build initial manufacturing 
capacities during the Peace Bridge I defense offset arrangements. The firm also further invested into 
building foundational skills and knowledge by participating in the KT-1 Woongbi Basic Trainer 
program at the same time of working itself to win the KFP contract. A comparison of the three 
contemporary major aircraft-manufacturing firms shows that Korean Air tops the three while Daewoo 
lags behind in all aspects of the company’s performance; short history, investments, employees, 
experience, and so forth. Whatsoever, the rapid capacity building efforts within a relatively shorter 
period than its peers encapsulated the company’s strong commitment into this sector, support by its 
corporate strength demonstrated in other business sectors such as finance, machinery and tools, 
electronics, and so forth. In this respect, in September 1986, the working group’s survey of the Aircraft 
Industry Promotion Committee recommended Daewoo Heavy Industries as the prime contractor for the 
KFP. However, the Presidential Office rejected the recommendation and directed to reexamine the 
survey process. Putting into account the fluctuating political variables altogether, the Committee 
immediately turned around its initial assessment, disqualified Daewoo Heavy Industries, and selected 
Samsung Aerospace as the prime contractor over the KFP program the following month.749 
The collusion between state and business has taken place at this juncture over contract awards. 
Formally established institutions and regulatory procedures were overrun by political manipulation. 
Although Daewoo was assessed with the highest grades by the Committee, its lead was merely within 
a small margin against it competitors. Reportedly, a week before the announcement of the final contract 
to Daewoo, the Chairman of Samsung Group had a secret gathering with senior officials at the 
Presidential Office, most likely the President himself. The general knowledge tells that it was through 
this intersection how the decision for the KFP contractor selection was overturned in favor to Samsung. 
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At the time, Mr. Lee, Byeong Cheol, the Chairman of Samsung Group, had his eyes on the developments 
of Japan’s aerospace industry, revealed by the FSX Program in collaboration with the United States. 
Through this effort, Samsung has abandoned the earlier reluctance to commit itself into the defense 
business, and started actively investing into the newly emerging aircraft-manufacturing sector.750 
Leaving behind the stormy type selection and contractor award process, the KFP returned to its 
initial track, which was to serve in building both military capacities and technology competitiveness. In 
order to achieve this goal, the program authorities had to exert efforts to obtain technology transfers and 
reach certain localization rates in component production as much as possible.  
 
Section Primary Contractors and Subcontractors Localization (%) 
Engine Samsung Aerospace 44 
Avionics Goldstar Precision, Goldstar Electric, Daewoo Electronics, Samsung 
Semiconductors and Communications, Ewha Electric, Jeil Precision, Hyundai 
Electronics, Daeyoung Electronics, AFCOA Korea, Litton Korea 
34 
Fuselage/ 
Machinery 
KIA Machine & Engineering, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Korean Air, 
Dongmyeong Heavy Industries, Rocket Electric, Tongil Heavy Industries, 
Korea Fiber, Hyosung Heavy Industries 
Fuselage: 61 
Machinery: 52 
Material Samseon Engineering, Oriental, Korea Fiber - 
    Table 53. KFP Contractors and Component Localization Rates  
    Source: Samsung Aerospace 20 Years, 1997, p. 402. 
 
U.S. Technology Provision and Restrictions over the KFP 
The KFP was subject for public scrutiny in the U.S. Congress, not only because the program 
fell under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, but because of the growing concerns of providing 
assistance to a potential contender in a time of diminishing U.S. economic dominance. Aerospace was 
one of the very few remaining industrial fields where the U.S. continued to maintain competitive 
advantage against other competing entities worldwide. The concerns of eroding such leverage in the 
business sector were raising skepticism within the political constituencies over the effectiveness of U.S. 
security cooperation and conventional arms transfer policies. Most of the concern over the KFP within 
the U.S. Congress placed tremendous weight on the possibility of nurturing the technological capacities 
of an emerging aerospace contender at the expense of deteriorating the competitiveness of its own 
industry. The U.S. Congress rigorously scrutinized the program and identified the number of 
deficiencies resulting from poor interagency coordination between the Department of Defense and 
Department of Commerce for not factoring in the impact of technology transfers with the effects to the 
local American economy. Government oversight on export control measures regarding technology 
transfers and component manufacturing workshare was inadequate in the course of crafting the KFP 
contract between Korean defense acquisition authorities and General Dynamics. With the full 
acknowledgement of Korea’s ambitions to enter the global aerospace market, U.S. Congress was baffled 
over the idea that the crucial elements of capacity building derived from American sources. Thus, 
Congress was urging the need to consider a direct off-the-shelf program instead of a co-production deal 
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for the KFP.751 
At the time being, the most controversial military co-development program in the aspects of 
technology security was taking place between the U.S. and Japan regarding the Fighter Support 
Experience (FS-X) in consideration to Japan’s ambitious drive to develop an indigenous but expanded 
variant based on the F-16 baseline configuration. Although different in scope and substantially lower in 
developmental magnitudes, the KFP was being scrutinized in parallel with the FS-X program within the 
U.S. legislative authorities. The challenges presented in the viewpoint of U.S. conventional arms 
transfer policies was that the KFP and FS-X attracted higher attention on the commercial benefits to 
Korea and Japan than actual military contributions for American regional alliance politics. The general 
perspective accepted within the U.S. was that Japan has gained significant technological capacities 
through the sizable volume of American military and economic assistance, which has become a major 
threat to the U.S. economy throughout the 80s and 90s. The same logic was being applied to the KFP 
case where the country has also benefited from large packages of U.S. military assistance in various 
dimensions of the country’s scheme to build-up its force structure and defense industrial base. 752 
Nonetheless, the fundamental difference between the KFP and the FS-X lies on the fact that the FS-X 
involved substantial degrees of transferring system design and development technology, whereas the 
KFP involved the transfer of production information and know-how in assembly work, which was 
considered lesser in sophistication compared to the FS-X. Compounding to the situation was the huge 
lay off of workers by one of the major U.S. aerospace giants, McDonnell Douglas, the year prior to the 
export decision. McDonnell Douglas announced a plan to cut at least $700 million from its operating 
budget, which forced over 10,000 employees leaving the company. In a time of shrinking defense 
budgets, development cost overruns, and struggling commercial aviation products, the company became 
financially stressed off from the once dominant figure as an aerospace giant from the sector.753 The 
substantial business losses, followed by the layoff plans, have raised grave concerns within the U.S. 
Government and Congress over the country’s competitive edge in aerospace. 
 Consequently, the U.S. Government inhibited the availability of certain technologies for 
license production and limited the proposed industrial benefits from the initially expected spinoff effects. 
The KFP originally attempted to purchase three (3) F-16 aircrafts directly off the shelf, twenty (20) 
aircrafts in kit form as local assembly work, and the remaining ninety-seven (97) aircrafts under 
domestic license production. In the course of executing this arrangement, the defense authorities 
insisted General Dynamics to buy back locally manufactured components, not only for the KFP but also 
for other U.S. government programs as well. The special offset guidelines imposed upfront in soliciting 
the Request for Proposals for the KFP competition highlighted a minimum of 60% in a preferable form 
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to support domestic aerospace industrial development projects. Opposed to the original program 
requirements drafted by the Korean Government, the U.S. Government viewed license production as a 
form of defense offsets in itself, which would’ve exceeded the actual offset value over the given 60% 
guideline. After the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Commerce intervened in offset 
negotiations, the production arrangement and offset thresholds were substantially revised. In the process 
of examining the KFP arrangements, the U.S. Department of Defense had more coordinative sessions 
with its counterparts at the Department of Commerce in comparison to Japan’s FS-X program. This 
alludes to the fact of how much scrutiny was given to KFP alone by the U.S. authorities. The U.S. 
Government returned with an offer to increase the numbers of direct purchase to forty-eight (48) and 
commercial license production to seventy-two (72). The direct purchase numbers were adjusted to 
twelve (12) purchases off the shelf and thirty-six (36) local assembly in kit form. Under the direct 
intervention of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the offset threshold was adjusted to 30%, while without 
accounting for license production as defense offsets. The intervention of the highest U.S. defense 
authority – Secretary of Defense – in a commercial arrangement between a foreign ally nation and a 
U.S. defense firm was unprecedented, which indicate the level of interest the KFP was under at that 
point.754 
 
Subchapter Conclusion 
The domestic efforts of capacity building in military aircrafts experienced a number of 
successful cases while also confronted multiple stumbling blocks. Often times, political collusions 
circumvented legitimate decisions made through proper deliberation processes. In that matter, sectoral 
efforts of capacity building were undermined and in some cases entirely abandoned, which precluded 
continued efforts for knowledge accumulation and subsequent potentials for innovation. Most of the 
capacity building processes concentrated on building manufacturing infrastructure and workshop level 
technicians, while little efforts were committed to R&D and enhancing the sector’s technology 
readiness levels. In this respect, local development programs showed high reliance on foreign parts and 
technology, especially dependent on American sources. Through the defense offset package, however, 
the inclusion of providing technology assistance to build an advanced trainer aircraft for the Korean Air 
Force has set the conditions to improve the prospects of sectoral competitiveness. Further details will 
be described in the following sections. 
 
7.2. Korea Trainer Experience Second Batch (KTX-2): T-50 Golden Eagle Supersonic 
Advanced Trainer 
The T-50 Advanced Trainer Program is a one of a few supersonic trainer aircrafts in the world that 
evolved into multiple roles, spanning from advanced trainer (T-50A), aerobatics (T-50B), trainer and 
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light attacker (TA-50), and multirole fighter (FA-50). With a development budget of KRW 2.11 trillion 
programmed under an eight-year period for development and production, the aircraft was the first 
indigenously developed fighter, supported through an international strategic alliance arrangement with 
Lockheed Martin for co-development, and has been extensively marketed to global customers.  
The program was one of the very first indigenous aircraft development efforts that went 
through modern engineering and manufacturing processes, including computer aided 
design/engineering/manufacturing, integrated systems engineering, test & evaluation, and product life 
cycle management. For a country like Korea that lacked the experience in designing and building its 
own aircraft, technology assistance from advanced foreign partners was imperative. The success 
potentials of this strategic partnership relied on how effectively and efficiently the program authorities, 
ranging from the program management office to the prime contractor, can acquire the requisite 
knowledge and skill base for the development program. Absorptive capacity depends on whether the 
firm obtains prior knowledge and experience on the subject matter program. T-50 was an example of 
this capacity since it evolved from the KT-1 development and KFP license production experience the 
country has accumulated from Daewoo Heavy Industries and Samsung Aerospace. The program was a 
result of these prior efforts, on-top of the multiple technology transfers from British and U.S. sources, 
and subsequently a co-development effort between KAI and Lockheed Martin. This section will review 
the motivations, program milestones, and sources of innovation that occurred throughout the 
development of the T-50 program.  
 
7.2.1. Development Motivations and Objectives 
The development motivations were generated from three objectives. 1) Build an advanced 
trainer aircraft that can perform multirole missions in an evolutionary prospect. 2) Provide opportunities 
to upgrade the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. 3) Strive to build a self-reliant defense capability. 
The requirement generation process of the T-50 followed an evolutionary sequence that started from an 
advanced pilot trainer and concluded over a multirole fighter aircraft. Normally, an advanced jet trainer 
has the potentials to become a tactical light attacker after some additional overhaul works made in 
avionics and armaments. The force requirement for an advanced trainer originally started in 1989. At 
the time being, two major aircraft programs were in progress – the KFP F-16 license production and the 
KT-1 Basic Trainer. In parallel to these development programs, the Air Force raised additional 
requirements for an advanced trainer that can cover high performance training functions before formally 
becoming a certified fighter pilot. Thus, a bond of sympathy developed within the senior echelons of 
the Air Force to introduce such capability, which evolved into project name Korea Trainer Experience 
2 (KTX-2). The looming specters of the Iran-Iraq War during the mid-1980s also raised the attention of 
acquiring indigenous development capacities for an aircraft capability as well. After the pullout of U.S. 
military assistance to Iran, the F-14 fighter, which constituted the major air capability of the Iranian Air 
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Force, was completely grounded for no use in the air campaign against the Iraqi forces. The situation 
showcased the real threat perception of lacking a self-reliant military support structure, caused from 
excessively relying on foreign sources without building domestic capacities, which may virtually result 
in neutralizing its own readiness posture. The Iranian case triggered the need to nurture industrial 
competencies within some senior level officials in the Air Force and ADD.755 
 At the time of specifying the development needs, Korea was far behind global technological 
standards in building an indigenous aircraft, thus the country was in dire needs of technology assistance 
from international forerunners of the sector. The majority of the technology originated from the KFP 
offset deal under a collaborative provision with General Dynamics. As noted in the previous section, 
General Dynamics owed a 30% offset package to Samsung Aerospace under the KFP contract. The 
dollar value of the offset approximated nearly USD 14 million, but was considered insufficient as a 
manufacturing deal to further expand into a concrete business opportunity. A direct offset arrangement 
in subject areas such as concluding on a counter-trade contract between the two firms would result in 
simply expending the offset value in producing low end aircraft components without much meaningful 
spinoff effects into the industry. At this point, aerospace was frequently cited as a buzz word for new 
business opportunities and industrial upgrade in the late 1980s where major Chaebol firms were hastily 
rushing into the sector without being properly equipped with requisite R&D capacities and 
manufacturing infrastructure. Senior engineers in the Air Force, ADD, and Samsung Aerospace all 
aspired to take full advantage of this state driven demand pull, with their eyes on the follow-up 
development potentials after the KFP license production. In regards to an evolutionary development 
sequence, the authorities had in mind of developing an advanced trainer aircraft as a subsequent project 
after the KFP. The Air Force took the lead in this discussion after undergoing multiple rounds of 
deliberations within the force requirement departments. After the Air Force fully approved the 
exploratory phase of an advanced trainer program in 1989, the development authorities at ADD had to 
further specify the operational requirements in parallel with the country’s technology readiness level. 
As a result of these multiple review sessions, the authorities concluded an indirect offset package that 
involves substantial amount of technology transfers would be the best option to fully capitalize from 
the KFP offset trade arrangements.756 
 The program confronted resistance internally and externally before becoming a formal 
program of record. Regarding external factors, an advanced trainer emerged as an urgent requirement 
for the Air Force during the early 1990s in order to properly train its pilots in preparation of the 
imminent F-16 flight missions before 1996. At the time being, the Air Force was flying the obsolete T-
33 and the TF-5B as its advanced trainer, which were shortly considered for replacement. Hence, it was 
physically unfeasible to complete the indigenous development effort within the given timeline. 
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However, the replacing the development program to a foreign procurement would result in entirely 
undermining the opportunity to build an indigenous industrial capability. In order to fulfill the trainer 
needs while supporting the indigenous development efforts, the Air Force was compelled to introduce 
an interim solution before the conclusion of the KTX-2 development. At first, the Air Force selected 
the Italian Aermacchi MB-339 jet trainer, but abruptly reversed the decision to purchasing twenty (20) 
Hawk Advanced Trainers from the British Aerospace (BAe). The catalyst of the sudden change derived 
from the triple layered offset package proposed by the Executive Vice President of BAe himself, which 
included the training of test pilots, technology assistance in developing a trainer simulator, and the 
transfer of system design technology for a subsonic advanced trainer, under a price tag of USD 8.5 
million per aircraft. The offset package provided the opportunity for a team of ADD researchers to study 
critical design skills and manufacturing processes at the BAe research lab over a 14-month period.757 
 BAe, however, had aspirations to sell more trainers to the Korean Air Force with additional 
light attack performance features. In early 1992, the Air Force generated the need for additional 
advanced trainers, but the newly identified force requirement did not agree with the development 
milestones of the KTX-2. Under collaborating with some retired top brass Korean Air Force officials, 
BAe staged a secondary lobbying scheme to sell twenty more aircrafts. The additional purchase would 
take away a significant portion from the KTX-2 program budget and eventually increase the unit cost 
of the aircraft to unaffordable limits, which may potentially cancel the entire development efforts. This 
would provide extra opportunities for BAe to monopolize the entire trainer program of the Korean Air 
Force. In a desperate move to save the KTX-2 from an off-the-shelf purchase, the parties supportive of 
an indigenous capability strongly insisted to lease a U.S. trainer as an alternative option until the KTX-
2 development efforts conclude. In this regard, the defense authorities decided to lease thirty (30) T-38 
Talons for its advanced trainer under a USD 86 million contract as a bridging capability until the KTX-
2 becomes fully operational in 2005.758 
 Regarding internal factors, an advanced trainer capability had to compete against other force 
requirement priorities within ADD as well as with the three military services. After the country’s 
foremost defense R&D lab approved the exploratory phases of developing an advanced trainer, the 
program had to wrestle with existing programs. The exploratory phase was planned within a two-year 
duration (1989-1990) with a requested program budget of KRW 400 million, but was only allocated 
with an initial budget of KRW 5.3 million in the first year, which only allowed to purchase pencils and 
papers.759 Thus, the first year budget was truly regarded as seed money to explore the frugal limits of 
defense spending in a cynical sense.  In terms of contending with other military programs, the senior 
heads in the Ministry of National Defense gave little attention to a trainer development while having to 
deal with high visibility programs like main battle tank upgrades, missile procurements, next generation 
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naval destroyers and submarines, and so forth. The adjudicating offices for drafting the Midterm 
Defense Plans argued that the tremendous resource commitments required for indigenously developing 
a high risk aircraft program defies the impending threat conditions of the Peninsular Wide Theater 
Campaign Contingency Planning. However, in a turnaround situation, the KTX-2 program advocates 
successfully linked the aircraft development needs with the KFP defense offsets, and inserted the idea 
of a possible government audit if the defense authorities neglected the offset option, which would 
eliminate the industrial upgrading potentials of the domestic economy. Under pressure of a conceivable 
state-led audit and subsequent public scrutiny, the defense authorities formally conceded with the 
development proposal. In December 1992, the KTX-2 became a formal development program and 
entered into the official stages of concept refinement. Hence, the program name changed from KTX-2 
to the T-50 Advanced Supersonic Jet Trainer, ‘T’ implying trainer and ‘50’ celebrating the 50th 
Anniversary of the Air Force.760 
  
7.2.2. Technical Assessment and Readiness Level at the Time of the T-50 
In order to conduct thousands of iterations of test and evaluation over the aircraft before rolling 
into the first product in October 2005, the program authorities had to conclude the development phase 
of the program no later than June 2003. In this regard, the design phases of the program had to conclude 
at least around the first half of 2002. In the early phases of the program, the number of qualified 
engineers that can adequately cover the design aspects of the aircraft, from concept development to 
detailed system requirements, accounted for around 100 within ADD, Air Force, and Samsung 
Aerospace. With the almost nonsensically condensed program milestones amid a serious shortage in 
qualified manpower, the given advice was to increase the system design engineers to 1,000. The 
program recruited professional system engineers from the automotive and shipbuilding sector, and had 
to provide an intensive fast-track training course on aeronautical engineering basics and aerodynamics. 
 
7.2.3. Choosing a Co-Development Partner 
The initial assessment of the T-50 development cost during the beginning of the program in 
1990 ranged around USD 1 billion. Although an assessment, the dollar figures were never an affordable 
price tag for a late industrialized economy. In order to save cost while securing additional overseas 
export markets, the idea to expand the T-50 into an international cooperative development program was 
being socialized within the senior defense leadership group. In the summer of 1993, after recognizing 
the Spanish Air Force also had a growing appetite for an advanced jet trainer, the Ministry of National 
Defense, represented by ADD, proactively engaged with the Spanish CASA and Lockheed Martin to 
review the feasibilities of further refining the trainer needs into a trilateral effort. The three stakeholders 
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conducted a joint review board the same year and agreed to start coordinating until July 1994 over the 
details of the aircraft performance requirements and work breakdown structure. At first, the decision 
was to share the cost by Korea (50%), CASA (40%), and Lockheed Martin (10%). In terms of the work 
breakdown structure, Korea would take 50% responsibility in manufacturing the forebody and AFT 
fuselage, static test, subsystems, final assembly, and flight test. CASA would take 50% responsibility 
in the main wing, avionics, stress test, final assembly, and flight test. Lockheed would cover the main 
airframe and flight control. However, because of the difference in system requirement within the 
Spanish Air Force, CASA renounced its participation and withdrew from the consortium in 1994. In 
order to maintain the work breakdown structure, ADD reached out to the German DASA. As the 
situation unfolded, CASA decided to rejoin the consortium in 1995. By this time, the T-50 has attracted 
much international publicity, other global contenders also strived to take part in the program. In the fall 
of 1995, the simmering heat of the T-50 induced the formation of a separate consortium among the 
European contenders, notably between CASA, DASA, and Denel. However, in the spring of 1996, the 
second consortium broke up over a disagreement on who shall assume the leading role.761 
At the time being, foreign firms such as the British BAE, German DASA, and the Spanish 
CASA, continuously probed on the potentials of opening the Korean market to promote their products. 
BAE offered an upgraded variant of the Hawk 67 that included a modified fuselage and wing design. 
After returning to the T-50 scene as an independent member from the initial trilateral arrangement, 
CASA attempted to ally with a Korean firm to co-develop its ATX supersonic trainer and light attacker 
program. The proposal included a cooperative marketing campaign to sell the final product both at the 
Korean and Spanish Air Force. However, the CASA system requirement differed from that of the 
Korean Air Force, and the prospects of an advance trainer program was uncertain for the Spanish Air 
Force. After the collapse of the second consortium, DASA, in collaboration with the South African 
Denel, proposed the AT-2000, while commencing talks with Hyundai Space and Aviation for a possible 
local production deal. However, the aircraft did not fully develop into a final program, but still remained 
at the drawing board as a paper aircraft at the time of the proposal. DASA also proposed a cooperative 
marketing effort to sell the aircraft at all three markets – Korea, Germany, and South Africa. But, the 
requirement for a trainer aircraft at South Africa also appeared foggy. Challenges over prime contractor 
selection also became an issue by other companies vying to participate in the program. Domestic 
aircraft-manufacturing firms that were eliminated from the T-50 bidding competition objected the 
government’s unilateral decision over vendor selection by raising serious petition to the process. 
Hyundai Space and Aviation called into question the insufficient legal basis of awarding the contract to 
Samsung Aerospace, for which the firm argued the selection defied the rules of fare competition. 
Hyundai especially posed the problem of possible restrictions on exporting the aircraft to third countries 
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under the provisions written in the memorandum of understanding signed with the U.S. Government.762 
For the purpose of the T-50, Hyundai had partnered with the German DASA and commenced a 
marketing campaign to co-produce the proposed AT-2000 supersonic jet-trainer project.763 As the T-50 
stumbled on the roadblock during the lead agency transition period between 1996 and 1997, As the 
chances of cancelling indigenous development was looming during the lead agency transition period of 
1996-1997, DASA returned with a more advanced product, the Ranger 2000 jet trainer, but under a 
significantly affordable price tag, with high hopes to partner with ADD and Samsung Aerospace.764  
Understanding the fierce competition in both areas of selecting international partners and 
domestic contenders, while trying to salvage the T-50 program, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
conducted a feasibility review until the second half of 1997 under the directive of the Deputy Prime 
Minister in Economics. KDI at the time did not view the Samsung Aerospace-Lockheed Martin 
partnership as a fair trade, and strongly urged to select the co-development partner through a more 
transparent competitive bidding process. For this reason, KDI did not approach the T-50 program with 
a friendly attitude in both an economic and technological sense.765 The recommendation made to the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs in July 1997 reflected the negative perspectives of the 
development identified in the impact factors to the economy, high risk factors of indigenous 
development, and the inherent problems with the selection process of international partners. In order to 
reduce the risk factors, the KDI report strongly asserted for more industry commitment, which opposed 
the conventional practice of having the government covering the entire nonrecurring development costs. 
In this aspect, the KDI report insisted that the commercial vendors should also take part in the 
investment scheme to induce stronger commitment into the program and share development risks. 
Especially Samsung Aerospace was pressured to invest a meaningful portion into the program. Based 
on these recommendations, the T-50 development proposal was forwarded to the Aerospace Industry 
Development Policy Committee (AIDPC) the same month, where the Committee all ruled in favor of 
inaugurating the T-50 co-development effort as a formal R&D program of record. As a result of the 
KDI feasibility studies and the AIDPC decision, the total share of the T-50 development composed of a 
70% public investment supplemented with a 30% investment from Samsung Aerospace and Lockheed 
Martin (Samsung 17% and Lockheed 13%). The arrangement was for the government to reimburse the 
30% development investment share from the two companies after the program entered into full scale 
production. Lockheed Martin originally expressed reluctance on the idea of partaking some financial 
obligations in the program. But the business forecast of the international trainer market, which projected 
a potential sales opportunity between 2,500-3,000 jet trainers in the next two decades, encouraged 
                                                          
762 연합뉴스, “초점: 국방부-현대, 방위력 개선사업 놓고 전면전,” 1997.11.18. 
763 Andrzej Jeziorski, “DASA prepares for AT-2000 definition go-ahead,” Flight Global, July 9, 1997. 
764 Andrzej Jeziorski, “DASA hopes to salvage Ranger with KTX-II deal,” Flight Global, February 7, 1998. 
765 Flight Global, “South Korea reconsiders KTX-II,” January 1, 1997. 
 269 
Lockheed to share the development load. 766  Hence, the acquisition strategy of the T-50, which 
designated Samsung Aerospace, later KAI, as the prime contractor and lead system developer of the 
program and Lockheed Martin as the co-development partner, was formally approved for execution.767 
 
7.2.4. Program Milestones: Major Stakeholders in the T-50 
The T-50 started under the auspices of a state driven concept development exercise where 
ADD took the initial lead in project initiation. ADD researchers were at the receiving end of learning 
advanced technology and skills from the two defense offset arrangements obtained from the KFP and 
Hawk trainer procurement. However, to the surprise of many, in the summer of 1995, the Ministry of 
National Defense detached from the traditional practices of state-led defense R&D programs and issued 
a solicitation offer to both ADD and Samsung Aerospace in a move to select the system developer of 
the program. The objective was to introduce competition for improved program efficiency and generate 
spinoffs into other business sectors. Normally, system development roles were assigned to ADD where 
the prime contractor of the program merely performed in limited R&D capacities. The core 
responsibilities of the prime contractor were mostly focused on building production capacities where 
the priority was given on component localization. This state led R&D arrangement was perhaps 
commonly accepted in the early days of industrialization when Korean firms did not possess the 
requisite capacities to perform complex R&D projects compared to the better resources and higher 
technology standards of government research institutes. However, the old arrangement granted the 
government’s exclusive ownership of the proprietary rights produced from the development efforts, 
where the manufacturing firms, or the prime contractor of the program, only gain limited access into 
core technology areas. Such arrangement constrains potential development aspects of the program, of 
which expanding into systems upgrades and shelf life extension schemes becomes troublesome. The 
prime contractor does not grasp the opportunity to accumulate expertise from understanding the core 
technological elements of the system that would’ve been acquired through earlier system development 
processes. On the other hand, most of the core technology retained by the GRIs rarely sees light in 
further diffusion into other commercial opportunities. In this regard, the trickle down effects of state 
driven defense R&D programs resulted in disappointing outcomes. Such public concerns underscore 
the abrupt change in designating the entity of primary responsibility for lead system development in the 
T-50, which signified a transformation in state-led defense R&D governance.768 
 Although the system development lead transitioned from ADD to Samsung Aerospace in 1995, 
the actual development phase did not commence until October 1997. During the two year break period, 
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ADD and Samsung went through a phased transition effort to maintain the accomplishment of the 
exploratory development efforts as well as to retain the R&D workforce. The reason identified to date 
of the two year break period involves reluctance to enter into the full-fledged development phase of the 
program and the continued attempt to bring down the entire program by replacing the trainer concept 
with a foreign substitute. Between 1992 and 1996, the government committed nearly KRW 70 billion 
in direct investments throughout the exploratory phases of refining the concept. But the astronomical 
program budget, initially estimated approximately USD 2 billion, hesitated the decision authorities from 
giving the marching orders for program execution. In order to alleviate the financial concerns over the 
program, under the provision of the National Financial Act that stipulates the need to scrutinize national 
R&D projects exceeding KRW 50 billion, the Ministry of Finance and Economy directed the Korea 
Development Institute to perform a feasibility review over the program in 1997. Concerned over a 
possible program cancellation, the Ministry of National Defense warned the financial authorities that 
the cost already deployed into the T-50 in both direct and indirect terms amounted over KRW 1.5 trillion. 
Hence, a stalemate or a possible cancelation of the program would result in the government losing the 
substantial commitments previously obligated. Perhaps having this in mind, the KDI feasibility review 
recommended to continue the development project.769  
 
Period Phases Lead Agency Activities 
Apr 1989 – 
Jul 1992 
Requirement 
Generation/ 
Concept 
Refinement 
ADD 
 
Offsets: $400M 
Budget: ₩35B 
• ADD requests program development (Apr 1989) 
• Air Force purchases initial batch (20 aircrafts, Nov 1989) 
• MOU signed on offsets and tech transfer (BAE, May 1990) 
• Technology Assistance Agreement (TAA) and Implementation Contract 
signed (ADD – General Dynamics, Jul 1992) 
Oct 1992 – 
Dec 1995 
Technology 
Development 
• U.S. Government approves TAA (Nov 1992) 
• System development plan drafted (Jun 1995) – Samsung Aerospace 
selected as prime contractor for industry led R&D project 
Jan 1996 – 
Oct 1997 
Lead Agency 
Transition 
ADD 
↕ 
Samsung 
Aerospace 
Budget: ₩15B 
• Memorandum signed for lead agency change ( May 1996) 
• Program feasibility studies (KDI, Oct 1996 – Jun 1997) 
• Supporting agreements between SSA-Lockheed Martin (Sep 1997) 
• System development plan approved (Oct 1997) 
Oct 1997 – 
Sep 2005 
System 
Development 
Samsung 
Aerospace 
(KAI) 
Budget: ₩2.2T 
• U.S. Government export licenses approved (Nov 1997) 
• External configuration confirmed (Aug 1999) 
• Industry merger, KAI created (Oct 1999) 
• First prototype rollout (Oct 2001) 
Oct 2001 – 
Dec 2011 
T&A/ 
Production 
KAI 
Budget: ₩3.3T • Full rate production initiated (Nov 2003) 
Table 54. Key Development Milestones                
Source: 공군본부, T-50 연구개발사업 추진현황 보고, 국회 국방위원회 보고, 2003; 전영훈, T-50 끝없는 도전, 
행복한 마음, 2011. 
 
 The Ministry of National Defense controlled the program budget and coordinated interagency 
units, whereas the Air Force took the lead agency role in the overall aspects of program management. 
The Aircraft Program Group (APG) assumed responsibility for supervising requirement planning, 
technology management, configuration and quality management, integrated logistics support 
development, and so forth. The APG led the general decision making process in program costs, schedule, 
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performance and integrated systems. The Agency of Defense Development (ADD) initially took part in 
exploratory roles regarding concept refinement and technology development before the defense 
authorities decided to transition the system development responsibilities over to Samsung Aerospace, 
later KAI, the prime contractor of the program. Even after the transition, ADD served in supervisory 
and assistance capacities in close collaboration with the prime contractor in terms of managing 
technology acquisition objectives, preliminary and critical design review stages, further application of 
acquired technologies, and Test & Evaluation roles. The Defense Agency for Technology and Quality 
(DTaQ) performed quality control responsibilities during the low-rate initial production and subsequent 
full-rate production and deployment phases of the program.770 
 The prime contractor of the T-50, Samsung Aerospace, later KAI, assumed the largest 
responsibility in system design, development, and manufacturing. Under the terms of the program 
contract with the Air Force, the prime contractor served comprehensively in roles proceeding with key 
program milestones, ranging from systems engineering, prototyping and demonstration, production and 
deployment, and sustainment phases. The prime contractor routinely collaborated with its international 
co-development partner, Lockheed Martin, in all aspects of the evolutionary progression of the program. 
Subcontractor supply chain management also fell under the auspices of the prime contractor, which 
included 6 major domestic subcontractors such as Hanwha, LIG Nex1, and Samsung Techwin, and the 
489 international subcontractors and parts providers such as the Israeli ELTA Systems, General Electric, 
Honeywell, Martin Baker, and so forth.771 
 
 
        Figure 23. T-50 Program Management Structure      
        Source: 공군본부, T-50 연구개발사업 추진현황 보고, 국회 국방위원회 보고, 2003 
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  In January 1996, after transitioning the system development responsibilities from ADD to 
Samsung Aerospace (KAI), the program entered into the system development phase. But because of the 
KDI feasibility studies, the official beginning of the system design and engineering phases started in 
October 1997. The design period took about 33 months until July 2000, followed by a three year 
prototypes and demonstration sequence until August 2002. After successfully going through 
performance tradeoffs on prototyping, the program entered into dedicated operational test & evaluation 
in parallel with the low-rate initial production of four prototypes for nearly five and a half years until 
September 2005. Upon conclusion of the system development phase, the program entered into low-rate 
initial production with December 2003. The subsequent full rate production and deployment followed 
in March 2006. Concurrent engineering practices were applied in each major development phases in 
order to save cost and shorten program schedules. The initial operational test & evaluation period took 
especially longer than the actual system design and engineering phases, due to the high demand for 
product safety and reliability over aircraft manufacturing. Especially, considering the high thresholds 
on safety standards, test flights are conducted conservatively, which requires long test hours in both 
flight and ground testing stages. Also, the workshop level engineers and supervisors did not have prior 
experience in conducting the required test sequences, thus were mostly new to the game of evaluating 
the complete specifications for a new aircraft. Such situation directly impacted on the T-50 program 
since there were no prior experiences in performing a test flight on an aircraft from its own design and 
production effort.772 
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Table 55. T-50 Program Milestone                                    Source: KAI Updates on KTX-2 (2005) 
 
7.2.5. Capacity Building Process  
International Technology Transfers through Defense Offset Arrangements 
In a highly advanced technology system, strategically aligning with Tier-One countries or firms 
in regards to engaging in co-development or co-development programs is one of the most commonly 
sought out catch-up strategies for late entrants in these sector. Especially, firms share common 
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objectives and interest through strategic alliances, which mutually supplements technological 
insufficiencies, provides opportunities to absorb each other’s improved capacities, and internalizes the 
learning effects from these arrangements.773  
In this regard, strategic alliances between Tier-One and Tier-Two firms or countries have been 
a frequently pursued strategy in the global aircraft-manufacturing sector. Especially considering 
aerospace being a highly asset specific sector, special skill sets, infrastructure, and compliance. Under 
internationally set rules and regulations, strategic alliance is considered a viable option to reduce upfront 
investments and overhead costs. Inter-personnel exchanges, or in other words stickiness, are highly 
respected in developing complex product systems such as in aerospace, where the learning and 
innovation process is performed through the transferring of tacit knowledge opposed to codified 
documents. In this aspect, the higher degree of a firm’s absorptive capacity interacts as a force multiplier 
throughout the learning process.774 Strategic alliances for co-development programs are established to 
serve for these purposes. 
The T-50 was a product of technology transfers derived from multiple defense offset programs 
with foreign partners. At first, earlier aircraft procurement programs provided some meaningful sectoral 
manufacturing knowledge. The Boeing P-3C maritime patrol aircraft provided basic level wind tunnel 
testing skill, while the CASA CN-235 medium-range transporter provided technical information on 
composite structural design and fly-by-wire flight control systems. Secondly, the intermittent trainer 
solution (Hawk-67) proposed by BAE generated an offset package that allowed a team of 24 researchers 
and 3 test pilot candidates to attend a yearlong training program provided at the BAE production 
laboratory located at Brough. The collaboration with BAE assisted the determination of the early 
configuration design of the aircraft. Most notable from the BAE experience included the learning of 
computer aided design techniques through a design software called CAPS. The high demand of 
integrating various engineering disciplines into a single aircraft vehicle requires a multilayered process 
of reaching a design optimum in each development phase. Especially in conceptual design stages when 
assessing candidate configurations, the insurmountable task of applying conventional design tools with 
simplified decision parameters for analysis raises the need for a synthesized computational method. In 
this regard, computer assisted design and analysis tools have been integral for shortening the learning 
period of concept design and configuration management for the Korean team at BAE. The design team’s 
effort in acquiring the source code of the CAPS software allowed the program to incorporate both design 
analysis and verification instruments in the early design phases before maturing the conceptual draft of 
the outer mold line configuration.775 The collaboration with BAE over the CAPS software expanded 
into other design elements of the program. Most of the BAE technology transfers derived from the 
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baseline performance features of the Hawk-67, which was designed as a subsonic jet trainer. Associated 
design skills supported by the software were transferred to the design team, such as in system 
requirement review analytics, avionics conceptual design and interface, structural design and analysis, 
airworthiness certification, wing design and molding, propulsion systems integration, and so forth.776 
 But the majority of the technology derived from the offset agreement between the Korean 
Government and General Dynamics, which later merged into Lockheed Martin after the formal 
inauguration of the T-50. The alliance relationship between KAI and Lockheed Martin proceeded as a 
co-development contract where the two firms shared the workload in developing some requisite 
components. As the prime contractor of the program, KAI purchased the requisite technological 
subjects, such as in system integration level engineering and manufacturing processes, under a 
technology assistance agreement with Lockheed. At the time, the domestic aircraft-manufacturing 
sector had no experience in building a full scale aircraft with its own technology. The foundation of the 
engineering and manufacturing base derived mostly from the license production of the KF-16 fighter. 
In a parallel effort, the sector absorbed the experiences from developing the KT-1 Basic Trainer. A small 
but meaningful experience in basic design capacities added up from the country’s attempt to co-develop 
a mid-sized regional commercial airliner in the early 1990s. In this regard, the strategic alliance with 
Lockheed Martin was imperative for KAI in the course of learning critical engineering and 
manufacturing experiences. Although the lead system development entity of the program was KAI, 
Lockheed Martin took the lead in developing a portion of some innovative components such as the main 
wing, flight control system, and avionics. Lockheed provided most of the technology for system design 
and integration process since KAI lacked the adequate experience levels in this respect. 
 
Strategic Alliance with Lockheed Martin  
The strategic alliance between KAI and Lockheed Martin originated from the 30% defense 
offset value under the KFP arrangement with the formerly General Dynamics-Fort Worth Division. 
Lockheed Martin provided technology assistance in full spectrum of the program, which included 
component/system design and engineering, system integration and production knowhow, and the 
provision of test equipment for product evaluation. The technology acquisition strategy composed of 
different layers in terms of advisory services, co-development through strategic alliances, and support 
of technology data. 
Technology advisory services started in the exploratory phases of the program. In November 
1992, a team of scientists and engineers from ADD, Air Force, and Samsung Aerospace journeyed to 
Fort Worth Texas, the location of the primary F-16 system design and production facility. The objective 
of the team was to acquire requisite knowledge on system design and manufacturing technology through 
a one-on-one apprenticeship with a U.S. engineer, which developed into a close binding comradery 
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derived as a by-product of strong kinship as professional technicians in aeronautical sciences. 777 
Regardless of such relationship building efforts, Lockheed expressed extreme reluctance in disclosing 
core technology. A notable aspect of international technology transfers takes place in the workshop level 
interactions of the program. A team of experienced engineers from Lockheed were dispatched to KAI 
to provide the required technology assistance under the mutually agreed provisos of the contract. The 
duration of these engineers collaborating with KAI and other program authorities ranged from 1 to 6 
years in maximum, which mostly covered the system development phase and partially the low rate 
initial production phase of the program. In addition to the in-country engineering team, Lockheed 
provided a total of four iterations of examinations on the system design and development through a 
team composed of senior engineers and program managers called the Senior Design Review team. 
Restrictions on technology transfers appeared evident in sensitive core technology areas where 
Lockheed maintained a competitive advantage in the global market. Avionics and flight control systems 
required additional negotiation efforts, cost, and U.S. Government disclosure approval in order for KAI 
to obtain the respective engineering skills. Fortunately, substantial ranges of technology sections 
provided from Lockheed evolved from the F-16 baseline configuration, which made it more convenient 
for KAI to learn the process while having to go through minimal trial and error. Because of the complex 
nature of developing aircrafts that involve sophisticated integration work of multiple modules and 
subsystems, detailed design and engineering technology cannot be fully transferred through codified 
engineering schematics or technology manuals. Essential knowledge and skill sets are tacitly 
transmitted in the workshop level through dynamically interacting with relevant departments and 
engineers on the floor. In this aspect, apprenticeship type learning practices serves a major conduit for 
growing technology absorptiveness, which facilitates further progression into transferring critical 
technology. In the workshop level, the number of engineers dispatched from Lockheed to KAI totaled 
approximately 100 in size throughout the co-development period, at which the duration per person 
committed into providing advisory services averaged around 31 months, depending on the level of 
complexity and difficulty. In this regard, the duration of advisory service provided per person over 
highly complicated subunit areas such as aircraft design and analysis averaged around two years, 
whereas relatively less complex system such as machinery averaged around two years.778 
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Subject Advisory Period per Person 
Average 
Personnel 
Annual 
Numbers Remarks 
Fuselage 35 months 26 75.8 Shared with design and analysis 
Propulsion System 48 months 3 12  
Cockpit 32 moths 17 45.3  
Avionics 35 months 4 11.7 Primary responsibility under Lockheed 
Flight Control 32 months 4 10.7 Primary responsibility under Lockheed 
Design/Analysis 47 months 4 15.7 Shared with other airframes 
Machinery 23 months 9 17.3  
Test & Evaluation 31 months 11 28.4  
System Integration 32 months 8 21.3  
Other 52 months 13 56.3  
Average (Total) 31 months 99 294.5  
    Table 56. Advisory Services Provided by Lockheed Martin to KAI            Source: KAI internal report 
 
 Secondly, the co-development arrangement in component development – such as in main wing, 
avionics, flight control – through the KAI-Lockheed strategic alliance comprised the other layer of 
technology acquisition. However, due to the security barriers existing in the core technology categories 
over these items, the quantity of technology transfers was limited. The three components subject to the 
co-development effort constituted the core of aircraft technologies, in which the U.S. Government 
imposed heavy restrictions in transferring engineering know-how or manufacturing skills to foreign 
entities as an effort to sustain its global predominance in aerospace technology. The program authorities 
had to obtain U.S. Government approval in order to gain access into the subject technology information, 
which cost time and additional efforts. Also, in terms of securing intellectual property rights of the 
subject items, the program authorities had to pay significant costs to acquire the requisite technological 
packages, which were also controlled under U.S. Government export control adjudications. As a result, 
the only technology available for transfer to the T-50 program was in repair and maintenance level 
technical data in terms of components and software, which precluded access into the core technology 
elements required for new developments or upgrades.779 
 The third layer of technology acquisition considers the provision of technology data 
information. This layer involves the previous defense offset packages of the KFP, which evolved into 
the baseline Letter of Exchange between the Korean and U.S. government in 1996. Series of U.S. 
Government reviews on technology transfers followed the baseline memorandum. The signed 
memorandums between Samsung Aerospace (KAI) and Lockheed Martin include the Teaming 
Agreement, Technology Assistance Agreement (TAA), Technical Assistance Subcontract, and a 
Workshare Subcontract. The Teaming Agreement covers the exclusive cooperative relationship between 
Samsung and Lockheed within the agreed parameters of investment, joint marketing, production 
workshare, and other areas in support of the program. The TAA comprehensively included advisory 
services, technical data, knowledge and skillsets, development workshare, and other aspects required 
for system development. Technical Assistant Subcontract defines the scope and scale of technology data 
and advisory services in dollar value of USD 240 million. The Workshare Subcontract include a USD 
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240 million worth of workshare in avionics and flight control modules, associated with a USD 138 
million worth main wing production arrangement. Accordingly, the total investment from the Korean 
Government and Samsung Aerospace paid to Lockheed Martin for technology transfer and associated 
services totaled USD 498 million. About 50% of Lockheed Martin’s investment into the program would 
be refunded after the program enters into full production, whereas the other 50% would be returned by 
international export cases. Thus, the program authorities strived to involve Lockheed Martin into the 
program one way or another.780 
But because of the substantial scale of contract obligations, which reached nearly USD 600 
million, the review period took much longer than regular export control cases. In regards to export 
control decisions in the U.S., if the export value of the subject defense article or service exceeds USD 
50 million, it becomes subject to additional scrutiny, which also involves Congressional notification 
and reviews. The review process itself took nearly a one-year period until final approval on 12 
November, 1996. However, the approved export license contained 23 provisos that restricted the further 
use of the respective technology covered under the TAA. The restrictive composition sparked off a 
potential conflict between the two governments in regards to interpreting the restrictive provisos of the 
TAA. In an effort to explore a more reasonable option in a certain engineering field of the program, 
KAI issued a Request for Proposal (RfP) to third country contractors in France and Germany, opting 
for an alternative solution to reduce cost. However, noticing the inclusion of some controlled 
information in the RfP, Lockheed Martin filed a voluntary disclosure to the U.S. State Department in 
January 1999, claiming that Samsung Aerospace violated U.S. export control regulations. The situation 
could’ve worsen into a serious dispute between the two governments with a potential of the U.S. State 
Department rescinding all approved export licenses under the program, associated with levying a huge 
penalty fee against both the Korean Government and Samsung Aerospace. The worst case scenario was 
averted under the constant exertions by the Korean Government and Samsung Aerospace, but the 
situation showcases the restrictive condition of U.S. export control laws and the potential impacts on 
program implementation.781 
 
Accumulated Experiences through Engineering and Manufacturing  
The adoption of concurrent engineering methods facilitated the program authorities to curtail 
about three months from the design and prototyping phase of the schedule. In conjunction with 
concurrent engineering practices, the employment of a computer aided design and engineering software 
called the Computer Aided Tridimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) enabled to reduce about 
sixteen months from the entire schedule – eight months in basic design, five months in prototype 
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development, and three months in aircraft production from originally scheduled process.782 
The relational capital built up through subunit teams, as well as Lockheed’s technology 
assistance teams, constantly upgraded the knowledge base of KAI, which further translated into the 
overall segments of the T-50 development process. In terms of subunit teams, KAI attempted to form 
an interdisciplinary unit composition that organized similar subject matter experts under an optimally 
constructed team unit. For instance, a development unit would be practically composed of engineers 
under the discipline of aeronautics/mechanics (71%), electronics/electrics (17%), metallurgy (5%), 
computer/communication (4%), and materials (2%). In the case of building partnership between KAI 
and Lockheed engineers, the two parties used common office spaces to effectively update the 
progression in learning, sharing workloads, and augmented areas that needed supplemental efforts.783 
In respect to knowledge management routines, program authorities took the initiative to proactively 
share knowledge and information obtained throughout the development process with other teams and 
departments. KAI officials created, stored, and shared the knowledge and experiences acquired through 
the aspects of relational capital by employing three exercises. At first, regarding information obtained 
through official learning channels, the respective materials were registered, categorized, stored, and 
made available for reference. Secondly, information obtained through personal channels were uploaded 
on KAI’s internal network server for common usage into various applications. Especially, proper 
incentives were awarded to those who actively uploaded meaningful information. Lastly, internal 
learning groups in the form of small unit social gatherings that actively utilized the shared information 
grew in greater numbers as time progressed. These gatherings were organized spontaneously between 
engineers and technicians to collectively study and research the lessons learned from the subjects 
derived from each engineering stages. Such aspect made possible the most effective use and 
accumulation of the technical data, materials, and experiences acquired during the scope of the program. 
Until 2003 when the program was just about to enter the full scale production phase, the number of 
learning groups grew out to almost 200, the number of participating engineers totaled nearly 600, and 
the number of research papers published amounted nearly 130 per year. The results of these voluntary 
studying efforts were further compiled and refined by collectively discussing the subject matter 
throughout public seminars or research forums held within the program management organizations. 
Consequently, the workshop level efforts contributed to exploiting the knowledge and experiences 
acquired during the development phases, and promoted the prospects of technology diffusion for better 
success of the program.784   
In a program management perspective, the presence of on-site program management offices 
dispatched from the Air Force Program Management Group served in critical liaison responsibilities 
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between the defense acquisition planners and system developers. Design changes and technical 
modification required swift decision making at the highest program management level in order for the 
floor level to expeditiously move into subsequent stages of the program sequence. The on-site program 
management element effectively covered this  
In a contract management perspective, the T-50 had to weather out a number of turbulences 
occurring from both external and internal causes. Regarding the detailed contract management structure 
of the program, the Ministry of National Defense served in coordinating and controlling roles between 
all entities involved in the program. As the program manager of the T-50, the Air Force established 
contracts with the prime contractor (KAI), international co-developer (Lockheed Martin), and other 
domestic and foreign subcontractors. The implementing subcontracts in workshare and technology 
assistance were established between KAI and Lockheed Martin that defined the scope of specialized 
engineering and manufacturing tasks, in addition to cooperative marketing efforts to international 
customers. In terms of the disruptive factors that occurred in the initial stages of the program, the Asian 
Financial Crisis caused major delays in obligating adequate development funds while proceeding into 
major program milestones. Shortly after the defense authorities approved the full implementation of the 
program in July 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis instigated the chain reaction of failing companies, 
followed by the collapse of the domestic banking system, created significant chaos within the economy. 
Thus, the T-60 program experienced a yearlong delay in transitioning from the exploratory stage to the 
system development stage. Ensuing to the program delay, the restructuring process of the domestic 
aircraft-manufacturing sector, which consolidated three Chaebol firms into a single corporate entity, 
necessitated a streak of contract revisions. The flexibility and the agility of the T-50 program to the 
changing circumstances of the market and government position was possible since the lead agency of 
the program transitioned from government to private entity.785  
 
Follow-up Variants and Market Opportunities 
 The T-50 further evolved into a trainer/light attack aircraft (TA-50), and fighter variant (FA-
50) that performs multirole combat missions in air strikes and air superiority. The evolutionary design 
of the trainer into the TA-50 and FA-50 provided extra opportunities in modifying the conceptual 
engineering features while maintaining the baseline design of the aircraft. The FA-50 shares an identical 
platform configuration with the T-50 while accommodated some modifications to incorporate the radar 
warning receiver and chaft/flare dispensing system to detect radio emissions and improve electronic 
warfare capabilities. In addition to these performance standards, the FA-50 also incorporated tactical 
data links (Link-16), radar detection (EL/M-2032 multimode fire control radar), armaments (air-to-
air/ground missiles, JDAM and sensor fused weapons), night vision imaging system, and so forth. With 
a performance feature considered more advance than the F-5E/F combat fighters but less than the F-16, 
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the FA-50 will eventually phase out the current F-5 fleet of the Korean Air Force.786  
The two derivatives of the T-50 remained in the drawing boards until 2009 when the defense 
authorities decided to pursue the attack and combat variants of the trainer by awarding a green light on 
the program with a USD 306 million contract. At this point, KAI had grave concerns over the looming 
risks of suspending the T-50 production line after the delivery of its last order in 2012. In this regard, 
KAI and its subcontractors were desperate for a follow-up contract to sustain the production capacities 
and accumulate system development knowhow and experiences.787 For the same reason, the defense 
authorities approved the additional purchase of the TA-50 in 2017 in order to fulfill advanced pilot 
training requirements and continue to sustain industrial production capacities. At this point, the 
introduction of 40 F-35 Lightning-II Joint Strike Fighters and the prospective development of the KF-
X presented the extra requirements to introduce advance level tactical training needs.788 Additional 
discussions are made over the possibility of expanding the derivatives to advanced electronic warfare 
and reconnaissance aircrafts, dubbed the EA-50 and RA-50, in consideration of replacing the current 
electronic attack air fleet.789 
 The total production of the T-50 domestic variants as of 2018 accounts for 144 aircrafts, with 
an additional introduction of twenty (20) TA-50 trainer/light attackers scheduled for delivery after 2020. 
As shown in Table 57, the overseas export quantities to date records a total of 64 aircrafts with an 
additional contract of sixteen (16) aircrafts to five customer countries. The export value over these 64 
aircrafts amounts USD 2.93 billion. As such, the total production to date totals 208 aircrafts with an 
additional 38 aircrafts underway. The T-50 is eyed by some other countries considering to introduce a 
multirole platform that can perform in both training and combat mission roles. In April 2015, Pakistan 
has initiated plans to purchase a lead in fighter trainer with supersonic performance features to revamp 
its trainer and tactical fighter needs. The Pakistani defense authorities signed a memorandum with the 
Korean Defense Agency for Technology & Quality (DTaQ) to mutually establish quality standards as a 
preparatory move towards procuring the T-50. Currently, the program has entered into competition with 
a trainer variant produced by the Turkish Aerospace Industry (TAI), which has made the prospects of 
the T-50 selection a bit foggy.790 
 
Variant Korea Indonesia Philippines Iraq Thailand Total 
T-50 50 12  24 12 (+4) 98 (+4) 
T-50B 12     12 
TA-50 22 (+20) 4    26 (+20) 
FA-50 60  12 (+12)   72 (+12) 
Total 144 (+20) 16 12 (+12) 24 12 (+4) 208 (+36) 
           Table 57. T-50 Production and Export Status 
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The unique nature of the international armaments market requires the concerted efforts 
between the government and industry to penetrate the high barriers pre-established by its competitors, 
and also the customer country. International defense exports mostly associate defense ties between the 
exporting and importing countries that forms collaborative relationships through not only the product 
itself, but also in areas such as tactical training, technical repair and overhaul work, infrastructure 
constructions, technology transfers, and other various conduits of mutual benefit in the form of defense 
offset packages. In order to expand the export opportunities for improved bilateral relationship, the 
Korean Government waged a full scale promotion campaign to potential customer countries that 
expressed interest over procuring the advanced jet trainer. Some cases were successful, some were not. 
The T-50 export to Indonesia contained both positive and negative aspects of defense export initiatives 
between public and private entities. Indonesia announced its plans of introducing an advanced jet trainer 
capability in March 2010, and entered into a competitive bidding process with international aircraft 
manufacturing firms. In addition to KAI’s T-50, the Russian YAK-130, Czech L-159, and the Italian M-
346 intermingled in the bid for a contract valued over USD 400 million. Despite the relatively high 
price tag of the KAI T-50 jet trainer, the aircraft was selected as a preferred bidder in April 2011, and 
was subsequently awarded the final contract the following month. The selection of a Korean defense 
product in the Indonesian defense market, which predominantly consists of Russian origin products, 
was a surprise deal to international spectators. The T-50 export to Indonesia was an outcome of a united 
interagency collaboration between the military (MND/DAPA), commerce (MOTIE/KOTRA), and 
industry (KAI).791 However, some limitations over the Indonesian case points out that the export was 
not truly a successful outcome in a sense of fulfilling commercial objectives, but a result of a series of 
defense offset trade arrangements between the two countries. At the time of the T-50 sale, the Korean 
Government agreed to purchase four (4) CN-235 medium transport aircrafts manufactured by PT 
Dirgantara Indonesia (DI) as an offset deal.792 At the time, there were a number of bilateral discussions 
on defense industry cooperation between Seoul and Jakarta that considered the export and co-
development of submarines, advanced fighters, basic trainers, ground maneuver equipment, and so 
forth.793 The Indonesian case also went through major hiccups caused by international export control 
measures imposed from the U.S. Government. As Jakarta was included in the U.S. State Department’s 
partial sanctions list on arms exports, the request to authorize the usage of radar source codes was denied, 
which precluded the full scale operation of the TA-50 capability. The alternate solution provided was to 
use commercial source codes in lieu of encrypted military issued source codes. But the employment of 
non-encrypted commercial source codes would make the aircraft vulnerable to jamming attacks.794 An 
opinion against the U.S. export control policies over the T-50 export to Indonesia argues that the T-50 
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export license denial contradicts the U.S. Government position on conventional arms transfers, as 
Jakarta and Washington D.C. agreed in 2011 to provide 24 Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcons 
regenerated and refurbished to an upgraded Block 52 standard, equipped with advanced radars and 
armaments.795 Thus, the argument highlights the constraints from U.S. export control policies have 
underlining intentions to benefit U.S. defense firms over international competitive contracts.  
The cost-benefit of the T-50 export was also in question. As previously stated, the successful 
export of the aircraft to Indonesia was indebted to a defense offset arrangement where the Korean 
Government agreed to purchase four medium range CN-235 transporters in return of selling sixteen T-
50 to the Indonesian Air Force. Regarding its medium size and range, the CN-235 does not have much 
utility in regards to force enhancements to the Korean Air Force other than regular transport missions. 
Relevant engineering and manufacturing technologies, worth a value of USD 110 million, was already 
transferred to Korea as a defense offset package from the twelve CN-235 introduced earlier in the mid-
1990s from the original equipment manufacturer of the aircraft, the European aerospace giant CASA. 
Therefore, there were no benefits in a technology transfer standpoint from the Indonesian variant of the 
CN-235. 796  In terms of the T-50 work breakdown structure, the contract states that KAI will 
manufacture two models from its production line, while the remaining 14 aircrafts will be assembled in 
Indonesia. Additionally, the export contract obliged KAI to provide a yearlong support package of 
integrated logistics and other technical services at no costs. In this regard, although the price per aircraft 
was comparatively higher than its competitors, the entire support arrangement included in the T-50 
export package countervailed the disadvantages in the price competition. Nevertheless, at the end of the 
day it was KAI who had to absorb all the costs incurred in the export deal.797 
The prospects of additional export opportunities to other countries do not look all-so 
encouraging either. The attempt to cue in the T-50 to international customers, such as Poland, Israel, 
UAE, Singapore, all failed because of the aircraft’s high price tag. The T-50 price revealed to the pubic 
amounts USD 25 million per unit, which makes the aircraft comparatively higher than other competing 
models such as the Italian M-346 (USD 24.5 million), or the Russian Yak-130 and Chinese L-15 (both 
around USD 15 million). The primary reason for the costly price tag relates to the high performance 
feature built-up around the aircraft propelled with a supersonic thrust. The T-50 was designed to perform 
multiple roles in mission areas as an advanced pilot trainer, light attack, and to a certain extent an air 
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superiority fighter. In order to accommodate all these functions, the T-50 had to incorporate fourth 
generation avionics such as advanced fire control radars and precision guided weapons, which is 
considered too much for a simple trainer aircraft.798 The criticism over these exceeding expectations 
culminated on the inability to devise a reasonable force requirement in the initial stages of the program 
as the Air Force conceptually inserted performance functions more than a regular trainer capability can 
absorb. These factors appeared obvious in the unsuccessful bid to sell the T-50 to UAE in 2009. Among 
the many reasons for the ill-fated attempt to market the Golden Eagle to Dubai, a notable aspect 
appeared on the fact where the T-50 did not hold the requisite training capability compared to its arch 
rival, the Aermacchi M-346. The training capabilities of the M-346 include an integrated training 
system that connects the aircraft with ground based control systems, simulators, mission support 
systems, and so forth. It was especially known that UAE expressed special interest over the Embedded 
Tactical Training Simulation (ETTS) of the M-346 that enables a real-time interactive training 
capability for pilots, a training feature the T-50 Golden Eagle does not have.799 The T-50 export bids to 
other countries, such as Israel, Singapore, and Poland, were frustrated for similar reasons considering 
exorbitant cost and relatively lesser trainer functions. In an effort to overcome the price challenges, the 
Korean Government localized the aircraft T&E and accreditation process, which is expected to scale 
down USD 10.5 million from the per unit cost of the aircraft. The localization of the accreditation 
process, led by the Korea Testing Laboratory under MOTIE, will cover the testing of the high intensity 
radio frequency and electromagnetic pulse resistance of aircrafts, which used to be outsourced to foreign 
entities.800 
 
7.2.6. Structural Limitations and Program Constraints 
 Inherent restraints in a program management and technology transfer perspectives caused by 
export control restrictions and government decision making have limited the potentials for some fully 
expansive developmental activities over the aircraft. At first, the technical restraints of the T-50 in an 
export control perspective has become even more contentious in the aspects of improving flight 
performances and overseas export opportunities in relations with U.S. Government conventional arms 
transfer policies. In order to maintain U.S. military supremacy and technology advantage, engineering 
efforts to improve aircraft tactical capabilities were capped within the performance levels below the F-
16. For instance, with the intent to incorporate advanced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) 
radars for the FA-50 combat aircraft, the program authorities attempted to apply the compact Vixen-
500E radars developed by the European Leonardo-Finmeccanica (previously Selex at the time). 
However, the U.S. export control authorities refused to issue the technology transfer license because 
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the system integration requirements of the Vixen-500E radar would necessitate the disclosure of 
Lockheed’s proprietary source code information to a non-U.S. company. The program authorities 
sought for other options of including an American AESA radar, but none of the radars available in the 
market at the time were suitable in size to meet the compact requirements of the FA-50.801 Thus, the 
program authorities abandoned the idea of introducing an AESA capability and selected the Israeli 
EL/M-2032 multimode planar array fire control radar under the condition the Israeli company would 
enter into a coproduction arrangement with a Korean defense contractor (LIG Nex1), of which the 
installation work onto the aircraft to be performed by a U.S. company as part of meeting the provisos 
outlined by the U.S. Government and Lockheed Martin.802 
The U.S. Government and Lockheed Martin exercised its proprietary rights over most of the 
technology transferred to KAI and the Korean Government by narrowly limiting the extended usage of 
the program data to only the T-50 variants and other U.S.-origin combat aircrafts such as the F-5 and F-
16. In order to apply the program data to other systems or platforms, KAI or the Korean Government 
had to obtain prior approval from the U.S. Department of State through a revised export licensing 
process.803 Also, the substantial technology assistance from Lockheed Martin has subjected the T-50 
under the restraints of U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which consequently placed any attempts for 
international marketing efforts under the scrutiny and approval of U.S. export control authorities. 
According to the Government MOU that defines the roles of U.S. Government technology assistance, 
the final aircraft product must obtain an export license issued by the U.S. Department of State before 
signing an export contract with a foreign customer. Additionally, although the program authorities had 
high aspirations of introducing the product into the U.S. defense market, the sales prospects of the T-50 
would become impossible if another U.S. firm develops an aircraft with similar performance features.804 
Another case that demonstrates the reality of the T-50 being subject to U.S. export control measures 
was the frustration of the T-50B Black Eagle Aerobotic Team performing in the Zuhai Airshow at China 
in 2014. With the concerns of a potential unintended disclosure of sensitive U.S. military technologies 
applied in the T-50B aircraft, the U.S. Department of State denied the Korean Government’s request to 
fly the aircraft in the airshow.805 
Secondly, continued delays in government decision making during the early periods of the 
program also resulted in exacerbating developmental uncertainty during critical moments. Between 
1993 and 1994, the conditions were ripe to further materialize the trainer requirement into a formal 
program of record. Samsung Aerospace proceeded with the KF-16 license production, while the 
auditing authorities strongly insisted to execute the 30% offset obligations deriving from the KFP. 
Additionally, the government, represented by ADD, signed a series of memorandums with Lockheed 
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Martin (at the time General Dynamics) that specified the conditions of technology transfer and co-
development efforts. In this regard, the surrounding situation was shaped ready for full program 
execution. The initiatives outlined over the trainer development in this regard were an absolute 
opportunity that would certainly sustain the development and production capacity of the aircraft-
manufacturing sector as a successor program to the KF-16. However, although the industrial situation 
clearly indicated the need to formalize a follow-up program of the KF-16 license production after 
program conclusion in 2000, the authorities did not make a decision on the exact production quantities 
until July 1997. Because of such delays in the early phases, concept refinement and technology 
maturation did not takeoff into full speed during the early stages of the program.806 Such delays caused 
the possible suspension of the aircraft production lines at Samsung Aerospace (KAI) after the KF-16 
program concluded in 2000. In order to sustain the production capacities until the T-50 production 
officially came up to speed, the program authorities were compelled to order 20 additional KF-16 
fighters. Oddly enough, the end user of the aircraft, Air force, refused to accept the additional production 
batches, claiming the new deployments will have grave impacts to the force structure of the air power 
landscape within the overall theater campaign plan. But eventually the additional production took place 
for the sake of salvaging the existing aircraft-manufacturing facilities.807 
Thirdly, interagency participation and coordination was nonexistent. Despite the grandiose 
scale and scope of the development aspects, the program did not actively reach out to other key players 
within the interagency process. Accounting for an astronomical development budget over KRW 2 
trillion, which made the T-50 the single most expensive development program in the history of Korea 
at the time, the development authorities decided to use the given resources narrowly available within 
the defense establishment alone, without showing efforts of incorporating the competencies affordable 
from other innovation sectors, where the program became a sole product of military endeavors. Hence, 
although the program required a high degree of mastery in technologically complex systems, the 
expertise from the Ministry of Science and Technology or the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
was not appreciated at all. The participation of private sector competencies also remained low. 
University level R&D capacities were not offered a position in the development process in the course 
of exploiting the opportunities provided in the engineering and manufacturing phases of the program. 
In a provisional manner, the interagency aspects of the subsequent Korea Helicopter Program (KHP) 
poses a stark comparison in this regard where the KHP matured as a collaborative effort between the 
defense and industrial authorities within the interagency/regional arrangement. Assigning the Air Force 
as the lead program management agency was meaningful in a sense of portraying the exact customer 
needs into the system requirement and product performance features. But since the Air Force was not 
professionally trained and experienced in managing a highly complex development program, the overall 
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management itself at the national side had to rely on the prime contractor (KAI) and its international 
partner (Lockheed Martin), which obstructed the refinement of government program management skills 
over aircraft products.808 
Due to the multiple risk factors associated with developing highly complex product systems, 
the program costs preplanned for the engineering phases experiences in many cases a steep increase 
throughout the development process. The T-50 was no exemption from avoiding such cost increasing 
pitfalls. The T-50 engineering phase was divided in two phases, of which Phase 1 mainly covered the 
system development and airframe manufacturing process, whereas Phase 2 segment covered the support 
elements of the program including the development of training systems and integrated logistics. The 
Phase 1 program costs increased over 25.3% from the initial KRW 1.69 trillion to KRW 2.11 trillion. 
The major reason of the cost increase attributes from the Asian Financial Crisis, which soared the 
exchange rate from KRW 857 to KRW 1,179. The program area that experienced the highest increase 
was in design analysis and prototype development. The Financial Crisis also caused a six-month delay 
in the program in order for the program authorities to recalibrate its program budget in accordance with 
the changing uncertainties of the economic situation unfolding.809 
 
7.3. Chapter Conclusion 
Government intervention in contractor selection practices distorted the prospects of nurturing 
competence with the domestic industrial hierarchies. Instead of instituting regulative market control 
measures while spontaneously promoting firm capacities, collusive state-business relations still 
prevailed, which inappropriately manipulated market dynamics from evolving the aircraft 
manufacturing sector into the higher ends of competition.  
Opening the exclusive contract privileges previously monopolized between Korean Air and 
Samsung Aerospace to other firms in the mid-1980s by easing existing entry barriers motivated Chaebol 
firms like Daewoo and Hyundai to diversify into the emerging aircraft manufacturing business. 
Especially in the case of Daewoo during Peace Bridge-I, the firm exerted full commitment by investing 
substantial corporate resources into technologically high risk areas while submitting to apparent 
financial damages with hopes to win subsequent contracts of the KFP. Daewoo also entered into the 
KT-1 Basic Trainer to further accumulate sector specific knowledge and skillsets with sincere 
anticipations to become a competitive player in this market. Nonetheless, government defense 
authorities awarded the contract to Samsung Aerospace instead, thus hoarding the long investments and 
accumulated experiences of Daewoo’s long devotion. Such inconsistencies in government competition 
policy deteriorated firm performances in financial statements, which later swamped the Korean aircraft 
manufacturing firms into the Asian Financial Crisis. In this aspect, the government showed 
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incompetence in regulating or governing spontaneously grown innovation activities, while placing itself 
into controversy by collusive state-business relationship with a particular Chaebol firm. Alongside with 
the continued disconnect between each fighter development program and offset trade arrangement, the 
aircraft-manufacturing business has relinquished even the faintest expectations of energetically building 
up its domestic sectoral capacities for innovation. 
The impromptu evolution of the fixed-wing sector, however, has supplemented some home 
grown foundational capacities within the workshop level, which further expanded and intensified 
through the industrial consolidation process of the aircraft-manufacturing sector after the Financial 
Crisis. These critical elements gathered from these multiple developmental experiences compiled into 
the first indigenous initiative to build a supersonic jet trainer and light attack combat aircraft. With the 
absorptive capacities accumulated from other sectors in program management and engineering, the T-
50 development efforts showed apparent accomplishments as a fast follower in the sector. From 1997 
to 2002, although under a co-development arrangement with Lockheed Martin, the system development 
phase of the aircraft took a little over five years. The timeline of the full rate production and deployment 
phase defied the odds of program failure anticipated from its critiques, which projected the development 
phase may take over a decade for completion. Surprised to see the fast products of system development 
unfolding, Lockheed Martin, the original technology provider of the aircraft, dispatched a team from 
its R&D headquarters to KAI to examine the enabling factors of such fast paced engineering and 
manufacturing of the aircraft. Notably, included in the Lockheed team was the senior engineer who 
designed and built the F-35 Lightning-II itself. Such product was a result of professionalism and 
enthusiasm by workshop level engineers and technicians, striving to craft an indigenous aircraft.810 
Featured commonality in engines between the KT-1 Basic Trainer Aircraft and the KUH Surion Utility 
Helicopter also assisted the progress of technology sharing and diffusion. The PT6A-62 Turboprop 
Engine run by the KT-1 shares substantial technical commonalities with the T-700 Turboshaft Engine 
associated with the Surion Helicopter, since the two engines originate from similar gas turbine 
structures. 811  The T-50 was the first program that designated the primary system development 
responsibilities to the prime contractor. This was a huge transition from previous program management 
practices, in which the government normally designated ADD as the lead system development agency 
for indigenous development programs while assigning the domestic industry to take over the production 
piece. Thus, transitioning the system development responsibilities to Samsung Aerospace, now KAI, 
was a ringing flare for transforming the landscape of defense acquisition programs in terms of the work 
breakdown structure. 
Regretfully, the sole idea of completing the development within a constrained timeline, which 
further suffered from delays in government decision making over risk assessments, have forced the 
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program development efforts to hastily incorporate foreign technology and components instead of 
building long-term firm capacities. In regards to the condensed program milestone, Lockheed strongly 
insisted a one-year, if not at least 6 months, extension of the design phase. The request was fully 
authentic considering the complex nature of aircraft design, which was imperative to carefully account 
for all the high risks factors occurring in each development phase. On the other hand, a one-year 
extension was unacceptable to the program authorities considering the given timeline for initially 
operating capability scheduled in 2005. Consequently, the T-50 development could not avoid public 
criticisms for its low localization rates and subjugation into foreign intellectual property rights in 
technologies and critical components. 
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Chapter 8. Case Studies –The Korea Helicopter Program, KUH-Surion 
8.1. Sources of Capacity Building in the Rotor Wing Sector – From 500MD to MPH 
Despite the need of a military heliborne lift capability, the decision to go with an indigenous model 
constantly stalled in a snail’s pace for the Korean military and the aircraft-manufacturing sector. 
Considering the voluminous scale of rotor wing demand pull in military aviation, which accounted for 
almost 300 helicopters fully in operation, the sector was gifted with multiple opportunities to 
accumulate requisite knowledge and technical experiences through a phased developmental approach 
ranging from license production to full scale development projects. However, decision authorities 
selected to purchase foreign platforms instead of nurturing the domestic industrial base, awarded 
contracts intermittently to new entrants based on political ties instead of sustaining the existing 
production and development capacities, and even disposed of what was left from the limited production 
capacities established since the late 1970s based on inconsistent industrial policies. This sector reviews 
the brief history of military helicopter development programs before the launching of the Korea Multi-
Role Helicopter Program (KMH) in 2001. 
 The sheer magnitude of cost incurred in developing aeronautical technologies is an unbearable 
burden for low developed economies. Whatsoever, the arms race between the two Koreas and the 
country’s requirement to field vast numbers of tactical helicopters for operational purposes created a 
sizeable market that would suffice the economy of scale for developing helicopters. Most of the 
technologies were acquired through technology transfers from license manufacturing arrangements and 
foreign offset deals. The below table illustrates the sources of technology acquisition in the rotor wing 
sector before the KMH program. 
 
  Sources of Technology Technology Acquired 
Hughes MD500 
(co-production under 
license) 
• License manufacturing by Korean Airlines 
• Machine work, sheet metal worker 
• Final assembly, test flight 
• Forge wielding 
• Assembly works 
• Test and evaluation 
AH-1S 
(foreign purchase) 
• Technology offset deal 
• Main body manufacturing 
• Repair and maintenance 
• Main body manufacturing 
• Depot level maintenance 
CH-47D 
(foreign purchase) 
• Technology offset deal 
• Component/equipment production 
• Aerodynamics, machine design technical training 
• Main body, engine production 
• Structural mechanics, pilot training, 
wind tunnel tests 
UH-60P 
(co-production under 
license) 
• License manufacturing 
• Main body and related components 
• Substructure assembly, flight test 
• Component manufacturing, 
assembly technology 
• System integration of mission 
equipment, test and evaluation 
Lynx 
(foreign purchase) 
• Technology offset deal 
• Component production, depot level maintenance 
• System concept and component concept 
technologies 
• System concept design 
• Technology data 
• Applied design data on blade 
development 
BO-105 
(co-production under 
license) 
• License manufacturing 
• System integration (mission equipment) and 
certification 
• Final assembly, test flight 
• Main body assembly 
• Final assembly, test flight 
• System integration 
Table 58. Sources of Technology Acquisition                        
Source: KHP Program Management Office, Defense Acquisition and Program Administration, 2006 
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8.1.1 Capacity Building in the Early Stages: License Assembly of Hughes 500MD 
Defender 
Before the early 2000s, the technological foundations of the domestic rotor wing sector derived 
from the license manufacturing experiences of foreign models or producing components through 
defense offset trade arrangements subcontracted with overseas partners. Since the 1970s, heliborne 
airlift capabilities, first introduced in deep jungle guerrilla warfare during the Vietnam War era, 
transformed the tactics and doctrine of the Korean military. In order to apply the air assault counter-
guerrilla warfare tactics learned from the combat experiences in the Southeast Asian campaigns, the 
Korean military introduced three helicopter variants from the United States through grant-aid programs 
during the mid-1970s; UH-1H Huey Light Utility Transport, 500MD Light Armed Reconnaissance, and 
AH-1J Cobra Light Attack. 
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            Figure 24. Korean Helicopter Development Programs 
  
 At the time, the military top brass expressed firm determination to go domestic with helicopter 
production as part of the country’s strong drive into developing a robust heavy and chemical industry. 
However, cost factors propelled platform selection. The high price tag associated with the AH-1J Cobra 
stimulated the procurement authorities to directly purchase the helicopter instead of paving ways for 
local production. The most preferred utility platform was the UH-1H Huey, which grown popularity 
and familiarity to the Korean military based on the performances from its Vietnam experience. In the 
meantime, within the U.S. military, Hueys were retiring from its line of duty and being replaced by UH-
60 Black Hawks. Huge numbers of second hand UH-1H Hueys were being released to the market at a 
very affordable price. The UH-1H price tag offered by the U.S. Government was substantially lower 
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than the regular market price. The affordability of the UH-1H encouraged the Korean military to directly 
purchase the aircraft instead of coproducing it, which would’ve eventually cost threefold. Hence, the 
only platform remaining for local production was the Light Armed Reconnaissance capability, which 
was under competition between the Hughes 500MD and the Bell OH-58 Kiowa. The coproduction 
contract was subsequently awarded to the Hughes 500MD attributed to its air-to-air outperformance 
against the North Korean Antonov AN-2 the much inexpensive offerings from OEM, Hughes 
Helicopter.812 
 Up until the 1980s, most of the defense technology was provided through U.S. military grant-
aid programs entitled under Technology Data Packages (TDP). About 91.8% of the TDPs were in 
conventional small arms such as rifles, crew served weapons, ammunition, tactical communication, and 
so forth. However, for apparent reasons, the U.S. refused to provide technologies and design concepts 
for further sophisticated weapon systems such as maneuver vehicles, aircrafts, air defense guidance 
systems, etc. Thus the technology introduction channels altered from grant-aid to license manufacturing, 
which placed the Korean R&D and manufacturing base under U.S. close observation and technology 
restrictions.813  
 
   Table 59. TDP Introduced by Year 
Year 1971 - 80 1981 1982 1983 1984 Total 
Cases 677 85 56 22 13 853 
About 91.8% (783) of the TDPs consists of conventional small arms 
 
 The Korean Army selected the Hughes 500MD Defender for its localized helicopter 
production program in 1975. The 500MD was selected for its improved survivability and reduced 
infrared emission devices, with additional armament loading capabilities. Korean Air and Hughes 
Helicopters signed the license manufacturing contract in February 1976, and the first 500MD Defender 
rolled out to the public in May 1977. Following the license production of the 500MD, the chopper 
expanded its mission scope from airlift/armed reconnaissance to anti-tank, scout and escort missions 
for attack helicopters, search and rescue, MEDEVAC, etc. Putting into account the extended mission 
statements of 500MD, the production volume also increased from the initial 100 units to a total of 308 
units throughout a six phased production milestone. Also, Korean Air produced about 516 fuselages as 
a Semi-Knockdown assembly order to support Hughes Helicopter’s overseas export programs. These 
efforts substantially improved the production base of the local aircraft-manufacturing sector.814 
In the early phase of the program, the development efforts suffered from low technological 
achievements as the workload assigned to Korean Air pertained to low-skill subassembly work of 
airframe production. Critical components such as rotor blade manufacturing, transmission development, 
and engine production were covered by Hughes Helicopter, where Korean Air merely served in roles 
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for final assembly. Through a phased effort by Korean Air, the localization components increased from 
1,369 items to nearly 3,300 items in total, accounting for 42% in helicopter cost value. Approximately 
70 mid-to-senior level engineers were trained from the 500MD coproduction program. The 500MD 
Defender composed of a utility airlift role, which loaded 4 passengers, and an armed reconnaissance 
role, which equipped with 7.62mm machine gun and a 2.75-inch rocket pod. The Korean Army took 
the initiative and upgraded the 500MD with advanced avionics, high performing engine and rotor blade, 
and an all-weather armament system to include the TOW-2A Anti-Tank Missiles with an investment of 
about $3 million.815 The Korean Army retained the proprietary rights over the TOW-2A armament 
upgrade investments into the helicopter. In this regard, Korean Air collected a royalty fee of $20,000 
per helicopter production when the 500MD/TOW was to be sold overseas. For instance, the Israeli Self 
Defense Force paid the Korean Government nearly $600,000 as royalty fees for purchasing 30 units of 
500MD/TOW Helicopters. In addition to the royalty fee earnings from the TOW reconfiguration, 
Korean Air earned approximately $20 million in producing 500MD helicopter airframes for Hughes 
Helicopter between 1981 and 1993.816 
 
8.1.2. Helicopter Experience (HX) Programs 
The anticipated product life cycle of the helicopters introduced up until the mid-1980s were 
about to end starting in the early 2000s. In order to promptly replace these helicopters before reaching 
the shelf life, the defense authorities launched three major helicopter procurement programs in 1987 
dubbed the H-X (Helicopter Experiment) Program. The H-X consisted of three major helicopter 
development programs; Heavy-weight H-X (UH-60), Mid-weight H-X (UH-1H replacement), and the 
Light-weight H-X (KLH/Bo-105).817 Contract awards over the three H-X Programs became the source 
of cutthroat excessive competition among domestic aircraft-manufacturing firms, but also presented 
good opportunities to leverage advanced aeronautical technologies from participating foreign vendors. 
However, the H-X Programs were poorly managed by the defense acquisition authorities, which became 
severely complicated by program overlaps in aircraft performance types, hindered technology 
accumulation by inconsistent contract awards, and poor contribution to improving sector specific 
technological readiness levels. 818 The mismanagement of the three H-X Programs interrupted the 
developmental progression of the rotor-wing sector, which served troublesome for paving future 
foundations of the indigenous Surion-Korea Utility Helicopter Program. 
The Heavy-weight H-X was initiated in July 1987 as a license manufacturing program. Two 
domestic companies, Korean Air and Samsung Aerospace, allied with foreign firms and competed for 
the contract award. Korean Air joined forces with Sikorsky by proposing the UH-60 model whereas 
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Samsung Aerospace associated with the Bell 214ST. In September 1990, the Ministry of National 
Defense awarded the contract to the Korean Air – Sikorsky consortium with a program budget of KRW 
1 trillion over a two phased development deal. From 1991 to 1995, the program’s first phase 
manufactured 81 units of UH-60 helicopters over a gradual development scheme of purchasing eight 
complete sets of helicopters directly from Sikorsky in its first step, and the subsequent steps of having 
Korean Air assume more roles in semi-knockdown final assembly work and producing localized 
components. The second phase manufacturing program lasted from 1995 to 1999 and delivered 57 units 
of helicopters to the Korean Armed Forces. 
 
 Manufacturing Steps 
Local 
Workshare Units 
Program 
Cost 
(₩ million) 
Localization Rate 
Cost Item Total Item 
Localized 
Item 
Phase 1 
Introduction 
Step 1 Direct Purchase 8 
601,614 31.5% 48% 11,675 5,466 
Step 2 Final Assembly 12 
Step 3A Rear Fuselage 8 
Step 3B Front Fuselage 9 
Step 4 Center Fuselage 44 
Subtotal 81 
Phase 2 Step 4 Center Fuselage 57 455,455 35.4% 52% 11,675 6,067 
Total 138 1,057,069 -- 
Table 60. Heavy-weight H-X Program Statistics (UH-60)           
Source: 2013 Ministry of National Defense Report to the National Assembly  
 
Korean Air has been criticized for its low commitment in achieving higher technological 
performance standards from the aircraft-manufacturing business. Having been operating the country’s 
largest air transport fleet, the corporate identity of Korean Air was focused more on aviation logistics 
than aircraft manufacturing. Nevertheless, the government strongly urged Korean Air to invest in the 
aircraft manufacturing sector as a return to the exclusive benefits the company has been enjoying from 
the public-private collusive business arrangements in aviation services. Withstanding the financial 
losses anticipated from investing in aircraft-manufacturing, Korean Air accepted the offer ostensibly 
for ‘nationalistic’ or ‘patriotic’ motivations. 819  However, the decision to invest into aircraft 
manufacturing was obviously driven by concerns of losing its exclusive position in the domestic air 
logistics market, which was granted and protected through the collusive links with high political 
authorities. Hence, an overview of Korean Air’s investment portfolio into major military aircraft 
programs shows that it mostly consists of purchases for land and facility to house the manufacturing 
capacities whereas the level of emphasis given into technology acquisition remained insignificant. In 
this regard, despite Korean Air’s privileged position to accumulate requisite technology in the field, the 
42% localization of the 500MD Defender and 35.4% localization of the UH-60 were considered 
                                                          
819 조중훈, “항공운송사업의 역할과 발전,” 군사논단 제 9 호, 1997 년 겨울, p. 281 
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comparatively lower than other competing companies in the market.820 
 
Unit: KRW 100 million 
Land & Facilities Equipment R&D Total 
101 (63%) 56 (35%) 4.4 (2%) 161 (100%) 
  Table 61. Korean Air Investment Portfolio in Aircraft Manufacturing (1981-1983)     
  Source: 대한항공, 대한항공 20 년사, 1991, p. 279. 
 
Whatsoever, the domestic rotor-wing sector wasn’t able to fully reap out the benefits from 
license manufacturing the UH-60 not only because of Korean Air’s low commitment to technological 
development, but also because of the government’s inconsistent and discontinuous policy over contract 
awards. During the Phase 1 manufacturing of the helicopters, Korean Air was also awarded the contract 
to license manufacture the T700 engine integrated into the UH-60. However, on 22 November 1993, 
the Heavy-weight H-X Program Evaluation Committee that composed of members from MND, ADD, 
KIDA, and DQAA, decided to change the engine manufacturer from Korean Air to Samsung Aerospace 
for stated reasons of streamlining the production processes between final engine 
assembly/integration/test, component manufacturing, and depot level maintenance. In this regard, the 
Committee suggested Korean Air to transfer all engine related proprietary rights to Samsung Aerospace 
considering the license production contract with General Electric, and the tools and equipment 
purchased for engine manufacturing. The Committee argued that all equipment purchases and licensing 
fees were paid from government funding, therefore should be returned to government ownership, and 
should not remain under the ownership of Korean Air.821  
Apparently, the decision backfired on Korean Air, where the aircraft firm claimed that the 
decision proclaims preferential treatment to Samsung Aerospace, a relatively late comer in the business 
who disqualified earlier from the contract award competition over the UH-60 Program. Samsung 
Aerospace claimed that as the country’s sole company that specializes in aircraft engines, the company 
is more than qualified against Korean Air over the license manufacturing of the T700 engine. Also, 
based on its experience and accumulated skill set in the aircraft engine business, Samsung assessed that 
it should take an additional investment of KRW 6 billion into building new engineering facilities for the 
T700. In terms of the cost assessment over engine manufacturing, Samsung argued that it would take 
Korean Air more than KRW 10 billion to build the same facility, which would incur additional cost and 
most likely increase the eventual price tag of the helicopter in general.822 As a result, the Committee 
changed the T700 contractor to Samsung Aerospace for the Phase 2 production of the helicopters. But 
Samsung had to renegotiate a new arrangement with General Electric for the manufacturing license, 
since Korean Air persistently protested to give-up its original technology assistance arrangements with 
the American firm. In the long run, Samsung only had to invest an additional KRW 3 billion to augment 
                                                          
820 Samsung Aerospace marked 62% in localization in the KF-16 Fighter Program and 41% localization in its jet engine, and 
Daewoo Heavy Industries reached a 60% level in the KTX-1 Program. 
821 매일경제, “삼성에 면허 이전 거부 대한항공 UH-60 헬기 엔진 양도 불가 주장,” 1993.11.23. 
822 경향신문, “군헬기 조립업체 변경 파문,” 1993.11.23. 
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its pre-established facilities to manufacture the T700 engines.823 
The third Light-weight H-X, dubbed the Korea Light Helicopter (KLH) Program, was first 
announced in July 1990 with a program objective to replace the earlier 500MD Defenders and to 
augment armed reconnaissance capabilities in support of armor maneuver tactics. The fate of the KLH 
program was doomed with a number of reasons for failure due to a result of continued indecisiveness 
and inconsistencies of generating war fighter’s needs, disconnections and incoherence between defense 
acquisition and industrial policies, cutthroat competition over an ill-defined force requirement, which 
eventually caused huge business losses and ineffective technological accumulation. The program 
portrayed inadequate and unprofessional management practices in generating warfighter requirements, 
which constantly depicted discordances in policy coordination between force planners, defense R&D 
institutes, defense acquisition program managers, and industry planners. The program objective was to 
fulfill three mission areas listed below. 
 
1) Support the Army’s heavy attack helicopter fleet (AH-X: AH-64 Apache) in scout missions 
(cancelled) 
2) Support the Army’s main attack helicopter fleet (AH-1S Cobra) in scout missions 
3) Replace the aging 500MD light utility helicopter 
 
The warfighter requirement for the first and third objective was cancelled because the Army’s 
doctrine continued to change without presenting a coherent operational picture into its theater wide 
aviation operations.824 The program acquisition strategy was to develop 147 scout helicopters under 
foreign license in support of the existing 5 AH-1S attack squadrons and the proposed heavy attack 
helicopter squadrons for the future AH-X (Apache) program. The multiple changes in Required 
Operational Capabilities (ROC) reduced the number of helicopters all the way down to 12 units.825 The 
constant changes in force requirements, which were drafted by the Korean Army, represented the lack 
of professionally translating warfighter requirements into a coherent force structure planning document.  
Initial competition for contract award was fierce, at which six domestic firms, allied with foreign 
partners, severely clashed in an intense battle game against each other. Samsung Aerospace lined up 
with the Aerospatiale’s A365 model, while Daewoo Heavy Industries chose West Germany’s 
Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) Bo-105. Other firms such as Korean Air joined forces with the 
McDonald Douglas MK520, and Hyundai Space and Aviation partnered with Bell’s 406CS. Lastly, a 
new entrant into the market, Sammi-Augusta, established a 50:50 joint venture with the Italian Augusta 
Helicopters to co-produce the A109 model.826 On July 1990, Daewoo Heavy Industries was awarded 
                                                          
823 박대호, “삼성항공 대형 헬기엔진 생산,” 경향신문, 1995.6.3. 
824 Army Headquarters, Program Updates to the National Assembly, 13 August, 2007. 
825 Ministry of National Defense, Korea Light Helicopter Program Update to the National Assembly, August 10, 2012. 
826 장성효, “차세대 헬기사업(HX) 주계약업체 월내 선정,” 중앙일보, 1990.7.9. 
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the KLH contract with a program budget of KRW 300 billion, and subsequently invested over KRW 
150 billion in equipment tools and facilities with an ambitious objective to become a world class 
helicopter manufacturer until 2010.827  
However, with the AH-X program being cancelled and the 500MD replacement type branching 
out of the KLH and becoming a separate program of its own, the number of scout helicopters planned 
under the program quantities subsequently reduced to 54 units. What made matters worse was the Army 
constantly changing its doctrine on maneuver tactics, which discredited a close air support scout 
function associated with the main attack helicopter squadrons. Such uncertainties in aviation doctrinal 
development brought the number of KLH orders down to 36 in 1994. Without a proper scale economy, 
the unit price of the helicopter increased nearly 5 times the original sale value. The tradeoff for the cost 
increase was performance and technology development, where Daewoo had to purchase major 
component modules directly from MBB instead of localizing the technology. Because of this aspect, 
the Bo-105 failed the preflight acceptance test three times in a row by ADD, which raised skepticism 
over the purchasing of the helicopter in the first place. There were also some allegations that ADD 
deliberately failed the Bo-105 in order to convince acquisition authorities to directly pursue the 500MD 
replacement program instead of the KLH.828  
 
Period Required Units Justification 
Dec. 1988 147 • Armed reconnaissance for AH-1 Squadrons • Augment 500MD shortages 
Oct. 1990 106 
• Armed reconnaissance for AH-1 Squadrons: 57 
• Armed reconnaissance for AH-X Squadrons: 36 
• Reserved: 10 
• Pilot training: 3 
Jun. 1992 86 
• Armed reconnaissance for AH-1 Squadrons: 52 
• Armed reconnaissance for AH-X Squadrons: 26 
• Reserved: 6 
• Pilot training: 2 
Dec. 1992 54 • Armed reconnaissance for AH-1 Squadrons: 36 • Armed reconnaissance for AH-X Squadrons: 18 
Apr. 1994 36 • Armed reconnaissance for AH-1 Squadrons: 36 
Nov. 1997 12 • Scout functions for AH-1 Squadrons: 12 
          Table 62. Changes in KLH Requirements        
         Source: KLH Program Update to the National Assembly, August 10, 2012. 
 
The performance features also showed disappointing qualities where the Bo-105 lacked anti-
tank missile launching functions because of the tradeoffs made between cost and airlift weight. The 
substantial reduction of helicopter units, from 147 to 12, became costly to repair and maintain a separate 
batch of the Bo-105 engines. The basic engine designed for the Bo-105 was the 550 horse powered 250-
C28C turboshaft engine. In order for the Army to maintain economy of scale with the maintenance cost 
of the engines, it changed the 250-C28C to the 420 horse powered 250-C20B engine, which was the 
same engine installed in the 500MD Defender. Because of the degraded airlift power with lesser 
performing engines, the Bo-105 was not capable of loading additional armaments onto the platform. 
                                                          
827 매일경제, “대우중공업, 항공기 종합생산체제 추진,” 1995.12.4. 
828 National Defense Committee Proceedings during the National Assembly Audits, 21 October, 1990. 
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Therefore, the wording ‘armed reconnaissance’ was eliminated from the Bo-105 title and simply 
became a scout helicopter with no anti-tank heavy armament capability. 829  This became a 
representative case of illicit collusion between politics and industry in the history of Korean defense 
acquisition, by means of changing required operational capabilities generated from warfighter needs in 
order to sustain corporate business operations. Eventually, attributed to the changing tactical 
requirements of the Army, compounded with the moratorium in public finances from the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis, the decisions culminated into the near cancellation of the KLH in late 1996. With the 
sunken cost already committed into the KLH program, Daewoo became desperate and was prompted 
to lobby extensively towards the senior military leadership to prevent complete program cancellation. 
The program survived with producing only 12 scout helicopters, but it resulted in simply achieving 
local assembly skills of the Bo-105 with no recognizable technology obtained from system 
development.830 
The objective of the mid-weighted HX program was to replace the aging UH-1H fleet with an 
indigenous version. The Samsung Aerospace-Bell Helicopter partnership and the Daewoo Heavy 
Industry-Sikorsky consortium competed for the program. Samsung arranged a deal with Bell to license 
manufacture a derivative of the widely popular Bell-407 model at the time. However, the authorities 
continued to delay the decision over the mid-weighted HX, which resulted in the eventual cancellation 
of the entire program in 1992 for reasons undisclosed. Reportedly, both Samsung and Daewoo had to 
endure approximately KRW 15 billion in business losses for committing resources upfront in 
preparation of the contract award. 831  But Samsung Aerospace’s objective to become an aircraft-
manufacturing giant persevered. The Samsung-Bell partnership later evolved into the commercial utility 
program in the mid-1990s. The Multi-Purpose Helicopter Program (MPH) that emerged was initially 
raised by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with an objective to indigenously develop a light-
weighted eight (8) passenger helicopter. In the spring of 1996, after withstanding the losses from the 
mid-weighted HX program, Samsung Aerospace registered for the domestic license production of the 
Bell 407 single-engine utility helicopter as part of responding to the MPH program needs. Samsung 
intended to upgrade the 407 model with a twin-engine 6,000 lbs. class mid-weight helicopter and 
dubbed it the SB427 model, a derivative of the original Bell-407 configurative platform.832 The license 
production of the SB427 provided Samsung the responsibility for development and manufacturing of 
the fuselage, cabin wiring, and fuel system, which was worth approximately $300 million.833 In order 
for Samsung to prove its commitment in aircraft-manufacturing, the company headquarters dispatched 
approximately 50 engineers and technicians to the Bell Helicopter R&D center for technology transfer 
                                                          
829 최훈, “군장비 도입 때 업체 봐주기 의혹,” 중앙일보, 1996.10.21. 
830 조진수, “국산헬리콥터산업 성공 가능성은?” 월간조선, 2017 년 1 월호. 
831 매일경제, “방산기술 사장 우려,” 1994.6.13. 
832 동아일보, “삼성 경헬기 생산 허용,” 1996.2.24. 
833 Bell 427 Multipurpose Utility Helicopter, Aerospace-Technology, available online at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_427  
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and technical training in system design and engineering. An additional 40 technicians from Samsung 
joined the training to acquire knowledge and skills in test and evaluation.834 The program later merged 
with the military’s intent to replace 200 light-weighted 500MD/TOW Anti-Tank and AH-1S Attack 
Helicopters through the indigenous development of a commonality platform. In 2001, the MPH 
performance requirements later absorbed the cancelled mid-weighted HX (UH-1H replacement) 
program, which made the MPH a more lucrative business agenda for both Government Research 
Institutes and other business entities instead of pursuing the largely downsized KLH. Unfortunately, the 
MPH program that seemed to present promising business opportunities for the domestic rotorcraft 
sector was condemned with the nation’s economic condition. In 1998, in order to cut corners in light of 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the decision authorities completely cancelled the MPH program.835  
The discordances between the military and commercial authorities up until the late 1990s in 
regards to the drafting of a strategic industrial roadmap for the rotorcraft sector was a source of serious 
business losses and setbacks in technological accumulation and sectoral progress. Further complications 
caused by the Asian Financial Crisis subsequently resulted in the huge overhauling of the entire aircraft-
manufacturing sector. Military requirements were shortsighted with negligible considerations towards 
building technological competence. Industrial authorities showed amateurism in picking national 
champions and were incapable of providing concentrated support in financial terms and technological 
assistance. Because of this flustered indecisiveness in industrial policies, business conglomerates 
engaged in the aircraft-manufacturing sector became involved in a dog-eat-dog cutthroat competition, 
which brought about nothing but miserable failures in obtaining both a well-formed military force 
structure and a technologically competitive aerospace industry. 
 
8.2. Korea Helicopter Program (KHP) 
The Korea Helicopter Program (KHP) was initiated as a concerted effort between military and high-
tech industrial authorities that included the military (MND), industrial (MOTIE), S&T (MOST), the 
prime contractor (KAI: Korea Aerospace Industries), and other commercial entities engaged in aircraft-
manufacturing. It was a highly complex program, both organizationally and commodity wise, with the 
sole purpose to indigenously develop and deliver the first Korean made helicopter. This section will 
review the background, major program milestones, key linkages that enabled technology transfers and 
capacity building, and implications to innovation potentials throughout the entire process of the 
development efforts. 
 
                                                          
834 이상철, “한국의 헬기개발 기술현황과 육성을 위한 제안,” 항공산업연구 제 46 집, 1998, pp. 41-43. 
835 The MPH program was re-engineered several years after its cancellation and revived as the Korea Multi-Purpose 
Helicopter (KMH) in 2001. 최우영, “한국 항공기산업의 발전과정과 현황,” 항공우주산업기술동향 제 9 권 1 호, 
2011, p. 32. 
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8.2.1. Development Motivations and Objectives 
The government authorities in the late 1990s started to view the need to develop an indigenous 
helicopter unrestrained from foreign technology control that provided fully reliable integrated logistical 
support. Korea had a sizable domestic helicopter demand pull of around 1,000 in operations, at which 
military helicopters constituted nearly 700. Thus, the domestic helicopter market formed a well sized 
economy of scale. However, Korea did not hold a distinctively indigenous helicopter of its own despite 
the fact of carrying the world’s 7th largest helicopter fleet. Around that period, although carrying a much 
smaller heliborne aviation force, Japan already completed the full deployment of its own 
scout/observation helicopter, the Kawasaki OH-1 Ninja, in the late 1990s, which was entirely 
engineered and manufactured by Japanese technology.836  
Industrial forces from MOTIE and MOST also perceived the need to sustain the domestic rotor-
wing sector with more production orders. Military orders for the license manufacturing of the UH-60 
utility helicopter was about to dry up in 2000. Although there were potential programs such as the MPH 
or KLH under development or in the drawing board, the overall rotor-wing sector at the moment 
received only intermittent orders in MRO work from the military. Therefore, there was an urgent need 
to find new business opportunities to keep up the production lines moving. On the other hand, albeit the 
comparatively small scale against the military market, the commercial aviation needs were growing in 
big percentages in the early 2000s. The growth of commercial rotorcraft aviation during the ten-year 
period between 1994 and 2003 reached a 7.1% increase, with the public sector such as the Forestry 
Service, Police Force, and Coast Guard growing higher by 9.3%. Especially, the middle-weight 
helicopters in the 18,000lb class category, which constituted only 2.4% among all commercial 
helicopters, were growing in demand. The demand pull from the market increased up to 85.7% during 
this period, compared to the global trend of 20%. More importantly, the public sector was leading the 
growth patterns by marking a 122% rate of increase. Based on these trends, the number of commercial 
helicopters operating in both public and private sectors was projected to increase to about 3.4 times the 
numbers of in 2003.837 In this regard, senior government officials, both from the military leadership 
and industrial authorities, shared a common understanding over the need to build-up the domestic rotor-
wing sector for fulfilling both military and commercial objectives. 
The indigenous development program formally started as the Korea Multi-Purpose Helicopter 
Program (KMH) in 2001 after picking up the remaining components from the previously cancelled 
MPH, with a target development plan to locally manufacture both utility and attack functions 
simultaneously for a total of 477 (299: utilities, 178: attack) helicopters.838 With an estimated program 
budget of KRW 15 trillion, the largest in the history of Korean weapon systems development at the time 
                                                          
836 Interview with a former senior executive from the Korea Helicopter Program Development Group, 5 July, 2012 
837 안영수, “국내헬기시장의 구조 분석과 중장기 발전전략,” KIET 산업경제분석, 2005 년 12 월, pp. 42-45. 
838 KMH laid out a phased development plan, or a concurrent procurement strategy, which was to complete the utility 
prototype first between 2004~2010 (6 years), followed by developing the attack prototype between 2004~2012 (8 years) 
 300 
being, the KMH intended to consolidate the utility and attack version helicopters into a commonly 
designed platform to streamline and simplify the complex helicopter fleet of various kinds. Also, KMH 
intended to reduce the ever growing O&M costs of the helicopters by obtaining compatibility of key 
components such as in mission equipment packages, power transmission, and so forth through shared 
design and engineering configuration between the utility and attack variants. As such, the design scheme 
was to combine the utility functions of the antiquating Bell UH-1H and Hughes 500MD Scout helicopter, 
and incorporate the attack functions of the antiquating AH-1S Cobra and 500MD Tow Light Armed 
Reconnaissance helicopter into a commonly designed platform sharing commonalities in engines, rotor 
blades, airframe, and other control components. 
The domestic industry also complied with such growing business opportunities. In 2005, the 
Federation of Korea Industries (FKI) and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy jointly 
announced the aircraft industry as one of the areas that shall drive the Korean economy for the next ten 
years. The aircraft industry will accomplish this status through the domestic research and development 
of major military acquisition programs such as the Korean helicopter (KHP) and fighter (KFX) program. 
The consolidated entity of major conglomerates from 1999, KAI was the heir apparent to be awarded 
the government contract for these future development opportunities. At the critical juncture of the KHP 
program, the FKI believed that the current domestic market demand of these aircrafts from the South 
Korean military will both mature the technical work force as well as the capacity of the industry.839 
In this regard, the KHP was anticipated to have a significant spin-off effect to the local Korean 
economy, which was worth KRW 9.2 trillion and creating 50,000 new jobs for the Korean aircraft 
industry.840 The substantial capital invested to the program is believed to make comprehensive strides 
in areas such as in principal components and materials, automobiles, control systems, information 
technology, and energy. 
The intention for consolidating different mission area helicopters to a common platform, in 
order to achieve efficiency in logistics and O&M, adheres to a recent trend in the global aircraft 
industry.841 Such trend of maintaining high-commonality in utility/attack approach is found in the 
continued development case of the Bell UH-1Y Huey and AH-1Z Super Cobras for the U.S. Marines, 
which shares a compatibility ratio of 70% in airframe and subcomponents.842 The Eurocopter Group 
follows a similar approach in different variants of modular design within their tactical transport and 
naval helicopter fleet as well.843 The primary reason to combine different mission platforms is to share 
essential components which include drive train, rotor head, tail boom, avionics, software and controls 
                                                          
839 Yoo In-ho, “Automotives, Shipbuilding, Aerospace As An Engine Of Economic Growth The Next Decade,” Financial 
News [Korean text], 2005. 11. 15.  
840 DAPA defense program update to the National Assembly, [Korean text], August 29, 2006 
841 Bell Helicopter Homepage, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en_US/SupportServices/Support_Services.html  
842 The commonality rate of the Bell UH-1Y and AH-1Z in core functional areas is expected at 84% 
843  See “Eurocopter hands over first NH90 to Swedish Air Force in Paris Air Show Ceremony,” 
http://www.eurocopter.com/bourget/medias/news/pdf/1st-Swedish_NH90_Delivery-GB.pdf and “Eurocopter upgrades its 
most affordable twin to enter Market in 2007: More performance for similar cost” 
http://www.eads.net/1024/en/pressdb/archiv/2006/2006/20060227_ec_as555np.html  
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in order to save costs and resources through reducing redundancy in research and development and in 
follow-up logistical support and maintenance needs. Such design and engineering practice in 
commonality within the UH-1Y and AH-1Z program is expected to save the U.S. Marine Corps 
approximately $3 billion in operating and support costs over the 30-year expected lifespan. The practice 
of sharing a common platform was believed to reduce 30% of resources compared to the option of 
developing separate platforms for each attack and utility missions.844  
However, this line of thought has been seriously challenged by heavy cost over-runs and 
schedule delays due to difficulties in design and systems engineering in the development phase of the 
program. 845  The ill-fated development and subsequent cancellation of the Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 
Comanche helicopter, the U.S. Army’s stealthy light-attack/armed-reconnaissance capability, encapsulates a case 
where a program accommodating too many operational functions can go farther but fare worse. Having to absorb 
the horrific technical challenges still far to overcome while tolerating the diminishing operational needs of light-
attack/armed reconnaissance helicopters proven from the real combat grounds in Iraq and Afghanistan, lesser 
options remained for the U.S. Army but to cancel the 22 year $6.9 billion development project in 2004.846 
 
8.2.2. Technical Assessment and Readiness Level of the Rotor-Wing Sector before the KHP 
As of 2006 in the very start of program, Korea’s technology readiness level in the overall rotor-
wing manufacturing sector industry has marked 65% to that of its competitors in Northern America and 
Western Europe. Korea has shown its strength in the category of unmanned aerial vehicles, reaching 
almost 90% in every field, whereas technology types in other aircraft areas such as regional commuter 
jets and helicopters scored around 70% or less.847 
The degree of technological maturity in the rotor wing sector was considered to reach almost 
80% in the category of manufacturing skills and infrastructure compared to its forerunning competitors. 
Most of its strong points were identified in engine and component manufacturing. However, in order to 
technologically advance into the levels of North American and Western European countries, Korea still 
needs to acquire further skills and knowledge in system design and integration engineering, in which it 
still shows significantly low maturity levels around 60%.848 
 
 Product Development 
Indigenous 
Component Support 
Manufacturing and 
Infrastructure 
Quality 
Assurance Total 
Business Jets 60 70 75 85 73 
Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles 90 80 90 90 88 
Helicopters 60 65 80 60 65 
 Table 63. MOCIE, 2006 Techno-report, December 2006 
  
                                                          
844 John C. Milliman, “First All-up AH-1Z, 2nd UH-1Y Make Initial Ground Runs,” Navy Times, 21 Aug, 2002  
845 USMC Helos Breach Cost Overrun Laws, available online at 
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,183604,00.html?ESRC=marinenews.RSS  
846 Dan Ward, “Real Lessons from an Unreal Helicopter,” TIME, 25 May, 2012. 
847 Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, Techno-Report, December 2012 
848 Ibid. 
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As of June 2002 immediately after the approval of the KMH, the two primary public research 
laboratories, Agency of Defense Development (ADD) and Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), 
that took the lead in system design and technology development, accounted for about 454 in R&D 
manpower, in which 298 researchers obtained prior experience in aircraft design and development.849 
 
 Experienced Technicians Additional Manpower Total 
Helicopter Airframe 186 106 292 
Mission Equipment 112 50 162 
Total 298 156 454 65.64% 34.36% 100% 
Table 64. ADD and KARI R&D Manpower Rotor-Wing Development         
Source: 어하준, 고병성, “다목적헬기(KMH) 개발사업에 관한 연구,” 국방정책연구, 2002 년 겨울 
 
 The industrial base around the same period that were able to support the development efforts 
in airframe and mission equipment accounted approximately 20 companies. The primary contractor of 
the program, KAI, was supported by Korean Air in airframe components, and other mission equipment 
modules such as in avionics, integrated flight data processing and control, multi-function display, etc., 
were supported Samsung Thales, LIG Nex1, Huneed Technologies, and so forth. About 1,667 
engineering and manufacturing workforce was available to support the helicopter development process, 
with about 657 experienced technicians who had prior involvement in helicopter development in the 
past.850 
 
Technical Field Company Name 
Aircraft Development KAI, Korean Air 
Airframe 
Main Body/Wing KAI, Korean Air, Soosung Airframe 
Other Components WIA, Dongmyung Heavy Industries, Korea Lost-Wax, Dongseo Mechanics, Hanwha, Cheonji Industries, Seojin Instech 
Mission Equipment Samsung Thales, LIG Nex1, Huneed Technologies 
Composite Materials Korea Fiber, Hanwha, Oriental Manufacturing, Sun Aerosys 
Engine Samsung Techwin 
MRO KAI, Korean Air, Korea-Bell Helicopter 
         Table 65. Domestic Helicopter and Mission Equipment Manufacturers        
         Source: 어하준, 고병성, “다목적헬기(KMH) 개발사업에 관한 연구,” 국방정책연구, 2002 년 겨울 
 
Because of such low anticipation in technological readiness levels, the KHP was mostly 
criticized for the developmental scope and risk factors in the preliminary stage of the program. The 
Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector, both fixed-wing and rotor-wing, lacked experience in critical 
design and engineering skills. Normally, the technological progression of a late starter mostly follows 
a four phased evolution through foreign direct purchase-license engineering or co-production-system 
upgrade-indigenous development.851 In this aspect, the preliminary phases ranging between license 
manufacturing and system upgrades were considered a principle in the normal developmental 
                                                          
849 어하준, 고병성, “다목적헬기(KMH) 개발사업에 관한 연구,” 국방정책연구, 2002 년 겨울, p. 14. 
850 Ibid., p. 15. 
851 The Second Phase Upgrade of the KOREA Navy P-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft Project adheres to such evolutionary 
development as it recently contracted L-3 Communications for system upgrade. The contract accompanies significant 
technology transfer of some critical design technology for mission equipment, system analysis and system design technology 
for the tactical support center, analytic technology for logistical support and other key mission equipment. Monthly 
Aerospace, [Korean text] pp. 34-35. 
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procedures in aircraft-manufacturing. Most second tiered foreign helicopter manufacturers such as the 
Kawasaki OH-1, Denel Rooivalk, and HAL LCH, all went through this routine developmental process. 
KHP skips the third stage and moves directly into the later most sophisticated and demanding phase. 
Technology acquired through indigenous research and development was limited, which was a 
restraining factor in building competence over system design and structural analysis skills. 
In order to overcome these deficiencies, the acquisition strategy of the KHP was to execute the 
program as a cooperative development effort by strategically aligning with an established foreign 
partner in this sector. Thereby, KHP became a classic example of a country seeking to leap forward the 
routine developmental phases by joining forces with a forerunner in the industry. To the surprise of the 
international business community, on December of 2006, the Korean Government announced that it 
will conclude on a joint venture with the European helicopter mogul, Eurocopter, under a 50-50 percent 
ownership for co-developing, international marketing, the utility variant of the KHP program.852 
 
8.2.3. Program Milestones: Major Stakeholders in the KHP 
The Korea Helicopter Program evolved from the consolidation of different program needs that 
emerged throughout the process of determining the exact operational and commercial requirements of 
the domestic rotor-wing sector. The program underwent a number of changes in the lead development 
agency, which varied from industry driven to government driven, military driven to commercially 
driven, indigenous development driven to foreign procurement driven, etc.  
Regarding the performance specifics, as noted in previous sections of this chapter, the KHP 
picked up the remnants of the KLH and the MPH program, of which both became either substantially 
downsized or completely cancelled. The operational needs of the KLH required a maximum takeoff 
weight of 6,000 lbs. equipped to perform scout and light attack missions. The principal agent for 
program development in the KLH was driven by industry (Daewoo Heavy Industries), with limited 
government (ADD) involvement. As mention before, the availability of a larger attack platform placed 
lesser priorities on a scout/light attack helicopter, which reduced the total numbers from 130 to 12. The 
commercial/industrial authorities, led by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, in 
collaboration with the Agency of Defense Development, picked up from the KLH and added the 
commercial lift requirements from the market, which devised the slightly heavier MPH program (8,000 
lbs). The program objective was to develop 200 multi-purpose helicopters that can serve in both military 
and commercial capacities. After program cancellation due to the Asian Financial Crisis, the MPH 
absorbed the force structure needs of an attack variant, and progressed into the Korea Multi-Role 
Helicopter (KMH) Program in 2001. The KMH consolidated the utility and attack operational 
requirements of the military and commercial entities with a larger takeoff weight of 15,000 lbs. 
                                                          
852 Surion: Eurocopter’s KHP/KUH Helicopter Deal, Defense Industry Daily, available online at 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/korea-approves-eurocopters-khp-helicopter-deal-02325/  
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Technological development would be driven by industry, while the government provided oversight and 
technological assistance. However, because of the technological risk factors associated with 
concurrently developing a utility and attack variant simultaneously, the program authorities separated 
the two platforms into an independent development program, which became the Korea Helicopter 
Program (KHP) for the utility version and the Korea Attack Helicopter (KAH, later Light Attack 
Helicopter) in 2005. 
 
Year Name Max Takeoff Weight Configuration 
Lead 
Agency Program Method 
Quantities 
(Initial) Result 
1988 KLH 6,000 lbs. Scout/light attack Industry (Daewoo) 
License 
Manufacturing 130/12 
Reduced to Local production 
of twelve Bo-105 
1995 MPH 8,000 lbs. Multiple functions Gov (ADD) 
Indigenous 
Development 200/0 Cancelled, replaced to KMH 
2001 KMH 15,000 lbs. Utility/Attack (Concurrent Development) 
Industry 
(KAI) 
Indigenous 
Development 250/250 
Utility/Attack separated, 
transformed to KHP 
2004 KHP 19,000 lbs. Utility/Attack (Sequential Development) 
Industry 
(KAI) 
International Co-
Development 250/250 
Utility (Surion): 19,000 lbs. 
Attack (LAH): 10,000 lbs. 
Table 66. KHP Program Evolution 
 
 In June 2001, after reflecting all required operational concepts suggested from the military and 
the economic ripple effects into the aircraft-manufacturing sector, 186th Joint Chiefs of Staff Council 
finally approved the KMH program. The Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council, convened 
by MOCIE in March 2003, also supported the further progression of the KMH Program under the 
collaboration between MND and MOCIE. 
 During subsequent review sessions considering the program management structure of the KMH, 
the defense acquisition authorities decided a work breakdown structure where the government (MND) 
would take responsibility over material solution analysis and concept exploration/development while 
the industry (KAI) would take over the system design and development phases. Within the purview of 
Policy Working Group under the Executive Program Management Committee, the authorities decided 
to develop the utility transport version first and the attack version at a later time after reviewing the 
development progress of the utility version. The objective was to optimize commonalities in platform 
and subcomponents between the utility and attack variants.853 
Indigenous development programs were always challenged by foreign platforms because of not 
only the high price tag necessitated in the procurement, but also the developmental risks associated with 
the indigenous option. Foreign platforms from western advanced aerospace firms had a proven record 
of technological reliability and combat readiness through the number of experiences in the warzone. At 
the time of the KMH proposal, the Korean Army was in a predicament between building force structures 
opposed to supporting the local economy. The Attack Helicopter Experiment Program (AH-X) was an 
attack platform aspired by the Korean Army for many years since its first force requirement generation 
in 1990. It provides a day and night all-weather capability that strikes deep into the second echelons of 
enemy forces. Various platforms such as the Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow, Bell AH-1Z, Kamov 
                                                          
853 DAPA defense program update to the National Assembly, [Korean text], August 29, 2006 
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KA-52K competed for program selection, with the Korean Army most preferring the Apache option. 
The program was always in conflict with domestic programs because of the unbearable program costs 
competing for priority over other programs. In the process of program development, the astronomical 
cost of introducing two squadrons worth of 36 attack helicopters, on top of the shockwaves of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, the AH-X suffered some ordeals until the defense authorities decided to delay 
the program in order to support the development of the KHP.854 
The strong justification to launch the development program was not only on the military and 
economic impact factors, but also on the actual business opportunities presented in the market. Although 
Korea is a late comer in the global rotor-wing industry, there seems to have been still some leeway in 
the market space where Korean helicopter products can competitively rise as a global player. The global 
rotor-wing market is segmented into many areas such as in military – commercial, utility – attack 
variants, heavy weights – middle weights, and so forth. Most of the forerunners in this field, such as 
Boeing, Bell, Sikorsky, Augusta-Westland, Eurocopter, etc., compete in the heavy weight sectors of the 
industry. However, there exists almost no competition in the middle weight markets, at which point the 
KHP becomes an attractive marketable item. According to a Teal Group report on the global rotor-wing 
market, the overall demand will likely increase about 23% from 1,156 units to 1,502 units between 2004 
and 2013.855 Among the 1,502 units, approximately 90% are the variants that go to the global heavy 
weights in the market. The remaining 10%, or an annual average of 150 helicopters, are mostly middle 
sized helicopters weighing approximately 13,000~15,000lbs per unit, in which no visible contender, 
other than the KHP program, was identifiably competing for. Another source marked a potential 
quantity of 250 units per year for missile sized helicopters could be marketable worldwide.856 Therefore, 
with the extensive marketing campaign from the government and Korean firms, the KHP program will 
be able to reap some significant profits in this global niche market. In terms of the domestic market, the 
utility variant from the KHP program has secured a stable quantity of 250 helicopters until 2018, which 
is worth KRW 9.1 trillion accounting for its lifecycle costs.  
 At the exploratory phase of the program, the KMH confronted significant criticism from the 
budget offices and public opinion groups over the astronomical figures in cost elements.857 The KMH 
was at first proposed with total program cost of KRW 6.23 trillion within a six-year period, broken 
down by a development cost of KRW 750 billion and manufacturing cost of KRW 5.4 trillion. However, 
the cost figures and program duration varied between different assessment methods that caused 
confusion and skepticism over the program’s public credentials. In this regard, in order to come up with 
a consensus in carrying out the program, a third party assessment that could deliver an objective 
perspective in program cost and feasibility analysis was recommended. Hence, three public 
                                                          
854 오동룡, “사상최대의 전력증강사업 – 기로에 선 육군 헬기사업,” 월간조선, 2003 년 9 월호. 
855 Teal Group, Short Term Market Forecast of the Global Rotor Wing Industry, published March 2004, p. 3. 
856 Eurocopter’s KHP/KUH Helicopter Deal 
857 최현주, “30 조원 국책사업 결정이 경미한 사안인가,” 참여연대 평화군축센터, 2003.9.29. 
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organizations – Korea Development Institute (KDI), Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), and the 
National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) – conducted an interim feasibility analysis of the program. 
 The KDI assessment ruled the KMH with positive ripple effects into the economy. From 
December 2002 to June 2003, KDI reviewed technological, economic, and policy implications of the 
program, in which the feasibility study recommended a cooperative development under an international 
partnership, with a higher percentage in R&D responsibilities, provided that the domestic market 
assures about 500 helicopters in sales prospects, would increase the success factors of the program.858 
The BAI assessment, conducted from December 2003 to April 2004, reviewed the appropriateness of 
force requirement quantities, program success potentials and substitutability, and economic impact. The 
BAI results conveyed negative ramifications, which expressed concerns in excessive requirements 
quantities, non-substitutable options in case of program delay or failure, and low feasibility in 
indigenous development against foreign procurement. The NABO review was basically a public 
scrutiny of the two previous feasibility studies, which reconfirmed the need to pursue the indigenous 
development option.859  
(Unit: KRW trillion) 
Performance Category KMH Development Foreign Procurement (C) 
Differences 
KDI (A) BAI (B) KDI (A-C) BAI (B-C) 
Life 
Cycle 
Costs 
Development 2.4 2.5 - 2.4 2.5 
Production 
(470 units) 13.4 19.2 9.6~11.3 2.1~3.8 7.9~9.6 
Maintenance Cost 
(30 years) 14.9 17 15.3~18.4 0.4~3.5 1.4~1.7 
Total 30.7 38.7 24.9~29.7 1.0~5.8 9.0~13.8 
Value Added Effect to the Economy 9.8 12.5 2.4~2.9 6.9~7.4 9.6~10.1 
Table 67. Comparison of Feasibility Studies between KDI and BAI (Considering both Utility and Attack Variants)  
Source: 국회예산정책처, 국방 KHP 사업 사전평가, 2005 
 
 After a yearlong postponement of the program because of the feasibility studies, the program 
was resumed after going through significant reconstruction work. The suggestions from the feasibility 
studies were elevated to the highest executive level at the Presidential Office, in which the authorities 
became reluctant to pursue the parallel strategy of developing the utility and attack variant together due 
to the high cost and technological risk factors. Following an intensive review process, the National 
Security Council decided to separate the KMH into a utility variant (KHP: Korea Helicopter Program) 
and an attack variant (KAH: Korea Attack Helicopter), while giving first priority to the KHP. The KAH 
was to be initiated following a thorough progress assessment of the KHP.860 A subsequent feasibility 
study over the development of the utility variant conducted by the Korea Industrial Development 
Institute in 2005 estimated a R&D cost of KRW 1.31 trillion, and a full scale production cost of KRW 
4.16 trillion for a total of 245 helicopters. The life cycle cost of the 245 helicopters was estimated KRW 
3.64 trillion over a 30-year period. Thus, the total life cycle cost, combining all three elements of the 
                                                          
858 국회예산정책처, 국방 KHP 사업 사전평가, 2005, p. 94 
859 Ibid., p. 95. 
860 이정훈, “KMH 욕심 줄이고 실속비행 하나,” 주간동아, 2004 년 460 호. 
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program life cycle, estimated KRW 9.1 trillion. In this case, the substitute effect of developing an 
indigenous version opposed to a foreign procurement, was approximately KRW 2 trillion in value. The 
total industrial impact effect to the local economy was approximately KRW 13.87 trillion, which 
accounted for both production inducements and economic value added.861 
Due to the separation of the utility and attack variant, the program budget also substantially 
shrank from the initially estimated KRW 15 trillion to KRW 5 trillion. The acquisition strategy also 
changed from indigenous development to a hybrid strategy of indigenous development supported by 
international cooperative efforts, which accommodated both proposals submitted separately from ADD 
(indigenous development) and KAI (international cooperation). Hereinafter, the official title of the 
program changed from KMH to KHP. 862  The separation of the two platforms also relaxed the 
aggressive development objective, which at first targeted for a localization rate of over 70% in all 
associated systems and components, down to a rate of 50% anticipating for an improved technological 
readiness level after learning from advanced international partners in the rotor-wing sector.863 
The KHP was a total package solution that incorporated three integrated elements of the 
program – aircraft systems (KUH: Korea Utility Helicopter), integrated logistical support system (ILS), 
and training system. Two cabinet ministries – MND/DAPA and MOCIE (later MKE and subsequently 
MOTIE) have formed an inter-agency joint consortium in order to develop a helicopter that shared the 
performance features of both military and commercial applications. The program duration for 
development ranged a 6-year period, from June 2006 to June 2012. The total program budget – 
including RDT&E, production, and a 30 year life-cycle management cost for O&M – was estimated as 
KRW 9.1 trillion, which made KHP the single most expensive government funded program in the 
history of Korea.864 The breakdown of the total budget reports KRW 1.3 trillion for RDT&E, KRW 4.9 
trillion for production, and KRW 3.63 trillion for life-cycle management cost. The scope of the KHP is 
also unique as it crosses government sections from military to commercial, domestic supply to 
international export, military controlled technology to dual use technology, etc. MND and MOCIE each 
share the burden to 61% and 39% of the program budget. The military controlled Agency of Defense 
Development takes charge of developing 15 key components of the helicopter that are mainly in use for 
the military such as the mission equipment package. The Korean Aerospace Research Institute develops 
18 dual use key components such as in power transmission and flight control that constitute the core 
elements of the main helicopter platform. 
 
Total Development Cost Government Investment Industry (KAI) Total MND (DAPA) MOCIE (KARI) 
KRW 1.296 trillion KRW 1.0872 trillion KRW 697 billion KRW 390.2 billion KRW 208.8 billion 
Table 68. Breakdown of the KHP RDT&E Budget                 
Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration, September 2006 
                                                          
861 한국산업개발연구원, 한국형헬기개발사업(KHP)의 경제성 분석, 2005.5.31, p. 128-136. 
862 국방부, “한국형헬기 기동형 우선 개발, 연말쯤 착수,” 국정브리핑, 2005.2.19. 
863 박병진, “한국형 헬기 사업비 10 조 축소,” 세계일보, 2005.2.18. 
864 백영훈 외, 한국형헬기개발사업(KHP)의 경제성 분석, 한국산업개발연구원, 2005, p. 109. 
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Because of the need to manage a complex development project with the largest appropriated 
program budget in the history of Korean weapon systems development, in addition to incorporating 
critical technological resources dispersed throughout different government agencies and commercial 
entities in the most consistent way possible, the defense authorities perceived the need to establish an 
organization exclusively for the KHP that can effectively manage and mitigate program challenges. In 
September 2002, MND established the KMH Program Management Group under its acquisition branch. 
In accordance with Executive Order No. 18156, the KMH Program Management Group was formally 
established and was initially placed under supervision of the Minister of National Defense. Considering 
the gravity of developmental and coordinative challenges, a Deputy Minister level official was 
appointed as Chief of the Group, of which the Chief would exercise overarching authorities to 
coordinate and manage the flawless execution of the program between the military (MND), industry 
(MOCIE), and corporate businesses (KAI and subcontractors).865  
Due to the need to comprehensively reach out to various stakeholders to coordinate competing 
priorities and requirements, the status of the Group was elevated to a national level program 
management office in January 2004. In July 2005, in order to reflect the changes made to program 
sequences in terms of developing the utility variant first followed by the attack variant afterwards, the 
name of the group formally changed to the Korea Helicopter Program Group, and was placed under 
supervision of the Commissioner of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in accordance 
with the structural changes made on the country’s defense acquisition system.866 
  
                                                          
865 대통령령 제 18156 호, 한국형다목적헬기개발사업단규정, 2003.12.11. 
866 대통령령 제 18948 호, 한국형헬기개발사업단규정, 2005.7.15. 
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        Figure 25. KHP Program Management System                        
         Source: Reproduced from DAPA KHP Updates to the National Assembly, June 2012. 
  
 The KHP Program Group retained overall responsibility in managing and coordinating various 
tasks conducted by each subject entity in charge of its respective development segment. The military 
authorities, MND/DAPA, supervised the development of military capabilities in the program, whereas 
industrial technocrats such as MOTIE and other S&T authorities, managed the commercial piece of the 
program. DAPA managed all contract related matters in terms of payment schedules, offset trades, 
compliances to operational requirements, and so forth, through its Contract Management Agency. ADD, 
which is also an autonomous GRI under DAPA oversight, managed the development and coordination 
of technology with all developmental partners in overarching aspects of the KHP. The central repository 
of all development efforts resided within the prime contractor KAI in regards to system design and 
integration, component development with subcontractors, government relations, and so forth. ADD 
shared the development piece of military specific components whereas KARI took responsibility of 
developing dual-use components that had direct commercial application. Eurocopter Group, as the 
technology provider of the program, assisted with the design, production, test and evaluation, and 
quality assurance of the program with KAI.867 
 
Choosing a Co-Development Partner 
Because of the shortfalls in technological readiness levels, it was imperative for the program to 
collaborate with a highly competent international partner. International co-development efforts were a 
global industry trend for the development of new aircrafts considering the high development costs and 
                                                          
867 Ibid. 
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technological risks. The selection guidelines, reflected in the official Request for Proposal (RfP), 
underscored a foreign partner that provides adequate technological assistance for developing systems 
and components properly assessed to be built indigenously. In order to address the need to build 
technological capacities for the local aircraft-manufacturing sector, the program manifested a 30% extra 
weighted value in the contractor evaluation categories of technology transfers and assistance, 
intellectual proprietary rights and ownership, etc. It required the foreign partner to clearly and definitely 
understand the program work breakdown structure where the international co-development partner 
should assist the prime contractor (KAI) in achieving the suggested level of technological readiness and 
component localization rates. Because of the separation of the attack variant from the original 
development plan, the KHP also required an aggressive offset trade package that included the transfer 
of technology to build an attack helicopter as a follow-up program of the Korea Utility Helicopter 
(KUH).868 
 At first, foreign aerospace moguls expressed keen interests into the program, but they also kept 
strong restraints to prevent the emergence of a potential competitor in the market. Foreign firms not 
only showed deep concerns on the potential entry of a new contender in the global rotor-wing sector, 
but also expressed discomfort over the possible loss of a huge regional market. The idea of losing the 
world’s 7th largest helicopter market by assisting the development of an indigenous variant was 
obviously not in the business forecasts of these aerospace firms. In this regard, a number of foreign 
firms attempted to discourage senior Korean program officials and KAI executives over the KHP 
endeavors by presenting better license production deals or improved integrated logistics support 
packages. One firm produced a detailed booklet dubbed the “Dark History Book”, which illustrated 
previous cases of development missteps the company went through, and warned the program executives 
over the prospects of failure regarding the highly risky and unrealistic development schedule of the 
KHP.869 
The seven companies that attended the KHP Information Session, which was held at the KAI 
headquarters on 15 April, 2005, were Bell, Boeing Sikorsky, AugustaWestland, Eurocopter, 
Rosoboronexport, and Kazan. Only three rotorcraft firms – AugustaWestland, Bell, Eurocopter – 
responded with their respective development proposal for the program. The other four firms did not 
respond with a proposal after foreseeing the high risk factors associated with the program. However, 
AugustaWestland and Bell Helicopters refused to submit further details of the co-development proposal, 
at which the two firms demanded exclusive negotiating rights, under the premises that they would win 
the final contract award. Bell withdrew from the competitive bidding process, while the program 
authorities automatically disqualified AugustaWestland for not responding to the additional RfP 
                                                          
868 KHP 사업단, 한국형헬기사업 사업설명회 자료, 방위사업청, 2005.4.15, p. 32. 
869 Interview with a former KHP official, 15 September, 2012. 
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requirements.870 The highlights of the proposal were as follows871: 
 
• AugustaWestland 
o Proposed a 50:50 co-development of the A-149 platform, which was virtually a license 
production arrangement. This entirely differed from the original co-development RfP. 
o KAI has limited involvement in critical design, test and evaluation, whereas most of the 
development rights reside within AugustaWestland. 
o Expressed the firm had no intention to compete in a trilateral composition with the other 
two firms, and demanded to sign a Head of Agreement in advance for exclusive pre-contract 
privileges in preparation of preliminary negotiations. 
• Bell Helicopters 
o Proposed an overhaul of the UH-1Y platform, which was essentially a license production 
offer. This also differed from the original co-development RfP. 
o Bell argued the ambitious 6-year development timeframe is unattainable in terms of cost 
and development period. Therefore, Bell advised the UH-1Y overhaul as the only viable 
option that can fulfill the aggressive timeline. 
o Bell obtains overall responsibility of the core technology applied such as integrated design 
and manufacturing, structural design changes, avionics integration. KAI has limited 
authority in reconfiguring airframe and engine model. 
o Only when Bell is selected as the preferred bidder of the program shall the firm provide 
further details of the technology transfer package. 
• Eurocopter 
o Responded with a RfP that complied with the program guidelines in terms of technology 
assistance and co-development efforts. 
o Shall proceed with the international cooperative development by assisting the production 
of an indigenous Korean configuration. 
o In terms of technology ownership, KAI obtains 85% and Eurocopter obtains 15% of the 
KHP. 
o Shall transfer all technology that are not subject to export license control. 
 
Since Eurocopter solely responded among the three companies in accordance with the RfP, the 
program authorities selected the European firm as the priority bidder and entered into subsequent 
negotiation phases. Eventually, KAI and Eurocopter agreed on a total contract cost of EUR 202 million 
for technology transfers and assistance. Under the category of Recurring Costs on transferred 
                                                          
870 DAPA, KHP Update to the National Assembly, 1 September, 2005. 
871 김기정, “한국 헬기 사업의 진행과 역사,” 제 7 회 KAI 항공우주논문상, pp. 51-53. 
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technology investment, the reimbursement arrangement for Eurocopter concluded with a 70% 
disbursement in a ten-year payment schedule, under the condition of a successful product development 
and full scale manufacturing. The remaining 30% installments should be paid from the joint marketing 
efforts of the KUH to international customers.872 This arrangement was believed to keep Eurocopter 
committed into the Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the program as well 
as to the overseas exporting campaigns. 
The selection of Eurocopter as a development partner for the KHP signified the Korean 
Government’s strong willingness to put industrial development and capacity building first against the 
traditional alliance politics of prioritizing U.S. defense products, under the cloak of enhancing coalition 
interoperability. Purchasing U.S. defense products certainly had benefits in a sense of sharing 
concurrent spare parts and rendering repair services with its alliance partner in the perspectives of 
effectively managing the product life cycle. In this regard, most spectators anticipated Bell Helicopters 
as the most likely co-development partner to win the contract. But by carefully scrutinizing the RfP, the 
Korean Government’s intention revealed stronger commitment in building industrial capacities and 
sectoral competitiveness through picking the best option for assisting industrial growth.  
However, Eurocopter was also seemingly reluctant to transfer critical technologies for obvious 
reasons of protecting its technological competitiveness. The three representative high value product 
modules, which the KHP strongly insisted to localize, were the production technology of the main rotor 
blade, aircraft flight control system, and power transmission system. These were considered critical 
technologies that would allow the Korean firms to develop new variants of helicopters with its own 
initiatives. Eurocopter partially provided the requisite knowledge and technology for the rotor-blade 
and power transmission system, but strongly refused to even initiate discussion on the aircraft flight 
control system. Instead of providing the technology, Eurocopter offered a counter-trade, which is a form 
of an offset deal, to purchase the flight control systems. In this regard, the initial program objective to 
acquire about 63.8% of the technology preconditions for aircraft flight control systems resulted in 
obtaining zero technology from Eurocopter.873 
 
Program Management Methods: Deploying Concurrent Engineering Practices 
In a normal case, the average time period for advanced western aerospace firms to develop a 
new helicopter model takes around 8 to 10 years. To fulfill the urgent warfighter requirements of the 
military services in regards to the rapidly retiring helicopter fleet of the Korean Army, the KHP Program 
Group suggested an ambitious development timeline of six years (73 months). In this regard, it was 
imperative for the program management authorities to closely monitor the program costs and key 
compliance with key milestones in order to prevent any possible setbacks caused by cost increases or 
                                                          
872 Special Terms and Conditions of Technical Assistance Agreement between Korea Aerospace Industries and Eurocopter 
for Preliminary Design and Full Scale Development of Korean Utility Helicopter, December 16, 2005, p. 21. 
873 최승욱∙최현수, “소형 민군용 헬기 개발 1 조 6000 억 사업 위기,” 국민일보, 2016.9.26. 
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late deliveries. 
 
 
      Figure 26. KHP Program Development Milestones Applying Concurrent Engineering Methods 
      Source: Reproduced from DAPA KHP Updates to the National Assembly, June 2012. 
 
 The Defense Acquisition Program Administration perceived the need to deploy objective 
based scientific program management techniques in order to effectively manage highly complexed 
development programs. In this regard, program management methods were instituted into formal 
regulations associated with guidebooks that provided implementation instructions. 874  The KHP 
Program Group employed a concurrent engineering design concept as a response to the impending 
technological challenges entailed under such constrained timeline. In order to effectively manage the 
various risk factors inherent in complex product systems, there was a need to routinely scrutinize 
program performances and review the accuracies of follow-up actions. Thus, the concurrent engineering 
concept applied methods of systems engineering (SE) to manage the entire life cycle of the program, 
earned value management (EVM) to control timelines and phases, cost as an independent variable 
(CAIV) to monitor unit costs and O&M, etc. All these methodologies were assigned to each program 
entities based on the work breakdown structure (WBS) instituted by the KHP Program Group. 
 The Systems engineering method is a commonly deployed practice when developing products 
that require substantial integration work over a distinctive number of different systems into a single 
platform. The KHP Development Group proactively applied the engineering method in the early phases 
of developing the KUH. The program authorities drafted the Systems engineering Management Plan 
(SEMP) as a baseline guidance document that reflected the procedural aspects of engineering systems, 
subsystems, and components, under the prospects of a total life cycle management perspective. The 
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SEMP applied U.S. military specific technological standards (MIL-STD-499A) and built up the 
experiences from previous aircraft development cases such as the F-16, KT-1, and T-50. These elements 
were thoroughly analyzed and implemented the into the Preliminary Design Review phase, in which 
allocated the baseline to insure the operational effectiveness of the system. The decision and control 
processes in the design phase were managed through sequential series of formal technical review 
sessions, starting from the system requirement review phase all the way towards test readiness review 
phase.875 
 Earned Value Management (EVM) is a method where the program manager calibrates the 
assigned workload actually performed beyond the initial review of cost and schedule reports. It is a 
method that measures the project by the progress accomplished. After reviewing the progress and 
performances, the program manager makes an assessment on the total cost and program schedule in 
accordance with the trend analysis of the evaluated data.876 By employing the EVM method, the 
program authorities managed to track the major schedules and costs in accordance with the original 
development plan. At first, until December 2009, the program managed to stay on time within the given 
parameters in costs. However, after 2010, the program experienced schedule delays and cost overruns. 
These violations against the baseline planning documents were closely measured and monitored by 
applying the EVM practice.877 
 No matter how much objective based scientific principles were applied in the SEMP, 
coordination challenges emerged throughout practicing systems engineering methods. The utmost issue 
chronically identified was the synchronization of different system requirement viewpoints occurring 
throughout the design phase. Military operational requirements frequently confronted challenges in 
ways of interpreting the needs into a technological language with the system engineers. Such 
synchronization in development concepts would’ve been highly appreciated in the early stages of the 
design reviews, but the differences still remained even during preliminary design review sessions.878 
 In addition to these limiting factors, the cost deviation between the initial development cost 
estimates and the actual cost incurred showed an increase of 24.8% by KRW 321 billion. The systems 
engineering program management methods handled the overall schedule in track within the projected 
73-month timeline, which prevented additional possibilities of cost overruns caused by program delays. 
Among the 24.8% cost increase that incurred during the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase, the losses occurred from foreign-exchange differences between Korean Won and European Euros 
amounted about 10%, which accounted for KRW 130 billion in total development costs. The major 
cause of the cost deviation, or cost overruns, from the exchange rate was the 30% valuation of the Euro 
from the original forecast. The genuine culprit viewed as the true element for a cost overrun nested in 
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the remaining 14.8%, or KRW 191 billion, which occurred from engineering changes made in the design 
process and the alterations in concept design of the engine.879 
 
Responsible Program Office Planned Budget Actual Cost Cost Variance Variance Amount 
KHP Development Group ₩34 billion ₩28.7 billion -15.6% -₩5.3 billion 
KAI ₩721.3 billion ₩1.00 trillion 38.9% ₩280.9 billion 
KARI ₩333.2 billion  ₩374.3 billion 12.3% ₩41.1 billion 
ADD ₩206.5 billion ₩211.1 billion 2.2% ₩4.6 billion 
Total ₩1.295 trillion ₩1.61 trillion 24.8% ₩3.213 trillion 
Table 69. KHP Development Cost Increases       
Source: DAPA KHP Program Update to the National Assembly, August 2013. 
 
8.2.4. Capacity Building Process 
International Cooperation with Eurocopter 
The KHP Development Group selected Eurocopter with a contract value worth EUR 202 
million that included a co-development package of technology transfers and assistance, workshare 
agreement, and work breakdown structure. The technology assistance agreement valued EUR 102.5 
million that amounted 3,497 man-months in staff plans related to systems engineering, configuration 
design, aerodynamics, fuel systems, avionics, and so forth. Technology transfer arrangements accounted 
for 293 items, which accounted for 293 technical items and development know-how. The workshare 
agreement comprised of building the gearbox (transmission), drive-shaft, flight control computer, and 
so on, with a contract value of EUR 100.2 million.880 Thus, technology assistance provided from 
Eurocopter formed a critical element of the KHP development. 
As the KHP entered the design phase, the program authorities exerted full-fledged efforts to 
acquire the requisite knowledge and skills through the collaborative arrangements with Eurocopter. 
From June 2006 to July 2007, a team comprised of 40 scientists and engineers, gathered from KAI, 
KARI, ADD, and the KHP Development Group, were dispatched to the Eurocopter headquarters office 
in Marignane, France. The team was titled the Overseas Design Built Team (ODBT), and served in roles 
of absorbing advanced knowledge and skills required for fulfilling the technology transfer process. The 
ODBT worked with Eurocopter to accomplish the conceptual drawings and preliminary design phase 
within the constrained program timeline. Considering the shortfalls in technological competence and 
skills, it was imperative for the KHP Development Group, through the ODBT, to fully utilize 
Eurocopter’s advanced experience and infrastructure, before finishing the preliminary design phase 
milestones within the given timeframe. The ODBT teamed up with the Eurocopter Technology 
Assistance Team and conducted tradeoff studies by each application field to reach the landmarks of the 
final configuration design. Most of the existing helicopter structural features of Eurocopter derived from 
the AS532 Cougar family-design were applied in the new designing efforts of the KHP, which exerted 
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critical influence in shaping the initial configuration. The ODBT worked in close relation with the Korea 
Design Center (KDC), located at the KAI Headquarters, which functioned as the overall control office 
in laying out the integrated architecture of the helicopter throughout the entire design process.881 
  At first, the KHP Development Group intended to design a uniquely indigenous configuration 
that minimally replicated an existing design. On the contrary, Eurocopter proposed its twin-engine 
AS532 Cougar medium-weight helicopter as the basic structure of the KHP. Eurocopter argued that it 
should take at least three years to adequately test the new design features of a helicopter before entering 
into full scale development. In this regard, the program authorities had no option but to agree with the 
suggested AS532 Cougar configuration.882 
 
 
Figure 27. KUH Configuration Changes                     Source: KHP 사업단, KHP 사업추진현황, 2013.10. 
*SRR: System Requirement Review 
*SDR: System Design Review 
*SSR: Software Specification Review 
*PDR: Preliminary Design Review 
  
 Even after the program authorities selected the AS532 Cougar as the starting configuration of 
the KUH, further tradeoff studies ran into serious disagreements with Eurocopter in areas related with 
development risks and business interests. The program authorities preferred to start the design process 
with the C421 configuration, but Eurocopter insisted an altered configuration named C421A. The 
surface reason raised by Eurocopter pondered on the vibration caused from the aerodynamic 
composition of the main airframe in accordance with the manifested operational requirement document. 
According to the concerns of the Technology Assistant Team, even experienced rotorcraft 
manufacturers from Eurocopter had never altered the basic configuration of the Cougar despite going 
through multiple system upgrades and overhaul processes. Both Eurocopter and the ODBT went along 
pretty well with each other during the beginning phases of the configuration design and tradeoff studies. 
The Eurocopter Technology Assistant Team at the moment actively supported 16 iterations of tradeoff 
studies over the widened body C420 configuration. However, the cooperative stance changed after 
learning about required structural changes suggested to the baseline configuration. As the Korean 
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military was accustomed to U.S. standard military equipment, the operational concept developed by the 
Army in consideration for the KHP had Sikorsky’s UH-60 Black Hawk in mind. In this regard, the 
ODBT suggested to enlarge the width of the main airframe in order to accommodate the operational 
requirements of the program. The tradeoff studies conducted by the Korean Design Center stubbornly 
insisted for an American design over a European platform. This was a situation that Eurocopter could 
not easily accommodate.883  
The circumstances even worsened after October 2006. With the turnover of Eurocopter’s senior 
executive leadership, the cooperative stance of the Technology Assistant Team abruptly changed into a 
disobliging manner. The Cougar was originally built with a narrow body frame as a basic design feature, 
but the KHP design reflected the customer’s proposition to build a wider body than its original 
configuration. This implied serious adjustment in aircraft design. Normally before the System 
Requirement Review (SRR) phase, it would take about three years in average to apply design changes 
made on the baseline design configuration. In the meantime, the program authorities demanded to 
immediately enter the SRR phase just after three months of signing the contract. At the time, French 
helicopter designers closely monitored the recent crashes of the Indian Army’s Advanced Light 
Helicopter, and factored in the technical challenges of altering baseline configurations that did not went 
through appropriate review and tradeoff studies.884 Having this in mind, the Eurocopter leadership had 
problems over the development risks associated with the program, and concerned the potential setbacks 
in program delays or development failures caused by altering the basic configuration may result in a 
penalty of non-fulfilling the payment schedule, of which the corporate headquarters would not entertain 
over the company’s reputation.885  
The program authority overcame the differences with the Korean Army by mitigating the 
distinctively European characteristics, which raised the original warfighter needs in the operational 
requirements. Throughout the SRR phase, the Army showed commitment in all aspects of the 
development process, from the crafting of avionics to gunfire resistance design. Especially, active duty 
service members in the Army aviation fleet provided insightful recommendations and flexibly 
accommodated to customary differences between American and European designed helicopters. In 
order to actively apply the technical adjustments, the program authorities organized an interim team 
within the KHP Development Group called the Cockpit Review Team (CRT).886 Also, the system 
design components of the program were subsequently augmented by experienced system designers and 
engineers from the T-50 Golden Eagle Program. The shortened development period of the KHP has 
always placed every phases of the program under a tight development period, especially with the 
shortfalls in system engineers during the technology maturation and engineering & manufacturing 
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development phase. As the T-50 development concluded and entered into full rate production, the T-50 
engineers were reassigned to KHP design team and assisted the program milestones accordingly.887 
Based on these experiences, the Korea Aerospace Industries received the AP10120 Engineering 
Authority Delegation from Airbus in February 2015, which was the first of its kind for an Asian based 
aircraft-manufacturing firm.888   
 The technology transfer process underwent some difficulties provoked by workshop level 
cultural differences and corporate level competitive constraints. In the cultural aspects, the program 
authorities had to overcome the different approaches towards formally codified knowledge against 
customary tacit knowledge. Based on the number of bilateral arrangements in technology transfer and 
assistance, the ODBT initially expected to receive engineering schematics or technical documents that 
contained detailed descriptions of each respective technical field. Such expectation originates from the 
fact that most scientists and engineers of the KHP were more accustomed to the American way of 
building aeronautical artifacts, which highly focused on a system of engineering procedure based on 
standardized documents and technical manuals, codified as ‘MIL SPEC’ documents. On the contrary, 
the European approach towards aircraft manufacturing highly honored individual experience and 
workshop level coordination, in which the value extensively required a long gestation period for 
capacity building. European aerospace firms mostly come from a history of cultural heritage, which 
gives higher respect to experienced engineers and technicians than structurally codified blueprints. 
Especially, in regards to the first flight of the earlier AS532 Cougar model dated back to 1977, the 
evolutionary aspects of helicopter development in Eurocopter spanned over three decades of 
accumulated knowledge and experience. This implied that the technical learning process of 
Eurocopter’s human resource base mostly depended on tacit knowledge passed down by experienced 
engineers than codified knowledge recorded in document form. Unfortunately, time was of essence for 
the KHP, since the design phase had to conclude before the suggested 73 months, or otherwise the 
program would incur additional cost increases.889 
 In the corporate level, the program authorities collided with the Eurocopter corporate 
headquarters over the gross weight of the helicopter. At first, the KHP started with a primary mission 
weight of 15,000 lbs. however, as the program entered into System Design Reviews (SDR), after 
reflecting the multiple tradeoff studies in system design, the primary weight increased to 16,250 lbs. (7 
tons). However, the program authorities wanted to accommodate more capabilities into this mid-
weighted helicopter such as radar warning receivers, countermeasure dispensers, MEDEVAC, 
amphibious landing operations, and so forth. Putting these elements into consideration, the helicopter’s 
maximum takeoff weight increased to 19,700 lbs. (9 tons). This was unacceptable to Eurocopter for 
such increase in weight will place the KHP in competition with its own Cougar variants in the 
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international market. In order to arbitrate the on-going disputes in takeoff weights before the 
Preliminary Design Review in 2007, the program authorities intervened and negotiated directly with 
their defense acquisition counterpart in the French Government, the Direction Générale de l'Armement 
(DGA). The settlement was to adjust the max takeoff weight to 8.7 tons for internal weight limits, 9.0 
tons for external weight limits, and perform the preliminary performance tests in a weight category of 
7.5 tons.890 
 
Accumulated Experiences through Engineering and Manufacturing  
The culminated art form of aircraft manufacturing is the system integration phase of the 
program. This is where all millions of engineered components become integrated into one final 
masterpiece and function as a complete body of its own. The KHP went through a number of 
experimental approaches in the course of learning new technologies and applying old skills acquired 
from previous experiences. The development experience of the rotor blade offered opportunities and 
challenges in this respect. Rotor blade is a critical component that generates the lift-off power of the 
helicopter.  Rotor blade design and manufacturing is an area that requires mastery in sophisticated 
molding and composite material technology. Only less than a dozen countries in the world are capable 
of indigenously designing and manufacturing this major end item. The KHP program authorities had 
high expectation over Eurocopter’s effort to transfer necessary technology in order for KAI to localize 
the manufacturing process. Despite this expectation, the European firm disinclined to easily give away 
the technology. With an obvious intention to discourage a fast follower in aircraft-manufacturing, 
Eurocopter transferred mostly outdated and obsolete technology to KAI. In one case, the European firm 
chased a KAI engineer all the way to the airport and forcefully confiscated some basic level rotor blade 
technical materials furnished during the transfer process. 891  After obtaining foundation level 
knowledge and skills from Eurocopter, the KAI engineers self-taught themselves through collaborative 
efforts with its local subcontractors to mold the outer-frame of the resin-coated fiber-optic surface of 
the honeycomb core that holds nearly 80 different sub-materials from strong centrifugal forces. The 
short development period also pressed pressure on the engineers, in which even technicians from 
Eurocopter casted strong doubts on the slim chances of success. Nevertheless, after going through 
multiple iterations of trial and error, KAI engineers successfully developed and produced the main rotor 
blade with a much more sophisticated level than the product knowledge transferred from Eurocopter 
for less than two years of product research.892 
 The most challenging aspect in the system integration phase occurred when building the 
driving system. The driving system of a helicopter consists of the rotor blade, hub, engine, power 
transmission unit, and other supporting components. Since the driving system constitutes the most 
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delicate and sophisticated technology of a helicopter, most companies classify the relevant technologies 
as secret information under corporate proprietary rights. In this aspect, Eurocopter expressed strong 
hesitance in sharing detailed information related with developing the driving system. Compounding to 
the already insurmountable technical challenges, the program authorities selected the General Electric 
T700/701K turboshaft engine as the main power source of the KHP. The Cougar variants traditionally 
installed the Turbomeca Makila turbine engines as its main power source. The primary reason for the 
program authorities selecting T700/701K was for two reasons; 1) had more powerful thrust (1,855 
takeoff power) over the Makila 1A1 (1,820 takeoff power), 2) Korean companies already possessed the 
requisite technology and manufacturing experience.893 Whatsoever, the selection of the T700 engine 
confronted a number of technical challenges. Program authorities were comfortable with the T700 
variants since the engines were already under license production by Samsung Techwin. It provided 
better reliability and maintainability than procuring a newer source. Most of all, the featured 
commonality in engines between the KT-1 Basic Trainer Aircraft and the KUH Surion Utility Helicopter 
also reinforced the decision to select the GE engine over the European variant. The PT6A-62 Turboprop 
Engine run by the KT-1 shares substantial technical commonalities with the T700 Turboshaft Engine 
since the two engines originate from similar gas turbine structures.894 
The T700 engine was originally designed as a front-drive engine, which places the transmission 
at the front angle of the engine in order to effectively transmit the generated power into the drive system. 
However, the Cougar based configuration of the KUH required to place the engine at the opposition 
position from the transmission, in which the T700 had to be re-engineered as a rear-drive engine. This 
caused major complications in designing the drive system in relation with the power transmission unit. 
The power output generated from the engine transmits through a shaft that connects into the rotor blade 
system. The shaft constitutes a critical component in the transmission system.895 However, because of 
the installation of the GE T700 engine instead of the Turbomeca Makila engine, the KUH system 
engineers discovered during the integration phase that the shaft in the transmission fell a half inch 
shorter than the basic design. After reviewing the transmission components and design schematics 
multiple times, the KUH engineers concluded to add a bolt to fit the shaft into the transmission unit. 
Even after resolving the problem with the transmission unit, the incompatibility between the engine and 
the airframe caused serious vibrations to the main body, which suspended the development of the 
helicopter until the engineers worked out an answer to the problem. Only after General Electric became 
involved in the vibration testing, and advised to overhaul the engine protection box, did the vibration 
problem went away.896 
Considering the aspect of certifying the operational safety of the helicopter, three public 
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organizations performed the necessary airworthiness certification efforts over the KUH Surion in 
accordance with the Military Aircraft Airworthiness Certification Act, enacted in April 2009. The 
certification process was an imperative element to accredit the safety level of the helicopter to a status 
commensurate to international standards.  
The Certification Planning Division under the Bureau of Analysis, Test, and Evaluation 
assumed overall responsibility in coordinating and controlling the certification process. It served as the 
final approving authority in each phase of the certification process. The KHP Development Group 
administered the programming and execution of the certification process in parallel with the program 
implementation process. It supervised each phase of the program in accordance with airworthiness 
standards and requirements.  The Agency of Defense Development performed the verification process. 
After fulfilling the deficient areas identified during the survey, the KUH became fully airworthy 
certified for military operations in September 19, 2012.897 
 
Follow-up Variants and Market Opportunities 
The utility variant of the KHP for the military was assigned the project name Korea Utility 
Helicopter (KUH) Program. After soliciting names from an open contest, the KUH was given the name 
‘Surion’, which combined the words of Eagle (Suri) and world (on) in traditional Korean.898 KUH-
Surion Spun off into other modifications in accordance with the different mission sets designated for 
required airlift capabilities. The first that followed was the amphibious derivative built for the Marine 
Corps. The new amphibious variant was given the name ‘MUH-1 Marineon’, which combined the titles 
of Marine and Surion. The Korean Navy signed a contract with KAI, with a given program budget of 
KRW 6.3 billion, to purchase 30 marine derivatives as an effort to establish a separate aviation squadron 
for the Korean Marine Corps. The Marineon shared a 96% commonality rate in platform and 
components with its original Surion variant, but added additional functions such as rotor-blade folding, 
anti-sea water corrosion coting, supplementary fuel tanks for extended flight distances, and other 
supporting devices that allow the helicopter to board on the Dokdo-class amphibious assault ship.899 
 The medical evacuation variant of the Surion has also made its maiden flight in January 2016 
after incorporating medical rescue kits, such as stretcher props, survival recovery units, emergency 
medical service kits, etc., to the already completed Surion platform.900 With an initial contract to 
purchase 8 MEDEVAC helicopters, the Korean Government expects to deploy a squadron of a total 20 
helicopters until 2018, with a program budget of KRW 300 billion.901 The Korean Army established a 
MEDEVAC Squadron in collaboration between the Armed Forces Medical Command and the Army 
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Aviation Operations Command to build a professional medical first responder’s unit composed of 
aircrews and medical service members. The medical derivative of the Surion, the ‘Medion’, is assigned 
under this squadron to support the required MEDEVAC needs.902. 
 The National Policy Agency contracted a total of eight KUH helicopters (KUH-1P) overhauled 
to perform law enforcement missions, with an accumulated budget of KRW 129 billion from 2013 to 
2017, with an objective to deploy 20 KUH-1P helicopters until 2030. The Korea Forestry Service has 
also contracted one KUH in 2015 to perform monitoring and fire-fighting duties. The Korea Forestry 
Service deploys the largest rotorcraft fleet in public service, with an operating squadron of 45 
helicopters in service. It is the largest public customer after the military that has the potentials to 
purchase more KUH-Surion helicopters.903 The Forestry Service intends to buy 15 more choppers until 
2025, with a KRW 108 billion program budget. Chances are high for the Surion selection, but there are 
other competing requirements that needs to be overcome by KAI in order to win the contract deal from 
the Forestry Service.904  
 
KHP Performance Outcomes through Knowledge Accumulation 
Impact factors of the KHP measured jointly by the Defense Agency for Technology and Quality 
(DTaQ) and the Korea Industrial Development Institute (KID) showed positive effects to the domestic 
economy in terms of domestic production inducement, value added, and job creation. Table 13 annotates 
the economic effects attributed to the KHP R&D and production efforts, under the condition of the 
program reaching a 58.6% localization rate in component manufacturing. The technical ripple effects 
for the next ten years demonstrated a contribution of about KRW 5.32 trillion for aerospace, KRW 10.4 
trillion for other defense sectors, and KRW 4.12 trillion for commercial sectors other than aerospace 
and defense.905 
Unit: KRW 100 million 
Impact Index Development Production Sustainment 
Cost (program cost) 16,100 67,141 42,546 
Domestic Expenses  10,255 39,345 25,269 
Production Inducement 16,876 61,927 39,773 
Value Added 7,018 15,729 10,102 
Job Creation 7,795 jobs 24,532 jobs 15,756 jobs 
Table 70. KHP Economic Effects 
Source: 이기영 외, “수리온 연구개발사업의 경제적 파급효과 분석,” 한국항공우주학회지, 제44권, 2016. 
 
After the introduction of the first batch of KUH-Surions to the military, an assessment 
conducted by DTaQ over the program outcomes of the KHP concluded that the efforts for knowledge 
accumulation and learning by doing has indeed payoff in building up the overall sectoral capacities of 
aircraft manufacturing. In a force build-up perspective, the KHP substantially contributed to enhancing 
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the readiness posture of the military by the timely deployment of a critical airlift capability, obtaining 
an infrastructure for integrated logistics support and system upgrade, and becoming more self-reliant 
from foreign technological dependence. In an industrial perspective, the aircraft-manufacturing sector 
has secured a sizable market that can sustain the development competencies by generating local job 
opportunities for the thirty-year product life cycle of the helicopter, and contribute to promoting the 
domestic science and technology infrastructure in aerospace engineering. In an economic perspective, 
the domestic manufacturing of the helicopter significantly improved the trade balance in overseas 
rotorcraft purchases, and anticipates an effective technology spinoff effect into other business sectors 
such as automobiles, shipbuilding, ICT, and so forth.906  
In a more analytical perspective, the DTaQ report assessed the program outcomes by employing 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Delphi methods in each technological readiness levels (TRL). 
From a scale measurement from 1 to 9, the country’s TRL was assessed in the 8th level as of 2012, a 
two-step improvement from the previous Level-6 measured in 2005. Level-6 is a technological maturity 
stature where the program entities can perform intermediate level development of systems, subsystems, 
and prototypes. It does not include all technical aspects of the subject platform or system under 
assessment, at which it gives higher credibility to the performance of managing the development of 
related technology. Level-8 demonstrates a mastery level in system integration and test and evaluation. 
It shows a capability where the technical entities can sufficiently accomplish the given technical 
requirements and standards of the subject program of interest.907 
 
Year 
Overall Analysis (Delphi Analysis) Overall 
Outcomes 
(AHP Analysis) 
Technology 
Readiness Level 
(TRL) Design/Analysis Production/Assembly Test & Evaluation 
2005 56% 66% 61% 59% Level-6 
2012 77% 84% 83% 79% Level-8 
Table 71. Status of KHP Technological Improvement    
Source: 홍현의 외, KHP 사업 기술수준 제고효과 조사분석, 국방기술품질원, 2008 년 12 월. 
 
8.2.5. Technical Defects, Program Imperfections, and Public Criticism over the KUH-
Surion 
Despite the technological and economic achievements of the program, the KUH-Surion 
experienced substantial technical challenges as it was pressed for a short development time. The 73-
month development period evidently presented difficulties for both Eurocopter and the KHP 
Development Group in many aspects of the program. Despite the technological assistance the KUH-
Surion received from a global aerospace giant, based on an already existing European baseline 
configuration, developing a new helicopter within such a compressed timeframe for a country newly 
catching-up in a high-tech complex product system caused considerable repercussions in a technical 
                                                          
906 홍현의 외, KHP 사업 기술수준 제고효과 조사분석, 국방기술품질원, 2008 년 12 월, pp. 20-24. 
907 Ibid., p. 63. 
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domain and program management perspective. 
 At first, the compressed development timeline provided an insufficient gestation period for the 
program authorities to fully assimilate the opportunities provided from Eurocopter’s technology transfer 
and assistance efforts. In this aspect, the number of core technology and components targeted for local 
development eventually had to be purchased from overseas sources. The development of the 
helicopter’s transmission system was a classic example for this case. In July 2007, KAI subcontracted 
S&T Dynamic, a local precision machinery firm, to develop the engine transmission system of 
helicopter. S&T Dynamics subsequently signed a technology transfer arrangement with Eurocopter at 
the end of 2007 for engineering and manufacturing development. However, among the 450 components 
that constitute the transmission gear box, S&T Dynamics was only responsible to localize 134, or 30%, 
of those components. In a normal sense, as the sole subcontractor of the transmission system, S&T 
Dynamics should’ve engineered and manufactured the gear box under technology transfer and 
assistance from Eurocopter, and deliver the end product directly to the prime contractor, KAI. 
Nevertheless, the contract reads that S&T Dynamics shall deliver the manufactured components to 
Eurocopter, at which Eurocopter assembles the gear box and turn in the end product to KAI. There were 
also aspects of Eurocopter deliberately delaying the technology transfer process. According to S&T 
Dynamics, the turnaround period of receiving an official response for a memorandum from Eurocopter 
took more than one year, and the design plan frequently changed without providing advanced notice. 
At some instances, Eurocopter demanded to obtain quality certifications of certain products, which were 
not subject to any certification standards. Conclusively, because of these circumstantial constraints, 
S&T Dynamics was only capable of developing 80 out of the 134 components contracted with 
Eurocopter. What makes the matter worse is that Eurocopter refused to accept the components from 
S&T Dynamics, citing the original contract that reads the developer (S&T Dynamics) shall manufacture 
134 components of the transmission gear box. In December 2014, the Board of Audit and Inspection 
investigated this contract arrangement and suggested a penalty charge of KRW 13.6 billion to 
Eurocopter for breaching the contract with the KHP Development Group. However, about KRW 10 
billion of the penalty will have to be paid by S&T Dynamics because of the initial contract signed with 
Eurocopter.908 This was a case where a combination of incomplete contractual terms and Eurcopter’s 
reluctance to give up core technology resulted in an unsuccessful case in local development. Ensuing 
technical deficiencies mostly emerged from engine related power systems. Following the discrepancies 
of the transmission gear box, a number of technical defects were identified throughout the repair 
routines, which resulted in a crash incident of the fourth helicopter in 17 December 2015. 
In terms of program imperfections and interagency coordination challenges, the KUH-Surion 
was airworthy certified by the military, but it did not acquire type certification by commercial entities, 
which restrained the aircraft from obtaining standard airworthiness certifications for both military and 
                                                          
908 김현예, “수리온 핵심장치 기술이전 안돼 국산화 실패,” 중앙일보, 2014.12.13. 
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commercial platforms. Type certification is an authentication that verifies the conformity of the design 
and manufacturing process to publicly guided standards, which allows the aircraft to further proceed 
into the airworthiness certification. The issue of the Surion only qualifying the military airworthiness 
standards, but not the commercial standards of the FAA and EASA, limited the operations only to the 
military and law enforcement purposes. Other public entities, such as the Forestry Service and National 
Emergency Management Agency, were not eligible to purchase the helicopters into their aviation fleet. 
 
8.3. Chapter Conclusion 
The rotor-wing sector is an industrial area where the learning effects meaningfully accounts for future 
magnifying business opportunities. The constant creation of new business opportunities can bolster 
these learning effects into accumulated knowledge and experience, which can sustain this system of 
innovation. Thus, the key is to figure out how and where to find these new business opportunities. 
The Korean Rotor Wing Industry shows a typical pattern of a late comer country willing to 
catch-up to the global industrial high grounds by exerting efforts both from the government and private 
industry realm. It has went through skipping the stage of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
in the evolutionary routine by moving directly into the phase of Original Brand Manufacturer (OBM), 
despite the prevailing risks and continued criticism from the international market.  
The technological regimes show some resilience as the institutions to promote sustained growth 
in the market have been well established through legislation by law (Aerospace Industry Promotion 
Act), supported by a strong inter-cabinet decision making mechanism (Aerospace Industry 
Development Council), and followed by a concrete implementing body to execute the desired end state 
of the Korea Helicopter Program (KHP Program Management). In order to overcome the technological 
shortfalls, Korea made a smart move to co-develop the helicopter through a Joint Venture with 
Eurocopter, whereby reducing the risks of both technology maturity as well as export controls of 
sensitive defense related dual use technology. 
However, Korea’s future in the global aerospace market is highly dependent on how it 
leverages the US export control laws that are applied in the international transfer of arms. Korea has 
been technologically dependent to US controlled technology in defense and dual use technologies.909 
The major chunk of helicopters acquired from the United States, as well as sources of the technology 
base, constitutes almost 90% of the entire rotor wing fleet of Korea. The aerospace industry of the 
United States is notoriously well known for the strong protectionist policy it imposed into the transfer 
of US-origin defense articles and technologies to third parties.  
The reason for planning the development phase in such a short period was in order to replace 
the retiring helicopter fleet of the Army, which already passed its shelf life at the time when the KHP 
                                                          
909 Gil Bang Hee, “US Defense Technology Dominates Korean Arms Market,” Sisa Press [Korean Text], available online at 
http://www.sisapress.com/news/quickViewArticleView.html?idxno=31248 
 326 
discussion started. The root cause of this aspect originates from the delayed decision making of the 
program authorities at the beginning of the program itself. The initial required operational concept of 
the helicopter was raised in 1995, at the birth of the MPH program, but it took almost a decade, until 
2004, for the program authorities to make the decision on the full execution of the KHP. The government 
was not able to exercise strong leadership due to the lack of an effective interagency coordination 
mechanism throughout the incubation phases of the program. The KHP experienced various changes 
during this period, the cancellation of the original MPH, the frequent changes of the ROC, the 
incorporation of different performance functions into a single platform, numerous stages of feasibility 
studies, and public disputes on the program benefits, just to name a few.  
These policies are reflected in major control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), International Traffic of Arms Regulation (ITAR), Critical Technology Plan (CTP), 
and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), to name a few. These regimes impose harsh control 
measures to the host nation’s industrial policy which fundamentally prohibits reverse engineering 
schemes and obstructs the fluid diffusion of technology into other sectors of the economy. Strong and 
biased dependence to US systems and technology led to Korean firms being restrained to US export 
licenses, as well as being subject to a number of Memorandum of Understandings that restricted the 
expansion of the acquired technologies to higher level of technological maturity. The primary reason 
for such biased selection was mainly for national security causes – the military alliance between the 
two countries and the strong demand of interoperability creating such predilection. The politics of 
interoperability was pervasive throughout the military, not only limited to defense systems and 
platforms but also to the organizational structure and human resource development as well. The Korean 
military was equipped with US origin defense articles and was trained and educated by US military 
doctrine and tactics. In this aspect, the decision to select Eurocopter as a partner firm to develop the 
indigenous helicopter program was itself regarded highly innovative in nature. In this regard, with the 
KUH prototype, or the Surion Helicopter, successfully going through its first maiden flight on 
September 2011, the rise of the Korean aerospace industry will be an interesting subject for future 
observation. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
This study intended to review the transitional aspects of innovation systems under the realm of state-
business relations within the domain of high-technological products, in respect to the Schumpeterian 
Mark II technological regimes where complex engineering and manufacturing processes, alongside with 
regulatory control mechanisms, compounded with the complications of state-specific developmental 
challenges, have shaped unique systemic circumstances within the Korean innovation system from the 
national to the sectoral level of aircraft manufacturing. The main argument of the study asserts the need 
to effectively build cross sectoral coordinative mechanisms throughout the national, regional, and 
sectoral level of analysis, while exerting concerted efforts to overcome the multiple layers of hurdles 
against late entrants into technologically complex business areas. Consequently regarding an attainable 
solution for Korea successful accession into highly technological sectors, the paper necessitates the 
transitional efforts of transforming a rigid state-led innovation system into a spontaneously integrated 
coordinative institutional structure, which accommodates a broad spectrum of absorptive capacities and 
diffusion mechanisms tailored for developing complex product systems. This section examines the 
developmental efforts in high tech between the state and private sector throughout the arguments 
presented in the previous chapters, delineates the limits of this study, and presents a way ahead for 
future studies. 
The complex nature of aircraft-manufacturing requires effective collaboration between the state 
controlled public authorities and market regulated private entities. In the Korean case, the government 
leadership in R&D planning throughout the overall construct of the respective development program 
was indispensable in the early stages of aircraft manufacturing. However, perceiving the need to more 
effectively employ private resources for enhanced diffusion and affluent commercialization for 
innovation, the transition of R&D responsibilities from government driven efforts to corporate lead 
implementation was considered turning point in the history of Korean industrial development. In respect 
to the universal sense of sectoral innovation, the long accumulated experience in R&D and 
manufacturing enabled global aerospace and defense giants to further improve and upgrade system 
development concepts and production processes. The earlier work breakdown structure in a 
development program where the Korean government (ADD) took the lead in system development and 
the industry assumed responsibility in the manufacturing process created formative gaps in technology 
transfers and accumulation, which subsequently hindered spontaneous sectoral growth potentials in 
corporate competitiveness. In this regard, the two aircraft development programs chaptered in this study, 
in which the institutional interactions in system development efforts driven by corporate capabilities, 
supported under government policies, showcases the future prospects of large scale national high tech 
projects. Throughout the system development phases of the two programs, the prime contractor of the 
program, KAI, has accumulated substantial technological knowhow and skills required for advanced 
development projects under the constrained circumstances of existing institutions. Complex product 
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system like military aircrafts especially requires long gestation periods of development efforts and 
manufacturing experiences in order to further upgrade the sectoral competitiveness to the next level for 
sustained industrial development. No single entity can do it alone under the system integration concepts 
of complex product systems. But the number of attempts to fine-tune the developmental institutions in 
a way supportive towards innovation had to confront colossal challenges. The buzz word in this sense 
culminates in building coordinative institutions across all layers of the innovation engine. The 
comprehensive understanding of the system architecture in not only the aircraft itself, but also in 
integrated logistics support, training system for both engineers and product operators, and shelf-life 
extension elements, strongly demands for the establishment of inter/intra-agency coordination 
mechanisms that incorporate different stakeholders – spanning from national governance, regional 
interactions, and sectoral dynamics – into a synchronized planning and execution construct. In this 
regard, the Korean aircraft manufacturing sector strived to institute an innovation architecture outlining 
close coordinative relationships within multiple layers of innovation through a horizontally extensive 
networking interplay. 
Still, because of the limited level of competence to compete in the commercial market, 
government sponsorship in R&D and contract awards for new entrants in the aircraft manufacturing 
sector still serve as an imperative growth factor, which is a general aspect also applicable to the global 
aerospace and defense domain. Building public and private entity competitiveness constitutes the two 
pillars of sectoral innovation systems in aircraft-manufacturing. Although rapidly expanding market 
dynamics have diminished government influence in industrial policy making in the developmental state 
theorem, public resources and assistance in aircraft manufacturing still remain imperative for second-
tiered late entrants intending to attain a footprint into the field. Additionally, considering the complex 
nature of developing modern era aircrafts, parallel capacity building efforts in private sector R&D and 
manufacturing infrastructure sustains the other half of the pillar sustaining the sectoral innovation 
system.  
 The early history of the country’s aircraft manufacturing effort show that the sector did not go 
through adequate developmental phases geared towards building foundational industrial capacities. The 
Aircraft Manufacturing Law that administered in-country aircraft production of certain types, was not 
structured to support technological progression, but was structured to simply execute air traffic control. 
The country was basically an aid-recipient economy, not capable of self-governing a national science 
and technology program, in which almost no administrative authorities existed that can supervise and 
execute such activities. Just like other countries with a sizeable aircraft manufacturing sector, the 
military was the only organization capable of establishing a manufacturing structure in the earliest 
stages of the Korean aircraft sector. Apparently, the catch-up pattern of the country’s technical 
foundation pursued a general trend of building indigenous technical capacities through repair and 
overhaul work of foreign introduced equipment and technologies. At this stage, the technical assistance 
provided through foreign aid, primarily from the U.S. military, constituted the groundwork of building 
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sector specific innovation capacities, but it was also a source of obstruction as the USG authorities 
disapproved and discouraged further development of non-standard indigenous aircrafts. At the national 
level, there was no systematic government support to nurture a manufacturing base in a scale 
commensurate to an industry level, of which most efforts focused on crafting a small cadre of 
technicians that were capable of performing routine maintenance work for the military. Although there 
was the Defense Science Laboratory at the Ministry level serving as the overarching entity for defense 
science research, there was no centralized authority from this echelon supervising or supporting the 
aircraft development of the Air Force and Navy maintenance units, in which most of the indigenously 
manufactured aircrafts were simply a product of assembly work from parts and pieces of disposed 
aircrafts spontaneously grown out from individual workshops. The motivation to establish a domestic 
technical workforce at this time was initiated by national security concerns instead of market forces. 
Therefore the technological spinoff was constrained to serving military purposes only with minimal 
trickle-down effects to the private sector. The technical base was built-up by a few pioneering 
individuals such as several officers with engineering backgrounds sponsored under wartime military 
leadership. There were also some surprising events where a nascent form of assembly work resulted in 
the creation of new functioning aircraft types, but these events never translated into industrial build-ups 
or a full-fledged production of aircrafts. 
Proceeding into the golden ages of aircraft manufacturing during the late 70s and mid-80s, the 
institutional construct for capacity building in the aircraft-manufacturing sector strived to connect key 
players in R&D, industry, and military end users. However, there have been regrets over the 
effectiveness of building these institutional capacities in terms of observing actual policy enforcements 
and assessing real performance outcomes. Deregulated competition policy introduced new entrants into 
the sector, but did not produce the desired outcomes in terms of industrial upgrading and firm capacity 
building. Receding government influence in the market, signified by unregulated industrial competition 
over a finite share of the market, resulted in excessive business expansion that led to tremendous 
corporate losses while inducing limited contribution to building firm level competency. The industry 
was restructured into a highly monopolized structure where a single firm, KAI, has become the center 
of all development efforts whereby supported by a supply chain assisted by international forerunners 
such as Lockheed Martin and Eurocopter. In the late 80s and into the new millennium, throughout the 
intricate collaboration over a number of defense programs, the defense acquisition and national 
industrial apparatus endeavored to overcome the technological insufficiencies and resource shortages 
confronted in the Surion Utility Helicopter and the T-50 Advanced Trainer. Despite the efforts 
committed in the multiple phases of capacity building, the technological readiness levels and sectoral 
competitiveness in aircraft-manufacturing still have a long way to go before standing in par with first-
tiered aerospace contenders. The critical reason for such shortfalls in capacities relates with the 
impending threat perception in national security where it makes it difficult to assure long gestation 
periods in R&D returns regarding force improvement programs. Thus a number of development 
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programs were hastily conducted and relied heavily on foreign technological assistance. The structural 
restraints are highlighted in the below sections. 
 
Dysfunctional Coordinating Mechanisms: Interagency Coordination Processes and R&D networks 
 Under the logical reasoning of national innovation systems, institutional networks are 
considered the most significant factor that interconnect a country’s vibrant economic growth engine, 
represented through the critical linkages between R&D arrangements, production systems, and market 
dynamics. A country’s S&T governance structure draws together the anchor tenets between the strategic 
components of the innovation architecture. Having this in mind, Korea’s national S&T governance 
structure experiences systemic challenges in interagency coordination as the lead authority in R&D 
efforts transitioned from state controlled to industry dominated compositions. In this matter, vertically 
aligned bureaucratic stovepipes that used to stimulate economic growth during the era of fast followers 
have become troublesome in cooperative R&D programs with interagency and international partners, 
in some cases turning into severe roadblocks against technology diffusion and innovation. The critical 
disconnect between the defense R&D and the national S&T arrangement delineates the wretched reality 
of inadequate national level coordination.  
 Despite the fact of belatedly acknowledging the decoupled situation and thus incorporating the 
defense sector into the National Science and Technology Commission settlement, the integration into 
the planning and execution phase still has not fully taken place to date because of these prevalent 
barricades dividing the anchor tenets of potential innovation opportunities. In the aircraft-manufacturing 
sector, both driven by public and private sector development initiatives, the Aerospace Industry 
Development Policy Council (AIDPC) served as the forum with high expectations of bolstering 
interagency coordination and efficiently allocating vital resources to the sectoral subdivisions. However, 
the Council did not sufficiently grow its functional trustworthiness until the Asian Financial Crisis when 
the economic shockwaves obliterated the domestic aircraft-manufacturing sector. Before the Crisis, the 
Council was incapable of mitigating organizational differences, preventing inconsistent program 
decisions, and controlling distorted market forces from aggravating sectoral competitiveness. For 
instance, the Council could not adequately address the different objectives between the military and 
industrial authorities when planning and programming indigenous endeavors for building helicopters. 
In the case of major helicopter procurement programs, such as the UH-60P and Bo-105 license 
production, the military exerted no accounts over the industrial impacts of license production at all vis-
à-vis force requirements, despite the government’s prolonged declaration of exploiting these two 
defense acquisition programs as a springboard to enhance the country’s aircraft-manufacturing sector.910 
Industrial authorities had high anticipations of the potential spinoffs from these development programs, 
but these aspirations did not translate into the military’s required operational capability. The disparity 
                                                          
910 Defense Acquisition Program Administration Update to the National Assembly on Rotor-Wing Force Structure and 
Development Programs, July 2006. 
 331 
and insufficient coordinating relationship between the two cabinet ministries, compounded by the 
inability of the existing interagency coordination venues such as the AIDPC, resulted in low levels of 
component localization and marginal sectoral impacts on boosting technology competitiveness. 
 
State-Business Relations: Ill-fated Industrial Competition Policies amid Receding Government 
Influences, Increasing Private Sector Interests, and Distortive Market Forces. 
In the mid-1980s, during the de-regulation phases of the aircraft-manufacturing sector, the 
Korean government failed to effectively regulate and control cutthroat corporate competitions between 
the four major Chaebol firms. Recognizing receding state influence against market forces mashed in 
sectoral development policies, the government lifted strong protection barriers over existing aircraft-
manufacturing firms and prematurely allowed more competition in the market before firms built 
sufficient engineering and manufacturing competencies regarding technological foundations and capital 
resources. The streamlined functional specialties earlier designated by the defense acquisition 
authorities in the early 1980s, at which designated Korean Air for engineering and manufacturing 
overall aircraft systems, and Samsung Aerospace for jet engine and propulsion systems, became 
nullified after permitting Daewoo and Hyundai into the finite domestic market space. Thus, without 
expanding the boundaries of domestic market demand in military aircrafts, the four chaebol firms 
plunged into a dumping war against each other with no prospects of technology accumulation and 
industrial upgrading. 
The government decision making behavior in industrial competition policies, not only in 
aircraft manufacturing but in the overall industrial sectors in general, became a primary source of the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. The industry structure after the 1997 Crisis still remains unresolved, at 
which the government controlled Korea Aerospace Industries and chaebol-run Korean Air continue to 
compete over a limited share of the domestic market. In a similar sense, regional innovation clusters 
compete over politics instead of technologically and economically optimized solutions. The piecemeal 
approach and unnecessary competition among local governments in hosting MRO businesses within its 
electoral constituencies raise concerns over the potentials of revisiting the pre-1997 government 
industrial policy on aircraft-manufacturing where ineffective government mitigation and adjudication 
efforts, overwhelmed by excessively ambitious corporate interests, eventually resulted in business 
failures and bankruptcies. 
 
Cancellations and Manipulations: Delayed and Discontinued Development Projects 
Innovation closes in incrementally, especially for capital intensive high technology sectors such 
as aerospace. Long gestation periods of mastering sophisticated technology and manufacturing 
processes takes a proponent up to high performing competitive levels in the international market. Thus, 
accumulated knowledge and experiences is greatly respected for sustaining the incremental innovation 
patterns in the sector. Whatsoever, defense acquisition authorities have continued to delay and 
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discontinue critical aircraft development programs, and sometimes cancelled the entire development 
scheme in exchange of foreign substituting platforms.  
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the government abolished the initial competition 
structure of the aircraft-manufacturing sector dissected between Korean Air and Samsung Aerospace, 
and opened the playing ground to institute further competition among Chaebol firms without 
contemplating a coherent plan to nurture firm capacities and sectoral competence in technology and 
program management. Passive and narrow sighted commitments of Chaebol firms towards building 
sector specific R&D capacities and program management skills for aircraft-manufacturing resulted in 
mediocre performances comparative to other business fields. Considering the long incubation period 
for building modern aircrafts, in which the product life cycle extends into almost two to three decades, 
maintaining a certain pace in production without intermittent gaps between programs is imperative for 
sustaining technology readiness standards and workforce professionalism in both systems engineering 
and program management strengths. However, force improvement programs in aircrafts, administered 
by the defense acquisition authorities, have frequently left behind intermittent gaps in terms of R&D 
and production. The 6-year rift between the UH-60 license production and KUH-Surion development, 
substantial reduction of Bo-105 co-production from 147 helicopters to 12, disconnection between the 
KF-5E/F license production and KF-16 production, and sudden cancellation of the F-4 Phantom shelf 
life extension programs, all represent the discontinuities and lost opportunities in maintaining and 
sustaining a critical mass for sector specific workforce and manufacturing workloads.  
 
Workshop Level Efforts 
System upgrading processes allows the workshop level to mature the requisite technology and 
necessitates the incorporation of up-to-date novel technology through new system integration efforts. 
The process not only places respective weapon systems into the most modernized fashion possible, but 
also sustains the production base that withholds critical manpower. As discussed in chapter two, the 
general development path of aircraft-manufacturing spans within a sequentially phased framework of 
depot level repair works → license production with foreign assistance/component fabrication → system 
co-production → system design and manufacture. Regarding the long life cycle of an aircraft product, 
shelf life extension programs through system upgrade and airframe reinforcement work is considered 
an indispensable experience for late entrants in aircraft manufacturing in order to build sector specific 
capacities in system design and manufacturing work.  
The B-52 Stratofortress Bomber of the U.S. Air Force represents the impact and effectiveness 
of continued upgrading efforts extending throughout decades. After its first rollout in 1954, the aircraft 
went through multiple stages of system upgrades and overhaul work, which still enables the B-52 to 
serve as a primary bomber capability in the U.S. Air Force air fleet. With the current defense build-up 
plan, the B-52 Stratofortress will continue to see service until well into the late 2040s, which makes 
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some of the earlier airframes almost a 100 year design.911 In the case of the international best seller F-
16 fighter, ever since its first rollout in the late 1970s, the aircraft went through nearly 9 stages of system 
improvement efforts that include block upgrades (from variant 10 to 70), Shelf Life Extension Programs 
(SLEP), modifications tailored for customer needs, and various other re-engineering work.912 In the 
case of the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, the product has gone through three iterations of system 
improvement since its first deployment in 1980. The US Army has plans for three more upgrade 
programs for the tank in the coming end of this decade, including the recently launched Modular Active 
Protection System Program.913 In the case of the Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector, or the defense 
industry in general, system upgrade efforts are almost nonexistent. Korea’s international bestselling 
weapon product, the K-9 Self-Propelled Howitzer, has not gone through a single session for system 
upgrade since its initial operational capability in 1989. The system upgrade programs planned for the 
F-4 Phantom-II and F-5 E/F Freedom Fighter were cancelled in order to divert the resources to other 
weapon systems programs. Consequently, the cancellation of these programs abolished the opportunity 
of enhancing the standing TRL and MRL (manufacturing readiness level) to higher standards. Still, the 
upgraded variants of the KT-1 basic trainer to the KA-1 light attacker, the T-50 advanced trainer to the 
FA-50 light combat aircraft, and the derivative versions of the KUH-Surion into maritime and medevac 
support mission platforms signifies the growth potentials in relations to the evolutionary efforts of 
system upgrades. Further upgrading of these systems, in a sense of extending product life cycles and 
improving performance in the coming days of necessary shelf life extension efforts regarding airframe 
reinforcements and avionics advancement works, is a matter of critical interest for relevant stakeholders. 
The limits of state-led system development programs also make matters challenging for 
building sustained capacities in the aircraft-manufacturing sector. Vertical stovepipes and interagency 
bureaucracies make it difficult to initiate system upgrading efforts for programs with relatively short 
life cycles, such as in avionics. The quality and performance of modern aircrafts highly depends on the 
efficiency figures of the electronic modules integrated into the system. There is a critical linkage in 
avionics with commercial off the shelf technology since most of the technological sources originate 
from commercial information and communication technology (ICT), in which the public sector falls far 
behind in technological perfection compared to the private sector. Means of sensors and networks for 
precision strike capabilities, wireless data transmission and communication for command and control 
systems, integrated support systems between the battlefield engagement zones and rear area command 
centers in the course of sharing a common operational picture all rely on established ICT 
infrastructures.914 The vibrant development pace of the commercial IT sector rapidly progresses, such 
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that it becomes a matter of time for a novel product becoming obsolete. In order to respond to the 
changing market conditions, the introduction of an agile development system in the aerospace and 
defense sector is imperative for nurturing competitiveness and maintaining the manufacturing capacities 
in this domain. However, it seems to be a far achievable goal for state-led ICT development programs 
to obtain the expected level of agility in this regard. For instance, the Tactical Information 
Communication Network (TICN) shows the slow pace of public sector R&D performances, and also 
represents the case where regulatory restraints discourage evolutionary adaptations of advanced 
technologies.  
 
International Technology Restrictions and Excessive Reliance on Foreign Sources 
 Restraints in international technology transfers originate from the intent of creating higher 
barriers for new entrants into the market while protecting the competitive advantage of the incumbent 
in the global market. The global aerospace and defense sector is already saturated with fluctuating 
market demands in the military and commercial sectors. In the extended aspects of discouraging fast 
followers in this field, high technological military specifications vying for attaining technological 
prowess in maintaining regional and global hegemony resulted in imposing stronger institutional 
restrictions on the flow of technology transfers and intellectual property rights.  
 High dependence on international sources has constantly presented constraints on indigenous 
efforts of capacity building for catch-up economies. As covered in earlier chapters, Korea has been 
overly reliant on foreign products and systems, especially in its aviation sector. Airframes, propulsion, 
transmissions, avionics and sensors, armaments, and so forth, all have strong dependence on the 
technological assistances provided by foreign partners. During the early sequentially phased 
developmental periods of firm capacity and national competitiveness, collaborations with international 
forerunners in the sector was an indispensable for later starters. In a highly complex technological 
domain like aerospace, international norms and regulations inhibit the entrance of new contenders in 
the field. Especially, the development and manufacturing technology of complex product system 
requires long gestation periods in learning and improvement in design and manufacturing skills, at 
which indispensable know-how and technology are mostly passed down tacitly in the workshop level. 
The technology transfer process of the KUH-Surion between the KHP design center engineers and 
Eurocopter technicians supports this case in a cultural sense, where Eurocopter corporate headquarters 
expressed strong reluctance in further transferring critical design technology during the concept 
development process. As a result, the KUH-Surion is generally evaluated as a physically reduced 
version of the Eurocopter Super Puma configuration. In a more institutional sense, however, restrictions 
imposed through technology security regimes also prevented the indigenous efforts of capacity building 
and knowledge accumulation. Technology security regimes, imposed in the U.S. export control system, 
have controlled the flow of proprietary rights from entity to entity when in need to share the respective 
technological item. All technology transfer processes had to obtain pre-approval from the U.S. 
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Department of State and remain in constant monitoring by technology security authorities. Simple 
modification requirements such as cockpit reconfiguration work had to obtain U.S. Government 
approval. In this regard, system modification or upgrading requirements under indigenous efforts were 
restrained by the imposed technology security regime. 
The receding government influence in the defense industrial sector was associated with 
diminished assistances in financial support and contract awards. The deregulation process abandoned 
the protective designation incentives of certain defense firms implemented by the previous 
Specialization and Systematization Act, which further compelled the entire defense industrial base to 
enter into indefinite competition against each other. As such, more responsibility and authority has been 
given to the corporate sector. Lesser government influence and more competition have raised doubts on 
the prospects of building competitiveness and effectiveness, but is still a matter for continued 
observation as the domestic aerospace and defense sector constantly strives to secure a position within 
the country’s national innovation system. The 2014 selloff of Samsung Techwin and Samsung Thales 
from its holding company Samsung Electronics, the country’s foremost chaebol firm, symbolizes the 
dilemma confronted by the domestic defense industrial base regarding the future hope in this sector.915 
 The upper-tiered structure of the aircraft-manufacturing system still show overlaps in functions 
and responsibilities. The number of aeronautical programs sponsored under the two major aerospace 
and defense laboratory, ADD and KARI, require some streamlining efforts to enhance effectiveness and 
productivity in the R&D realm. The low popularity of aeronautical engineering departments at the 
university level should be more closely connected with government sponsored research programs 
awarded by the two aerospace related research institutes. These efforts shall be further exploited by the 
symbiotic relationship with the domestic manufacturing sector, represented by KAI and its 
subcontractors. Moreover, state sponsorship and networked collaboration with key proponents in the 
sector still remains as an integral component in aircraft manufacturing for late entrants in the sector 
such as Korea. 
 The Korean aircraft-manufacturing sector has incrementally followed the traditional 
development pathway when securing a foothold in the global market. Throughout the years of building 
sector specific capacity, aircraft manufacturing has proven the apparent limits of state led development 
processes in complex product systems, which not only associate sophisticated and interconnected 
technology products, but also international norms and regulations that sometime facilitate knowledge 
sharing efforts and technology transfer mechanisms, whereas also restrains further growth opportunities. 
Future development projects such as the indigenous Korea Fighter Experiment and the sector’s entry 
into commercial aircraft manufacturing will be a point of observation over the transformative aspects 
of innovation systems under the developmental states construct. 
 
                                                          
915 채우석, “삼성이 방위산업을 포기한 이유,” 뉴스타운경제, 2017.6.12. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The classic conundrum for sustaining a defense industrial sector relates with the pressing 
necessities of coping with impending national security threats. Especially, the perils of an immediate 
outbreak of war in the Korean Peninsula stresses the urgent need to deploy military force requirements 
in order to maintain the conventional balance in armaments between the two Koreas. That being said, 
military planners preferred short-to-midterm defense acquisition programs to rapidly introduce the 
required operational capabilities rather than a long-term commitment to indigenously build-up a self-
reliant capacity in domestic arms production. Such inclination to expeditiously marshal military 
capabilities collided with the value points prevalent in the hierarchies of other bureaucratic apparatus, 
which prioritized industrial development and prospective commercial opportunities. Due to the high 
reliance on government resources in aerospace and defense, the programming and execution of defense 
acquisition programs constitute the impetus of sustaining and improving the corporate sector into higher 
competitive grounds. Whatsoever, the differing value orientation between the military and industrial 
forces comprised the main reason for government indecisiveness in deliberating major aircraft 
development initiatives. In a program management perspective, such delay in government decision 
making compelled program management authorities to hastily proceed with the required R&D work 
and recklessly enter into contract awards in order to meet the condensed program timetable outlined for 
field deployment. In this regard, program authorities were unable to exert full commitment into 
incubating foundational capacities in the technology development phases of the respective program.  
Indiscreet control measures over emerging developmental risk factors constrained program authorities 
to rely inevitably on foreign sources, not only because of falling short in engineering and manufacturing 
skills, but also because of the preconditions to comply with major program milestones. 
 As observed in the major development programs, the program authorities did not productively 
utilize interagency competencies in system design and development. The planning and resourcing of 
major fixed wing and rotor wing development programs exclusively relied on the defense industrial 
sector without reaching out to the accumulated experiences of other public and private entities that 
obtained higher performance levels in managing complex product systems. Historically, major aircraft 
programs in the 80s and 90s, such as the HX series helicopters and KTX series trainer programs 
accounted for nearly billions of dollars in program execution budgets, in which entitled each program 
as the ‘Most Expensive National Development Program Since the Mythical Foundation of the 
Nation’.916 Despite the unprecedented resources entrusted into the aircraft-manufacturing sector, the 
supervising echelons over the national level S&T architecture was not adequately involved in the 
comprehensive process of the program. Thus, the domains of the national level innovation system were 
not effectively activated throughout the developmental aspects of domestic aircraft manufacturing 
endeavors. This is the most regretful part where the lack of a constructive coordinative mechanism, 
                                                          
916 The term is frequently catch phrased in Korean as ‘단군이래 최대 국책사업’. 
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which adjudicates imperative competencies and resources, consequently mars the prolific effects of 
innovative outcomes.  
 A critical linchpin considered for propelling this coordination mechanism is a professionalized 
workforce. Regardless of all the coordinative regimes and institutions established under the purview of 
government S&T initiatives with the stated purpose of revamping private-public partnership in various 
forms, the general performance of these venues was overall mediocre. An important strand of opinion 
raised by this author over such meager performance outcome extracts its roots from the poor 
professionalization levels of its workforce. In the days astride vast economic development and 
technology catch-up, simple abilities in machinery and consumer products was perhaps a requisite skill 
set for fast followers. Government coordination to build such capacities was comparatively accessible 
and easy to replicate. On the contrary, capacity building in developing complex product systems 
requires not only the most advanced level technology and capital support, but also extensive 
coordination efforts across relevant agencies and abounding pathways for accumulating knowledge and 
experiences. No matter how many regimes built for facilitating intra/interagency coordination processes, 
the catalyst for sustaining this effort is realized through a capable workforce that can adequately manage 
such complexities. Recent cases in international mergers and acquisition, where the principal agents 
strive to obtain requisite manpower in each respective areas of expertise, shows the significance of 
retaining a professional workforce. Recently, China has been aggressively recruiting talent around the 
globe in high-tech professions such as in semi-conductors, precision instruments, leading edge materials, 
and so forth. China has been recruiting top talent Chinese scholars in the S&T field residing overseas 
through the Thousand Talent Project, or The Recruitment Program of Global Experts, in order to 
enhance stronger technological competencies in major national innovation projects across various 
disciplines. China has also gained a notorious fame in snatching talented foreign engineers from 
competitor companies by luring high salaries and lucrative incentives. In the LCD panel business or 
semiconductor development, China has attracted the big wigs in major R&D projects from Korean firms 
with a so called 1-3-5 Deal (three times the annual salary over five years), or in some cases, offered a 
salary package nine times higher over a five-year period, including family support. Most of these high 
technology fields are those taught in university level classes and readily available through textbooks or 
public sources. However, it is the mastery of these technical subjects at the individual level that makes 
these tasks difficult to comprehend. Thus, in the high-technology field, fast followers must overcome 
the predicament of grasping the essentials of tacit knowledge against codified information.917 
 In the case of the aerospace and defense sector, the task becomes even more insurmountable. 
The vast system integration requirements of complex product systems strongly demand expert 
knowledge and skills in the program management side. Until the late 1980s, the U.S. defense industry 
constantly experienced program delays, system failures, cost increases, and so forth. A number of 
                                                          
917 남윤선 외, 반도체 전쟁: 4 차 산업혁명 시대 중국의 역습, 한국경제신문, 2017. 
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organizational insufficiencies and overlaps were identified in the weapon system development process. 
The sector turned into a large pit of cost overruns and excessive expenditures, represented by a case 
where a coffeepot purchase amounted $7,000 and hammer cost $400. These procedural insufficiencies 
were rampant across the board, which undermined key development projects of the military.918 In order 
to overcome the bureaucratic and managerial hiccups throughout the weapons development process, 
the White House launched the Packard Commission and initiated a major reform effort to efficiently 
manage the defense acquisition system by carrying out a full-scale restructuring process, instituting 
stronger government oversight, and promoting a professional workforce. The Commission identified 
the absence of a fine-tuned career pathway for the acquisition workforce, which lacked adequate 
training curriculums and structured career development and management planning. The Commission 
recommended the institution of an effective interactive mechanism between curriculum development 
and acquisition program management field activities in order to build a healthy training program that 
applied practical challenges confronted in the real-world. The launching of a reasonable career 
management pathway through the combination of training and post-training assignments enabled the 
workforce to accumulate knowledge and experience in the process of handling major defense 
programs.919 
 Unfortunately, neither of the Chinese aggressiveness in recruiting talent nor the U.S. 
determination in professionalizing its workforce is projected in the reality of Korea. Efficient 
coordinating mechanisms do not come fully enforced without the experts, specialized in each respective 
sectors, fully driving the steering wheel behind these initiatives. Experts are grown, not born, and the 
way how to home grow expertise is to acknowledge and respect the profession with a structured mindset 
and tenacious patience. An organization that rotates assignments every two-three years over subject 
areas irrelevant to each other, without instating a work development plan connected to one’s education 
and training endeavors, in the absence of a visionary career path considered translucent and promising, 
would apparently obstruct the seamless accumulation of knowledge and experiences, which serves as a 
prerequisite for bolstering competitiveness. Government policies always tend to capture these rhetoric 
in language, but it is in the detailed implementation phases where the actual execution of these initiatives 
requires a structured and patient approach. The Defense Acquisition Improvement Group in 2005, the 
preliminary commission in preparation of major structural defense acquisition reform, clearly stipulated 
the need to build a professional workforce in the newly legislated Defense Acquisition Program Act. 
However, the actual implementation of the stipulation still remains inactive even at the time of this 
publication. 
 
  
                                                          
918 David. S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics, Praeger, 1990, p. 57. 
919 Evelyn Layton, The Defense Acquisition University: Training Professionals for the Acquisition Workforce 1992-2003, 
Defense Acquisition University Press, 2000, p. 60. 
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